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Abstract 
 
Bodily Sensation in Contemporary Extreme Horror Film provides a theory of 
horror film spectatorship rooted in the physiology of the viewer. In a novel 
contribution to the field of film studies research, it seeks to integrate contemporary 
scientific theories of mind with psychological paradigms of film interpretation. 
Proceeding from a connectionist model of brain function that proposes psychological 
processes are underpinned by neurology, this thesis contends that whilst conscious 
engagement with film often appears to be driven by psychosocial conditions – 
including cultural influence, gender dynamics and social situation – it is physiology 
and bodily sensation that provide the infrastructure upon which this superstructure 
rests. Drawing upon the philosophical works of George Lakoff, Mark Johnson and 
Alain Berthoz, the argument concentrates upon explicating the specific bodily 
sensations and experiences that contribute to the creation of implicit structures of 
understanding, or embodied schemata, that we apply to the world round us. 
 
Integrating philosophy with contemporary neurological research in the spheres 
of cognition and neurocinematics, a number of correspondences are drawn between 
physiological states and the concomitant psychological states often perceived to arise 
simultaneously alongside them. The thesis offers detailed analysis of a selection of 
extreme horror films that, it is contended, conscientiously incorporate the body of the 
viewer in the process of spectatorship through manipulation of visual, auditory, 
vestibular, gustatory and nociceptive sensory stimulations, simulations and the 
embodied schemata that arise from everyday physiological experience. The 
phenomenological film criticism of Vivian Sobchack and Laura U. Marks is adopted 
and expanded upon in order to suggest that the organicity of the human body guides 
and structures the psychosocial engagement with, and interpretation of, contemporary 
extreme horror film. This project thus exposes the body as the architectural 
foundation upon which conscious interaction with film texts occurs. 
 
Keywords: phenomenology, experientialism, neuroanatomy, neurocinematics, 
extreme horror film, cognitivist film theory, connectionism, psychoanalysis.
  
 
Acknowledgements 
 
 I would like to thank my supervisor, Dr Brian Jarvis, for his invaluable advice 
and guidance during this project. His detailed feedback has undoubtedly resulted in a 
considerably more refined critical balance between the scientific, philosophical and 
film studies paradigms that underpin this thesis. 
 
 I am also indebted to my sister, Josie Downes, and her encyclopaedic 
zoological knowledge. It is under her tutelage that the relationship between science 
and cultural studies first came to my attention and I thank her unreservedly for 
assisting me in finding the source texts and physiological studies that have informed 
my critical stance. 
 
 Finally, I would like to thank my mother, Chris Downes, for allowing me the 
opportunity to return to university as a mature student and supporting me through 
eight years of higher education. 
  
 
 
Contents   
List of Figures vi 
Introduction – Body-Horror 3 
Chapter 1 – Re-Vision, The Eye and The Body 44 
Chapter 2 – Vestibular Manipulation in The Collector (2009) and The 
Descent (2005) 86 
Chapter 3 – From the Haptic to the Somatic: The Human Centipede 
(2009) and The Human Centipede 2 (2011) 134 
Chapter 4 – Pain: Feeling the Extreme in Martyrs (2008) and The Bunny 
Game (2010) 184 
Conclusion – Once More, With Feeling 234 
Filmography 257 
Bibliography 259 
 
  
 
List of Figures 
 
1.1 Norman Bates’ Optical Fascination in Psycho (1960) 47 
1.2 Still of the Found Footage from Gut (2012) 52 
1.3 Visual Fetishisation of Protagonist Dan 54 
1.4 Videodrome (1983) and Gut (2012) 59 
1.5 Colour Alterations in The Poughkeepsie Tapes (2007) 68 
1.6 Visual Distortion of the Close-up, The Poughkeepsie Tapes  69 
1.7 Digitally Manipulated Vignette Scenes, House of 1,000 Corpses 
(2003) 
77 
1.8 ‘I Remember You’ Segment, House of 1,000 Corpses 79 
2.1 Metaphor of Balance 96 
2.2 John Carpenter’s Halloween (1978) 97 
2.3 Rob Zombie’s Halloween (2007) 98 
2.4 Rule of Thirds 99 
2.5 The Collector (2009) 102 
2.6 Spider’s Descent, The Collector 105 
2.7 Bilateral Symmetry and Vertical Bias as an Outer Representation 
of the Human Body, The Collector 
108 
2.8 Visual and Directional Balance, The Collector 110 
2.9 Camera Roll Through the Transverse and Sagittal Planes, The 
Collector 
111 
2.10 Gravitational Manipulation, The Collector 114 
2.11 Diagonal Preference and Character Centrality, The Descent (2005) 120 
2.12 Visual Balance and Audio-Visual Redirection, The Descent  123 
2.13 Off-Centre Positioning of Human Figures Underground, The 
Descent  
126 
2.14 Tunnel Collapse with Steeply Angled Perspective, The Descent 129 
2.15 Perfect Diagonal Through the Centre of the Frame, The Descent 130 
3.1 Dr. Jospeh Heiter (Dieter Laser), The Human Centipede (2009) 144 
3.2 Horizontal Bias in Opening Scenes, The Human Centipede 146 
3.3 Heiter’s Basement, The Human Centipede 155 
3.4 The House, The Human Centipede 156 
  
ii 
3.5 Directional Gazing, The Human Centipede 158 
3.6 Facial Wounds and Directional Gazing, The Human Centipede 167 
3.7 Martin Lomax, The Human Centipede 2 (2011) 171 
3.8 Martin’s Centipede, The Human Centipede 2 174 
4.1 Opening Scene of Pascal Laugier’s Martyrs (2008) 188 
4.2 The Creature Reaches for Lucie (top) While Anna Sees Self Harm 
(bottom), Martyrs 
204 
4.3 Progression of Lighting Changes, Martyrs 210 
4.4 Adam Rehmeier’s The Bunny Game (2010) 217 
4.5 Visual Contrast and Overstimulation Mirrors Bunny’s Painful 
Experience, The Bunny Game 
222 
4.6 Bunny’s Torture Montage, The Bunny Game 223 
4.7 The Eponymous Bunny Game 225 
4.8 Meir Zarchi’s I Spit On Your Grave (1978) 228 
4.9 Zarchi’s I Spit On Your Grave (L), Monroe’s I Spit On Your Grave 
(M), Rehmeier’s The Bunny Game (R) 
230 
5.1 Composition of the Viewing Experience 250 
  
iii 
 
Introduction – Body-Horror 
 
‘Our eyes are one of those vulnerable chinks in the armor, one of those places where we can be had 
[…] Like our other facial equipment, eyes are something we all have in common […] But to the best of 
my knowledge, no horror movie has ever been made about a nose out of control, and while there has 
never been a film called The Crawling Ear, there was one called The Crawling Eye.’  
Stephen King, Danse Macabre (1981)1 
 
According to Stephen King – who ought to know – the horror genre holds a 
special regard for the human eye. Our eyes enable so much of our existence; when 
they function correctly they lead and guide our progress through the phenomenal 
world and we understand that they are to be protected. An attack upon the eye 
generates a primeval kind of terror that threatens the very existence of the victim. 
Horror begins with the eyes. There is, however, much anecdotal evidence to suggest 
that bodily engagement with horror cinema does not end with our optical organs. 
There have been repeated media reports and urban legends detailing the extreme 
bodily reactions of horror spectators. From the ‘fainting, vomiting and heart attacks’ 
provoked by The Exorcist (1973) to the ‘stomach-quivering, skin-crawling, bathroom-
dashing’ sickness prompted by The Blair Witch Project (1999) with its unstable hand-
held aesthetic.2 This genre can, it seems, promote an uncontrollably visceral reaction. 
Its effect does not end there, however, as intense ethical and political reactions are 
also instigated by the extreme content. The rise of home video equipment during the 
1980s saw horror titles proliferate, culminating in the demonisation of the ‘video 
nasty’ by The National Viewers and Listeners Association (NVLA).3 Ruggero 
Deodato’s Cannibal Holocaust (1980), Wes Craven’s The Last House on the Left 
(1972) and Meir Zarchi’s I Spit on Your Grave (1978), among others, were prosecuted 
under the Obscene Publications Act (1959) as morally reprehensible productions. 
Despite the subsequent reclassification of most of the banned films the link between 
visual fiction and real violence has proven enduring. Parts of the mass media often 
attribute the motivation for crimes to the viewing or playing of violent films and 
games. The murder of James Bulger was repeatedly associated with Tom Holland’s                                                         
1 Stephen King, Danse Macabre (New York: Gallery, 1981), pp. 202-3. 
2 BBFC, ‘The Exorcist: Case Study’, BBFC.co.uk (n.d.) <http://www.bbfc.co.uk/case-studies/exorcist> 
[accessed 16 July 2014] (para. 2 of 15); Emily Wax, ‘The Dizzy Spell of The Blair Witch Project’, 
Washington Post (30 July 1999) <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
srv/style/movies/features/witchdizzy.htm> [accessed 16 July 2014] (para. 1 of 22). 
3 BBFC, ‘Video Nasties’, BBFC.co.uk (2005) <available at: http://www.bbfc.co.uk/education-
resources/education-news/video-nasties> [accessed 20 August 2014] (para. 4 of 8). 
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Child’s Play (1988) in which protagonist Chucky ‘abducts the youngest [military] 
cadet and tries to kill him under the wheels of a fairground ghost train’.4 Similarly, 
Daniel Gonzalez murdered several people whilst claiming schizophrenic 
hallucinations were commanding him to behave like Freddy Krueger. The media 
reported that ‘Gonzalez's childish fascination with horror films […] briefly [gave] 
him the newspaper headlines he craved’ thus intimating that violent horror film 
somehow prompted or motivated the heinous acts.5 It seems that horror films have a 
multiple-aspect effect upon their viewers, enacting a triangulation of physiological, 
affective and intellectual responses. Horror film interacts with the viewer across a 
spectrum of engagement that incorporates biological, psychological and sociological 
factors. 
 
 This thesis will explore the construction of the viewing experience as a 
synthesis of physiological and psychosocial determinants. It will be contended that 
whilst conscious engagement with film often appears to be driven by psychosocial 
conditions – including cultural influence, gender dynamics and social situation – it is 
physiology and bodily sensation that provide the infrastructure upon which this 
superstructure rests. The argument set forth will, therefore, concentrate on 
highlighting the specific bodily sensations and experiences that contribute to the 
creation of implicit structures of understanding, or ‘embodied schemata’, that we 
apply to the world round us.6 A number of correspondences will be drawn between 
physiological states and the concomitant psychological states often perceived to arise                                                         
4 Paul Bracchi, ‘The Police Were Sure James Bulger’s Ten-Year-Old Killers Were Simply Wicked. But 
Should Their Parents Have Been in the Dock?’, Mail Online (13 March 2010) 
<http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1257614/The-police-sure-James-Bulgers-year-old-killers-
simply-wicked-But-parents-dock.html> [accessed 20 August 2014] (para. 55 of 66). 
5 Joe Boyle, ‘Craving of Horror Film Murderer’, BBC News (16 March 2006) 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/4802628.stm> [accessed 20 August 2014] (para. 23 of 23). 
6 Mark Johnson, The Body in The Mind (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), p. 21. The plural 
pronouns ‘us’ and ‘we’ are employed throughout this thesis to indicate the category ‘human’. The 
emphasis of this enquiry is placed upon the material conditions of embodiment – having a body of a 
specific sort – and it is maintained that, despite differences in gender, race, age, culture, sexuality and 
physical disability the human body is relatively homogenous at the level of its biophysiology. That is, 
all human beings have a centralised and cephalised central nervous system; a globally linked peripheral 
nervous system; a brain with the same basic capacities of function (i.e. all brains operate via neurons 
that conduct electrical impulses between cells); and, an inner biology that is principally adapted to 
directional bipedal locomotion (irrespective of the individual’s ability to achieve bipedal locomotion). 
The socioculturally influenced ways in which we conceptualise the body are not the primary focus of 
this thesis as it seeks to highlight the universally shared conditions of embodiment: every human has 
the same basic body, at the cellular biological level and it is this embodiment that influences the 
experiences of bodily sensation discussed in this thesis. 
  
3 
simultaneously alongside them. This is not, it must be underlined, an attempt to 
reduce psychological or emotive states to physiology but rather the imperative here is 
to instate physiological influence into the constitution of the psychological 
phenomenon of film interpretation through the integration of neuroscientific and 
neurocinematic principles with conventional film theory. It is the intent of this thesis 
to redress the paradigmatic film spectator – implicitly caricatured in some branches of 
film theory as a disembodied mind and a pair of eyes – as a distinctly corporeal, 
unified organism. In order to illustrate the ways in which bodily sensation can be 
inscribed in contemporary cinema, I will provide detailed analysis of a range of 
extreme horror films selected, in part, for their own sustained preoccupation with the 
human body. It will be proposed that extreme body horror, both in terms of its content 
and formal properties, underscores and enables the embodiment of the spectator more 
forcefully, and unavoidably, than any other genre.  
 
 This approach is predicated upon a critical recognition of the materiality of the 
human body as it drives and shapes the psychology of the individual and the ways in 
which they interact with their environment. The danger inherent in such an approach, 
of course, is that one subscribes to a crude biological determinism which occludes the 
import of sophisticated psychological processes with a simplified emphasis upon the 
physical. Needless to say, this thesis will aim at all times to eschew a hierarchical 
privileging of biology over psychology but its animating principle is that such a 
hierarchy exists – in reverse – in film theory with the body repeatedly subjugated by a 
myopic concentration on the mind. This devalorisation ignores the crucial role that the 
body and sensory experience play in determining the experiences of the individual. 
The relative inflexibility of the body’s macro-form must influence, guide and shape 
both the type of experience we can have and the ways in which we are subsequently 
able to interpret those experiences and create coherences from them. In the same way 
that buildings need material foundations from which they obtain structure and 
reinforcement, so too does the meaning-making subject require foundations. The 
architectural basis of the individual is the body and horror film theory must, like Dr. 
Frankenstein, bring the body back to life. 
 
 The remainder of this introductory chapter will explicate the ways in which 
the existing wealth of horror film scholarship can be augmented – mutated perhaps – 
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by a broader consideration of the influence of the physiological body upon the 
operations of the conscious mind. It will begin by surveying the contemporary 
extreme horror film, its cultural mythology, affects and effects in order to suggest that 
this subgenre is the pinnacle of inter- and extra-diegetic embodiment. It will 
subsequently engage with the enduring – and arguably dominant – critical paradigm 
of psychoanalysis, and suggest that, whilst such critiques are rightly influential, they 
are missing a conceptual spoke from their foremost wheel. It will be proposed that the 
very roots of a psychoanalytic approach must be indelibly planted in the material 
body; and, indeed, that much psychoanalytic engagement with horror is, in fact, 
uprooted from this basis by an incremental focus upon the psychosocial facets of 
personhood. It will be suggested that scientific advances in sensory neurology can 
help to elucidate the ways in which psychology is irrecoverably underpinned by 
physiology. To this end, the connectionist model of brain function will be explored in 
order to propose that material experience – including the sensory experiences of the 
human body – inescapably and intimately generates the conditions for consciousness. 
Consciousness is, therefore, an emergent property of the organic existence of the 
human animal. Thus, the objects of consciousness – including the psychoanalytic 
realms of the Imaginary and Symbolic in which the interpretation of films is alleged 
to take place – are inscrutably constituted from a collective of sociocultural, 
psychological and physiological factors. Finally, the psychoanalytic and scientific 
discourses will be synthesised and reintegrated with one another as the physiological 
foundations of psychosocial theory are excavated. In so doing, an epigenetic 
framework capable of illuminating the implicit embodied structures of human 
experience and psychosocial understanding will emerge, primed and able to address 
the embodied contemporary extreme horror film. 
 
Why Horror? 
 
 Horror, one hardly needs mention, has a longstanding fascination with the 
human body. It is arguably the most embodied of cinematic genres both in terms of 
filmic content and the somatic responses of the spectator. The very name of the genre 
implies its ultimate aim of generating an intense negative affect that is not principally 
limited to either the corporeal or the psychological. While the dominant use and 
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understanding of the word has been and remains a painful emotion compounded of 
loathing and fear, its supplementary, and for the most part historical, meanings 
incorporate additional concepts. From the 1300s ‘horror’ denoted roughness or 
ruggedness and by the 1600s it had become associated specifically with nausea. Such 
roughness was transmuted into a rippling or ruffling of the surface by the 1700s, 
while medical definitions from the 1500s associate the term with a shuddering or a 
shivering more in line with its Latin etymology, horrēre, meaning to bristle. 
Etymologically, thus, horror has tangible links with texture, with taste, bodily 
functions (nausea, shivering), with the notion of intrusion or disturbance to a surface 
and with the skin and hair that it causes to bristle.7   
 
 Critical responses to horror film, however, tend to take the physiological 
nature of the genre as a given and, as a result, succeed in marginalising the physical in 
favour of what it represents symbolically. Carol Clover, for example, quite rightly 
points out that ‘horror privileges eyes because, more crucially than any other kind of 
cinema, it is about eyes. More particularly it is about eyes watching horror’.8 Clover’s 
reduction presents the viewer of horror as constituted primarily if not exclusively by 
their eyes. This is perhaps justifiable: sight is our primary sense, after all, and the 
principal medium of transmission for film. The genre does display a preoccupation 
with eyes: from the literal attack upon the organ of sight in Umberto Lenzi’s Cannibal 
Ferox (1981) and Victor Salva’s Jeepers Creepers (2001), to the metaphorical attack 
on vision in Peeping Tom (1960) and The Eye (2008). Clover’s critical focus upon the 
dynamics of the cinematic look, together with the frequency of close-up shots of 
terrified eyes, situate vision (and the primacy of that sense) as a site of conflict within 
horror cinema. While the genre undoubtedly depicts eyes and vision in a metonymical 
fashion, drawing attention to the mechanisms of the medium and the propagation of 
the fascinated look that it produces through the mobilisation of that same look, to 
reduce the horror film viewer to their eyes is to perform a disservice to the sensorial 
range of the medium and the individual. The eyes are, after all, the sensory organ 
most intimately tied to the central nervous system of the human organism: ‘despite its                                                         
7 This type of embodied response to horror also shares salient features with a popular psychoanalytic 
theory that often finds application in the genre – Julia Kristeva’s abject. It is the more bodily, visceral 
reaction that distinguishes Kristeva’s abject from Sigmund Freud’s also-often cited uncanny. This 
bodily dimension of Kristeva’s theory, and its significance for this inquiry, will be elaborated on 
shortly. 
8 Carol Clover, Men, Women and Chain Saws (London: BFI, 1992), p. 167. 
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peripheral position, the retina […] is actually part of the central nervous system’ and, 
by virtue of its proximity, the eyes are often considered to be the fastest of the sensory 
organs to generate and adapt to perceptions.9 We do not disengage our eyes and mind 
from the remainder of our bodies when we watch a film and yet many critical 
accounts of horror appear to ignore, or only incidentally gesture towards, the totality 
of the viewer’s body. 
 
 Linda Badley’s study, Film, Horror and the Body Fantastic (1995), positions 
the body as the centrepiece of its critical focus but nevertheless demonstrates the 
difficulties of addressing the physiological within or alongside the psychosocial 
process of viewing film. Of 1980s horror, Badley writes that it ‘joined with other 
discourses of the body to provide a language for imagining the self in transformation, 
re-gendered, ungendered, and regenerated, or even as an absence or a lack’.10 While 
Badley seizes upon the fact that horror often explores the human body through its 
themes and motifs, already we sense the slippage between the organic entity and its 
sociocultural construction. Horror’s joining with other discourses, its reimagining of 
the self and the very notion of transformation indicate a body that is more conceptual 
than physiological. Enacting a move from the biological to the sociological, Badley’s 
discourse addresses the way in which the image of the body influences and shapes 
psychosocial concepts of the (biological) body. Indeed, she goes on to discuss the 
construction of the body as culturally mediated when she claims that medical and 
surgical culture leads us to feeling 
 
trapped in the bodies that increasingly determine who we are, 
projecting a negative or positive image, defining our neuroses as 
disorders and our rituals and relationships as addictions and 
codependencies. As gene therapies bring back the spectre of eugenics, 
our sense of identity and the human is undermined.11 
 
Contemporary consumer culture is saturated with images of bodies – a 
phantasmagoria of commodities, fashions, celebrities, and plastic surgery – that have                                                         
9 Dale Purves , G. J. Augustine, D. Fitzpatrick, et al., eds., Neuroscience, 2nd edition (Sunderland, MA: 
Sinauer Associates, 2001), p. 234. This perception, however, is flawed, as the senses of balance and 
hearing are typically as quick to respond to changes in stimuli as the eyes. Nevertheless, vision retains 
a heightened significance because of its import to our experience. 
10 Linda Badley, Film, Horror and the Body Fantastic (Westport: Greenwood, 1995), p. 3. 
11 Badley, p. 27. 
  
7 
become weapons of ideology. The body is used to sell products (clothes, makeup, 
personal hygiene), services (laser hair removal, teeth whitening) or an ideal (breast 
and penis augmentation, Botox injections). The mediated body surrounds us to the 
extent that there appears to be ‘an unlimited display of physicality in mass culture’.12 
Yet it is the body as a signifier, the body that is already socially coded, that surrounds 
us and it is this body that is most frequently the concern of horror film criticism. 
Paradoxically, however, it is the universality and the corporeal commonality of the 
physiological body that allows this mode of signification to exist. As Ted Polhemus 
argues, it is ‘because every individual in a society has a physical body and because 
the education of that body can begin from babyhood (if not before) [that] the body 
(that is the socialized body) is the fundamental and universal guide by which human 
beings understand that they are social beings’.13 I would like to extend Polhemus’ 
argument: it is because every individual has a physical body that they are aware that 
they are beings in the first place, before they realise that their body type is shared and 
that they are social beings. The fundamental importance of that physical body leaves 
it vulnerable to mobilisation for a purpose, whether that purpose is selling products or 
urging citizens to contribute to national defence. 
 
 The image of the body is held in place by multiple psychosocial structures of 
influence and control. When Badley claims that we are trapped in our bodies she is 
invoking the psychosocial body – the image that controls so much of our wants and 
needs – and not the physiological body. We are trapped by what we believe our 
bodies to be (incorporeal non-bodies subject to remanufacture by socioeconomic 
machinery). The discomfort with this psychosocial body that generates the feeling of 
being ‘trapped’ is based upon a fundamental tension between what we think we are or 
would like to be and what we actually are. Our concept of ‘the human’ has for 
centuries been focused upon sentience, higher order thinking and on the concept that 
the human being is unlike any other creature on the Earth. Medical advances, 
cosmetic surgery, celebrity culture, health culture, advertising, even the Internet, 
perpetuate the idea that the human – that most rational, thinking creature – should be 
able to transcend its form, to be whatever it wants to be. Increasingly, however,                                                         
12 Marzena Kubisz, Strategies of Resistance (Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 2003), p. 8. 
13 Ted Polhemus, ‘Social Bodies’, in The Body as A Medium of Expression, ed. by Jonathan Benthall 
and Ted Polhemus (New York: E.P. Dutton, 1975), pp. 13-35 (p. 31). 
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science and technology show us that this idea is a myth, that artificial augmentation 
solves none of the perceived problems of human physicality. Even if it were to 
partially solve them it would inevitably transmute the original ‘problem’ into a new 
one, thus propagating the never-ending cycle of desire-acquisition-new desire that 
structures the Western capitalist economy. Despite understanding the principles of 
cognition, for example, we are as yet unable to recreate sentience in an artificial 
intelligence. Despite great advances in medical science the biggest killers are the 
organic diseases of cancer and AIDs, for which we are yet to discover remedies. 
Concepts like eugenics haunt the human psyche because they remind us that our body 
is organic and that we are, fundamentally and to a large extent, shaped by our biology. 
We are ‘trapped’ but we need to be trapped. There is a remarkable degree of 
flexibility within the human body and mind, a flexibility that has been extended by 
the advances of science and medicine – gender reassignment surgery, for example, 
reconciles the individual with their ‘correct’ biological body, and injury and aging 
redefine the way one conceptualises their own body – but there is only a finite 
spectrum along which the body can be flexible. The type of biological limitations I 
am recognising here are the large-scale structural limitations: wings cannot be grafted 
onto a human body and a bird be produced; gills cannot be implanted into a human 
because of the extensive alterations to the vascular system that would need to be in 
place to support the aqueous exchange of oxygen without functioning lungs. We are 
hominid bodies and without hominid bodies we would not be ‘us’. What neuroscience 
is now leading us to is a vantage point from which we can explore what it means to be 
constituted and limited by our complex biology and how this can help us understand 
our own, often contradictory behaviour.  
 
Where horror has often been read as a reflection of social hierarchies and 
ideologies in contention, I would like to make the argument that the genre has always 
been principally concerned with the potentials and limitations of human embodiment. 
Contemporary horror, and particularly the extreme variant that portrays the very 
limits of physical suffering, is increasingly following neuroscience to its analytical 
vantage point in order to survey and analyse what it means to be embodied. In 
particular, the films addressed by this thesis form part of a brand of horror film that 
exhibits a visceral fascination with the body, embodiment and the limits of our 
organic existence in terms of both content and form. The films are grouped under the 
  
9 
tentative title of ‘contemporary extreme horror’ in an attempt to off-set the potentially 
pejorative connotations of other labels applied to similar films. Of these alternative 
labels, Hollywood ‘torture porn’ and Franco-European ‘new extremism’ have the 
most cogency for the current inquiry. It is important, therefore, to explicate the 
similarities and differences between these labels in order to define the subgenre of 
horror film addressed by this thesis. 
 
 James Quandt coined the term ‘New French Extremism’ in response to a wave 
of horror film that emerged during the early twenty first century. Grouping films 
including Gaspar Noé’s Irréversible (2002) and Alexandre Aja’s Haute Tension 
(2003; also known as Switchblade Romance) together as paradigmatic examples, he 
argues that the new extremist aesthetic is characterised by 
 
a cinema suddenly determined to break every taboo, to wade in rivers 
of viscera and spumes of sperm, to fill each frame with flesh, nubile or 
gnarled, and subject it to all manner of penetration, mutilation and 
defilement.14 
  
Drawing together the moral implications of the taboo, the pornographic connotations 
of sperm, nubile flesh and penetration, with what is implicated to be an excess of 
bodily violence, Quandt’s label bears a remarkable resemblance to David Edelstein’s 
coinage of ‘torture porn’. Devised two years following Quandt’s assessment of 
French cinema, Edelstein’s moniker was applied to a batch of Hollywood films whose 
narrative centred upon ‘explicit scenes of torture and mutilation’.15 Listing Saw 
(2004), Hostel (2005), and The Devil’s Rejects (2005) amongst his examples, 
Edelstein focused upon what he views as the inherent sadism in viewing scenes of 
explicit violence. Whilst both classifications exhibit a preternatural fascination with 
graphic violence and both intimate the relationship between horror and pornography, 
subsequent development of the terms has led to a disparity in their application. For                                                         
14 James Quandt, ‘Flesh and Blood: Sex and Violence in Recent French Cinema’, in The New 
Extremism in Cinema: From France to Europe, ed., by Tanya Horeck and Tina Kendall (Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press, 2013), pp. 18-26 (p. 19). Written in 2004, Quandt’s article predates Pascal 
Laugier’s Martyrs (2008). In an Afterword written in 2011, however, Quandt includes Laugier’s film 
in his New French Extremism classification. 
15 David Edelstein, ‘Now Playing at Your Local Multiplex: Torture Porn’, New York Movies, (n.d.) 
<http://nymag.com/movies/features/15622/>, para. 2 of 12 [accessed 18 September 2014]. 
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example, Tim Palmer argues that the New Extremism challenges cinema to be a 
medium that can ‘generate profound often challenging sensory experiences’ whilst 
Christopher Sharrett proposes that torture porn demonstrates ‘intellectual bankruptcy’ 
and that ‘an attempt to evaluate these films seriously provokes doubt about such a 
project’s worth’.16 Differentiated by the excesses of Hollywood style, the two strains 
of extreme film may be viewed as being in contention with one another. As Palmer’s 
extremism encompasses the artistry of filmmaking alongside violence, Sharrett’s 
focuses upon the bravura celebration of violence induced by Hollywood’s 
exhibitionist titles. I would argue, however, that the difference between the two 
strains is more a matter of viewpoint than of fundamentally opposing aesthetics. The 
spectacular violence of so-called torture porn films can, in some instances, work with 
the ‘challenging sensory experiences’ provided by contemporary cinematic 
technologies in the generation of an embodied viewing experience that integrates the 
viewer’s sensorium with the extremity of violence onscreen. There is an area of 
overlap between the simultaneously arising movements that combines the Hollywood 
predilection for special effects with the extremist fascination with the manipulation of 
the viewing experience. It is within this intersection that the films analysed herein can 
be found.  
 
This thesis will focus upon how a film interacts with its viewer and to this end, 
new extremism is perhaps a more beneficial term to appropriate in relation to the 
body of films discussed; yet it is not quite specific enough. It is not only extremity that 
characterises these films, but a confluence of extremity, the sensorial experiences of 
spectatorship, and the embodied knowledge of the viewer. In the introduction to The 
New Extremism in Cinema, Tanya Horeck and Tina Kendall extend and refine 
Quandt’s Franco-centric classification to a selection of European films that are united 
not only by their content and form but also by their effect upon the viewer. Horeck 
and Kendall propose that 
 
                                                        
16 Tim Palmer, ‘Style and Sensation in the Contemporary French Cinema of the Body’, Journal of Film 
and Video, 58 (2006), 22-32 p. 22; Christopher Sharrett, ‘The Problem of Saw: “Torture Porn” and the 
Conservatism of Contemporary Horror Films’, Cineaste, 35 (2009), 32-39 (p. 32).  
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beyond the collective emphasis in these films on explicit and brutal 
sex, and on graphic or sadistic violence […] it is first and foremost the 
uncompromising and highly self-reflexive appeal to the spectator that 
marks out the specificity of these films.17 
 
It is upon this ‘appeal to the spectator’ that my classification of contemporary 
extreme film rests. Like new extremism, the films selected display a disturbing 
fascination with violence against the human body. More specifically than either of the 
alternative classifications, however, the titles discussed in the following chapters 
exhibit a preference for the manipulation of sensory experiences, directly through 
stimulations (Palmer’s ‘challenging sensory experiences’) and indirectly through the 
invocation of embodied structures of understanding. As such, it is the viewing 
experience that differentiates these films from other subgenres of horror film. The 
notions of spectacle, extremity, sociocultural taboo and even spectatorship itself are 
routinely problematized within narratives that, as Palmer points out, ‘engross, 
bewilder [and] shock’ the viewer.18 My classification is distinguished from torture 
porn by the rebuttal of spectacle that will be constructed throughout this thesis, and 
from new extremism by its inherent focus upon corporeality on and off screen. It will 
be argued that it is not simply ‘an array of devices’ and ‘brutal and visceral images’ 
that can be found in these films, but the viewer’s corporeal body itself integrated as a 
critical cog in the production of the viewing experience.19 It is the commingling of 
viewer and film performed by these titles that typifies them and, crucially, creates an 
important communicative bridge between neurophysiology and psychology as the 
twin pillars of my methodological framework. 
 
The conjoining of neuroscience and horror film may seem unlikely, at first 
glance, but a consideration of horror tropes is surprisingly revealing: the scientist – 
mad, righteous or otherwise – has, since Dr. Frankenstein, been a staple of both the 
Gothic and horror genres. From David Cronenberg’s The Fly (1986) to Tom Six’s The 
Human Centipede (2009) the horror scientist typically alters bodies. Indeed, the 
concerns of biology generally – the pursuit of knowledge about the organic world and                                                         
17 Tanya Horeck and Tina Kendall, ‘Introduction’, in The New Extremism in Cinema: From France to 
Europe, ed., by Tanya Horeck and Tina Kendall (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2011), pp. 1-
17, p. 1-2. 
18 Palmer, p. 28. 
19 Palmer, p. 28; Horeck and Kendall, p. 1. 
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everything within (including human bodies) – partially mirrors one of the concerns of 
horror – the pursuit of anxieties pertaining to the organic nature of the human body. 
Of course, the search for new material, which keeps horror in step with sociocultural 
and scientific developments, is generated by the need – both economic and social – 
for the genre to remain ‘current’. As a result, horror film today is returning to a focus 
upon its affective origins: its intent to make the viewer ‘feel’. Crucially for the sub-
category of horror film upon which this thesis is focused, the bodily sensation elicited 
does not solely rely upon psychological structures of empathic engagement and 
identification but is delivered immediately to the viewer through their bodies. This is 
not affect via empathy, but affect through direct sensory stimulation. It is necessary, 
however, to acknowledge that this corporeal element of spectatorship exists within the 
context of a multifarious film experience that combines the physiological spectator 
with the psychosocial conditions of viewing. Both viewer and film have a dual 
existence: they exist physiologically and psychologically. The heart of the arguments 
presented here lies in the recognition of a direct relationship between the 
physiological and psychological modes of subsistence. In order to explicate and 
concretise the bridges between the two it is necessary now to review the significant 
psychological influences upon horror film spectatorship that have already been 
theorised. The following section will thus provide an overview of an influential 
psychosocial model of horror film criticism – psychoanalysis – as a precursor to 
uncovering the essential points of contact between the physiological and 
psychological acts of viewing. Through analysis of the foundations of the 
psychoanalytic approach it will be proposed that while the emphasis of the paradigm 
may be upon the human mind, the ‘mind’ is not an extant entity but rather finds its 
own basis in the physiology of the human body. 
 
Psychoanalysis and Horror 
 
The genre itself invokes psychoanalytic considerations, at times borrowing its imagery from the 
symbolic apparatus of dream interpretation 
Andrew Tudor, ‘Why Horror? The Peculiar Pleasures of a Popular Genre’ (1997)20 
 
                                                        
20 Andrew Tudor, ‘Why Horror? Peculiar Pleasures of a Popular Genre’, Cultural Studies, 11(1997), 
443-463 (p. 446). 
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 Andrew Tudor’s polemical assessment of the horror genre is undoubtedly 
accurate: it does indeed offer itself to psychoanalysis as something of a sacrificial 
lamb. Its very subject matter – death, doppelgangers, murder, incest, violence, the 
annihilation of social taboos, the subverting of social order and the refusal of norms – 
and its unerring focus on what it means to be a living (or dead) human often appear to 
speak directly to the psychoanalytical paradigm deployed within film theory. During 
the 1970s, Christian Metz proposed a highly influential Lacanian-Freudian framework 
for applying the clinical psychiatric practice of psychoanalysis to the examination of 
cinema. Metz’s semiological model built its foundation on three theses: firstly, it 
constructs ‘cinematic fiction as semi-dreamlike’; secondly, it advances ‘the spectator 
screen relationship as a mirror identification’; and finally, it proposes that there is a 
code to ‘the cinematic dream’ that can be accessed and analysed through 
psychoanalytic methods.21 The potential discord between what is a clinical framework 
for the treatment of neuroses developed through, for example, Sigmund Freud’s 
interpretation of dreams and Jacques Lacan’s identification-forming mirror stage, is 
reconciled in Metz’s work by the equivalence he finds between the human psyche and 
the way an individual interacts with the world – including their reactions to art, 
literature, fiction and film. In a drastically simplified form, the critical viewpoint 
assumes that traces of the structure of the human psyche can be discovered within the 
artefacts that the psyche can produce. For Metz, ‘certain phenomena that 
psychoanalysis has illuminated or can illuminate occur in the cinema’ – particularly 
the pursuit of the ‘good-object relation’, or filmic pleasure.22 The cinematic 
‘institution as a whole has filmic pleasure alone as its aim’, not least because 
pleasurable viewing experiences stimulate repeat custom thus driving the cinematic 
industry.23 In Metz’s view, not only is the structure of the human psyche intrinsic to 
how we access and interact with film, but the industry itself (in its desire to generate 
pleasurable viewing experiences) models itself upon the composite parts and drives of 
that psyche.  
 
                                                        
21 Christian Metz, The Imaginary Signifier (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1977), p. 6. 
22 Metz, p. 22. 
23 Metz, p. 7. 
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The outer machine (the cinema as industry) and the inner machine (the 
spectator’s psychology) are not just metaphorically related, the latter a 
facsimile of the former, ‘internalising’ it as a reversed mould, a 
receptive hollow of identical form, but also metonymically related as 
complementary segments: ‘wanting to go to the cinema’ is a kind of 
reflection shaped by the film industry, but it is also a real link in the 
chain of the overall mechanism of that industry.24 
 
Metz’s semiology thus canonised psychoanalysis as the emerging dominant paradigm 
of cinematic theory in a way that highlighted not only the important psychological 
relations between spectator and film, and spectator and the cinema apparatus, but also 
the economic function of the cinema industry and the role that it plays in the 
generation and maintenance of a particular type of audience. Crucial to this is the 
notion of situating the spectator in relation to the events onscreen, such that the screen 
acts as the ‘mirror’ of Jacques Lacan’s mirror stage. 
 
In the mirror the child perceives the familiar household objects, and 
also its object par excellence, its mother […] But above all it perceives 
its own image. This is where primary identification (the formation of 
the ego) gets certain of its main characteristics: the child sees itself as 
an other, and beside an other. This other other is its guarantee that the 
first is really it: by her authority, her sanction, in the register of the 
symbolic.25 
 
During the mirror stage the child recognises himself as both subject (me) and object 
(not me) in the reflection, his status as subject being confirmed by the mother who 
stands with him. He ‘assumes an image’, appropriates his reflection as the ‘Ideal-I’ 
and the formation of the ego begins.26 As a result of this primary identification, the 
Lacanian realms of the Imaginary (the Ideal-I, objects) and the Symbolic (typified by 
language) precipitate from the realm of the Real (pre-symbolic experience that cannot 
be articulated) and the child is able to objectify the world, to recognise the world of 
objects (including itself). Lacan’s mirror stage is a distinctly psychological process 
that hinges upon the individual’s classification of him or herself as either subject or 
object. This type of abstract reasoning originates in the Lacanian Real, in the 
individual’s sense of itself, but is projected into the Imaginary and the Symbolic –                                                         
24 Metz, p. 8. 
25 Metz, p. 45. 
26 Jacques Lacan, ‘The Mirror Stage as Formative of the Function of the I as Revealed in 
Psychoanalytic Experience’, in Cultural Theory and Popular Culture, Volume 1, ed. by John Storey 
(Harlow: Pearson, 2006), pp. 287-292 (p. 288). 
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immaterial realms of cognitive comprehension. The individual that passes through the 
mirror stage is one capable of detaching him or herself (as Ego, self or Ideal-I) from 
their physiological body in an act of conceptual understanding.  
 
Like the Lacanian mirror, the cinema displays objects that are recognised as 
reflections or projections of the objects that they represent but, unlike the Lacanian 
mirror, it does not show the subject. 
  
Thus film is like the mirror. But it differs from the primordial mirror in 
one essential point: although, as in the latter, everything may come to 
be projected, there is one thing and one thing only that is never 
reflected in it: the spectator’s own body.27 
 
Metz’s cinematic theory presupposes a spectator who has passed through the mirror 
stage, successfully entered the symbolic realm and who can thus recognise on the 
cinema screen a similar representation of objects in the realm of the Imaginary to the 
reflection of the mirror that presided over the primary identification. The viewer is 
thus divided, like the original subject of the mirror stage, as both a material existent 
object and a conceptual ‘viewer’. The very mechanics of cinema (its projection of 
images that are quintessentially ‘unreal’), for Metz, align it with the Imaginary – a 
realm of reflections that metonymically points beyond itself to the concepts that it 
represents – and the Symbolic concepts that the Imaginary comes to communicate. In 
doing so, however, Metz’s viewer does not consist of the body that reacts to the light 
and sound emitted from the cinema screen, but the consciousness that interacts with 
the contents of the film. This foundation has enabled the psychoanalytic paradigm to 
explore cinema in terms of both form and content but has, nevertheless, focused 
critical attention upon the psychosocial act and conditions of viewing. The viewer’s 
body, their organic reality, and means of accessing the film have been implicitly 
abandoned in the auditorium. 
 
Laura Mulvey’s often-cited theory of spectatorship, detailed in her influential 
essay ‘Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema’ (1975), addresses the ways in which 
cinema ‘as an advanced representation system […] poses questions about the ways in 
which the unconscious (formed by the dominant order) structures ways of seeing and                                                         
27 Metz, p. 45. 
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pleasure in looking’.28 Like Metz, Mulvey draws upon the Freudian concept of the 
pleasure principle, in association with the scopic drive, to elucidate a pleasure in 
looking that articulates the ambivalence of the Lacanian mirror-stage. The dual 
recognition of one’s own reflection as both subject and object generates a dichotomy 
that spurs the child into engaging with the Imaginary. This dynamism of the ‘look’ 
leads to a revelation: ‘I see only from one point, but in my existence I am looked at 
from all sides’.29 Alongside the disassociation of the reflected image from the 
material body, the child realises that the look itself is also disassociated. As he looks, 
he is also looked upon, prefigured by the paradoxical situation of the reflection; he 
looks at himself looking at himself. The look becomes the gaze, disassociated from 
the gazer, even from the eye. The disjoint between ‘the eye and the gaze [is] for us the 
split in which the drive is manifested at the level of the scopic field’: the 
dematerialisation of the gaze, according to Lacan, is a replication of the split between 
the subject and his ego caused by the mirror stage.30 The gaze denotes both looking-at 
and to-be-looked-at-ness and it is this latter signification that Mulvey attributes to the 
representation of women in cinema. Mulvey’s essay takes the gaze of the cinematic 
apparatus and explores, through the dual notions of the scopophilic drive and 
narcissistic identification with the image, the way in which that gaze reproduces the 
image of woman as a patriarchal signifier as it ‘satisfies a primordial wish for 
pleasurable looking, but it also goes further, developing scopophilia in its narcissistic 
aspect’.31  
 
Although subsequently updated in ‘Afterthoughts on ‘Visual Pleasure in 
Narrative Cinema’’ (1981) and Death 24x A Second (2006), Mulvey’s ‘Visual 
Pleasure’ essay has influenced horror critics both explicitly (including Carol Clover 
whose work and relationship to Mulvey’s theory will be explored shortly) and 
implicitly as a framework through which to explore the attraction to horror. Of her 
initial framework Mulvey writes that it, 
 
                                                        
28 Laura Mulvey, ‘Visual Pleasure in Narrative Cinema’, in Visual and Other Pleasure, 2nd edn 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2009 [1989]), pp. 14-27 (p. 15). 
29 Jacques Lacan, The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis, ed. by David Macey (London: 
Penguin, 1994), p. 72. 
30 Lacan, Four Fundamental Concepts, p. 78. 
31 Mulvey, ‘Visual Pleasure’, p. 17. 
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intends to use psychoanalysis to discover where and how the 
fascination of film is reinforced by pre-existing patterns of fascination 
already at work within the individual subject and the social formations 
that have moulded him. It takes as its starting point the way film 
reflects, reveals and even plays on the straight, socially established 
interpretation of sexual difference which controls images, erotic ways 
of looking and spectacle.32 
 
Mulvey takes as her point of origin the fact that the cinematic apparatus is man-made 
and culturally defined (as indeed, are the films it shows) and posits that the mechanics 
of cinema itself reflect and reinforce the social hierarchies at work in the wider 
society. What the ‘Visual Pleasure’ thesis suggests therefore is that the cinematic 
apparatus acts as a mechanism for reinforcing the key structural relationship between 
the male order and the female symbolic. In doing so, however, the relationship 
between the physiological aspects of the viewer – their body, their sensory modalities, 
and their brain – and the film, as a confluence of both symbolic meaning and sensory 
experience, is subtly elided. The ‘real’ aspects of viewership (the physiological 
experience) depreciate as the ‘symbolic’ aspects of viewership (interpretation, the 
deciphering of meaning) are pushed to the fore.  
 
In his seminal contribution to this field, ‘An Introduction to the American 
Horror Film’ (1979), Robin Wood uses a Freudian-Marxist framework to propose that 
the genre is grounded in a horrified fascination with monsters which embody all that 
is oppressed within society and repressed within the self. Applying what Metz might 
recognise as an assessment of characterology, Wood uses the concept of repression to 
interpret a range of horror film tropes as symptomatic of the regulation and creation 
of ‘monogamous, heterosexual, bourgeois, patriarchal capitalists’.33 Like Mulvey’s 
model, Wood constructs cinema as a reflection and refraction of society. Using this 
prototype, ‘non-hegemonic’ sexual energy – bisexuality, female sexuality and child 
sexuality – is considered to be essential material for repression in order to maintain a 
social order that fosters the desirable norms of heterosexual patriarchal power and 
above all, the desire to conform. Thus Wood describes two psychoanalytic theses in 
relation to this process: ‘that in a society built on monogamy and family there will be 
an enormous surplus of sexual energy that will have to be repressed […] what is                                                         
32 Mulvey, ‘Visual Pleasure’, p. 14. 
33 Robin Wood, ‘An Introduction to the American Horror Film’, in Planks of Reason: Essays on the 
Horror Film, ed., by Barry Keith Grant (Lanham, MD: Scarecrow, 1996), pp. 164-200 (p. 165). 
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repressed must always strive to return’.34 The connotations of ‘family’ for 
conservative America in the 1970s were largely those associated with a vision of 
society that allows the (male) norms to control the perceived dangers of female and 
child sexuality with the stipulation of monogamy and patriarchal dominance. 
Repression is thus geared towards the eradication of non-conformist non-male desires 
and impulses so that masculine heterosexual normativity may harmoniously reign. 
The implication of this reading is that in most conventional Western societies there is 
a suppression of the needs of the (non-male) individual by the needs of (male) 
civilisation.35   
 
The ideological imperative of these films, according to the psychoanalytic 
model, is to allow the expression of anxieties that ultimately leads to ‘rejecting and if 
possible annihilating [them] or […] rendering [them] safe and assimilating [them]’.36 
Closure, however, is not always possible, and indeed for a significant subgenre of 
horror film is virtually impossible to achieve. Wood’s own review of horror films can 
be widely supplemented by more recent antecedents.  The critique of female sexuality 
in Island of Lost Souls (1932), Cat People (1942) and Sisters (1973) can now be 
joined by Mitchell Lichtenstein’s darkly satirical Teeth (2007). The concerns of the 
proletariat Wood found in Frankenstein (1931), The Texas Chain Saw Massacre 
(1974) and Race with the Devil (1975) are complemented by Rob Zombie’s House of 
1,000 Corpses (2003). Anxieties relating to other cultures depicted in Island of Lost 
Souls and The Manitou (1978) find analogies in Cannibal Holocaust (1980), The 
Descent (2005) and Eli Roth’s The Green Inferno (2013). The explorations of homo- 
and bi-sexuality in The Rocky Horror Picture Show (1975) and Demon (1976) are 
reiterated in Alexandra Aja’s Switchblade Romance (2003) and Bradley Rust Gray’s 
Jack and Diane (2012). The monstrous children of The Omen (1976) and The 
Exorcist (1973) are supplemented by the child protagonists of One Missed Call 
(2008) and Insidious (2010). Some monsters, it seems, just keep coming back. A 
                                                        
34 Wood, p. 177. 
35 Civilisation is here considered not as a phenomenal object but a dynamic web of interactions 
between a group of socially motivated animals (human beings). It thus does not directly infer society in 
its physical or political forms but implies both in its striving to continue the productive social relations 
that are so often based upon the rules of conformity and mutual social assistance. It is a civilisation that 
includes the needs and desires of the individual body in association with the demands of a social 
structure. 
36 Wood, p. 168. 
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psychoanalytic account of the function of these horror films has traditionally returned 
to notions of identification and spectatorship in order to account for their function and 
attraction. 
 
These critical ways of analysing the social act of seeing have proved 
incredibly influential. Mulvey’s model of spectatorship underpinned a decade of 
screen theory and Wood’s combination of Freudian and Marxist approaches continues 
to structure insightful analysis of contemporary horror titles. The intricacies of the 
theories have also instigated critical debate that has developed and advanced the 
original models. Carol Clover, for example, problematizes Mulvey’s construction of 
spectatorship as guided by the male gaze with her own formulation of a more 
dynamic cinematic look. Clover’s Men, Women and Chain Saws (1992) opens a 
critical dialogue with Mulvey’s work focusing upon gender hierarchies in the horror 
film. Whereas Mulvey takes the primary identification with the camera as inherently 
gendered male and therefore assigned to the male protagonist of film, Clover argues 
that horror in particular ‘is far more victim-identified than the standard view would 
have it’.37 Indeed, the cultural categories of male and female are themselves given 
flexibility in Clover’s model as ‘gender [becomes] less a wall than a permeable 
membrane’.38 Clover argues that rather than simply recreating the dynamics of male 
dominance through the apparatus, the horror genre problematizes the notion of fixed 
gender-positions. The killer in slasher films, Clover argues, is rarely completely 
masculinised, floundering as (s)he does to complete the mission and eventually being 
overcome (at least temporarily) by the Final Girl. The Final Girl of slasher films – 
Laurie Strode from Halloween (1980), Sidney Prescott in Scream (1996), and Dana 
Polk from The Cabin in the Woods (2012) et al. – is the victim that gets away, the sole 
survivor. Frequently semi-masculinised by her name, a characterisation that usually 
involves a refusal of promiscuous female sexuality and ultimately by her assertive and 
successful action against the monster, the Final Girl seems to navigate or even 
combine gender roles. The Final Girl is female but her symbolic function is to ‘‘read’ 
some aspect of male experience’: it is the relationship between the positions she 
traverses that is significant, not the positions in and of themselves.39 Clover’s                                                         
37 Clover, pp. 8-9. 
38 Clover, p. 46. 
39 Clover, p. 53. 
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framework questions what happens if or when a masculinised primary identification 
collides with an empathic victim-focused secondary identification: is the gaze 
controlling or is the control subverted by the reflexivity of the victim-role? In either 
case, the preoccupation with identification, the social construction of gender and the 
relentless return of the repressed (is it a coincidence that the slasher monster is 
characterised as always returning?) focus both Clover and Mulvey’s engagement on 
the level of the psychosocial. Despite Mulvey, Wood and Clover’s models addressing 
the ways in which horror film affect and influence their viewers, the frameworks 
offered do little to address the materiality of those viewers. Spectators are constructed 
as psychological beings constituted by complex psychosocial influences that interact 
with ‘the film’, where the film is considered to be a pre-constituted ‘whole’ that exists 
as a concept, rather than a phenomenal object. Lacan’s recognition of the realm of the 
Real, however, indicates that his psychology (and indeed, the psychologised subject) 
has corporeal origins, and it is the intent of this thesis to reconnect psychosocial 
readings of film with the physiological foundations of understanding. 
  
 Implicit in psychoanalytic models of film criticism is the relationship between 
the individual viewer and the psychosocial environment in which they exist. This 
emphasis can be traced – superficially at least – to the dematerialising aspects of the 
Lacanian mirror stage. The promotion of the ego as a type of ‘disassociation’ of the 
subject (consciousness, and its concomitant unconsciousness) from their object-body 
is a process that projects the subject into the dialectical realms of the Imaginary and 
the Symbolic. Both the Imaginary and the Symbolic are psychosocially constructed 
spaces of abstract thought – the registers through which the subject can conceptualise 
himself and his place in the order of the world. The construction of the cinema as an 
industry of the Symbolic, proposed by Christian Metz and implicitly reiterated in the 
persistence of an engagement with the ‘unreality’ or the ‘deceptive’ nature of cinema, 
necessarily situates the film viewing experience in the consciousness of the individual 
– in their mind, but not in their body. The psychoanalytical paradigm appears to be a 
dematerialising one. Yet the claim for the dematerialising force of psychoanalysis 
seems somewhat counter-intuitive. Lacan’s psychoanalytic framework was born from 
the clinical need to address and treat psychophysiological disorders, irrecoverably 
rooted in the material existence of the patient. Psychoanalysis is a science of 
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behaviour that has been adapted and partially transmuted to ‘fit’ the frame of literary 
and filmic interpretation.  
 
Slavoj Žižek’s more recent psychoanalytic analyses of the cinema have 
suggested that the canonical ‘Lacanians’ are better considered to ‘engage with’ Lacan, 
rather than draw upon his work directly. ‘They appropriate some Lacanian concepts 
as the best descriptions of the universe of patriarchal domination’, yet the readings 
that they produce seem curiously disassociated from the body of the spectator around 
which they are written.40 The very qualities of the emphasis upon fiction – the fiction 
of the narrative and the ‘fiction’ of the medium – have led theory towards the 
incidental (rather than systematic) disregard of Lacan’s realm of the Real. Film is, 
after all, essentially un-real. Lacan’s Symbolic and Imaginary, however, find their 
origins in the Real in the first instance: in the pre-symbolic, pre-mirror stage state, the 
child is engulfed in the Real – the inarticulate experience of being. Once the child 
enters into the Imaginary in the recognition of his reflection as his Ideal-I, and then 
into the Symbolic in his ability to conceptualise and communicate through the 
Imaginary, does the Real cease to be a crucial realm of experience? Because we are 
unable to articulate, in the Symbolic, the experience of the Real does this mitigate its 
influence upon the developmental stages of life? 
 
The paradox is that this symbolic pact, this structural network of 
relations, can establish itself only in so far as it is embodied in a totally 
contingent material element, a little-bit-of-Real which, by its sudden 
irruption disrupts the homeostatic indifference of relations between 
subjects. In other words, the imaginary balance changes into a 
symbolically structured network through a shock of the Real.41 
 
Although Žižek applies this principle to the narrative content of film, I propose that 
the viewing of films involves the Lacanian Real as much as the Symbolic or 
Imaginary – not necessarily in a causal manner, but certainly in a developmental one. 
The Real, the something that pre-exists the formation of the ego, is constituted in part 
by the physiological reality of the individual’s existence, the material facts that enable 
its being. Whilst I wish to recognise the strong influence of sociocultural factors upon                                                         
40 Slavoj Žižek, The Fright of Real Tears (London: BFI, 2001), p. 2. 
41 Slavoj Žižek, ‘Introduction’, in Everything You Always Wanted to Know About Lacan: But Were 
Afraid to Ask Hitchcock, ed. by Slavoj Žižek (London: Verso, 1996), pp. 1-14 (p. 5). 
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the relationship between a film and its viewer (and thus the validity of the 
psychoanalytic approach as a method of delineating the psychosocial aspects of film 
viewership) I would also argue that this type of reading requires a conceptual 
foundation. Psychoanalysis may contend that this foundation is the human mind, but 
the mind is not itself an extant entity. One cannot remove and capture the mind 
extrinsic to the body. There are, as Don Tucker states, ‘no faculties of memory, 
conscious perception, or music appreciation that float in the mental ether’; no 
organism has yet been encountered that can generate the conditions of consciousness 
without the conditions of a highly specified type of brain.42 The foundation of the 
psychoanalytic approach is the human mind, and neuroscience proposes that the mind 
is an emergent property of the brain. A cogent psychological investigation must, 
therefore, pay heed to the influence that the brain and the central and peripheral 
nervous systems have upon the development of the mental domain. Such an inquiry 
would seek not to undermine the wealth of psychoanalytic literature but to underpin 
it. Concomitantly, the directions already explored in psychoanalytic film theory – 
primary and secondary identification, the isolation of specific monster types and 
functions, an assumption of pleasure in viewing – can act as signposts, directing the 
inquiry to places where the physical may reinforce the psychological. If 
psychoanalysis is an exploration of the mind ‘from ‘within’, from the first person 
perspective of what it feels like to be a mind, a living experiencing subject’, then this 
inquiry can only benefit from an exploration of the mind that maps the connections 
between the mind, the brain and the body.43 
 
The Architecture of Mind 
 
In order to view ‘the mind’ from the exterior, we must first contextualise what 
is meant by the term. The mind is an abstract space in which certain cognitive 
processes take place. It encompasses our thoughts, our emotions, and the way we 
view the world. It is linked conceptually and literally to the brain and altering or 
injuring the brain results in alterations to the function of the mind. Insofar as the mind                                                         
42 Don M. Tucker, Mind from Body: Experience from Neural Structure (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2007), p. 59. 
43 Joseph Dodds, ‘The Monstrous Brain: A Neuropsychoanalytic Aesthetics of Horror’, PsyArt, 
(December 15 2009) <http://www.psyartjournal.com/article/show/dodds-
the_monstrous_brain_a_neuropsychoanalyti> [accessed 29 May 2014], Part 1 (para. 5 of 8). 
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can be considered as a mental space in which in the individual ‘thinks’, it 
encompasses a wide array of specific neurological phenomena including emotions, 
decision-making, and motivational responses. George P. Prigatano elucidates the 
connection between physical brain damage and the alteration of the ‘emotional and 
motivational characteristics of a person’.44 Brain damage can lead to transient or 
permanent changes to ‘the control or expression of an affective response’ and, ‘in 
regions subserving complex visuospatial perceptions, language processing, and higher 
order or ‘executive’ functions [it] can affect […] cognitive processes’.45 
 
The precise nature of the link between the brain and the mind is an enduring 
topic of exploration for both psychology and neuroscience, and one that is yet to 
receive any kind of definitive answer. Despite this ambiguity, there is a tangible 
connection between the functioning of the brain and that of the mind and it is this that 
I will now explore. Drawing upon a connectionist model of brain-mind function, I 
wish to highlight the ways in which the neurophysiology of the brain impacts and 
shapes the psychological structures of the mind. The brain is, in its most basic form, 
an integration hub – a superstructure for the collation of sensorimotor information 
gathered from the external and internal environment that allows the individual to 
move, manipulate itself and objects, and survive in the phenomenal world. The brain 
is the central hub of the human nervous system, an intricate web of sensory fibres that 
are distributed throughout the human body. As such, the brain is the conduit between 
bodily sensation and the psychological cognition that takes place in the mind. The 
mind is structured by the brain, which in turn is constituted by the sensory capacities 
of the organic body. That is not to say that the mind is reducible to its organic 
components but it is fundamentally underpinned and structured by the human nervous 
system, sensory organs and brain. This viewpoint is based upon a theory of cortical 
                                                        
44 George P. Prigatano, ‘Personality Disturbances Associated with Traumatic Brain Injury’, Journal of 
Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 60 (1992), 360-68 (p. 360). 
45 Prigatano, p. 360. 
  
24 
organisation proposed in the 1970s that formulated the parallel distributed processing 
(PDP) model of brain function.46  
 
The work of Vernon B. Mountcastle and Gerald M. Edelman was brought 
together through the Neuroscience Research Program in 1977. Mountcastle proposed 
that human brain function was organised into a modular distributed network. 
 
The general idea is as follows. The large entities of the brain we know 
as areas (or nuclei) of the neocortex, the limbic lobe, basal ganglia, 
dorsal thalamus, and so forth, are themselves composed of replicated 
local neural circuits, modules which vary in cell number, intrinsic 
connections, and processing mode from one large entity to another but 
are basically similar within any given entity […] Each module is a 
local neural circuit that processes information from its input to its 
output and in that processing imposes transforms [sic] determined by 
the general properties of the entity and its extrinsic connections. 
Modules are grouped into entities such as nuclei and cortical areas by a 
common or dominating extrinsic connection, by the need to replicate a 
function over a topographic representation or by some other factor […] 
Closely linked and multiply interconnected subsets of modules in 
different and often widely separated entities thus form precisely 
connected but distributed systems.47 
 
The human brain and spinal cord constitute the central nervous system (CNS). The 
brain itself is comprised of billions of neurons that transmit information, via the spinal 
cord, to and from a global web of nerve fibres that comprise the peripheral nervous 
system (PNS). The fibres of the PNS carry information from target cells to the CNS 
and onto the brain and then transmit information from the CNS that causes the human 
body to act and react to the environment around them. Prior to the work of 
Mountcastle and other neuroscientists the brain was presumed to process this slew of 
information serially but these serial models could not account for the speed and                                                         
46 It should be noted that a scientific ‘theory’ is not necessarily the same as a philosophical or 
conceptual ‘theory’. The term theory, as applied to science, indicates that something is an explanation 
of how or why something occurs. As such, scientific theory is the net result of the amalgamation of 
several years of study across interrelated domains, not a hypothetical postulation based on anecdotal 
evidence alone. Both gravity and evolution remain scientific theories. The PDP model is thus based 
upon the experimental data of hundreds of individual studies that have isolated and demonstrated the 
local and global neural connections of the brain. The ‘theoretical’ aspect of the model lies in the scaling 
of this evidence to account for theories of ‘mind’ and the very tangible connection between brain 
architecture and cognitive ability. 
47 Vernon B. Mountcastle, ‘An Organizing Principle of Cerebral Function: The Unit Module and The 
Distributed System’, in The Mindful Brain: Cortical Organization and the Group-Selective Theory of 
Higher Brain Function, ed. by Gerald M. Edelman and Vernon B. Mountcastle (Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press, 1978), pp. 7-50 (p. 8). 
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complexity of human information processing skills. Moreover, serial models of 
artificial intelligence could not perform complex distinguishing or learning tasks. This 
indicated that the human brain does not process information in this way. 
Mountcastle’s theory states that the neurons in the brain are clustered into local neural 
circuits that respond to certain stimuli. These local circuits are then interconnected to 
neighbouring circuits that process similar, but not identical stimuli.  
 
In each brain area then, hundreds of local circuits go about processing the 
pieces of information they are specialised for but the connections between them allow 
that information to be filtered, matched, cross-checked or ordered to create coherence 
between the fragments of information sensed by individual local circuits. In addition 
to interconnections within the areas, Mountcastle further proposes that each brain area 
has numerous connections to other areas that allow for further communication across 
the entire cortex. The brain is thus a highly diverse, incredibly interconnected web of 
neural circuits that processes information in parallel – in technical terminology, a 
parallel distributed processing (PDP) system.48 
 
 Gerald Edelman’s work focused upon the higher brain functions and was 
based upon a similarly interconnected PDP model of brain function. Edelman 
proposed that 
 
the brain is a selective system that processes sensorimotor information 
through the temporally coordinated interactions of collections or 
repertoires of functionally equivalent units each consisting of a small 
group of neurons. According to the model developed here, the brain 
processes sensory signals and its own stored information upon the 
selective base in a phasic (cyclic) and re-entrant manner that is capable 
of generating the necessary conditions of conscious states.49 
 
                                                        
48 The PDP model of brain functioning is a description of the physical infrastructure of the brain. Its 
metaphorical analogies stem from the model’s subsequent use in artificial intelligence models of 
programming. It is notable that artificial neural networks have, unlike their serial antecedents, 
successfully been ‘trained’ to recognise emotion when ‘viewing’ films. Pia Tikka, Aleksander 
Valjamae, Aline W. de Borst, Roberto Pugliese, Niklas Ravaja, Mauri Kaipainen and Tapio Takala, 
‘Enactive Cinema Paves Way for Understanding Complex Real-Time Social Interaction in 
Neuroimaging Experiments’, Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 6 (2012) 
<http://dx.doi.org/10.3389/fnhum.2012.00298>.  
49 Gerald M. Edelman, ‘Group Selection and Phasic Reentrant Signalling: A Theory of Higher Brain 
Function’, in Edelman and Mountcastle, eds., pp. 51-95 (p. 52). 
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The massively parallel, distributed processing system of the brain is, in Edelman’s 
view, selective. That is to say that not all of the information sensed by the body 
causes a distinct response or successfully makes it to consciousness. In fact, ‘far less 
than 1% of the information taken in by the nervous system’ is able to action a 
cognitive or physical response in the recipient body.50 Indeed, psychologists and 
neuroscientists have long noted a diminished capability of human beings to be able to 
successfully and quickly perform multiple tasks at once. As Elizabeth A. Styles notes, 
‘here we have a paradox. The brain is apparently unlimited in its ability to process 
information, yet human performance is severely limited even when asked to do two 
very simple tasks at once’.51 It seems natural, therefore, to make a claim for 
selectivity in the functioning of the brain. The PDP model proposed by Mountcastle 
would allow for the massive parallel processing of information on a large scale, while 
the interconnections between sensory areas would allow for a selective system as each 
sensation is cross-checked, matched, grouped and interpreted in light of the other 
sensations also being processed.  
 
 The most interesting, and controversial, aspect of Edelman’s proposition, 
however, is the notion that the behaviour of the interconnected neural circuits – that 
crucially process information in parallel, in a nonlinear fashion and in association 
with ‘stored information’ that manifests in what humans know as ‘memory’ – 
generates the necessary conditions for consciousness. In this model ‘consciousness is 
not a property of the entire brain, but rather is a result of processes occurring in 
certain defined areas’.52 Consciousness is not a realm or a mental space, as it is often 
characterised in philosophy, but an emergent property of the functioning of the human 
brain. The mind – that incorporeal container of our subjective consciousness – is 
inextricably linked to the neuro-architecture of the brain and may be viewed as an 
emergent property of the complex function of our neurophysiology. 
 
What this theory does not propose, and what is not supported by the 
experimental data (of functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) or positron                                                         
50 D. E. Berlyne, ‘The Development of the Concept of Attention in Psychology’, in Attention in 
Neurophysiology, ed. by C. R. Evans and T. B. Mulholland (London: Butterworths, 1969), pp. 1-26 (p. 
8). 
51 Elizabeth A. Styles, The Psychology of Attention (Hove: Psychology Press, 1997), p. 116. 
52 Edelman, p. 74. 
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emission topography (PET) studies) is that the mind is entirely reducible to the brain 
or that human beings can be reduced to brains in jars with their entire experience 
simulated artificially. The PDP model set forth by Mountcastle and Edelman, and 
subsequently developed by Randall C. O’Reilly and Yuko Munakata (among others), 
is an example of a ‘graded, random, adaptive, interactive, (nonlinear) network’ that 
finds its basic infrastructure in the neural circuitry of the human brain.53 That neural 
circuitry is not inflexible as studies of the foetal rerouting of visual and auditory 
cortices have shown.54 Brain tissue function is not set at birth but has a limited type of 
plasticity inherent within it. Furthermore, sensory and neural experiences shape the 
strength of the connections between the various circuits in the human brain, thus 
allowing the PDP model to draw upon the notion of ‘graded’ inputs. The relative 
strength of neural impulses through the network determines the likelihood of those 
impulses being attended to or grouped with other impulses.  
 
To take an extreme view one could propose, as Jaak Panksepp has, that,  
 
in the beginning, our higher neocortical brain, for all intents and 
purposes, is a tabula rasa of seemingly endless fields of self-similar 
columnar ‘chips’ that are programmed by subcortical processes. Thus, 
practically everything that emerges in our higher neocortical apparatus 
arises from life experiences rather than genetic specializations.55 
 
What Panksepp is suggesting is that the higher levels of the human brain – the 
neocortex that is absent in many other species of animal lacking the ‘higher order 
thought’ that humans are capable of (abstract reasoning, conceptualisation, certain 
functions of memory) – are essentially ‘blank’. The cortex is organised into local 
circuits that connect with neighbouring ones to create larger networks but their 
specialisation is not prefigured. Each person’s higher-level brain function is 
programmed by his or her subjective experience such that the way in which an                                                         
53 Randall C. O’Reilly and Yuka Munakata, Computational Explorations in Cognitive Neuroscience: 
Understanding the Mind by Simulating the Brain (Cambridge, MA: MIT, 2000), p. 10. 
54 C. U. M. Smith, Biology of Sensory Systems (Chichester: Wiley, 2000), p. 29. In these cases, areas of 
brain tissue were rerouted to different sensory organs via neuron repositioning. Some nerve fibres from 
the eye actually connected with brain tissue in the auditory cortex while nerve fibres from the ear 
connected with tissue in the visual cortex. Each rerouted section of cortex went on to develop some 
features of the other: the rerouted auditory cortex had characteristics of the visual cortex, and vice 
versa. 
55 Jaak Panksepp, ‘The Basic Emotional Circuits of Mammalian Brains: Do Animals Have Affective 
Lives?’, Neuroscience and Biobehavioural Reviews, 35 (2011), 1791-1804 (p. 1795). 
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individual thinks is shaped by their sociocultural situation as well as their 
neurophysiology. Whilst on the surface, this may seem a cogent reason for not 
attending to the neurophysiological architecture one must bear in mind that although 
life experience shapes the neuronal connections and programs the neural circuits, it 
cannot alter the very structure of those circuits. Irrespective of life experience each 
human being has a relatively homogenous central and peripheral nervous system, they 
share the same sensory apparatus and have the same arrangement of organs and 
limbs.56 No amount of life experience would result in the remodelling of the human 
nervous system, just as no amount of life experience will enable a human to see the 
wide range of light perceptible by the Mantis Shrimp (including infrared and 
ultraviolet light, artificial technologies notwithstanding). As a result, ‘there is freedom 
(‘free will’ or ‘free agency’) in [a PDP system] – the freedom is in the selective 
grammar of the neuronal groups – but this freedom is not limitless’.57 No two brains 
are the same and human beings are not clones but we can only function within a 
certain spectrum of behaviour. We cannot suddenly exist, sense or perceive beyond 
the boundaries of our material bodies but nor can we be reduced to the sum parts of 
those bodies. The methodology inherent within the PDP model of human brain 
function and cognition relies upon a two-stage process. Stage one is based on the 
principle of reductionism – ‘reducing phenomena into component pieces’.58 
Mountcastle sets out this reduction for the neuroscientific account of the human brain 
as the seemingly homologous cortex has been reduced to its neural networks. Stage 
two proceeds to reconstructionism, of ‘using those pieces to reconstruct the larger 
phenomenon’.59 This is enacted by Edelman’s theory of the emergence of 
consciousness from the function of the neural circuits of the human brain. What 
results in both cases is a preliminary separation of two levels of description, or a ‘bi-
level physical reductionist/reconstructionist hierarchy, with a lower level consisting of                                                         
56 Certain disabilities and birth deformities can alter the arrangement of organs and limbs, sometimes 
radically, but the homogeneity of the human nervous system is relatively stable. Indeed, the 
malformation of the human nervous system results in life threatening and limiting conditions – spina 
bifida, anencephaly and encaphalocele – associated with deformity of the structures that encase the 
central nervous system (spinal vertebrae, the skull, meninges). Although such conditions often result in 
premature death, the structure of the nervous system itself – the brain in the head region, the central 
spinal cord, peripheral nerve branches and motoric nerves – is not radically altered. One cannot, as yet, 
be born with the nervous system of an arachnid, for example.  
57 Edelman, p. 87. 
58 O’Reilly and Munakata, p. 3. 
59 O’Reilly and Munakata, p. 3. Incidentally, all scientific endeavour adopts this two-part framework, 
thus negating accusations of biological determinism. 
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neurobiological mechanisms, and an upper level consisting of cognitive 
phenomena’.60  
 
The phenomenon that we call the human mind is not located in either the 
neurobiological mechanisms that underpin it, or in the cognitive phenomena that 
occur as a result of it, but somewhere in between the two. Neurobiology has a bottom-
up effect that transmits information, constrained and limited by the materiality of the 
architecture itself, ‘up’ towards the cognitive sphere. At the same time, the cognitive 
sphere has a top-down effect, transmitting previously stored and recalled information 
in the form of codas, schemata and memory ‘down’ towards the neurobiological 
sphere. Somewhere between the two levels the information travelling in both 
directions collides, mingles, causes adaptations to one another and generates the 
condition that we commonly think of as consciousness. All conscious processes are 
influenced both physiologically and psychosocially and, as such, neurobiology and 
psychology have equally valid contributions to make to the study of mind, cognition 
and behaviour.  
 
This thesis adopts a similar model to investigate the viewing process: the 
viewing experience is likened to the emergent mind and is influenced by psychosocial 
factors – including but not limited to cultural elements that may be found within a 
film, such as the representation of power hierarchies – and by physiological factors. 
The following chapters focus primarily upon stage one of the method outlined above 
– the reduction of the phenomenon into its component pieces – as this is the 
preliminary stage of a manifold conceptual inquiry. For the purposes of this 
introduction, however, we now need to return to psychoanalysis in light of the 
corporeal aspects of the ‘mind’. The practical implications of the embodied mind will 
be illuminated through detailed analysis of a psychoanalytic dynamic that is often 
applied to the horror genre: Julia Kristeva’s abject. The following, therefore, seeks to 
identify the physiological influence upon Kristeva’s theory and demonstrate the way 
in which the fusion of physiology and psychology can augment and advance a viewer-
centred analysis of contemporary horror film.                                                         
60 O’Reilly and Munakata, p. 6. It is preliminary, of course, because the ultimate aim is to reintegrate 
the two levels into a phenomenal whole. While each level can be helpful in explicating the other, the 
dynamism of human experience lies not in their points of difference or similarity but in their ultimate 
synergy with one another.  
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An Evolution of Horror Criticism  
 
 Psychoanalysis, it needs to be stressed, is not a disembodied intellectual 
activity. Freud’s work, in its day, offered a rigorous and controversially embodied 
model of the mind as an entity that developed from physical experience. Freud 
attempted to recognise and reconcile a connection between biology and psychology in 
his early writings for an unfinished thesis later titled Project for a Scientific 
Psychology (written c.1895). By 1915, however, he seemed to have accepted that 
explication of these connections was beyond the scope of the physical or 
psychological disciplines at that time.  
 
Research has afforded irrefutable proof that mental activity is bound 
up with the function of the brain as with that of no other organ. The 
discovery of the unequal importance of the different parts of the brain 
and their individual relations to particular parts of the body and to 
intellectual activities takes us a step further – we do not know how big 
a step. But every attempt to deduce from these facts a localization of 
mental processes, every endeavour to think of ideas as stored up in 
nerve-cells and of excitations as travelling along nerve-fibres, has 
completely miscarried.61 
 
We are now in a position, of course, to explain precisely how excitations travel along 
nerve fibres. We have isolated the neurotransmitters that facilitate this process and 
have identified gradations in the speed and strength of the functioning of nerve fibres. 
The PDP model of brain function goes some way to putting in place the foundations 
for an explanation of how abstract notions such as ideas can be ‘stored up’ in nerve 
cells. There are medical techniques that now allow us to see brain activity as a subject 
undertakes a specific task (fMRI and PET scans) and even allow us to compare brain 
activity in response to the same task across a range of participants.  
 
One such study dealing specifically with film viewing was undertaken by Uri 
Hasson et al., and published in 2008 in the film journal Projections. Hasson et al. 
performed functional-MRI scans on participants as they watched a clip from Sergio                                                         
61 Sigmund Freud, ‘Project for a Scientific Psychology’, in The Origins of Psycho-Analysis: Letters to 
Wilhelm Fliess, drafts and notes: 1887-1902, ed. by Marie Bonaparte, Anna Freud, Ernst Kris, trans. 
by Eric Mosbacher and James Strachey (New York: Basic, 1954), pp. 347-445 (p. 349-50). 
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Leone’s The Good, The Bad and the Ugly (1966). The fMRI scanner took continuous 
images showing where brain activity occurred over time. Using a novel methodology 
of inter-subjective correlation (ISC) analysis, Hasson and his colleagues compared 
brain activity similarities across their test-subjects. By comparing the activity in 
specific brain areas with well-established functions, such as the ‘fusiform face area 
(FFA) – a region of the brain believed to be critical for face recognition’, they were 
able to ascertain that ‘the activity […] increased and decreased following a similar 
time course in all viewers’.62 The fact that this brain activity was similar across 
participants suggests that their brains were involved in the same type of processes at 
the same time. When this methodology was extended to different types of film 
(Alfred Hitchcock Presents Bang! You’re Dead (1961), and Larry David’s Curb Your 
Enthusiasm (2000)) it was found that the similarities across participants were 
replicated although the overall brain activity produced was vastly different between 
each film both in terms of the brain areas that were active and the total quantity of 
cortex engaged throughout the viewing process. Where Larry David’s comedy clip 
stimulated 18% of the cortex, Hitchcock’s thriller clip stimulated 65% of the cortex.63 
What this suggests is that not only do audio-visual clips influence or direct brain 
activity but different genres or styles of clip achieve different levels of brain activity. 
When we watch a film or a television programme there is undoubtedly something 
occurring in our brains at the same time as something is happening in our minds.  
 
Hasson begins the article with the intuitive statement that ‘cinema takes 
viewers through an experience that evolves over time, grabbing their attention and 
triggering a sequence of perceptual, cognitive, and emotional processes’.64 It is this 
precise experience that all film theory seeks to explore, unpack and in some ways 
explain. Most often this process is approached from a psychological or top-down 
perspective through an investigation of meanings or morals. What Hasson provides is 
a bottom-up approach that seeks to discover what happens when a viewer watches a 
specific type of filmmaking. The findings, however, are almost automatically scaled-
up from a very basic physiological condition to a highly complex psychosocial state.                                                         
62 Uri Hasson, Ohad Landesman, Barbara Knappmeyer, Ignacio Vallines, Nava Rubin and David J. 
Heeger, ‘Neurocinematics: The Neuroscience of Film’, Projections, n.s., 2 (2008), 1-26 (p. 4). 
63 The experimenters noted that this corroborates the anecdotal evidence of Hitchcock’s mastery and 
‘control’ over his viewers but I believe more comparisons within the thriller/horror genre are required 
before this assertion can be strongly upheld by neurocinematics; Hasson, p. 14. 
64 Hasson, p. 1. 
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There are two important implications of the finding that a movie can 
evoke similar time courses of brain activity across viewers. First, some 
films have the potency to ‘control’ viewers’ neural responses. By 
‘control’ we simply mean that the sequence of neural states evoked by 
the movie is reliable and predictable, without placing any aesthetic or 
ethical judgment as to whether the means to such control are desirable. 
Second, under the assumption that mental states are tightly related to 
brain states (a hypothesis that is widely believed to be true by most 
neuroscientists and many philosophers), controlling viewers’ brain 
states, for our purposes, is the same as controlling their mental states 
including their precepts, emotions, thoughts, attitudes etc.65 
  
The outline above presents an incredibly simplified version of the connectionist 
hypothesis that states that brain states are correlated with psychological states. There 
is no definitive proof of what causes or controls psychological states – as Freud noted 
nearly a century ago – but there are many correspondences that have been 
demonstrated between specific brain areas and mental states. This can be identified in 
neuroscientific theory as the ‘token identity thesis’ which states that ‘the brain is the 
basic substrate of the mind […] there is a correspondence between tokens of mental 
states and tokens of brain states – that every time we think or feel or sense or want 
something there is some process occurring in our brain’. 66 It does not state that these 
correspondences are identical or directly causal across individuals. To claim that the 
brain activity that can be recorded by fMRI or PET scanners alone derives the mental 
state of the individual is, I believe, to reduce the individual to the sum of their biology 
and to negate the cogent and intrinsic effects of psychosocial factors. Similarly, 
focusing exclusively upon the psychosocial factors to the detriment of the 
physiological influences upon so-called mental states is to disembody the human 
being and refuse to acknowledge the inherent corporeality of our existence.  
 
Reintegration: Mind-Brain-Body 
 
 Film theory in the contemporary age needs to adopt a framework that 
considers, with equal emphasis, the influence of physiological and psychosocial 
factors upon the viewing experience – a framework that attempts to avoid reductive                                                         
65 Hasson, p. 3. 
66 Naomi Goldblum, The Brain-Shaped Mind (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), pp. 14-
15. 
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comparisons between ‘the mind’ on one hand, and ‘the brain’ on the other. There is 
no dichotomy between the mind and the brain because they are, essentially and 
irreducibly, parts of the same whole. It is perhaps more accurate to conceive of an 
adaptive mind-brain that integrates stimuli to meet the needs and desires of the 
individual as they navigate the physical and psychosocial landscape. This thesis seeks 
not to undermine theories of mind, like psychoanalysis, but to return them to the 
fundamental question that animates all intellectual analysis – physiological, 
neuroanatomical and psychological – of the human being: how do humans ‘work’? To 
this end, we should not search within or beside the current critical paradigms, but 
beneath them to their assumptions and presumptions so that we may illuminate the 
ways in which the apparently disparate frameworks originate from a similar locus. 
 
Human psychology is underpinned by physiological understanding in a most 
implicit and inescapable manner. Freud recognised the importance of the brain to the 
functioning of the mind long before neuroscience illuminated the micro-functions of 
neurons and sensory fibres. Lacan recognised the Real as the realm of origination, the 
point from which the ego is generated, on which it is based, and it is this tangible 
corporeality that this thesis seeks to return to film theory. Let us take, for example, 
Julia Kristeva’s psychoanalytic account of her theory of the abject. The abject, 
Kristeva claims, is a 
 
massive and sudden emergence of uncanniness, which, familiar as it 
might have been in an opaque and forgotten life, now harries me as 
radically separate, loathsome. Not me. Not that. But not nothing either. 
A ‘something’ that I do not recognize as a thing. A weight of 
meaninglessness, about which there is nothing insignificant, and which 
crushes me. On the edge of nonexistence and hallucination, of a reality 
that, if I acknowledge it, annihilates me. There, abject and abjection 
are my safeguards. The primers of my culture.67 
 
The abject is a crisis of identification, a complex dynamic between self and other, 
object and subject. The objects of the abject are formed at a primal, preconscious 
stage of identity formation that finds bodily wastes, refuse, vomit, corpses, blood and 
other bodily fluids set against the subject as signifiers of the subject’s dissolution. The 
                                                        
67 Julia Kristeva, Powers of Horror: An Essay on Abjection (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1982), p. 2. 
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objectification of these ‘somethings’ is not, however, complete. They are ‘not me’ but 
they are ‘not that’ either – they are neither part of the subject nor wholly 
distinguishable as disassociated objects. It is the fluidity between the categories of 
self/other, object/subject that allow these abjected somethings to produce the intensely 
visceral reaction that humans feel in their presence. The abject is always in an 
intimate relation to the self. 
 
As in true theatre, without makeup and masks, refuse and corpses show 
me what I permanently thrust aside in order to live. These body fluids, 
this defilement, this shit are what life withstands, hardly and with 
difficulty, on the part of death. There I am at the border of my 
condition as a living being.68 
 
Kristeva refers to a psychological process of creating the conscious construct of the 
self – a self that necessarily has to disassociate itself from what came before, which 
for psychoanalytic thought is the familial relationship to the maternal parent who 
becomes the first Other. Her language nevertheless invokes the very tangible 
physicality of the sensation of the abject. The inquiry begins with the physiological 
sensation of repulsion and loathing that generates bodily reactions such as nausea.69 
In essence, Kristeva’s survey of the abject is a phenomenological dissection of the 
physiology of violent disgust: she begins with the affect and attempts to first describe 
what it is, to communicate its multifaceted architecture, before she then offers an 
explanation. This is, however, a process that is inherently blockaded by the fact that 
the abject originates in what Kristeva might recognise as the pre-social or pre-
symbolic order and thus resists adequate expression in the terms of symbolic 
language. Edmund Husserl’s phenomenology followed a similar methodology as it 
attempted to become a ‘presuppositionless science of consciousness’.70 Focusing 
upon phenomena as they are presented to the subjective consciousness of the 
perceiver Husserl’s method involved a number of reductive steps that allow the 
individual to access and appraise the conditions through which they experience the 
world around them. Adapted by Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and later adopted by film 
critic Vivian Sobchack, the phenomenal method has three phases: 
                                                         
68 Kristeva, p. 3. 
69 Kristeva, p. 31. 
70 Dermot Moran, Introduction to Phenomenology (London: Routledge, 2000), p. 126. 
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Phase 1 – the Phenomenological epoch 
‘distancing oneself […] from the taken-for-granted judgments, beliefs, 
and presuppositions that ground our everyday existence as “reality” 
and limit the possibilities for understanding the phenomena’ 
(a) respond to the phenomena as experienced 
(b) discard logical presuppositions 
(c) discard presuppositions of reality 
 
Phase 2 – the eidetic reduction 
Describe and thematize the phenomena ‘in the fullness and potential of 
[its] possibilities for experience’ 
 
Phase 3 – the transcendental reduction 
The world and its constituents are isolated, described and bracketed so 
that what remains is the ‘correlation of intentionality’ that offers ‘a 
description of the phenomena of consciousness’.71 
 
Phase 1 entails the reduction of an experience to its most immediate properties, the 
physical feeling of revulsion generated by the abject for example, and the discarding 
of logical presuppositions that are attached to the phenomenon as we interpret that 
feeling almost simultaneously to its presentation. As soon as that roiling feeling of 
disassociation from one’s own self begins to rise from the stomach, we attach to it the 
signifier ‘nausea’ and all the connotations that our particular schema for this 
physiological phenomenon entails. What phenomenology is interested in is the feeling 
itself, indelibly rooted in sensory neurology, and this is just what Kristeva aims to 
describe. A synthesis of phenomenology, neuroscience and psychoanalytic theory can 
expose the very foundations upon which this ambivalent experience rests, and 
subsequently return the phenomenal body to the experiencing subject.  
 
 The aspect of the phenomenological method that takes Kristeva’s theory into 
the realm of the psychoanalytic is the transcendental reduction that focuses the final 
inquiry upon the ‘correlation of intentionality’ and the reception of a phenomenon by 
the subjective consciousness. Whilst aiming to uncover the properties of human 
experience, phenomenology itself often situates the seat of that experience within the 
mind and somewhat bypasses the physiological body. Indeed, since subjective 
consciousness was considered to be located in the mind, or ego, Husserl did not 
                                                        
71 Vivian Sobchack, The Address of the Eye: A Phenomenology of Film Experience (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1992), pp. 36-37. 
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adequately consider the body until very late in his philosophical career.72 This 
ambivalence towards the body was inherited to an extent by Maurice Merleau-Ponty 
in his own substantial phenomenological project. Although Merleau-Ponty 
acknowledged that ‘the perceiving mind is an incarnated mind’, and he sought to 
establish that ‘one does not account for the facts by superimposing a pure, 
contemplative consciousness on a thinglike body’ he was similarly reluctant to accept 
the partial explanations that scientific discovery could offer to the phenomenological 
endeavour.73 The danger that Merleau-Ponty foresaw was of privileging a science that 
made embodied experience ‘the mere perception of a quality […] the projection of the 
external world in the living body’.74 Kristeva’s method is precisely to outline the 
incredibly corporeal nature of the feeling of abjection – to highlight the physiology 
behind (beneath, within) the psychology. It can, therefore, be viewed as a conceptual 
bridge between science, philosophy and psychology as it attempts to integrate the 
three spheres of understanding.  
 
When addressing the sensation of nausea, Kristeva claims that ‘I give birth to 
myself amid the violence of sobs, of vomit’.75 The abject is not just connected to the 
subjective consciousness but also to the body in both its acts of creation and reaction. 
Kristeva claims that because of the difficulty of distinguishing the abject thing from 
the subject, abjection is concerned with borders. It ‘is something rejected from which 
one does not part, from which one does not protect oneself as from an object’.76 The 
primal border that enables us to conceptualise ourselves (and thus the mind) as a 
‘thing’ is the corporeal border of our bodies. When one is attempting to use the 
phenomenological method to describe an experience that inextricably unites the 
physiology of the individual with the psychosocial processes that influence them, a 
consideration of that very physiology must be appropriate. 
 
                                                        
72 Hugh J. Silverman, Inscriptions: Between Phenomenology and Structuralism (New York: Routledge 
and Kegan Paul, 1987), p. 21. 
73 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, ‘An Unpublished Text by Maurice Merleau-Ponty: A Prospectus of his 
Work’, trans. by Arleen B. Dallery, in The Primacy of Perception, ed. by James M. Edie (Evanston, IL: 
Northwestern University Press, 1964), pp. 3-11 (p. 4). 
74 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, trans. by Colin Smith (London: Routledge, 
1962), p. 55. 
75 Kristeva, p. 3; emphasis added. 
76 Kristeva, p. 4. 
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 If we examine Kristeva’s psychoanalytic theory closely we can see that the 
psychological process of the construction of the subject that allows each individual to 
enter into the symbolic order of psychosocial life is predicated upon a set of 
fundamental principles. Firstly, it assumes that ‘I’ am a distinct entity, different from 
‘you’ and different from ‘that’. It also assumes that ‘I’ am discontinuous with my 
environment. If ‘I’ am discontinuous from my environment, then ‘I’ have a boundary. 
Before any psychosocial order can be established by whatever means the theory first 
assumes: ‘I’ am a thing, ‘I’ am a distinct thing, ‘I’ am a bounded distinct thing. Where 
does this knowledge come from? It originates from a place as primal as Kristeva 
claims the abject to be, the only place it can come from before we even acquire the 
concepts of ‘thing’, ‘distinct’ and ‘bounded’. It comes from our bodies. 
 
 The human body is a collection of individual units – cells, nerves, tissues, 
organs, and organ systems – that retains its homogenous shape as a result of the 
structure of its various bones, muscles, tendons, ligaments and finally, its skin. Our 
perceptive experience as pre-social infants allows us to encounter our own bodies in 
fundamentally structuring ways. We realise we can move arms and legs by force of 
will; that most objects cannot move through our skin, but that they can inflict pain 
upon us; we can manipulate objects, honing fine motor skills, and we learn that when 
we put objects in our mouths we can receive new sensations, sometimes pleasant, 
sometimes not. All of these experiences, which we are not able to process within the 
language system of our species in the formative stages of development, structure our 
knowledge of the fundamental existential truth that I am me and not that. As a result, 
we are able to generate a detailed body schema – a coherent structure of 
understanding that draws directly upon physical experience for its governing 
principles. This schema conceptually reinforces the truism that ‘I’ am a distinct thing, 
so beginning the process that allows the subject to view itself as an individual, one 
thing among a world of many things. 
 
 Secondarily, this motor experience is reinforced by the physiology of the 
human eye that directs how we are able to view the world around us. The eye moves 
in a series of jumps (saccades) alternated with a series of pauses (fixations). During 
each fixation a small section of the visual field is directed upon the fovea, a portion of 
the retina that produces the most acute vision, and the objects in this section are more 
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sharply defined. As the eye moves, the previously sharp object fades in clarity, as 
another object becomes the focus of the fixation. As a result, the visual field appears 
to be comprised of distinct things that seem to be discontinuous with their 
environment. These physiological experiences combine in a body schema – a ‘system 
of sensory motor capacities’ that arise directly from physiological, and crucially pre-
social, experience.77 This schema goes towards forming the primal understanding of 
the individual’s material existence, of their discontinuity from the parent, of their self-
direction and free will. Upon socialisation and the acquisition of expressive language, 
this schema becomes more generalised to that of the container schema, which states 
that a container has a boundary which separates an interior from an exterior.78 
 
 It is only on the premise of this body schema that Kristeva’s process of 
abjection can occur. Had the individual not previously had the very specific 
physiological experience of having a body of a certain sort, and more importantly a 
brain of a certain sort, the schema would and could never be in place. In the 
phenomenological reduction, one has to discard all logical presuppositions. Surely, 
we must also discard (at least temporarily) consciousness itself as the source of these 
presuppositions? If consciousness is an emergent property of the function of the 
human brain then a further reduction is in order: the reduction of conscious structures 
of understanding into their underlying architectural schemata. While the abject 
relation humans have to corpses, wastes and bodily fluids is intrinsically influenced 
by social systems, those very systems are predicated upon the materiality of the 
human species and the reaction to the abject is fundamentally embodied. Something 
cannot be ‘not me’ unless there is first a pre-concept of what ‘me’ is. The confusion 
inherent in the abject is that the abjected things cannot be adequately disassociated 
from me: my vomit is not me, but it is me. In fact, it is more me than the ‘subject’ that 
aims to repel it. What is abjected cannot be completely extricated from the self 
because it is an expression of the material conditions of the genesis of the subject. To 
deny my vomit is to deny the very basis upon which the socialised-I exists. The abject 
thus ‘takes the ego back to its source on the abominable limits from which, in order to 
                                                        
77 Mark Johnson, The Meaning of the Body: Aesthetics of Human Understanding (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 2007), p. 5. 
78 Johnson, The Meaning of the Body, p. 141. 
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be, the ego has broken away’.79 It reduces the subject to its previous form, to the 
entity that was before the subject entered into the symbolic. And what is this source 
upon which the subject-ego was built if it is not pre-social embodied experience? This 
certainly offers an explanation for Kristeva’s choice of abjected materials and 
accounts for the violence that she sees in the abject reactions of disgust, nausea and 
repulsion. Physiological experience underwrites the complex psychosocial processes 
of self-identification and demarcation by offering to consciousness embodied 
schemata of understanding that our experiences must fit if they are to be made 
coherent. 
 
Sum, Ergo Cogito Sum 
 
 There is a tangible link between our physiological experience and the way in 
which we discern meaning; just as there is a tangible link between our psychosocial 
experience and way in which we discern meaning. This is based upon a theory of 
mind that sees the physiological brain as generating the conditions of consciousness. 
But the brain is not itself isolated; rather it is the point at which sensorimotor 
information pertaining to all actions and behaviours of the human organism 
integrates. In a very tangible sense ‘we can think and act only through our bodies’ and 
our bodies structure much more of our cognitive processes than we may realise.80 In 
Philosophy in the Flesh, George Lakoff and Mark Johnson make the claim that, 
 
most of our thought is unconscious, not in the Freudian sense of being 
repressed, but in the sense that it operates beneath the level of 
cognitive awareness, inaccessible to consciousness and operating too 
quickly to be focused on.81 
 
This echoes Berlyne’s earlier assertion that less than 1% of all the information that is 
taken in by the human brain causes a sensory or motoric reaction. The selection 
system suggested by Edelman’s account of the human brain must be operating 
somewhere but it is not on the level of conscious awareness. Of course, psychosocial 
influences can greatly affect the significance of certain stimuli and increase the                                                         
79 Kristeva, p. 15. 
80 Johnson, The Meaning of the Body, p. 2. 
81 George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, Philosophy in the Flesh: The Embodied Mind and Its Challenge 
to Western Thought (New York: Basic, 1999), p. 10. 
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likelihood of certain sensations entering into consciousness, but often those selective 
structures are based upon biologically significant mechanisms. That is, stimuli that are 
harmful and need to be avoided usually make it to consciousness without necessarily 
requiring the intervention of psychosocial processes. Similarly, startling, unexpected 
or incoherent stimuli also usually enter consciousness, if only to facilitate the act of 
making sense of them. The unity of the human being is a complex system designed 
specifically for making sense of the environment, for establishing coherences between 
sensations in order to survive. This process of generating meaning from sensory 
information is possible, precognitively, because ‘meaning traffics in patterns, images, 
qualities, feelings’, in embodied sensations that are directly ‘meaningful’ to the 
organic body.82 It is upon the basis of these embodied meanings that conscious 
concepts and prepositions are built.  
 
Physiological experience underwrites the conditions of the human mind and 
the structures by which we assimilate psychosocial experience but it also structures 
the very mechanisms by which we find and correlate meaning by developing a range 
of embodied schemata that are irrevocably tied to physiology. The container schema 
is one of the most fundamental that will be discussed in this thesis as it gives structure 
to horror’s themes of proper and improper use of the human body, but it is joined by 
movement schema (source-path-goal, up-down, into-out of, toward-away from and 
straight-curved), orientation schema (front-back, top-bottom, and balance), as well as 
schematically structured metaphors (the body as container, the body as fortress and 
up is positive). These physiological schematic modes of comprehension are projected 
upwards as psychosocial schemata are projected downwards in the conscious process 
of viewing a film. When watching a human body onscreen, the recognition of its 
humanness is structured by the container schema, which in turn associates the into-
out of schema that allows us to ascertain what it is and what should and should not 
happen to it. The subsequent (and apparently inevitable with this genre) evisceration 
of the body and the projection of its innards to the outside environment contradict 
both schematic understandings and the act is recognised accordingly as improper. 
Simultaneously, psychosocial experience allows us to attach a gender to the body, 
along with all the connotations that the signifier brings, which furnishes us with                                                         
82 Johnson, The Meaning of the Body, p. 9. 
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sociocultural reasons why eviscerating human bodies is wrong (lawlessness, decay, 
disease, lack of hygiene, lack of compassion) and the result of both influences is the 
psycho-physiological response of shock, fear or terror. 
 
Rather than overwriting film theory with scientific theory, or indeed vice 
versa, a comprehensive methodology should allow for adequate recognition of both, 
as they exist in a state of synthesis with one another. In order for this methodology to 
be rigorous and complete a reduction needs to be made in the initial stages but this 
reduction occurs only with the intention of generating a fuller understanding of the 
nuanced influences that both sides of the spectrum bring to this exploration of the film 
viewing experience. In relation to film, the psychological function of the medium and 
of individual narratives has been consistently and coherently theorised but the 
influence of bodily sensation and embodied knowledge appears to have fallen by the 
wayside. As neuroscience continues to bring new, non-invasive techniques to 
researchers the ways in which the architecture of the brain structures and influences 
the mind are becoming more and more apparent. It is upon this relationship that this 
thesis will focus as it illuminates the bodily sensations that are encoded within 
contemporary horror film. What this project seeks to do is find the tangible threads 
that link our primary physiological experience with the psychosocial experience of 
viewing a film. The following chapters will address a range of contemporary horror 
films in relation to a selection of sensory modalities.  
 
Chapter one, ‘Re-vision: The Eye and the Body’, will attend to the primary 
cinematic sense of vision. It will be argued that the eyes never operate in isolation but 
are always integrated with other sensory organs. Focusing upon Elias Ganster’s Gut 
(2012) and John Erick Dowdle’s The Poughkeepsie Tapes (2007) the specific ways in 
which the tactile sense of touch is embedded in vision will be explored. It will be 
proposed that the stylised cinematography of ‘found footage’ films enacts a re-
embodying of vision that highlights the ways in which sight is indelibly connected to 
the senses, body and mind of the viewer. Extending the notion of cross-modality, 
analysis of Rob Zombie’s House of 1,000 Corpses (2003) will explore the 
phenomenal synthesis of audio-vision in contemporary cinema. It will be argued that 
bravura editing replete with multisensory juxtapositions introduces audio-visual 
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malleability – a type of sensorial exchange – that creates a distinctively ambivalent 
viewing experience.   
 
Chapter two, ‘Vestibular Manipulation’, will explore the sensations of balance 
and orientation. It will be proposed that the vestibular sense of balance is the sense 
that most closely interacts with and disturbs vision. Both the primacy and the 
immediacy of balance to the stability and locomotion of the human body enable the 
experience to act as a primer to orientation-based metaphorical structures of 
understanding. Providing analysis of Marcus Dunstan’s The Collector (2009), it will 
be contended that vestibular manipulation, combined with counterintuitive stimulation 
in the visual and auditory spheres, simulates sensory crises of balance. The ways in 
which this physiological experience interacts with the metaphorical concept of 
balance will be explored through a reading of Neil Marshall’s The Descent (2005). It 
will be proposed that the interaction between sensory stimulation and metaphorical 
simulation amplifies the communication of the extreme bodily sensation depicted in, 
and through, the film. 
 
In chapter three, ‘From the Haptic to the Somatic’, the physiological sensation 
of gustation, a term that involves smell, taste and the visceral ‘touch’ of the inner 
digestive system will be discussed. It will be contended that The Human Centipede 
(2009) and The Human Centipede II (2011) invoke, and at times visually and tactilely 
manifest, the human digestive system in all its physiological and psychosocial 
abjection. The interplay between the sensory modalities that allows this manifestation 
will be explicated in order to demonstrate how the contravention of the body as a 
container metaphor and the into-out of body schemata contribute to the psychosocial 
construction of human waste.  
 
Chapter four, ‘Pain’, will address the bodily sensation that continues to haunt 
horror film. Offering detailed analysis of Pascal Laugier’s Martyrs (2008) and Adam 
Rehmeier’s The Bunny Game (2010) it will be contended that rather than pain being 
incommunicable, as Elaine Scarry and other theorists have suggested, it finds its 
shareability in the mechanisms of the sensation itself. Drawing upon Ronald 
Melzack’s ‘neuromatrix’ theory of pain it will be proposed that pain in horror film 
has to be embodied by multi-layered combinations of sensory stimuli. Moreover, it 
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will be argued that the embodiment of pain in the cinematic experience provides the 
stage upon which its metaphorical significations are acted out. Pain ‘means’ because 
it is felt. 
 
 Finally, a detailed portrait of the sensorial body of the cinematic viewer will 
emerge, not as a purely biological object but as a multifarious, extant being that 
engages with film on multiple levels. The physiological landscape covered in the 
preceding chapters will be excavated and the ways in which bodily sensation 
structures and drives the viewing experience in this intensely embodied cinematic 
genre will be evaluated. The architectural foundations upon which conscious 
interaction with film texts occurs will be uncovered and areas of psychosocial inquiry 
that may provide the conceptual bridges between bodily sensation and the complex 
totality of human cinematic experience will be proposed. 
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Chapter 1 – Re-Vision, The Eye and The Body 
 
In her seminal study of the slasher film, Carol Clover explains that ‘horror 
privileges eyes because, more crucially than any other kind of cinema, it is about 
eyes’.1 With its persistent interest in the demonisation of vision (Peeping Tom [1960]; 
The Ring [1998]; The Eye [2008]; Julia’s Eyes [2010]; Occulus [2014]); its attack on 
the eyeball (The Beyond [1981] The New York Ripper [1982], May [2002], Hostel 
[2005], Saw II [2005] and Saw VII [2010] and Repo! The Genetic Opera [2012]); its 
fondness for the blind monster (Alien [1979]; The Thing [1982]; Jeepers Creepers 
[2001]; the Crawlers of The Descent [2005]; the nurses of Silent Hill [2006]; The Mist 
[2007]); and its preoccupation with the mechanics of looking and technologies of 
surveillance (The Ring [2002], My Little Eye [2002], the Saw series [2004-2011], 
Feed [2005], The Poughkeepsie Tapes [2007], Sinister [2011], The Task [2011], Gut 
[2012], The Bay (II) [2012]) the ocularcentricity of the horror genre cannot be denied. 
Yet – and this is the animating principle of my thesis – this singling out of vision as 
the sense par excellence of horror neglects to consider the fundamental physiological 
concept that no one or two senses are isolated in the dynamic and continual sensory 
experience of the human body. Scopic isolationism, or visual exceptionalism 
simplifies and distorts (to use an inappropriately optical trope) the film experience. 
 
Despite the specialised senses – sight, smell, taste, touch and hearing – having 
organs, tissues and nerve fibres specifically adapted for and dedicated to the detection 
and relay of modality-specific stimuli, the anatomy of the brain does not support the 
theory of independent senses. The parallel distributed processing model of brain 
function states that the cortex of the brain is organised into neural circuits, which are 
adept at performing certain sensorimotor functions. As a result, the brain has multiple 
sensory areas that are principally involved in the detection and processing of a 
particular sensory input. These areas are not, however, functionally isolated as ‘each 
primary sensory area […] sends information to adjacent regions, called the sensory 
association cortex’ and these sensory cortices in turn receive information from more 
than one primary sensory area.2 The visual association cortex found in the occipital                                                         
1 Carol Clover, ‘The Eye of Horror’, in Viewing Positions: Ways of Seeing Film, ed. by Linda Williams 
(New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1994), pp. 184-230 (p. 185). 
2 Neil R. Carlson, Foundations of Behavioural Neuroscience, 8th edn (Amherst: University of 
Massachusetts Press, 2011), p. 69. 
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lobe receives information from the primary visual sensory area as well as the auditory 
association cortex of the temporal lobe and the somatosensory association cortex of 
the parietal lobe. It is by virtue of these interconnected association cortices that 
sensory information is integrated and can be cross-referenced between modalities. 
Such integration is instantaneous and preconscious, that is to say that the coherence 
one experiences between the visual and audible aspects of a sound film, for example, 
is phenomenally accurate because the integration occurs automatically and without 
pause between the stimulation of the sensory organs and the resulting perception.3 
That automaticity, however, can be manipulated by the concomitant presentation of 
juxtaposed, discontinuous or, to use Michel Chion’s terms, anempathetic cross-modal 
stimuli.4 Such sensorial manoeuvring can interfere with the integration of those 
stimuli in order to disturb the coherence of sensory experience. 
 
The human senses, rather than being segregated into a series of distinct 
modalities, are perhaps more accurately viewed as ‘permeable envelopes, folding onto 
and into one another’.5 They are not directly translatable, one cannot see what one can 
hear – except, arguably, in clinical cases of synaesthesia whereby input from one 
sense becomes mistranslated by neural connections resulting in a perceptual output in 
a different modality (for example, a patient may hear the note middle C and see the 
colour red) – but each modality works in combination with others to enable the 
individual to build a dynamic, multisensory model of the phenomenon in question. 
There is no such thing as an exclusively visual experience. If this critical position is 
applied to film, the focus within occularcentric film criticism inherently overlooks the 
additional senses that provide the individual with valuable information concerning 
both their own bodies and the objects and events they perceive and experience.  
                                                         
3 A distinction is needed here between sensation – the physiological process of sensing something with 
the specialised or generalised organs of the body – and perception – the psychological, or conscious, 
interpretation of those sensations into a meaningful array of information. 
4 Michel Chion, Audio-vision: Sound on Screen, ed. by Claudia Gorbman (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1994), p. 8. An example of the manipulation of sensory inputs can be found in the 
McGurk illusion. When simply heard, the English phonemes ‘ba’ and ‘da’ are quite distinct. When 
teamed with incongruent visual information, however, the two sounds can be transposed so that when 
one sees the mouth shape for ‘da’ that is the phoneme that is ‘heard’, even if the sound being played is 
actually ‘ba’ and vice versa. In this instance, vision takes precedence over hearing to alter the 
interpretation of the auditory input and change what the individual ‘hears’. 
5 Jennifer M. Barker, ‘Out of Synch, Out of Sight: Synaesthesia and Film Spectacle’, Paragraph, 31 
(2008), pp. 236-251 (p. 238). 
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It is upon this basis that I wish to issue a challenge to traditional 
understandings of vision in film studies. Drawing upon horror films that foreground 
the dynamics of looking, including Elias Ganster’s Gut (2012) and John Erick 
Dowdle’s The Poughkeepsie Tapes (2007), I will first explore the relationship 
between vision and the tactile sense of touch. Focusing upon the mechanisms of 
visual limitation and distortion within the found footage subgenre, it will be 
contended that explicit and sustained manipulation of the image results in the 
disintegration of visual coherence that invites a tactile, haptic mode of looking. 
Extending this notion of cross-modality, I will then explore the synthesis of audio-
vision in Rob Zombie’s House of 1,000 Corpses (2003). It will be proposed that 
rather than simply complementing one another, the integration of modalities in 
bravura editing techniques provides an element of sensorial exchange as the 
modalities cross over, mingle and augment one another. It will be proposed that, as a 
phenomenon in its own right, a film is not merely watched by the spectator but 
experienced through multiple senses simultaneously and that these combinations of 
stimuli can augment the interpretation of a film, creating a distinctly ambivalent 
viewing experience. Whilst the primary sense of filmic experience may be vision, the 
eye itself allows malleable access to a range of other sensory modalities through 
neural connections and psychosocial associations. The cinematic medium’s ability to 
replicate the multisensory experience of everyday life constitutes a significant 
augmentation of the aesthetics of film stylistics that necessitates the reinstatement of a 
holistic sensorial body in theories of spectatorship. 
 
The Eyes Are Not Alone 
 
 Marion Crane (Janet Leigh) has checked into the Bates’ Motel in Alfred 
Hitchcock’s Psycho (1960). Following a light supper with proprietor Norman Bates 
(Anthony Perkins) she returns to her room to shower and sleep. Listening to the 
sounds of her movements through the wall – a combination of light thuds and 
shuffling accompanied by a quiet violin soundtrack – Norman approaches a framed 
picture. He removes it from the wall to reveal a peephole. He leans forward and peers 
through the hole, high-pitched violins begin to play long, tremolo notes as he watches 
Marion, who stands perfectly central in a frame that is now edged with the blurred 
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black outline of the peephole. In the reverse shot, Norman’s face is fragmented, his 
eye highlighted by the light coming from Marion’s room (Figure 1.1). 
 
The shallow focus directs the viewer’s attention to the fine details of Norman’s eye: 
the wet glint of the eyeball, the delicate fringe of lashes surrounding it and the subtle 
texture of adjacent skin. The repetition of the circular pupil in both Norman’s eye and 
the artificial peephole replicates visually the hierarchy of spectatorship that is 
generated as the viewer watches the voyeur watching the object of his affections. In a 
reflexive layering of vision that is typical of the horror genre, the image of Marion 
that the extra-diegetic viewer receives is transmitted through the eye of the peephole, 
the eye of the filmic antagonist and the eye of the camera.  
 
Yet the viewer does not simply see this scene. Norman’s eye is situated to the 
far left of the visual field in a position that emphasises the concealed nature of his 
voyeurism but decreases the power of his gaze as it alights upon an object outside of 
the visual frame. His eye may be probing and illicit but it is also restricted and 
distanced, its power to discover and control ultimately limited by its vantage point. 
Without the benefit of a facial expression, Norman’s emotions are unclear. The 
strings that provide the soundtrack, however, offer more of an indication as to his 
motivation as they rise from a low timbre to a high tremolo. The increased vibration 
of the string suggests an increase in tension as the audible movement of the note is 
Figure 1.1: Norman Bates’ Optical Fascination in Psycho (1960) 
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superimposed upon the movements of Norman’s eye, and the implied sexual tension 
of his voyeuristic gaze. The intimacy of the images of both Norman’s eye and 
Marion’s undressed body – dominated by the presence of skin, the organ of touch – 
appeals to the tactile nature of human textural experience in such a way that this short 
scene is principally felt rather than only seen. 
 
The technologies of the cinema – in this case visual and audio technologies – 
converge to allow and encourage a multisensory viewing experience. Although this 
scene does replicate the masterful and gendered look that Laura Mulvey identifies in 
her ‘Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema’ essay – particularly the assaultive 
voyeuristic gaze inscribed within the mechanics of the cinema which suggests a 
scopophilic pleasure for the viewer – that is not all that this scene achieves. Like the 
infamous eye-cutting scene from Salvador Dalí and Luis Buñuel’s Un Chien Andalou 
(1929), the wet and soft eyeball connotes the tactile sense in its gleam, its movement 
and its sheer primacy in the scenario. This primacy is intuitive: the eye is the principal 
human sense organ, it allows us access to the world, it facilitates movement, 
experience shows us that it is tender, fragile and perhaps most disturbingly, not 
entirely solid. The eye of horror – the eye that watches, pursues, attacks and is 
attacked – is a primary operator in the conceptualisation of the material world and a 
principal means of accessing our own organic natures. An attack upon the eye – 
whether literally in horror film narratives or figuratively through the assault on the 
viewer’s gaze – is necessarily an attack deeply embedded in embodied knowledge and 
understanding. Losing our eyes is symbolically tantamount to losing ourselves – a 
symbolism literalised in Victor Salva’s Jeepers Creepers (2001) as Derry loses his 
eyes and his life – and this experience of un-existence is grounded in the most violent 
and organic reactions of terror that structure many horror films. Not all attacks upon 
eyes are so explicit in their violence, however, and one subtle disturbance to the 
primacy and safety of vision that has proven successful has been the found-footage 
subgenre. Questioning the reliable cohesion of vision with sensory contrasts and 
overload, this subgenre invites the body into the viewing experience through 
combinations of visual fascination and disturbance. 
 
The found-footage horror film was popularised by Daniel Myrick and Eduardo 
Sánchez’s The Blair Witch Project (1999), which presented hand-held video camera 
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footage lacking in many of the Hollywood conventions of style, form and narrative. 
The ‘found’ footage of The Blair Witch Project was presented ambiguously to the 
audience to the extent that many were initially unsure whether it was real footage that 
had been discovered, or a mock-documentary feature film. Found-footage film uses 
stylistic devices to appeal to a sense of authenticity including: shaky camera work, 
dropped or unseated cameras, unconventional camera angles, unstable colours that 
alternate between full colour, partial colour and monochromatic schemes, abrupt cuts 
between scenes and sections, video decay effects to depict age or damage and unusual 
or absent soundtracks. Although made popular in the late 1990s, these techniques 
have been utilised in extreme horror film for many years in an attempt to portray 
realistic and shocking violence.  
 
Ruggero Deodato’s Cannibal Holocaust (1980), for example, depicts the 
making of a documentary to explain the disappearance of a group of American 
filmmakers attempting to reach the native tribes of the Amazon rainforest. The 
documentary is assembled from the film reels that are recovered from the rainforest. 
The surrounding film retains hallmarks of what has become the conventional style of 
Hollywood-inspired filmmaking: carefully constructed scenes, smooth camera tracks 
and pans with seamless soundtracks. The rediscovered footage, however, is 
characterised by shaky camera movements, the lack or superimposition of sound at a 
later date and poorly composed scenes as the camera often moves behind trees, huts 
and other people to manoeuvre through the rainforest. The resistance to classical 
cinematic techniques represents a break in what might be considered normalcy: the 
filmmakers were in a hostile and unknown environment and the uneasiness of the 
cinematic style denotes instability and apprehension. It also, however, denotes 
volatility and savagery as much of the extreme violence is contained within these 
found footage segments. At moments of high violence, the camera is often most 
unstable as the operator runs, falls or breaks the film and the scene cuts abruptly.  
 
The techniques of found-footage films combine sensory stimuli – light, shade, 
balance, movement, sound – in such a way that the viewing experience is disturbed. 
The film loses itself in its own format as the technologies of the cinema break through 
to assault the viewer in a way that mimics the violence, or frenzy of emotion, often 
portrayed in these scenes. There is a connotative link in many horror titles between 
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the force of physical violence and the force of emotion or sensation. Scenes portrayed 
in the typically unsteady found-footage style often depict terror or the fight-or-flight 
response – most often flight, as in the case of an iconic scene from The Blair Witch 
Project that sees the protagonists fleeing through the forest at night-time. They also 
frequently contain extreme violence which is either shown in graphic detail or is 
performed with the camera; The Last Exorcism (2010), for example, contains a 
harrowing scene of a cat being beaten to death with the camera. In addition to these 
intense physiological states, they frequently portray inappropriate sexual activity as in 
the case of Cannibal Holocaust when two of the missing filmmakers have intercourse 
as native tribes people burn to death behind them. Physical and emotive force is 
mingled in the movement of the camera as sensorial stimulation reinforces the 
increasingly frantic and desperate nature of the narrative events. The more extreme 
the content, the more effective the forceful sensory manipulation is.6 In these 
moments – scarce but pertinent in Ruggero’s film, continuous and almost nauseating 
in Myrick and Sánchez’s – the ‘advanced representation system’ that Laura Mulvey 
identifies in the cinema (that allows high-level psychological processes to enact 
empathic emotion in the viewer) breaks down and is replaced by an altogether more 
immediate physiological experience.7 In engaging the viewer’s body so explicitly the 
perception of the film becomes embodied in such a way that, 
 
the film experience [becomes] a system of communication based on 
bodily perception as a vehicle of conscious expression. It entails the 
visible, audible, kinetic aspects of sensible experience to make sense 
visibly, audibly and haptically.8 
 
At these points of sensory engagement – that Laura U. Marks identifies as haptic, a 
term I shall return to and explain fully later in this chapter – the complex and 
reflexive process of psychological identification and interpretation fade as the body 
comes into clearer focus as the mode of delivery. That is not to say that Ruggero’s 
film ceases to be a commentary on the nature of savagery in the so-called civilised                                                         
6 This connection between the frantic motion of the camera and the power of emotion or violence in a 
scene is one of the many horror tropes parodied by the Scary Movie franchise (2000-2013), which often 
foregrounds the gregarious and unnecessary actions of the camera as it, for example, zooms in and 
collides with characters during tense scenes.  
7 Laura Mulvey, ‘Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema’, Visual and Other Pleasures, 2nd edn 
(London: Palgrave, 2009 [1989]), pp. 14-30 (p. 15). 
8 Vivian Sobchack, ‘Phenomenology and the Film Experience’, in Viewing Positions: Ways of Seeing 
Film, ed. by Linda Williams (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1994), pp. 36-58 (p. 41). 
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world during these scenes but that, momentarily, the viewer’s ideological biases are 
surpassed as the single uniting feature of ‘savage’ and ‘civilised’, the human body, is 
mobilised as the primary vehicle of meaning. The scenes of fear and violence in found 
footage films are literally assaultive: they assault the viewer’s senses. Not all horror 
strives to explicitly manipulate the senses in this manner and the haptic – the tactile – 
can be stimulated through more subtle techniques. The look, any look, is never simply 
a matter for the eyes and mind. Each look is embodied and exists in an existentially 
unique cradle of physiological, psychological, social and cultural interconnections 
that give rise to the individual.  
 
The Look of the Spectator  
 
Elias Ganster’s Gut (2012) is a found-footage film that focuses the viewer’s 
attention upon the mechanics of watching without making use of the traditional style 
of the subgenre. It depicts the relationship between childhood friends Tom and Dan. 
Tom is married with a young daughter. He is bored of his mundane office job and is 
drifting further away from Dan. Dan is a horror film fan and he repeatedly invites 
Tom to watch the latest horror release with him. In a quest to stay abreast of the latest 
horror developments, Dan lists his PO Box address on an Internet forum asking for 
specific out of production films and new releases. What he receives, however, is a 
batch of anonymous discs of found-footage depicting the evisceration of female 
bodies. He shares the discs with Tom and the film follows their respective reactions. 
Their viewing experience is complicated, however, when the victims become people 
Tom and Dan know – Dan’s new girlfriend Sally and eventually, Tom’s wife and 
daughter. 
 
The footage Dan initially receives lasts only a few seconds and depicts a 
female torso in close-up, the palette appears to be dulled as both skin and the white 
sheet behind display a faint blue tint and the shot remains in deep focus so that the 
fine textural details can be clearly seen (Figure 1.2). Blemishes and shadows upon the 
skin are shown as a male hand, covered in a smooth latex glove, moves into the 
frame. It travels down the central axis, slowly, as a finger delicately traces the 
  
52 
contours of the moving torso. Sweat appears to be pooling around the stomach of the 
victim and the tracing finger smears the droplets as it continues its descent.  
 
The soundtrack that accompanies this clip is comprised of muffled whimpering, 
presumably of the victim, and the gasps of air they draw as panic begins to rise. The 
hand moves off screen at the bottom of the frame and the shot cuts to Tom and Dan as 
they watch the clip. Tom reclines on the sofa, brows slightly furrowed with the blue 
tint composing an artfully artificial array of shading across his features that only 
heightens the air of confused attraction expressed in his face. Dan leans forward, eyes 
searching and lips slightly parted in a more recognisable display of pleasurable 
fascination. The two are silent as the whimpering continues to dominate the 
soundscape. Another cut returns to the footage as the hand reappears holding a small, 
curved blade. The smoothness of the metal contrasts with the blemished skin and the 
textured sheet it lays upon. The blade is drawn down the torso, in the same track the 
wandering fingers took a moment earlier as a brief cut (all puns intended) again 
shows Tom and Dan, their reactions constant as deep crimson spills from the newly 
opened wound, and the whimpering gives way to gargled retching. As the blood runs 
across the skin and stains the sheet, the hand, now without its latex cover, slowly and 
repeatedly penetrates the wound. Another cut shows Tom and Dan still watching, 
fascinated, as a disturbing wet sound becomes the soundtrack. The static camera 
neither moves to show what lies on the periphery nor zooms to enhance details of the 
penetrative act yet the deep focus ensures that all details are maintained with equal 
Figure 1.2: Still of the Found Footage from Gut (2012) 
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clarity and importance. Although this marks a stylistic break from the found-footage 
traditions of unsteady camera work, the perspective nevertheless reinforces the same 
questionable visual precedence found in Cannibal Holocaust. The shaky camera of 
Deodato’s found-footage succeeds in both presenting a specifically situated visual 
representation of the purported events and obscuring large parts of the events that may 
alter the subsequent interpretation of the footage. This subjective framing is 
highlighted in the narrative by the inter-diegetic viewing of previous ‘news’ footage 
shot by the same crew that was, in fact, artificially staged: a fiction presented as 
reality, much like Deodato’s own reflexive attempt in Cannibal Holocaust. Gut’s 
static camera achieves much the same end without manoeuvring through the realm of 
authentically amateurish recording. The visual field remains both specifically situated 
and, to a large degree, obscured from the viewer as Tom and Dan are locked into a 
perspective in which motion, and the ability to look away, is implicitly prohibited.  
 
The static camera fragments both the body of the victim and the bodies of the 
inter-diegetic viewers as it serves a dual function: firstly, the camera replicates the 
characters’ inability to look away, tying the inter- and extra-diegetic viewers together; 
secondly, it reproduces a controlling gaze that objectifies the onscreen image by 
ordering its fragmentation. This type of static, fragmentary looking could be said to 
display what Laura Mulvey terms ‘a hermetically sealed world’ that affords ‘the 
spectator an illusion of looking in’ where the focus is very much upon the look.9 The 
segregated scopic space, contained within the boundaries of the screens and cameras 
that constitute it encourages an almost textbook example of the psychoanalytical 
prescription of the voyeuristic look and scopophilic gaze. This type of fascinated, 
masterful gazing is certainly evident in Tom and Dan’s reactions to the footage 
(Figure 1.3). The blue overlay that dominates makes the very act of viewing illicit as 
it brings forth connotations of pornography: this, literally, is a blue movie. 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
9 Mulvey, ‘Visual Pleasure’, p. 17. 
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The camera that records the victim objectifies her, but the camera that records 
Tom and Dan also objectifies them. This foregrounding of the mechanics of vision 
ensures that all avenues of looking in Gut are contained within, and constrained by, 
the visual technologies that enable it. While Mulvey’s theory of spectatorship focuses 
upon the second function of the static camera, and indeed may posit the first function 
as a property of the controlling gaze the camera replicates, I would like to suggest that 
the prolonged and continuous stasis of the camera in Gut serves an alternative 
function to fragmentation and objectification. Western film tradition has rendered 
camera movement, pans, tracks, tilts and zooms, something of a norm. The found 
footage subgenre of horror has promoted almost hysterical amounts of movement as 
an acceptable and effective vehicle for intensifying fear, dread and terror. The fact 
that the camera in Gut remains stationary serves to highlight the staged nature of the 
image by contradicting the innate primacy of motion.  
 
The human eye and brain is designed to perceive and process movement, both 
of one’s own body and of other objects. Movement of the body in space is assessed by 
combinations of proprioceptive input (sensory fibres in the muscles and limbs 
communicate information regarding their position in space on a continuous basis), 
visual input (proprioception is confirmed by our visual registry of where our limbs 
Figure 1.3: Visual Fetishisation of Protagonist, Dan 
  
55 
and external objects are) and vestibular input concerning balance and orientation.10 
This information provides a detailed and highly accurate sense of where the body is 
and what it is doing at all times. The motion of objects and other beings is processed 
by multiple mechanisms within the optic and accessory optic pathways in the brain 
and is facilitated by two specific adaptations of the human visual system: optic flow 
and ocular pursuit. The principle of optic flow counteracts the distortion of the retinal 
image as the body moves through space.11 As the head and eyes move the retinal 
image is subjected to a certain degree of turbulence that is not perceived by the 
individual because of a neural response that allows for the gauging of velocity vectors 
between point of origin and point of destination. In other words, the brain uses 
proprioceptive information to judge its own velocity and factors into the visual field 
the organic equivalent of a digital camera’s image stabilisation. This also enables us 
to see a continuous, steady image when we pan our eyes to the left or right, even 
though human eyes move in a series of saccades and fixations. Ocular pursuit is a 
resultant property of the fovea that allows moderate and continuous movements to be 
tracked, even if those movements are interrupted in the visual field.12 If an object 
moves across the visual field, an animal with a fovea – some fish, birds, reptiles, but 
amongst mammals only the simian primates posses a fovea – that animal will be able 
to track the movement and accurately predict its continued trajectory if the object 
passes behind an obstacle.  
 
When we move, a series of motor neurons are activated that stimulate and 
control the various muscles and tendons involved in performing an action. Reaching 
out to grasp a cup of water will produce a neural motor pattern that governs 
everything from preparing to move the arm to counteracting the force of gravity with 
the correct upward force to lift the cup without spilling its contents. There is evidence 
that demonstrates that when a person thinks about performing an action, the same 
neural motor pattern is produced in the brain even though no action is actually 
                                                        
10 The intricacies and importance of the vestibular system will be explored in more detail in the 
following chapter. 
11 Alain Berthoz, The Brain’s Sense of Movement, trans. by Giselle Weiss (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2000), p. 60. 
12 Berthoz, p. 62. 
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taken.13 The neurons that simulate these ‘actions’ are commonly termed mirror 
neurons and they can activate in a variety of situations, including: when one thinks 
about performing an action; when one watches someone else perform an action; and 
when one hears action words such as ‘kick’ or ‘stand’. It seems that ‘humans […] 
internally simulate the action which’ is thought of, or even read out to them, in a way 
that incorporates the bodily experience of our own movement.14 The human visual 
system, then, has a certain propensity towards movement and is organised around the 
detection, analysis and prediction of it in a way that mirrors the primacy of motion in 
our everyday lives, thus defining it as a distinctly vital component in the gathering of 
information. The lack of motion inherent within the mechanical eye of the camera in 
Gut, therefore, creates a problematic tension. If ‘the body […] forms our primal 
perspective or mode of engagement with the world’ then the most natural mode of 
interacting with the world, real or fictive, would entail re-enacting those modes of 
embodied interaction.15 The human brain functions most generally ‘as a hypothesis 
generating machine’, taking in sensory information and proposing coherent scenarios 
of objects and events: in order to perform this function, it seeks out sensory 
information through moving its parts – its limbs, head, and eyes – and its self through 
the world around it.16 
 
Our eyes and our bodies were made to move. Being trapped within the look 
that does not move creates a disquieting, expectant tension. As if the stasis of the 
camera were being placated, the deep focused close-up shots that characterise Gut 
induce a kind of paradoxical visual frenzy that encourages furtive investigation of 
what is seen even as the look is disempowered and ‘locked down’. The human 
sensory system is an interconnected network of detectors that continually and                                                         
13 Olaf Hauk and colleagues explored the neuronal representation of action words (‘lick’, ‘kick’, ‘pick’) 
during a passive reading task and discovered that some of the same motoric nerves involved in 
performing the action are also utilised in the metaphorical representation of that word. Similarly, 
Evelyne Kohler et al. investigated the mental representation of objects and actions through associated 
sounds, again finding that some of the same neurons involved in the experience of the object were also 
utilised in the comprehension of the associated sound. Olaf Hauk, Ingrid Johnsrude and Friedmann 
Pulvermuller, ‘Somatotopic Representation of Action Words in Human Motor and Premotor Cortex’, 
Neuron, 41 (2004), 301-7; Evelyne Kohler, et al., ‘Hearing Sounds, Understanding Actions: Action 
Representation In Mirror Neurons’, Science, 297 (2002), 846-48.  
14 Christina Jung and Peggy Sparenberg, ‘Cognitive Perspectives on Embodiment’, in Body Memory, 
Metaphor and Movement, ed. by Sabine C. Koch, Thomas Fuchs, Michela Summa and Cornelia Muller 
(Philadelphia: John Benjamins, 2012), pp. 141-154 (p. 141-2). 
15 Richard Shusterman, Body Consciousness: A Philosophy of Mindfulness and Somaesthetics 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), p. 2. 
16 C. U. M. Smith, Biology of Sensory Systems (Chichester: Wiley, 2000), p. 402. 
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consistently cross-matches each of its individual perceptions, compares them to 
previous physiological and psychosocial experience and generates a coherent scenario 
of what is most likely to be happening. For example, if a large portion of the visual 
field moves, the brain will most often assume that the individual has moved and the 
world has stayed stationary, creating a momentary sensory discomfort as the 
individual seems to feel him or herself in motion. Consulting the vestibular system, 
however, confirms that the individual is stationary and the illusion is broken within 
seconds. When one sense is disabled, or providing information that is discontinuous 
with our previous knowledge or experience, the brain turns to other senses to assist in 
ascertaining the coherence of a particular event. The static camera of Gut sequentially 
reinforces the cinematic frame, marooning vision in a frustratingly limited position 
that, by its inadequacy and the inherent desire to want to follow the movement of 
characters and objects off screen, actually offers a way to break that frame by 
heightening engagement with other not so explicitly framed senses. As the viewer 
stares back at Dan’s face the inability to associate that with the concomitant reverse-
shot produces a visual fascination with what the viewer can see: the odd angle of 
Dan’s glasses, the contrast between his pale skin and dark features, the slight sheen of 
sweat on his forehead, the slight downturn of his eyes that is mimicked by the shape 
of his pursed lips, the glint of light reflected upon his glasses, eyes, lips and skin all 
reinforce a kind of textural exploration of a single image. The viewer disengages from 
the narrative in order to explore the oscillating contours of a single frame among the 
flow of many. 
 
Linda Williams’ subtitle – the frenzy of the visible – is invoked very 
consciously here for its association with both fascination and pornography. It would 
be remiss not to note the pornographic qualities of Gut: the vaginal imagery of the 
wound, the penetration of the wound by the male hand, the fascinated voyeurism of 
Tom and Dan, and the blue tint that suffuses their acts of spectatorship. It would also 
be neglectful to ignore horror’s on-going dalliance with pornography – from Michael 
Findlay’s Snuff (1976) and the literal conflation of sex and death, to its contemporary 
counterpart in Srdjan Spasojevic’s A Serbian Film (2010) – which often results in ‘a 
perverse displacement of pornographic hard-core sexual activities, which typically 
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end in penetration, onto the penetrating violation of the body’s very flesh’.17 The 
sexual organs ‘become’ the body as the conventions of horror and porn comingle and 
pollute the semantic stability of the image. Horror’s version of the pornographic often 
begins with penetration, of course, as the weapon of choice slashes and hacks its way 
through the vulnerable flesh of the victim to reduce the body to a symbol of the sexual 
organs. The epitome of the complete conflation of the sexual organs and the wound is 
the act of intercourse with/through the wound (Andy Warhol’s Frankenstein (1974), 
Crash (1996), Deadgirl (2008)) that openly exchanges one for the other, confusing 
the bodily acts and sensations of sex and death in the extreme. This confusion is 
enabled partly because the symbolic system that organises the various body parts and 
orifices becomes confused within the narrative – in Crash, for example, the 
psychological trauma of physical injury leads to a perverse fixation upon the wound 
as a sexual object and a means to ratify one’s material existence – but partly because 
‘correct’ orifices and ‘incorrect’ wounds share a common function: they open the 
fortress of the human body. The opening of the body exposes the vulnerable interior 
and ties the experiencing subject to their most material form through undeniably 
organic processes and sensations – eating, excreting, sex, birth, death – that act as the 
gateway to a sensorial pleasure/pain continuum.18 The figurative, and sometimes 
literal, ‘replacement of orgasm’s ‘little death’ by real death’ is possible because the 
resultant sensations are of the same order – death arguably, and paradoxically, 
requires the same moment of surrender to the viscerally organic that orgasm does as 
physiological control is relinquished permanently (death) or temporarily (orgasm). 
They are both primarily and fundamentally of the body and this is why horror and 
pornography resonate with one another so explicitly.19  
                                                         
17 Linda Williams, Hard Core: Power, Pleasure and the Frenzy of the Visible (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1989), p. 192. 
18 A continuum not because they are directly related, as the adage ‘pain is close to pleasure’ may 
suggest, but because the tangible qualities are phenomenally similar: visceral, subconscious, 
precognitive, primal. 
19 The united front of sex and death in the horror film is not unique to this contemporary turn of 
embodied, extreme horror. From Mark Lewis’ murder of prostitutes and supply of pornographic 
material to a local adult outlet in Michael Powell’s Peeping Tom (1960) and Norman Bates’ sexual 
desires in Psycho (1960), to the low-budget Snuff (1976), the sexually charged slasher-cycle of the 
1980s analysed by Carol Clover in Men, Women and Chain Saws, and rape-revenge titles including 
Meir Zarchi’s I Spit on Your Grave (1978), recently remade by director Steven R. Munroe – the union 
between the two body genres perseveres and, perhaps more importantly, sells. What is crucial for this 
investigation of extreme horror is the way in which the sex-death combination opens the body – both 
onscreen and off – to sensorial stimulation in an increasingly effective and reliable manner. Mingling 
horror and pornography provides a shortcut to generating visceral affect in the viewer. 
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This resonance is, however, a complex biopsychosocial mechanism that is 
somewhat ahead of the argument at this juncture. The salient point is this: the material 
existence and experience of the human body can enable seemingly disparate concepts 
such as sex and death to be so entangled with one another that, on occasion, 
contemporary cinema cannot separate the two. Horror’s incestuous relationship with 
pornography, then, retraces the genre’s troubled communion with the body and 
problematizes the emotional effects of extreme horror. Horror/pornography 
exemplifies the attraction/repulsion dialectic of Julia Kristeva’s abject: it excites and 
horrifies, horrifies because it excites (in a physiological sense it causes an increase in 
energy or activity without that rise being explicitly coded as positive or immediately 
sexual). The marriage of sex and violence in contemporary horror acts as a 
magnifying conduit, uniting highly emotive and distinctly embodied fields of 
knowledge and understanding in order to excavate a visceral avenue of affect that 
extends from the film onscreen to the very heart of the viewing individual.  
 
This kind of cinematic control, that directs the viewer through one level of 
psychosocial engagement to another level of physiological engagement, is a subtle 
manifestation not only of the enduring anxiety pertaining to sexuality and certain 
sexual practices but also of the 
perceived influence of the media. 
Reflected in the on-going 
campaigns by Mediawatch-UK 
(formerly the National Viewers 
and Listeners Association) against 
‘content which is potentially 
harmful’ and the association 
between media representations 
and violent crime noted in the 
previous chapter, the link between 
violent images and violent acts is 
theoretically tenuous but 
Figure 1.4: Videodrome (1983, top) and Gut (2012, 
bottom) 
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arduously enduring.20 The imagery of the clip in Gut with its prone, helpless body and 
vertical incision recalls David Cronenberg’s Videodrome (1983; Figure 1.4, above) as 
protagonist Max Renn is slowly corrupted by another form of mediated looking, a 
broadcast television signal. As the Videodrome’s influence over Renn’s psychology 
grows and he begins to hallucinate, a vertical wound opens in his stomach. 
Videotapes are inserted into the wound and are then ‘played’ into Max’s mind, 
controlling his thoughts and influencing his actions. Although the role of the mediated 
image, represented by television and video in Videodrome, is less heavy-handed in 
Gut the parallel remains: Tom and Dan are, like Max Renn, so fascinated by the 
violence onscreen that they find themselves willingly transgressing the boundaries of 
good taste in watching what appears to be snuff footage.  
 
Both Videodrome and Gut use the mechanisms of looking to explore the 
ability of media technologies to create ambiguous images in a manifestation of the 
‘long-standing struggle with the role of the media in modern societies’.21 Chuck 
Tryon notes that the cycle of found-footage horror at the turn of the twenty-first 
century juxtaposes various visual or surveillance technologies with horrific imagery 
in order to suggest ‘that electronic media will lead to fragmented social relationships 
because of their illusion of authenticity and their potential to further isolate people 
from a larger community’.22 An extension of a capitalist critique of the media, this 
view draws upon the function of representation as one that distances the viewer from 
the objects that are represented onscreen. The image of a naked female body projected 
through the media is not only representative of a naked female body, but also of the 
gender dynamics that Mulvey identifies in the cinematic apparatus; it speaks of the 
organic but it also speaks of the psychosocial significance of that image. Mediatised 
images are never simply representative of what they portray but also encode a type of 
illusion whereby the image of a body comes to be more significant than the body 
itself. As was noted in the introduction, there is ‘an unlimited display of physicality in 
                                                        
20 Mediawatch-UK, Home Page (2013) < http://www.mediawatchuk.com>, [accessed 20 August 2014] 
(para. 1 of 3). 
21 Lajos Császi, ‘Towards a Cultural Framework of Audience Response and Television Violence’, 
CLCWeb: Comparative Literature and Culture, 10 (2008), 
<http://docs.lib.purdue.edu/clcweb/vol10/iss3/2>, [accessed 25 October 2011] (p. 2). 
22 Chuck Tryon, ‘Video From The Void: Video Spectatorship, Domestic Film Cultures, and 
Contemporary Horror Film’, Journal of Film and Video, 3rd ser., 61 (2009), pp. 40-51 (p. 40). 
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mass culture’ yet the body that surrounds us is not a body per se but an image of a 
body.23  
 
In Videodrome, Renn’s body is controlled by the Videodrome signal in the 
same way that the media companies construct and control the omnipresent image of 
the body in contemporary culture. When Videodrome’s Brian O’Blivion explains to 
Renn that ‘there is nothing real outside our perception of reality’, there is an 
implication that this perception is, perhaps, generated by the media and given to the 
individual as ‘reality’. Certainly, the Videodrome became Max Renn’s reality as he is 
driven to first murder and then suicide by the controlling technology. In Gut, 
however, the primacy of the mediated image of the body and the assumption that it is 
an image untethered to organic reality is problematized.  
 
The mode of viewing created by the film is principally embodied with both 
Tom and Dan having a connotatively sexual reaction to the footage. That reaction is 
disturbed, however, when the perceived safety of the anonymous image – the 
assumption that it is unreal, staged, or part of a work of fiction – disintegrates as the 
victims become identified as ‘real’ bodies. The only time the camera pans in Gut is to 
reveal that victim three is Sally, Dan’s girlfriend. This single, quick movement as the 
camera moves up to Sally’s face and then back to her stomach offers the viewer the 
visual freedom that had previously been denied by the insistently stationary camera 
only to counter that freedom with the implication of complicity in the act. The 
mediated image is no longer representative or symbolic, it is no longer an image but 
an actual body. Moreover, the viewer (Dan) is identified as both the intended recipient 
and a causal factor in the creation of the footage. The representation system of the 
cinema fades and the sanctity of viewership is questioned in a purposely-confused 
moral dilemma that teeters on the borders of the body/image.  
 
In using technology in this manner, however, films also foreground their own 
inherent bias as they both ‘enframe and reveal’ the image presented and the method of 
technological presentation.24 In Deodato’s commentary on savagery, the deceptive                                                         
23 Marzena Kubisz, Strategies of Resistance (Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 2003), p. 8. 
24 Joost Van Loon, ‘Enframing/Revealing’, in Ethics and Media Culture, ed. by David Berry (Oxford: 
Focal Press, 2005), pp. 54-72 (p. 57). 
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nature of ‘news’ reporting is outlined by the revelation that hard-hitting footage of an 
event was entirely staged – a process that is then reinforced by the mock-documentary 
style of the film. The commentary upon the media becomes reflexive, projected 
towards the extra-diegetic viewer as the inter-diegetic ones are annihilated by the 
ambiguities of technological influence and control.25 Cannibal Holocaust, 
Videodrome and Gut provide representations of the act of representation, which 
serves to question the authenticity of the media involved. We are looking now at 
looking and more specifically at how looking can never take place in isolation from 
the richness of human experience. Mechanical representation, like human vision, is 
subjectively constructed – in other words, the camera always lies, vision is always 
from a specified perspective – and it is this subjectivity that opens the mediatised 
image to exploration in the same way that the human body is literally opened in the 
horror film. The opening of the body onscreen performs a cinematic sleight-of-hand 
that takes the image into the symbolic (for the extremity of such violence can only be 
an illusion in a representative medium that perpetually presents unreality as reality) 
and simultaneously, through its very visceral subject matter, into the realm of organic 
corporeality. The significance of the image of the body – the fact that it is inscribed 
with multiple structures of meaning through its indelible relevance to both our 
existence and our society – returns the viewer to their own insidious (at least in the 
current context) organicity as the viewer’s eye ‘move[s] over the surface of [the 
image] rather than [plunging] into illusionistic depth’.26 As the body onscreen is 
opened, augmented, dismembered, violated and murdered, the body watching is 
similarly opened, stimulated, manipulated and affected as optical modes of looking 
for meaning elide with a haptic mode of viewing. 
 
                                                        
25 This critique of technology and the mechanics of its misleading vision echo the development of the 
understanding of human vision as subjective, situated and biased that Jonathan Crary explores in 
Techniques of the Observer. At the outset of scientific endeavour vision was conceptualised as an 
exterior process that simply represented an objective truth to the seer. As physiological understanding 
has developed, however, vision has become internalised and individualised within the body to become 
a process that represents those facets of the environment that are of highest biological and cultural 
importance to the person who sees. 
26 Laura U. Marks, The Skin of the Film: Intercultural Cinema, Embodiment and the Senses (Durham: 
Duke University Press, 2000), p. 162. 
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The Haptic Mode of Looking 
 
The type of looking that is encouraged by these highly detailed but 
fragmentary images of opened bodies is a mode termed the haptic by critics including 
Vivian Sobchack and Laura U. Marks. Of this mode, Marks writes that 
 
certain images appeal to a haptic, or tactile, visuality. Haptic images, I 
suggest, invite the viewer to respond to the image in an intimate, 
embodied way, and thus facilitate the experience of other sensory 
impressions as well. These sense experiences are not separate, of 
course […] they inform each person’s sensorium, the bodily 
organization of sense experience.27 
  
To look at an image or film frame in the haptic mode is to attend to the fine textural 
detail of the image as in a field of vision. It is a process that occurs before meaning-
making has been completed and, as will be argued below, it forms an integral part of 
the meaning that is subsequently constructed. To take a haptic look at an image is to 
allow the eye to see what is put before it without imposing interpretations or 
symbolisations onto the objects and events seen. It is, however, a mode of looking 
facilitated in horror by an immediate and visceral recognition of significance within 
an image – a significance structured by organic experience. This bodily experience 
and understanding is not so much outside of social or cultural determinants as it is 
beneath them. The haptic is a different, perhaps more primal, certainly more 
phenomenally immediate mode of viewing that gives access to the experiences that 
need to be socially and culturally coded in order for coherence to be made of them.  
 
A tacit assumption of this mode of seeing is that the body, and specifically the 
eye, is not an isolated organic unit that operates under the direction, or on behalf of, 
the conscious individual but is the very mode of being and experiencing itself. The 
problematic mind-body split that traditionally privileges consciousness over 
physicality is redressed within a theory of haptic vision. Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s 
claim that ‘through the phenomenal body we are in a constant relationship with an 
environment into which that body is projected’ approaches the mind-body distinction 
                                                        
27 Marks, The Skin of the Film, p. 2. 
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but fails to nullify the inherent opposition of the two terms.28 It is not ‘through’ the 
body that ‘we’ contact the world but rather, the body is a composite part of ‘us’ as we 
are in the world. Phenomenologically, and particularly for haptic visuality, the mind 
can be conceptualised as an expression of the physiological existence and experience 
of the individual such that consciousness, as we understand it, arises as a by-product 
of the neurological and physiological structures of the human body, and particularly 
the central nervous system. This fledgling consciousness, in constant contact with the 
physical and psychosocial world in which it exists, is then physiologically and 
socially influenced. It is this embodied experience that underpins our conscious 
perception of our selves and the world. Body horror and extreme film are able to 
access the body of the viewer through the coherent simulation of bodily sensation in 
the haptic mode of looking accessed through the subject matter of the narrative. 
 
 Marks’ theory of the haptic, set out in The Skin of the Film, posits two 
different but interconnected angles of approach. In her borrowing of the term from 
Aloïs Riegl, Marks acknowledges both a haptic image and a haptic visuality. Haptic 
images, following Riegl’s definition, are associated with a visual sharpness that 
invites the experience of touch into the detailed textures of the visual field.29 The 
consistent use of deep focus in Gut allows such haptic images to be offered to the 
viewer. Textural details of fabric and skin are visible, colour tints emphasise shape 
and form and repeated images of fetishised gazing mimetically encourage a higher 
level of visual scrutiny from the viewer. The visual textures of the elements within the 
frame seem to emerge from the image and invite the viewer’s attention in a way that 
leads into the sensorial scrutiny of individual details rather than an assessment of 
narrative context. Haptic visuality, however, refers to a viewer’s willingness to 
engage in the type of looking that these images offer. It is possible, for example, to 
look at what Marks would define as a haptic image with a more traditional cinematic 
gaze. The eviscerated female torso being penetrated by the male hand can be viewed 
in its totality as a representation of the psychodynamics of gender hierarchy. The deep 
focus that creates the sustained detail of the shots can be seen as a mechanism for 
promoting spectacle, for dehumanizing the female torso and encouraging the                                                         
28 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The Phenomenology of Perception, trans. by Colin Smith (Henley: The 
Humanities Press, 1962), p. 396. 
29 Marks, The Skin of the Film, p. 162. 
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masterful male gaze. The restraint of the female, the objectification of her body, the 
power of the male (reflexively reinforced in Mulvey’s model of spectatorship through 
the apparatus itself), and the ritualised penetration of the female body can be read as 
signifiers of a deep social conflict between male and female that returns us to early 
psychoanalytic film readings. The return of the repressed – female sexuality iconised 
by the curvaceous midriff, stylised artificial vagina and the final act of violence 
against the mother and her daughter – and the mastering of that repressed entity 
through its annihilation can easily and perhaps productively be uncovered here in 
Gut’s narrative and iconography. 
 
Such a reading, however, suggests that the viewer not only automatically 
senses and perceives both what is shown in the image and what that image means but 
that this social context is the primary force that drives interpretation. It is the social 
significance of the bodies as male and female – distinct social categories irrefutably 
bound with the history of modern society and the hierarchies and struggles they 
contain – that dictates the route of interpretation and directs the viewer to seek 
coherences based upon the schemata associated with gender categories. These 
schemata, webs of connotations that have been woven together through generations of 
sociocultural history and experience, are not necessarily ontologically linked to the 
material origin of the social categories; they are not principally embodied. Indeed, 
Mulvey’s theory of spectatorship assigns the labels ‘male’ and ‘female’ to viewing 
positions, largely irrespective of the actual gender of the individual occupying them. 
Similarly, Carol Clover’s exploration of character roles and identification 
mechanisms in the slasher film proposed that gender itself was not clearly demarcated 
and that ‘male’ and ‘female’ often elided with one another and oscillated disturbingly 
through the intimacy between slasher villain and the Final Girl. There is no attempt 
here to deny the validity or political drive of this type of critical framework, it is 
simply being noted that although the language purports to speak of the body, the 
critical application routinely departs from the organic in favour of the psychosocial. 
Beneath the very concepts of gender, however, lie structures of embodied 
understanding that guide and influence interpretation. 
 
Haptic images resist the cultural predisposition to overlook embodied 
experience in favour of social signification by separating the process of sensing – a 
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physiological one – from the process of perceiving – a psychosocial one. By drawing 
attention to the very form of the image – to its colours, lines, shapes, to the textures, 
both expected and unexpected, to the way things move and to the grain of the film 
medium – the viewer is invited to allow the eye to wander. This invitation is not 
prescriptive: there is not a single avenue of exploration but many, threading 
themselves over the surface of the image to create a sensorial tapestry of the viewing 
experience. By drawing attention to this alternative mode of viewing the 
‘representational power of the image’ is diminished as haptic visuality ‘privileges the 
material presence of the image’ itself.30 The emphasis is resituated from what the film 
represents to the experiences it can present to the viewer. The haptic image invites the 
viewer to approach it not as a pre-constituted unity to be deciphered but as a re-
creation of the visual experience of everyday life. The form of the image takes 
precedence as a structural component of the content of that image.  In this re-creation 
the viewer must integrate their various sensory perceptions in order to construct 
coherence and ultimately create meaning from and within the haptic image. While the 
haptic image adopts visual clarity to invite the sense of touch into the experience of 
vision, haptic visuality can be equally encouraged by a lack of visual acuity that 
inhibits the ability to interpret the image within a narrative context. The found footage 
subgenre is particularly adept at manipulating this lack of visual precedence in order 
to stimulate alternative sensory modalities. Whilst Gut subverted the aesthetic 
expectations of found footage by restricting camera movement, The Poughkeepsie 
Tapes (2007) combines visual-vestibular distortion in association with video decay 
effects to generate an anti-Hollywood, mock-documentary style narrative that 
formally undermines the power of the coherent visual image. 
 
The Poughkeepsie Tapes (2007), along with other contributions to the found-
footage subgenre including V/H/S (2012) and Sinister (2012), continues the tradition 
of adopting poor quality video recording in order to both enhance the viewing 
experience and question the role of technology in the display of violent imagery. As 
Xavier Aldana Reyes argues, the focus upon mediated images in The Poughkeepsie 
Tapes, together with its ‘unreleased’ status, explores the anxieties around ‘the 
possible misuses of new and more immediate systems of image recording and file                                                         
30 Marks, The Skin of the Film, p. 163. 
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sharing’ that ultimately mediates the depiction of violence and its subsequent 
consumption.31 Although The Poughkeepsie Tapes had a small theatrical opening in 
America, it has subsequently only been accessible through online file sharing 
networks and video platforms like Vimeo and YouTube. These video files, however, 
regularly disappear and reappear on different platforms. The cultural mythology of 
the film is built upon this notion of ephemerality as it stands on the border of fiction 
and documentary, thus continually questioning its own acts of representation. I would 
like to supplement Reyes’s claim by proposing that this questioning is largely 
facilitated by the medium’s propensity to prevent the viewer from relying exclusively 
upon vision to discern the events of the narrative. It is not only ‘the act of viewing’ 
that The Poughkeepsie Tapes questions but the legitimacy of the act of viewing in a 
technologically multisensory culture.  
 
The Poughkeepsie Tapes presents a documentary style recording that makes 
use of video footage discovered in the house of an alleged serial murderer. Both the 
documentary footage and the discovered tapes are of low resolution with many 
sequences fading, distorting and physically degrading as the viewer watches.32 
Typically, and in contrast to Gut, the images are grainy and out of focus. In addition 
to this the colours often distort so that the contrast between certain objects and 
features is disrupted or elided completely. Figure 1.5, below, shows the kind of colour 
shift that is present throughout scenes and the film as a whole. In this example a 
victim is drugged with chloroform in front of the handheld camera that records the 
killer’s acts. The camera is stationary as the victim’s head moves from side to side. 
                                                        
31 Xavier Aldana Reyes, ‘Violence and Mediation: The Ethics of Spectatorship in Twenty-First 
Century Horror Film’, in Violence and the Limits of Representation, ed. by Graham Matthews and Sam 
Goodman (London: Palgrave, 2013), pp. 145-159 (p. 146); (p. 156). The Poughkeepsie Tapes has 
received surprisingly little critical attention, getting only a notational mention in Alexandra Heller-
Nicholas’ Found Footage Horror Films (Jefferson: McFarland, 2013) monograph, perhaps owing to its 
low budget and lack of commercial success. Irrespective of its commercial standing, the film is notable 
for its peculiarly disturbing style and the way in which it elides the primacy of vision through the 
systematic destruction of that sense. 
32 Video decay is an effect commonly used in this particular subgenre in an attempt to increase the 
authenticity of the ‘discovered’ footage. Scott Derrickson’s Sinister (2012), for example, uses the 
melting of 8mm videotape to suggest an increased age to the discovered footage in that narrative. It is 
also a technique that has been employed in music video. The White Zombie track More Human Than 
Human features a video structurally similar to The Poughkeepsie Tapes: two streams of footage are 
interlaced, with one being representative of old home videos. This stream is artificially aged in a way 
that, like the intermittent and discontinuous clips of Poughkeepsie, evokes the authenticity and validity 
of represented images.  
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The image continuously breaks down into static and returns with a different colour 
scheme without a conventional cut or editing technique being immediately evident. 
 
While this kind of visual instability does contribute to the sense of authenticity that 
the mock documentary film is attempting to build, it also renders it increasingly 
difficult for the viewer to engage with the represented events in a psychologically 
meaningful manner. The structure of the film interpolates two streams of footage: the 
first is a documentary that is more visually consistent, and the second is the found 
footage of the killer’s acts. The alternating of these two streams necessarily fragments 
the narrative as the reservoir of found footage clips is shown out of sequence and out 
of context. As such, each clip appears isolated in the run of the film and there is little 
opportunity for the narrative to build tension or momentum. The effect of such 
structuring is distinctive in that the display of the supposed found footage appears as a 
type of fascinated looking as the documentary makers and police watch the tapes and 
attempt to piece together the events and actions they depict. This in turn encourages 
the viewer to look from one aspect of the image to the next, appreciating each in 
isolation, without comprehending the totality of those elements or the potential 
significance of them.  
 
 The fascinated look is manifest in Gut and The Poughkeepsie Tapes through 
the repeated focus upon the gaze of characters within the films. In Gut the face is 
most often shown in a state of ambiguous arousal as the protagonist fixedly stares at 
the screen, lips pursed and sweating lightly. In The Poughkeepsie Tapes the faces of 
victims are typically distorted by the home video aesthetic. Figure 1.6, below, shows 
two parts of a lingering zoom that refocuses the image from the full body of the 
victim to her fearful face.  
 
 
 
Figure 1.5: Colour Alterations in The Poughkeepsie Tapes  
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Just prior to the zoom commencing the grainy, monochrome scheme of the image is 
replaced with the distressed, multi-coloured overlay of degrading film. The curtain 
that hangs behind the victim becomes pixelated and distorted by the green and yellow 
hues that seem to wash over it and the woman’s body. The image is given a sense of 
movement by the repeated weaving of the lines in the background that appeals to the 
viewer’s sense of their own bodily movement and balance as the film appears to be 
threatening to degrade before their eyes. The coarseness of the colour transitions and 
the graininess of the image appeal to the viewer’s experience of texture as the film 
seems to be fragmenting and breaking apart, its tears evident in the abrupt lines and 
harsh, almost dazzling contrast. As the camera zooms closer the contrast of the image 
appears to increase so that the boundaries of the woman’s face disappear into 
whiteness and become tinted with purple hues that hint at the violence she may 
shortly be suffering. Whereas Gut invokes texture within the image, The 
Poughkeepsie Tapes invokes texture upon the image by using visual technologies to 
replicate the same kind of granularity associated with touch. The image fluctuates 
throughout The Poughkeepsie Tapes between alternate modes of visuality: between 
the authenticity of the documentary style footage and the sensorial quality of the 
found footage. The narrative emerges in fits and starts as pieces of linear coherence 
are interspersed with sensory incoherence and interruption. The two modes of 
viewing are effectively layered – narrative coherence, available to consciousness 
through a complex web of psychosocial connotations, sits atop a roiling sea of almost-
overwhelming sensory experience – as haptic knowledge is enmeshed with 
psychosocial engagement. As the camera begins to zoom in on the woman’s fearful 
face and the image begins to distort a juncture is created – a point of contact between 
the modes of looking that allows the viewer to move between the two, to disengage 
from the attempt to create narrative coherence and become preoccupied with the 
sensory quality of the image. This splitting of the image into its optical and haptic 
Figure 1.6: Visual Distortion of the Close-up, The Poughkeepsie Tapes 
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facets creates a moment of sensory exchange as elements of tactile texture are offered 
to the eye in a way that integrates the two modalities. Touch and vision mingle and 
allow the viewer to explore the image through this dual-modality. The repetition of 
these junctures throughout the film encourages an oscillating movement between the 
layers of the image and modes of looking that facilitates cross-modal exchanges 
between the senses.  
 
The Poughkeepsie Tapes is not an anti-narrative film, or an abstract art 
performance; it is a film that weaves its narrative from and through the bodily 
sensation of its viewer in an effort to communicate the bodily sensation of its victims. 
When Reyes notes that The Poughkeepsie Tapes was ‘criticized for the uneasy 
complicity [the film] establishes between documentary and spectator’ and that the 
‘audience are rendered complicit with the enjoyment taken from representations of 
cruelty and violence’, it is by virtue of the intermittent appeals to cross-modal bodily 
sensation.33 These moments of sensory experience break the involved engagement 
with the narrative that would render the acts horrific. The horror genre is the 
cinematic genre of bodily sensations, of representing and creating them, and these two 
processes are intimately connected. In order to effectively represent bodily sensation, 
the film must use both its form and content to present bodily sensation. Advancing 
prostheses, computer generated images and special effects have greatly increased the 
quality of staged effects in the content of horror films (note the differences between 
Videodrome and Gut’s similar imagery in Figure 1.4; while Max Renn’s stomach 
wound looks artificial, the wound in the female victim’s stomach is not so obviously 
staged), and the content remains of utmost importance to the genre. The need for an 
embodied viewing experience is propelled precisely by the extreme content of the 
images: how else can one display the evisceration and penetration of a female torso 
without the image inciting psychosexual pastiche unless the delivery of that image is 
fundamentally embodied, thus ensuring that the reaction, inter- and extra-diegetically, 
is visceral? 
 
The resulting movement between narrative and sensory experience, content 
and form, gives the impression of attention shifting as the viewer navigates from one                                                         
33 Reyes, p. 158. 
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level of viewing to the other. Techniques that encourage this type of short-attention 
sensory movement could be considered as 'showy exercises in technique and style' 
that use formal play without it necessarily enhancing the interpretation of the visual 
fiction.34 The so-called ‘MTV aesthetic’, as Marco Calavita discusses, refers to the 
perceived tendency of films since the 1980s ‘to privilege gloss, atmospherics, and 
camerawork’, which are often ‘clearly meant to be noticed and appreciated on their 
own burnished terms’.35 In addition, the increased pace of the film is often also 
aligned with the music video, whose purpose it is to communicate a miniature 
narrative within three or four minutes. Films that display the MTV aesthetic – a title 
whose legitimacy Calavita disputes – incorporate ‘manic editing that often features 
flash-cuts, jump-cuts, and the stirring together of varied film stocks, colours, and 
speeds’.36 While The Poughkeepsie Tapes certainly does make use of inventive 
editing techniques and gives the impression of using mixed stock in order to 
differentiate the threads of its narrative, it does not present its formal qualities over 
and above its content. Like Deodato’s early found footage film, the stylistic qualities 
of The Poughkeepsie Tapes serve to enhance its narrative content and not to detract 
from it. Therein lies the distinction that the pejorative label renders almost impossible 
to make; it is entirely plausible that a film may exhibit a bravura style that adds 
something to the viewing experience.  
 
The Poughkeepsie Tapes appears to be an occularcentric film that focuses 
relentlessly upon the construction, mediation and presentation of the image. All acts 
of violence are mediated on three diegetic levels – the discovered tapes, the 
constructed documentary and the cinematic film – resulting in the same type of 
optical amplification found in Norman Bates’ scene of voyeurism in Psycho. The 
uneven nature of the editing, at times matched and smooth while at others crosscut 
and frantic, both foregrounds the image whilst beginning a systematic devolution of 
its own optical exceptionalism. The consistent low resolution exposes the pixels that 
intimate the electronic and sociocultural machinery that produces and propagates the 
mediated image. The switches between continuous shots and the decontextualised, 
isolated vignettes of the recovered footage within the context of a documentary (that                                                         
34 Marco Calavita, 'MTV Aesthetics at the Movies: Interrogating a Film Criticism Fallacy', Journal of 
Film and Video, 3rd ser., 59 (2007), 15-31 (p. 16). 
35 Calavita, p. 16. 
36 Calavita, p. 16. 
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the viewer nevertheless understands as a film) enact a continuous transition between 
the categories of documentary, news and film. The visual excess of The Poughkeepsie 
Tapes – its compilation of a video aesthetic, decay effects, uneven editing and hand-
held technique – leads to sensorial exchange and overload. Laura U. Marks identifies 
‘the possibilities of electronic and digital manipulation, and video decay’ as potential 
sources of haptic visuality in the digital image.37 The consistent foregrounding of 
those optical manipulations in The Poughkeepsie Tapes thus enables a devolution of 
vision into its sensorial constituents. The optical field is awash with details – some 
pertinent, others not so – and the viewer is faced with a sensory dilemma: continue to 
attempt to find coherences between the representation of events onscreen (that is, by 
its very form, inhibiting its own act of representation) against the tide of accumulating 
stimuli, or find an alternative method of establishing coherence. One such method 
encouraged by the granular nature of The Poughkeepsie Tapes’ images is sensory 
exploration. Instead of focusing upon the changes in represented events, the formal 
changes in colour, texture, balance, orientation, and lighting seep through to the 
surface of the image and encourage textural wandering between the senses. Through 
the very mechanics of its representation the haptic image ‘relies not on the viewer’s 
ability to identify signs, but on a dispersion of the viewer’s look across the surface of 
the image’: a dispersion that is enabled by the destabilisation of the primacy of 
vision.38  
 
The effectiveness of The Poughkeepsie Tapes lies in the fragmentary, 
multisensory nature of its delivery and the experience a viewer has when watching the 
film through their Internet-connected device. This kind of sensorial eclecticism may 
be categorised under the remit of an ‘MTV aesthetic’. This aesthetic is often ‘attacked 
for its high-speed, music-oriented editing, its superficial lack of in-depth narrative 
drive and its inability to offer a satisfactory level of spectatorial contemplation’, but 
this contemplation is implicitly constructed as psychosocial engagement with a 
narrative.39 The visual fragmentation of the image in The Poughkeepsie Tapes and its 
continual lack of focus mimic the ungainly and mysterious origins of the film itself,                                                         
37 Laura U. Marks, Touch: Sensuous Theory and Multisensory Media (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 2002), p. 9. 
38 Marks, Touch, p. 20. 
39 Lara Thompson, ‘In Praise of Speed: The Value of Velocity in Contemporary Cinema’, Dandelion, 2 
(2011), <http://dandelionjournal.org/index.php/dandelion/article/view/35/84>, [accessed 16 June 2014] 
(para. 2 of 24). 
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and they also encourage a different type of sensorial contemplation that interrupts, but 
does not entirely overrun, the experience of re-creating the narrative. Both the form 
and the content combine to encourage the viewer to engage in sensorial prying, as the 
texture of the film becomes labyrinthine. Vision thus becomes a conduit through 
which to access the wider sensorium as its isolated immediacy is revealed – by its 
own hand – to be misguided and myopic.  
 
I would suggest that the cinematic style branded as the ‘MTV aesthetic’ is less 
concerned with the trappings of emulating music video in terms of brevity of editing 
and spectacular effects and more focused upon the phenomenological fusion of multi-
sensorial experience. It has been noted that the fusion of vision and the haptic sense of 
touch in The Poughkeepsie Tapes is enacted by a type of sensorial exchange in which 
the digital image striates and offers tactility to vision. In a similar cross-modal 
borrowing, Carol Vernallis claims that music video attempts ‘to match a song’s shape, 
texture, and flow […] by approximating the experiential qualities of sound’.40 What 
Vernallis is describing is a cross-modal malleability that emerges when vision and 
sound come together, not merely as complementary but as a synthesis of one another. 
As the violin tremolo instigated a sexual overtone to the singular shot of Norman 
Bates’ eye in Psycho, the music video aims to extend its signification through the 
unification of two sensory modalities. The fusion between the optic and the auditory 
is, of course, greatly significant to film but the phenomenal synthesis between the two 
modalities is perhaps more delicate than it first seems. In the words of Walter Ong, 
‘sight isolates, sound incorporates’: the modalities of sight and sound are noticeably 
different in the manner of sensation and the transmutation of those senses to 
perceptions.41 Nevertheless, as vision can allow sensorial access to the haptic sense of 
touch, the merging of sight and sound can similarly invoke a type of audio-visual 
malleability. 
 
                                                        
40 Carol Vernallis, Experiencing Music Video, Aesthetics and Cultural Context (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2004), p. 175. 
41 Quoted in Vernallis, p. 175. 
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Audio-visual Malleability 
 
It was noted in the introduction to this thesis that the anatomy of the visual 
system plays a developmental role in the establishment of the body as a container 
body schema. The isolation of visual acuity on the fovea, and the movement of the 
eyeball reinforce the notion that objects in the environment (including ourselves) are 
discontinuous with that environment. Hearing, however, is a continuous process of 
translating vibrations in the apparatus of the ear into what we perceive as sound. As 
Michel Chion notes, hearing is more sensitive than vision, but it is also more fluid.42 
Whilst vision hinges upon the ability to segregate and classify, the auditory sense 
focuses upon the continuity between individual vibrations and elements of sound. 
Music is a very specific type of sound that relies upon the relationship between the 
constituent parts of the whole. The melodies of music emerge not only at, but also in 
between the notes sounded as the harmonic progressions – the intervals between notes 
– contribute as much to the overall impression of the piece as the individual notes 
themselves. As such, ‘the listener is an active contributor to the perception of music, 
eliciting a diversity of subtle processes derived in part from […] cognitive and 
emotional associations, and anticipations and expectations’.43 A collection of notes is 
only considered ‘music’ if it meets certain physiological and psychosocial conditions 
of progression and harmonics. Those conditions are flexible across cultures, of 
course, but both sound and music emerge in the spaces between auditory ‘objects’ – 
individual notes, timbres, and pitches. In order for vision to approximate the 
experiential qualities of sound, the isolating nature of the modality has to be modified. 
In The Poughkeepsie Tapes, vision was augmented by the technologies that enabled it 
as they challenged the perceived coherence of our principal sense. The segregation of 
the film’s narrative into distinct sections – footage, documentary, film – both 
performs, and questions, scopic isolationism as the image becomes increasingly 
haptic. When an auditory dimension is added, visual disintegration is heightened as 
the two modalities mingle and generate cross-modal perceptions that cannot be 
                                                        
42 Michel Chion, Film: A Sound Art, trans. by Claudia Gorbman (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 2009), p. 265. 
43 Harvey Richard Schiffman, Sensation and Perception: An Integrated Approach, 5th edn (New York: 
Wiley, 2001), p. 376. 
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delineated as either visual or audible alone. As Chion notes, ‘we never see the same 
thing when we also hear; we don’t hear the same thing when we see as well’.44 
 
As Norman Bates watched Marion Crane undress, the low tremolo of the 
violin creates what K. J. Donnelly identifies as ‘a distinctive and enveloping “sound 
architecture” or ambience’.45 Crucially, however, the music not only acts as a 
reiteration of the visual scene but also extends it. The isolation of Norman’s eye and 
Marion’s body is counteracted by the tremolo that implies both his voyeuristic 
pleasure and the impending threat to her life. This extension is performed through the 
common association of certain sounds with certain emotive situations, but it also 
draws upon the physiological reactions caused by specific notes, tonal combinations, 
pitches, and timbres. ‘Perceptual and emotional musical experiences lead to changes 
in blood pressure, pulse rate, respiration, the psycho-galvanic reflex and other 
autonomic functions’ indicating that music has not only a psychological but also a 
physical effect on the listener.46 Of particular interest to the study of horror film are 
the associations of positivity, happiness or excitement with high pitches, major keys, 
fast tempos, tonal, and consonant chords when contrasted to the associations of 
negativity, sadness or passivity with low pitches, minor keys, slower tempos, atonal, 
and dissonant chords.47 Such recognition and associated physical response is thought 
to be at least partially unconscious and innate.48 Rather than responses to horror film 
music being predominantly learned it seems that viewers’ reactions to music are at 
least in part physiologically unavoidable. Certainly, anecdotal evidence of the 
pervasiveness of the acoustic startle reflex caused by the shock cut-stinger 
combination suggests that the physiological augmentation caused by audio-visual 
combinations produces a marked and replicable effect. In light of the tactile                                                         
44 Chion, Audio-Vision, p. xxvi. 
45 K. J. Donnelly, The Spectre of Sound: Music in Film and Television (London: British Film Institute, 
2005), p. 93 
46 G. Harrer and M. Harrer, ‘Music, Emotion and Autonomic Function’, in Music and the Brain, ed. by 
MacDonald Critchley and R. A. Henson (London: William Heinemann, 1977), pp. 202-216 (p. 202). 
47 Alf Gabrielsson and Erik Lindström, ‘The Influence of Musical Structure on Emotional Expression’, 
in Music and Emotion, ed. by Patrick N. Juslin and John A. Sloboda, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2001) pp. 223-248 (pp. 228-235); for further detail on the associations made see original article: H. 
Costa, P. E. R. Bitti, and L. Bonfiglioli, ‘Psychological Connotations of Harmonic Musical Intervals’, 
Psychology of Music, 28 (2000), 4-22. 
48 Harrer and Harrer, p. 203; Isabelle Peretz, ‘Listen to the Brain: A Biological Perspective on Musical 
Emotion’, in Music and Emotion, pp. 105-134 (p. 118): for a more detailed review see original article 
by I. Peretz, L. Gagnon and B. Bouchard, ‘Music and Emotion: Perceptual Determinations, Immediacy, 
and Isolation After Brain Damage’, Cognition, 68 (1998), 111-41. 
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dimension of vision that has emerged through analysis of the haptic images of Gut 
and The Poughkeepsie Tapes, and the physiological component of sound perception, 
the combination of visual and auditory modalities generates a number of distinct yet 
malleable avenues of embodied sensation that go beyond the concept of one sense 
merely illustrating or reiterating another. 
 
Rob Zombie’s House of 1,000 Corpses (2003) is a prime example of what 
might be casually labelled as an MTV aesthetic film. Perhaps unsurprisingly given 
Zombie’s background as both a television producer and most famously as a heavy 
metal musician, his directorial debut incorporates many music video techniques 
including: over and under exposed frames, split-screen effects, cross and jump cuts, 
vignette-style ‘asides’ that interrupt the narrative, and combinations of graphic 
imagery with counter-intuitive audio tracks. The film, set in the mid 1970s, follows 
two couples – Bill, Jerry, Mary and Denise – as they travel across America seeking 
out backstreet country attractions to include in a guidebook they plan on writing. 
They happen across Captain Spaulding’s Museum of Monsters and Madmen where 
they hear the legend of local killer ‘Dr Satan’. On their quest to locate the fabled tree 
where Dr Satan was killed the couples come across a lone hitchhiker named Baby. A 
series of acutely unfortunate events lead the couples to Baby’s family home where 
Mama Firefly, Grampa, Tiny Firefly, Rufus and Otis Driftwood are waiting for them. 
The Firefly family subject the couples to an evening of bizarre Halloween celebration 
culminating in graphic torture and murder. The film finishes as it began, with the 
legend of Dr Satan, as Denise and Jerry are lowered into an underground lair where 
the cybernetic doctor is eager to include them in his experiments.49  
 
Throughout the opening scenes of the film, the narrative is punctuated by a 
series of decontextualised vignettes that display the hallmarks of the ‘electronic and 
digital manipulation’ that encourages haptic visuality (Figure 1.7).50  
 
                                                         
49 The film purportedly pays homage to 1970s exploitation cinema and the similarities to Tobe 
Hooper’s The Texas Chain Saw Massacre (1974) are striking. The style of the film, however, is distinct 
from its predecessors as it combines themes and motifs from classical, exploitation, splatter and slasher 
style horror films. 
50 Marks, Touch, p. 9. 
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Interspersed between the narrative, these shots of billboards, carnival attractions and 
people dressed in what appear to be voodoo-inspired costumes are intrusive. 
Physically, the bright colours of the scenes are juxtaposed to the chiaroscuro lighting 
throughout the rest of the film, creating a tangible jolt of increased sensation. This in 
turn foregrounds the fact that these scenes operate extra-diegetically: they are not 
implicated to be seen by the protagonists, but instead are ‘additions’ to the unfolding 
of the narrative. These additions effectively ‘break’ the continuity of viewing both 
physically and metaphorically in a way that subtly begins to invoke the haptic element 
of vision. The contrast between light and dark, the contours of individual shapes, and 
the lower resolution of these brief images draw the viewer’s eye, momentarily, 
towards the surface of the image. This transition from optic to haptic visuality 
foreshadows the sensorial conversion that is later enacted by Zombie’s combinations 
of vision, haptic tactility, and music. 
 
Once such sensory augmentation occurs as Officers Wydell and Nash, along 
with concerned father Doug Willis, visit the Firefly’s homestead in search of the two 
missing couples. The sequence of shots begins with over-exposed images of the car 
approaching the farm interspersed with images of body parts. The vivid colours seem 
to bleed into one another, connecting as-yet indistinct objects by hue and shape as 
blunt lines slowly begin to materialise. As the engine sound dies, the image slowly 
fades into a conventional film shot, temporarily restoring vision as the narrative 
segment begins. Nash and Willis go around to the rear yard where they find a shed. 
On opening the shed doors all diegetic sound stops and the images continue in slow 
motion as Slim Whitman’s country ballad I Remember You dominates the auditory 
field. Laura Weibe Taylor suggests that ‘popular song in film is often used to set a 
specific mood or historical time period’, and goes on to claim that popular music in 
Figure 1.7: Digitally Manipulated Vignette Scenes, House of 1,000 Corpses (2003) 
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Zombie’s overture functions as a normalising device that draws connections between 
the viewer and the narrative antagonists.51 I believe, however, that the qualities of the 
specific tracks chosen by Zombie, coupled with the manipulation of vision, have a 
more intrinsic effect.  
 
Beginning with harmonica melodies and continuing with a consistent rhythm 
reflected in the steady lyrical metre, Slim Whitman’s track makes use of consonant 
chords, major keys and a reasonably high pitch to create an emotional but upbeat song 
reminiscing about a lost love impressed upon the singer’s memory. In contrast to the 
sentimentality of the musical track the silent, slow motion images expose scenes of 
utter horror: dead bodies strung from the rafters of the garden shed; Denise, bloodied 
and bruised thrashing against her bindings; Officer Wydell being shot in the temple 
by Mama Firefly; Doug Willis being shot in the back by Otis Driftwood with a cross-
cut showing Willis’ home video footage of previous Christmases; and finally, Officer 
Nash being held at gunpoint and forced to his knees by Otis (Figure 1.8, below).  
 
                                                        
51 Laura Weibe Taylor, ‘Popular Songs and Ordinary Violence: Exposing Basic Human Brutality in the 
Films of Rob Zombie’, in Terror Tracks: Music, Sound and Horror Cinema, ed. by Philip Hayward 
(London: Equinox, 2009), pp. 229-237 (p. 232). Zombie’s film has been analysed by Phoebe Fletcher 
as a post-9/11 splatter film, enacting the destruction of the American institution through the perversion 
of the ‘ideal family’ trope which raises questions about the legitimacy of the claim for historicity 
fashioned by Zombie’s use of 1970s popular music. Phoebe Fletcher, ‘Terror and Anti-Production in 
the Post 9/11 Splatter Film’, in The Many Forms of Fear, Horror and Terror, ed. by Leanne Franklin 
and Ravanel Richardson (Oxford: Inter-Disciplinary Press, 2009), pp. 81-92. 
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This scene is bracketed from the flow of narrative by the music-video style 
cinematography that precedes it, implying subtly that all is not what it seems as vision 
is manipulated by the mechanics of the medium. The slowing of the action within the 
scenes, together with the removal of all diegetic sound while the song plays, creates a 
disturbing illusion of altered reality as if these scenes have been lifted out of the 
Figure 1.8: ‘I Remember You’ Segment, House of 1,000 
Corpses (2003)  
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narrative and partnered with the disjunctive musical track by entirely non-diegetic 
means. This impression mimics the process of film production, replicating and 
reinforcing the artificiality of the medium whilst invoking an appreciation of the 
technical ability demonstrated in the combinations of visual and audible stimuli. 
Rather than normalising graphic violence through the combination of popular music 
with ‘extended displays of violence against the malefic backdrop of the destruction of 
symbols of American progress’, this sequence isolates violence through the sensorium 
and enacts it as a principally disquieting and discomforting narrative event.52 A subtle 
subordination of vision to the auditory sense is enacted through the artificial slowing 
of the film. The film and song achieve a heightened sense of synchronicity as their 
tempos are more closely aligned, but the exchange is subtler than mere mimicry as the 
modalities draw closer and begin to augment one another. 
 
This is by no means a technique unique to Zombie’s filmmaking. Stanley 
Kubrick’s A Clockwork Orange (1971) pairs Beethoven’s Ninth Symphony with 
violence, and subsequently the counter-conditioning of that violence. Rather than 
being starkly counter-intuitive, however, the combination actually enacts a synthesis 
between the audible and visual components. The dramatic staccato opening of 
Beethoven’s symphony, for example, emulates the visual impact of bodily violence 
whilst the upbeat tempo intimates at the frivolity Alex displays whilst participating in 
such acts. The seemingly mismatched musical accompaniment has, through the 
sonorous similarities between melody and visual content, ‘the effect not of freezing 
emotion but rather of intensifying it, by inscribing it on a cosmic background’.53 In 
this manner, these scenes of paired sensory experiences take on the quality of cross-
modal emulation as one sense attempts to mimic the phenomenal qualities of another 
in a different medium. If as Vernallis claims, the music video aims ‘to match a song’s 
shape, texture and flow’, I propose that a similar dynamic is at work in contemporary 
film as visual scenes are increasingly paired with audio tracks that are, on first 
hearing, apparently inappropriate.54 
 
                                                        
52 Fletcher, p. 82. 
53 Michel Chion, Audio-Vision: Sound on Screen, ed. by Claudia Gorbman (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1994), p. 8. 
54 Vernallis, p. 175. 
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The partnering of such disparate images and sound in House of 1,000 Corpses 
results in the sentimental country track revealing a different aspect of itself as it 
effectively becomes ‘mapped’ to the violent image. The lyrics ‘when my life is 
through, and the angels ask me to recall, the thrill of them all’ become connotative of 
not only the lost love indicated in the song but of the sadistic ‘thrill’ that Otis receives 
through murder and the voyeuristic ‘thrill’ the viewer may feel through watching 
violent films. The superimposition of this song over these scenes foregrounds the 
violence and suggests a profound disturbance of normality which is underscored by 
presenting depravity in such a whimsical manner. This sequence concludes with Nash 
kneeling and Otis’ gun resting on his forehead; the scene is still and silent as the 
camera slowly zooms out for twenty-five seconds. This elongated moment of eerie 
stillness further separates the preceding sequence from diegetic events and intensifies 
the sense of abnormality. The silence of the audible sphere imbues the image – which 
was previously ‘alive’ with movement, manipulation, noise, and emotion – with a 
curious stasis not dissimilar to the frustrating effect of Gut’s motionless camera. The 
viewer maps the silence onto the elongated camera pan, sees the audible sphere in 
terms of the visual as one modality lends itself to the other while the viewer 
anticipates the inevitable ending of the scene. 
 
Michel Chion claims that ‘we never see the same thing when we also hear; we 
don’t hear the same thing when we see as well’ to demonstrate the complex 
relationship between audio and vision.55 In the example above, the confluence of 
stimuli discourages the feeling of shock usually associated with scenes of this ilk in, 
for example, The Texas Chain Saw Massacre (1974).56 The discontinuity between 
hearing and vision mimics the discontinuity between modes of looking in The 
Poughkeepsie Tapes. As the opening chords of the song sound, a different way of 
‘seeing’ is offered. House of 1,000 Corpses explores the limits of visual reliance 
through invocation of the sensorial malleability of the filmic image. Whilst the visual 
junctures created in The Poughkeepsie Tapes by the degradation of the image                                                         
55 Chion, p. xxvi. 
56 The dissipation of shock prevails in Zombie’s work and contributes to what Weibe Taylor identifies 
as the suggestion ‘that the capacity for brutality is something all humans still share’. Displaying 
violence with such brutality, however, also resists recreating the sensational violence that critics of the 
media, such as Mediawatch-UK, blame for negatively influencing viewers. Arguably, brutal portrayals 
of pain and suffering do not desensitise the viewer as much as reveal the embodied nature of pain that 
more stylised depictions perhaps negate. Weibe Taylor, p. 230. 
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encourage movement between the two different types of vision – optical and haptic 
looking – the audio-visual junctures in House of 1,000 Corpses encourage movement 
and exchange between two different sensory modalities. As the silence finds 
synchrony with the retreat of the camera from the scene of violence the viewer is 
transported from the audible realm of the musical overture to the visible realm of the 
image, with their attention directed by the audible stimuli to a certain aspect of the 
visible field.  
 
  It is in this way that images in House of 1,000 Corpses and The Poughkeepsie 
Tapes take on the quality of a multisensory haptic. Vision is given ‘the impression of 
seeing for the first time, [of] gradually discovering what is in the image rather than 
coming to the image already knowing what it is’.57 Instead of being pre-categorised 
based on the viewer’s experience of horror film, the images are experienced first-
hand, as it were, through a type of vision ‘that is not merely cognitive but 
acknowledges its location in the body’ through its indebtedness to other senses.58 This 
is not a reductive MTV aesthetic, but an expansive and interactive multisensory 
mode. The haptic image is one that presents a confluence of sensory experiences to its 
viewer that encourages them ‘to dissolve [their] subjectivity in […] close and bodily 
contact’ with the film, such that the significance of the image is constructed through 
the viewer’s own embodied knowledge and experience.59 The viewer does not need to 
have experience of the acts depicted in such imagery but merely needs to draw upon 
their embodied experiences of sound, vision, and the haptic tactility of those senses as 
they transition between modalities. In doing so the image instigates an explicitly 
multisensory interaction with, and response to, the film.  
 
It is this notion of sensory stimulation being infused within cinematic scenes 
that may otherwise have deep sociocultural signification that I would like to explore 
in the following chapters. I propose that for each ‘visual’ frame there is an underlying 
layer of sensory stimulation that contributes to the way in which it is sensed, 
presented and used by the viewer. This layer of sensory input is accessed through the 
eyes and ears of the viewer but inherently appeals to additional modes of sensory                                                         
57 Marks, The Skin of the Film, p. 178. 
58 Marks, The Skin of the Film, p. 132. 
59 Marks, Touch, p. 13. 
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experience in two ways. Firstly, it can invoke the senses in the content of its visual 
images, the composition of individual frames and through the contrasts it can offer. 
Thus, the combination of smooth skin and the coarse weave of the sheet it lies upon in 
Gut both stimulate the viewer’s experience of touch, and the combination of a blue 
overlay and lightly sweating brows evokes the experience of temperature sensation. 
Secondly, film can appeal to the senses through the foregrounding of its own sensorial 
form. The Poughkeepsie Tapes, for example, replicates the disjointed filmic structure 
in its discontinuous visual disturbances, using one to enhance and sometimes 
contradict the other. Often, these two methods of appealing to the viewer’s senses are 
used in tandem, combining elements of the visual with elements of the multisensory 
nature of the medium to produce the type of ambivalent viewing experience 
constructed by House of 1,000 Corpses. I would like to suggest that extreme horror is 
particularly adept at manifesting this bodily dimension because of its subject matter.  
 
Persistent images of the violated and distressed body lend themselves readily 
to the articulation of an embodied response to the onscreen events. A shared 
experience of textures, sounds, pressures, events and people, along with empathically 
geared mirror neurons, encourage the viewer to relate what happens on the screen to 
their own experiences regardless of the experiential distance between the two.60 It is 
certainly not unique in this manner but, as a subgeneric branch of mainstream cinema, 
it has uniformly expressed a sustained turn towards intense bodily sensation. It is 
because of the body that human beings are able to live and function as they do. It 
seems necessary, therefore, to attempt to reinstate the body of the viewer into a film 
theory that deals explicitly with spectatorship and to emphasise the difference 
between certain terms commonly ascribed to theories of spectatorship and perception. 
The fundamental difference between sensation and perception needs to be reiterated 
such that sensation refers explicitly to the physiological stimulation of the human 
body via the sensory organs, whilst perception refers to the cognitive processes that 
occur as a direct and almost immediate result of the sensation. To sense a 
                                                        
60 It is unlikely that many viewers of horror films have encountered such life-or-death scenarios. This 
does not, however, detract from the shared basis of understanding that humans have through their 
mutual experience of their bodies and the way that those bodies allow access to the world. Caressing 
and eviscerating a body may be beyond the remit of the majority of cinemagoers but caressing is still a 
shared bodily experience evoked by the film. 
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phenomenon is not to perceive it, although to perceive it necessitates a commensurate 
sensation.  
 
When considering vision, the sensation of a phenomenon has different levels 
of development: the immediate ocular system contained within the eye; the optic 
neural pathway and the accessory optic pathway that connect the optic nerve to 
multiple integration centres in the brain; and, finally, the interconnectivity of each 
integration centre in the brain. A detailed discussion of how a phenomenon presents 
itself to the eye, the refraction of light through the lens, the function of the retina and 
the inversion and reorientation of the visual field has only limited applicability to an 
analysis of film engagement. Arguably, considering only the mechanics of the eye 
objectifies the human body and reduces visual phenomena to mere mechanical 
functions. The neuronal optical pathways, however, provide a richer source of 
information that bridges the gap between the purely physical sensation of the image 
and the cognitive interpretation of that image. For instance, the multiple optic 
pathways connecting the eyeball to the brain are populated with neurons that ‘respond 
to visual movements in preferred directions’ and that are aligned with the major 
planes of bodily orientation.61 In isolation this fact may seem irrelevant, but when 
taken in consideration with human physical experience and social imperatives, a 
physical predisposition towards the sensing of directional movement along specific 
orientations may, in fact, serve to guide conscious attention and influence those 
factors of the visual scene that are deemed to be important. It is within this dynamic 
and complex relation between physiology and cognition that the viewing body can be 
rediscovered in the cinematic experience and instated as a primary organiser of 
perceptions and conscious understanding.  
 
The following chapters will address the ways in which vision, casually 
considered as the primary cinematic sense, can be corporealised in such a way that the 
viewing experience can no longer be considered as an exclusively single-sense 
process. Spectatorship is no longer primarily situated within the eyes or ‘mind’ of the 
viewer but rather within their entire neural network as multisensory systems are 
stimulated, simulated and appealed to. The discussion will map connections between                                                         
61 Berthoz, p. 64. 
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the less frequently explored senses, including the vestibular (balance and orientation) 
and gustatory (taste and smell) senses, and the broader sensory experiences of touch 
and pain. The ways in which the physiological experience of the embodied individual 
guides the construction of conscious frameworks of understanding will be explicated 
in order to argue that the human body provides much of the structures of 
comprehension that enable the interpretation of the phenomenal world. As a result, 
the multisensory medium of film, and particularly (although not exclusively) extreme 
horror film, has the potential to deliver a highly excitatory experience to its viewers 
that not only depicts bodies in extremis but also entices their bodies to enter into the 
filmic experience. 
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Chapter 2 – Vestibular Manipulation in The Collector (2009) and The 
Descent (2005) 
 
 In the previous chapter it was argued that vision is never isolated in the human 
sensorium and that the eye acts as a conduit to other sensory modalities. In the case of 
the found footage films analysed, it was contended that the manipulation of what 
could and could not be seen facilitated a juncture in the visual process between 
viewing the image as a coherent, socially significant whole and viewing the image as 
a collection of less cohesive sensory stimulations. At times these stimulations 
coincide to create points of contact between the visual and the multisensory haptic, a 
point of slippage in which the viewer transitions between modes of viewing in a truly 
multisensory film experience.1 In these moments of sensory overload the body of the 
viewer is drawn into the viewing experience. At its most effective the result is 
distracting and discomforting in a way that serves to emphasise the heightened 
emotion or violence depicted on the screen. 
 
The Poughkeepsie Tapes, for example, features a portion of home video shot 
by the killer that suggests the murder of a young girl. Throughout the film the home 
video camera claims authenticity through its handheld style and the visual distortion 
and degradation noted in the previous chapter that encourages the viewer to look upon 
the image not as part of a coherent whole, because coherence is systematically denied 
by the structure of the film, but as an image in its own right. Coupled with this 
application of the home video aesthetic is the strict manipulation of what the viewer is 
allowed to see. The scene in question begins as the camera, being operated from 
inside a car, tracks over a domestic scene showing a girl playing outside her house. 
The field of vision jostles from side to side as the killer gets out of the car. The 
motion of the visual field on the one hand suggests the movements and actions of the 
killer and on the other hand fragments the viewer’s vision and disallows a sense of 
continuity from one frame to the next. The killer approaches the girl and asks a series 
of questions that culminates in him asking ‘you want to see what it looks like through 
the camera?’ The camera then rotates as the killer offers it to the girl. Off screen a                                                         
1 These sensorial transition points are, in their instigation, comprised of bodily reflexes to stimuli that 
are incongruent or otherwise ‘out of the ordinary’. Layers of psychosocial knowledge and experience 
then augment these moments of corporeal awareness as the viewer consciously contemplates their 
appearance, function and purpose within a narrative. As the discussion continues, the interactions 
between bodily sensation and psychosocial contemplation will be explored more fully. 
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thudding sound is heard, followed very quickly by the rapid movement of the camera 
as the killer runs back to the car. The camera is again jostled as he gets into the 
vehicle before eventually falling onto its side on the passenger seat, stranding the 
viewer’s vision in an unfamiliar axis. This technique offers the authenticity sought by 
the found-footage premise and prevents important events from appearing onscreen but 
it also appeals to the viewer’s sense of movement and balance. At the climax of the 
scene the viewer is locked into a viewing position that visually contradicts his or her 
own knowledge of bodily orientation. The spell of the cinema is momentarily broken 
as vision is used as a gateway to the physiological manipulation of our sense of 
kinesis, of orientation and balance. 
 
The following discussion will contend that owing to its physiological co-
dependency with the vestibular system – the portion of the inner ear that detects 
bodily directionality, velocity, inertia and gravity – the eye provides the point of 
access to the human experience of balance. The link between vision and balance will 
be explicated by reviewing cinematic techniques that draw upon the embodied 
understanding of the sensation with illustrative examples from Rob Zombie’s House 
of 1,000 Corpses (2003) and Halloween (2007). It will then be proposed that the 
congruence, or otherwise, of the visual and vestibular systems can manipulate the 
viewer’s understanding of horror film through appeals to both the physical experience 
of balance and the metaphorical concepts that arise from that experience. It will be 
suggested that Marcus Dunstan’s The Collector (2009) manipulates physiological and 
metaphorical understandings of balance in order to generate an effectively embodied 
viewing experience. The cogent link between the experience of balance, and the 
psychosocial signification of balance as a component of the visual and audible fields 
will then be explored with reference to Neil Marshall’s The Descent (2005). 
 
Visual-vestibular Manipulation 
 
It has been noted that the fundamental mechanics of vision – the way in which 
light enters the eye, is refracted by the lens and stimulates the rod and cone cells of 
the retina – is potentially an unproductive avenue of exploration when considering a 
viewer’s reaction to contemporary horror cinema. This did not intend to suggest, 
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however, that the very method through which humans access the visual world is 
irrelevant to a discussion of how a film is viewed but rather to suggest that the visual 
system is much more complex than the well-known mechanics of the specialised 
sensory organ. To a certain extent these mechanics are unseen and unperceived by the 
individual and, although they impose limits upon what can be seen – humans cannot 
see ultraviolet light for example – they do not necessarily hold sway over how the 
visual world is interpreted. As Maurice Merleau-Ponty writes, 
 
when I say that I see the house with my own eyes, I am saying 
something that cannot be challenged; I do not mean that my retina and 
crystalline lens, my eyes as material organs, go into action and cause 
me to see it; with only myself to consult, I can know nothing about 
this.2 
 
 For Merleau-Ponty, the inner workings of the eye are unknown to the beholder 
and secondary to the fact of perception itself. I see the house is a truth regardless of 
the flexibility of the human ocular system. But what is a house? A house is a 
collection of features and properties that are recognised as being combined in a 
specific way to produce a coherent concept that we associate with the signifier house. 
Human concepts are typically elastic and generalised, thus allowing for the 
classification of many different types of houses under the same category heading. 
What would happen, then, if the human eye morphologically altered itself to be able 
to see ultraviolet, infrared and radio wave light sources? If we could spontaneously 
see properties not explicitly associated with the visual concept of a house – density or 
temperature, for example – the category would undergo considerable semantic 
augmentation. The organic specificities of the eye establish the parameters for how 
and what we can conceptualise.  
 
The same logic applies to the medium of film: the manner in which I see the 
film can only ever be a descriptive endeavour concerning what might be considered as 
pure physiology. As this investigation intends to focus upon the way in which 
physiology influences the application and interpretation of what is seen, it is enough, 
in relation to the organs of sight, to state that the film is seen without detailed 
                                                        
2 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The Phenomenology of Perception, trans. by Colin Smith (London: 
Routledge, 1962), p. 67. 
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description of how that occurs. It is the extraneous elements of the ocular system – the 
optic nerve, the accessory optic neuronal pathway and the visual sensory cortex and 
association cortex in the brain – that provide the opportunities for insight into the 
‘certain manner of approaching the object’ on which Merleau-Ponty focused his 
phenomenological inquiries, and that this chapter will explore.3  
 
The human eye is particularly adept at sensing, following and predicting 
movement and this primacy of kinesis – principally enabled by the fovea – 
incorporates and perhaps reflects the evolutionary importance of motion to human 
survival. It is the affective significance of motion (or lack thereof) that allows found 
footage films to effectively communicate violence and terror through the stylistics of 
the subgenre. This is not the only function of the fovea; the area of the retina that 
allows sharp visual clarity upon an isolated portion of the visual field also guides our 
visual perception and our conceptualisation of the ‘visual field’ itself. As each 
successive area of the visual landscape becomes focused upon the fovea, the 
surrounding area fades in clarity which encourages the viewing individual to consider 
the landscape as being constituted by multiple discrete areas or objects. This 
segregation of the ocular space is further reinforced by our ‘bodily movements, 
manipulations and experiences’ that suggest that we, like the objects we view 
successively, are a bounded and discrete entity.4 This combination leads to a critical 
ontological metaphor: the body as a container. The human being conceives of him or 
herself as a container – with an inside (me), an outside (the world) and a boundary 
(the skin) – not unlike the various containers we make use of every day (houses, cars, 
cups, our stomachs).  
 
This ontological metaphor structures not only how we think about ourselves, 
but also how we can categorise the world around us. The visual field becomes a 
container – it has an inside (what can be seen), an outside (what cannot be seen) and a 
boundary (human eyes respond to light frequencies between 430-790 THz, the highest 
and lowest values representing the boundary). Even abstract notions can be 
conceptualised in this manner as the auditory field, a space that is principally                                                         
3 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p. 67. 
4 Mark Johnson, The Body in the Mind (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), p. 34. The 
implications of conceptualising the body as a container will be discussed in further detail in the 
following chapter that addresses Tom Six’s The Human Centipede franchise. 
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imaginary, is a container with an inside (what can be heard), an outside (what cannot 
be heard) and a boundary (human hearing ranges between 20-20,000 Hz). One only 
has to look at the language commonly used to describe these ‘containers’, often 
referred to as fields. A field is, of course, a clearly segregated bounded space with an 
inside and an outside. Another quality of bounded entities is that they have the 
capacity to contain objects. If our bodies are indeed the prototypical containers, the 
directionality and arrangement of those objects will be significant as the bodily 
experience of balance is extrapolated for application to our abstract containers. Bodily 
balance is controlled by the visual and vestibular systems working in concert and it is 
this co-dependency that allows film to physically and metaphorically manipulate the 
viewer’s sense of balance. 
 
Human infants are born with many sensorimotor capacities relatively 
undeveloped: they are able to see and hear but are unable to maintain an upright 
posture or control the movement of their heads with any degree of accuracy. A 
primary act of learning for an infant, therefore, is experiencing the forces of inertia 
and gravity through the vestibular organs of the inner ear thus gaining knowledge of 
the position of their own bodies in space through proprioceptive receptors in the skin, 
tendons and muscles, and then learning to coordinate this information to enable them 
to support the weight of their head and eventually to support their trunk.5 Together the 
vestibular apparatus can detect the direction in which the head is facing and whether 
the head is moving or stationary. The vestibular system is ambiguous, however, and 
confuses ‘head tilt, acceleration, and deceleration [with] visual inputs [being] 
necessary to resolve this’.6 The information regarding head position and velocity is                                                         
5 The vestibular apparatus is located behind the mechanism of sound detection in the inner ear and 
consists of two components: a pair of vestibular sacs called the utricle and saccule; and, three semi-
circular canals. Each canal originates from and returns to the utricle; is set at right angles to the other 
two; is filled with a fluid called endolymph and approximates a major plane of the head: horizontal, 
vertical and frontal. Information regarding head tilt and acceleration from the vestibular system is 
combined with visual, proprioceptive and kinaesthetic information to stimulate appropriate bodily 
adjustments and responses. The vestibular system is connected to the vestibular branch of the cochlear 
nerve and, evolutionarily, is older than the capacity to hear. C. U. M. Smith, Biology of Sensory 
Systems (Chichester: Wiley, 2000), p. 101; Neil R. Carlson, Foundations of Behavioural Neuroscience, 
8th edn (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2011), p. 191-3. Proprioception refers to the 
individual’s knowledge of the position of its own body in space. Such information is relayed through 
receptors in skin, muscle and joints that detect flexion, tension and stretch in the structural components 
of the human body. This information in turn gives rise to a sense of movement, or kinesthesia, that 
allows the individual to comprehend the positioning, velocity and movement of their body. 
6 Alain Berthoz, The Brain’s Sense of Movement, trans. by Giselle Weiss (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2000), p. 32. 
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combined with visual, proprioceptive and kinaesthetic information to refine the 
vestibular input and stimulate appropriate responses.7 The physical experience of 
balance is, therefore, a complex integration of a multisensory system of inputs that 
can be manipulated by any one, or a combination of, the modalities that influence the 
conscious perception that arises as the sum of the multiple sensations.  
 
Perhaps the easiest to demonstrate, and the most pertinent to the study of film, 
is the direct relationship between visual and vestibular information. One such 
example would be the Cine360 that appeared at the Alton Towers resort in the UK in 
the mid-1980s. Consisting of a panoramic, domed screen the attraction displayed 
short films taken from the front of a roller coaster train. Viewers would stand in the 
dome and in order to track the movement of the coaster had to perform significant 
head, neck and trunk movements. The result was a convincing emulation of the 
experience of riding the coaster that generated a sense of motion and often imbalance 
that was not universally well received. In this instance the otoliths of the inner ear 
would not be detecting motion of the body in response to gravity because the 
gravitational force acting upon the stationary body remained constant, but the eyes 
would be relaying information that the body was in fact moving. Because the screen 
occupied the entire field of vision there were no referents against which to disprove 
this and so the disparity between the visual and vestibular stimuli would result in 
imbalance and potentially nausea. What this and other similar visual illusions 
demonstrate is that it is possible to stimulate a combination of sensory receptors in 
such a way that a viewer is physically unbalanced, despite remaining stationary and 
grounded at all times.8 
 
                                                        
7 Smith, p. 101. 
8 The vestibular system’s influence upon the correct balance of the body is perhaps most obvious when 
under the influence of alcohol. Extreme intoxication can lead to a sensation of the room spinning, 
something that often becomes more pronounced when the eyes are closed. Alcohol affects the density 
of the endolymph in the inner ear – a thick gel-like substance that fills the semi-circular canals. The 
cupula of these canals – a wider chamber – contains hair-like projections that respond to the 
movements of the endolymph in order to detect motion. Normally, the hair-like projections convey 
accurate information regarding head tilt and viewing direction. Under the influence of alcohol, 
however, the endolymph undergoes a change of density, which results in it moving more freely in 
response to smaller stimuli (like gravity, for example). The increased movement in the endolymph 
causes an increase in receptivity of the hair-like projections, in turn causing the sensation that the body 
is in constant motion. This effect becomes more pronounced when the eyes are closed as visual 
information no longer contradicts the vestibular sense of imbalance. 
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Alfred Hitchcock’s Vertigo (1958) contains a famous cinematic example of 
the sensation and simulation of imbalance achieved by utilising the dolly zoom, or 
contra-zoom, such that the background of the shot appears to change perspective 
whilst the foreground remains stationary. While the visual field appears to report a 
change of perspective that suggests the viewer is moving closer to the object 
onscreen, the vestibular system detects no change in gravitational forces that would 
suggest such acceleration. The contra-zoom succinctly mimics the sensation of 
vertigo, whereby great heights induce dizziness, felt by John Ferguson (James 
Stewart) in Hitchcock’s film. The shot is used twice in Vertigo, once when Ferguson 
looks down from a rooftop and once when he looks down a large flight of stairs in 
order to convey to the viewer the disorientation felt by the protagonist. Following 
Hitchcock’s pioneering use of the technique, the dolly zoom has been used across 
genres as an extra-diegetic device aimed at communicating an emotional, rather than 
physiological reaction.9 Rob Zombie’s House of 1,000 Corpses (2003), for example, 
makes use of the dolly zoom as victim Denise enters a labyrinth of underground 
tunnels: here the technique intimates the fantastical nature of the final scenes of 
Zombie’s film, the expansive nature of the warren-like tunnels and the futility of 
Denise’s escape attempts. What it does not do, however, is communicate a physical 
sensation that is experienced by the character. Denise does not experience vertigo as 
she enters the tunnels, but rather a generalised sensation of disorientation and fear. 
The dolly zoom here is utilised primarily for the benefit of the viewer and not the 
narrative. As a result of its continued appropriation by many genres of cinema, 
including blockbuster and animated titles, the dolly zoom’s wider connotations lend it 
an air of stylised cliché. 
 
The found footage subgenre of horror has been discussed in the previous 
chapter but it is worth noting that alongside the visual disturbance, the unsteady 
nature of the camera movements and the often-obliquely canted angles that typify this                                                         
9 A fast contra-zoom was used by Steven Spielberg in Jaws (1975) to communicate the emotional 
reaction of Chief Brody (Roy Scheider) to seeing the shark swimming amongst bathers. Disney’s 
animated film The Lion King (1994) uses a simulated shot that achieves a similar effect when Simba 
realises that a wildebeest stampede is heading towards him. Although in this instance it is the 
foreground perspective that changes and the background that remains stationary this visual-vestibular 
incongruence remains such that the shot is disorienting and suggestive of an intense emotive reaction 
on the part of the protagonist. These examples serve to reiterate the emotional response intended to be 
communicated through these scenes – they operate upon the viewer to manipulate their interpretation 
of the scene, but they do not communicate the physiological experience of a character. 
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style of film, the subgenre also incorporates visual-vestibular disturbances to increase 
the communication of panicked movement that mirrors the high emotion in its more 
kinetic scenes.10 Sensory manipulation in film can operate both inter-diegetically to 
communicate a facet of the on-going narrative or extra-diegetically as a technique that 
appeals to the viewer and manipulates their emotional response. The crucial aspect of 
inter-diegetic sensory manipulation is that it contributes significantly to the narrative. 
While it may be said that these techniques encourage the viewer to take notice of the 
technological medium as opposed to the violent content of horror films, they also 
often invite the viewer to engage bodily with the film. The horror genre is concerned 
specifically with the human body, its tribulations, and limitations. As such the 
incorporation of cinematographic techniques that encourage the viewer to engage 
bodily is an expression of form mirroring content. As the bodies onscreen undergo 
myriad sensorial changes so do the bodies before the screen. While cinematography 
can momentarily interrupt the viewers’ physiological knowledge of their own body by 
presenting incongruent visual information, a more sustained effect is achieved 
through combining such camerawork with the extensive metaphorical understanding 
of balance that arises from bodily experience.  
 
 
 
                                                        
10 A particularly effective visual-vestibular combination occurs in Barry Levinson’s The Bay (II) 
(2012). The film is constructed from found-footage segments that include home video recordings and 
the amateurish recordings of a trainee journalist, and documents the outbreak of a parasitic epidemic in 
a busy seaside resort in America. The fast-acting parasites are ingested through the water supply and 
eat their hosts from the inside. As the situation progresses and order begins to break down in the small 
town, there is a short scene that makes use of the viewer’s sense of motion and disequilibrium to 
emphasise the severity of the situation. The scene is shot from the viewpoint of the CCTV inside a 
police car as the officer drives through the town. The darkened image resembles infrared night vision 
imagery in its lack of colour, contrast and detail. The entire visual field is manoeuvred as though it 
were on-board the car which leads to a convincing sense of motion, not dissimilar to the one elicited by 
the Cine360 attraction. The limitation of the visual field adds to the motion by obscuring details that 
could contradict the illusion. The prognostic brain assimilates the signifiers of motion and generates 
predictions: that the car will continue; that, owing to genre conventions, something will likely stop the 
car unexpectedly; that this something is likely to be illuminated by the headlights a split-second prior to 
stopping the car. Unexpectedly, however, the screen image is violently skewed and immediately 
removed from its established course without anything appearing in the field of vision. The lack of 
precursor to the abrupt change in direction generates a physical jolt of shock in the viewer as the car 
collides with something off screen. Despite the viewer’s propensity to ‘expect the unexpected’ when 
viewing this type of film, the absolute lack of visual indication, coupled with the intense and immediate 
alteration of the image in terms of motion and orientation effectively mimics the sensation of the 
collision, albeit on a smaller scale. 
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Visual Balance 
 
The primary experience of coordinated balance structures the metaphorical 
concept of balance and defines the stable components of human understanding. 
George Lakoff and Mark Johnson claim that ‘no metaphor can ever be comprehended 
or even adequately represented independently of its experiential basis’.11 Such an 
outlook situates the physical basis of metaphorical concepts as essential to an 
understanding of how human beings apply and interpret those concepts. In essence, 
balance is understood as equal distribution along an axis because when infants learn 
to balance it is an act of distributing weight and forces equally around the vertical axis 
that allows them to remain stable and upright. The planes of bodily orientation 
signified by the vestibular apparatus correspond to the major planes of movement and 
‘form a basic egocentric frame of reference’ which structures the way we 
conceptualise our bodies and environment.12 Alain Berthoz goes on to make an 
argument for the planes of orientation of the body and the vestibular system 
structuring even the most abstract of notions, including Euclidean geometry. The crux 
of the argument rests upon the fact that because the body can orient and move in three 
dimensions – the dimensional axes of the vestibular organs – it is a natural 
progression to adopt a working three-dimensional model of reality.13 The concept that 
balance refers to the equal distribution of mass or force along an axis becomes 
intuitive when one considers that when we stand, gravitational and kinaesthetic forces 
are equalised along the horizontal and vertical axes of our body and in order to remain 
upright we must learn how to manipulate these forces. In addition, our bodies have 
superficial visual balance as they display a left-right equivalency, or bilateral 
symmetry. If the human body was constructed or oriented differently, in the manner 
of a quadruped for example, then the conceptualisation of balance would be markedly 
different. As Mark Johnson notes, the meaning of balance ‘begins to emerge through 
                                                        
11 George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, Metaphors we Live By (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1980), p. 19. 
12 Berthoz, p. 36. 
13 Berthoz, pp. 36-37. The very nature of three-dimensional embodiment, however, prevents this theory 
from attaining any status higher than an observational coincidence: it would require an animal able to 
orient and move in more or less than three dimensions, with the ability to communicate across species, 
in order to support or falsify such a claim for direct causality. 
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our acts of balance and through our experience of systemic processes and states 
within our bodies’.14  
 
Balance has an organic meaning that develops not from the nuances of 
linguistics, but from the interrelations of physical sensations and experience. The 
specificity of the concept together with its adaptability implies an immediate, 
experiential basis; a series of events that allow an individual to become accustomed to 
a given principle. As such, the embodied actions of the individual, including direct 
bodily sensation and the manipulation of other discrete objects in the environment, 
give rise to specific concepts that are so tightly enmeshed with the experience that 
they become almost indiscernible. ‘Above’, for example, is conceptualised as a 
relative term that places one object above another and the direct correlate of this 
notion arises from discovering objects in relation to one’s own physical position. 
Indeed, the specificities of the bodily experience that give rise to the concept ‘above’ 
render the notion relative not only to the body but to the organ that most explicitly 
orients an individual’s knowledge of their own physicality: the eye. ‘Above’ is not 
only above the body, but also very specifically above the eye-line of the body. Rather 
than refuting the Saussurean notion that the relationship between signifier and 
signified is entirely arbitrary, the inherent connection between terms such as ‘above’ 
and experience lies within the comprehension of the concept: ‘above’ may as easily 
be labelled ‘below’ and signify the same concept if the underlying structures of 
experience remain the same. The concept of balance exists before language as babies 
learn through their manipulations of their own bodies that balance entails the equal 
distribution of weight along an axis. Only later do they acquire the linguistic sign that 
goes on to signify the metaphorical concept of balance as applied to other objects. In 
order to comprehend correctly the human schema of balance one must have 
experienced some form of physical balance and it is this experience that goes on to 
structure the metaphorical understanding and application.15  
                                                         
14 Johnson, The Body in the Mind, p. 75. 
15 It should be stressed that this experiential basis does not apply to all human concepts, but it does 
apply specifically to a set of ontological metaphors and body schemata that provide the foundations for 
the ways in which we are able to perceive and interpret phenomena. The metaphors being elucidated 
here are those most closely associated with bodily experience, what Lakoff and Johnson term 
‘orientational metaphors’ (front-back, top-bottom) and ‘ontological metaphors’ (container, in-out, 
balance).  
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Figure 2.1: Metaphor of 
Balance 
 
Once extrapolated from experience in metaphor 
the concept of balance (represented visually in Figure 
2.1) can be adapted: the axes can be manipulated to the 
horizontal or vertical planes; the axis itself can be 
negated and reconstituted as balance around a given 
point as in the case of circular symmetry; and, it can be 
extended further into the realm of metaphor as ‘weight’ 
is subsumed by information or effort. We can therefore speak of an argument being 
‘balanced’ if the points on each side of the metaphorical axes have equal weighting or 
importance. Another extrapolation of the balance schema can be found when we 
speak of visual or auditory stimuli being balanced.  
 
When referring to the formal aspects of film frame composition, the balance of 
the scene is often cited as reinforcing or undermining the activity or passivity of the 
various characters. This notion of balance has two frames of reference: balance 
around the central point, or along an axis with the centre of the frame often 
representing some sense of normalcy. John Carpenter’s Halloween (1978), for 
example, often reinforces the central axis with the use of vertical and horizontal lines. 
Figure 2.2 (below) shows a low-angled shot from the film that uses the clothes rail as 
a central line, effectively splitting the frame into two roughly equal parts. Michael 
Myers is then positioned slightly off-centre in the right side of the frame, leaning 
around the door with much of his body hidden. As Carol Clover observes in Men, 
Women and Chain Saws (1992) this type of shot typically positions the camera, and 
therefore the spectator, in the role of victim. While the camera-victim remains central 
in this frame – something that is reinforced throughout the rest of the film with Laurie 
Strode’s frame position being predominantly central – Michael has to reach into the 
wardrobe, compromising his balance in order to be in view of the camera. 
Additionally, Michael’s looming body on one side of the frame creates disequilibrium 
within the scene, as there is no similarly sized object to the left to balance him. As a 
result, this particular camera angle and frame composition serves to reinforce 
identification with the camera-victim whilst subtly disempowering Michael, despite 
his size and apparent domination of the scene.   
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The effectiveness of the disempowerment of the antagonist through the manipulation 
of frame balance can be clearly seen when comparing the above technique – one of 
many that characterised Carpenter’s seminal contribution to the slasher subgenre – 
with the remake, Halloween (2007), directed by Rob Zombie. William Wandless 
claims that Zombie’s remake functions as a ‘homage to and radical revision of the 
1978 original’ and there are certainly stylistic differences.16 The iconic shock cut-
stinger combination is all but absent and nearly a third of Zombie’s remake is 
dedicated to depicting the teenage Michael at Smith’s Grove Sanatorium. It is the 
smaller, but no less important details of frame composition and editing that provide 
the film with its most notable difference, however.17 Figure 2.3, below, shows a 
typical shot from Zombie’s remake and immediately the differences in frame balance 
and composition are noticeable. 
                                                        
16 William Wandless, ‘Spoil the Child: Unsettling Ethics and the Representation of Evil’, LIT: 
Literature Interpretation Theory, 22 (2011), 134-54 (p. 138). 
17 An interesting comparison of shot duration and density between Carpenter’s original and Zombie’s 
remake has been carried out by Nick Redfern. Using time series clusters applied to shot length Redfern 
was able to produce a set of graphical representations of the shot density of both films. When shot 
densities were normalised and the differences in duration accounted for, Zombie’s shot density peaked 
higher and fluctuated less than Carpenter’s indicating that both films had a significantly different pace 
and structure. While Carpenter builds tension through the increase in shot transitions to the climax of 
the film, Zombie’s film shows little fluctuation from its higher baseline indicating a sustained level of 
tension that perhaps detracts from the sense of narrative movement. Nick Redfern, ‘Time series 
clustering and the analysis of film style’, Cinemetrics.lv (2013) 
<http://www.cinemetrics.lv/dev/redfern_q3_opt.pdf > [accessed 25 June 2014]. 
Figure 2.2: John Carpenter’s Halloween (1978) 
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 The victim-identified camera angle is absent in Zombie’s Halloween, with a 
third-party omniscient view being presented for much of the film. In contrast to 
Carpenter’s composition above, there are relatively few markers within the frame that 
break up the ‘white space’ around the characters – shots are often framed by trees, the 
sides of characters’ bodies or houses, but the central areas are more often dominated 
by the protagonists. Chief amongst them is Michael, who appears centrally in the 
frame much more frequently in Zombie’s film than in Carpenter’s original. In the still 
above, Michael dominates the visual space by being the largest and most central 
object in view and the majority of his body is positioned in the central section of the 
screen. In addition, his victim is dwarfed by his massive size and he looks down upon 
her, succinctly reinforcing the power dynamic. At no point in the narrative does the 
power shift to the Final Girl, as it does in Carpenter’s original, as the balance remains 
perpetually with the unstoppable, mountainous Myers. 
 
 Visual frame balance is a combination of relations between objects onscreen, 
including: relative size, placement around the axis, shape, colour, movement, innate 
significance, and relative clarity of focus. In order to balance the frame in Figure 2.2, 
for example, a similarly sized human body would be needed on the left of the frame. 
Figure 2.3: Rob Zombie’s Halloween (2007) 
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The image would then be segregated into thirds with a visually significant object in 
each section: Myers on the right, the clothes rail in the centre, and the additional body 
on the left.18 In order to unbalance the frame in Figure 2.3, the victim would need to 
be much larger in order to detract from Myers’ power and immediacy.  
 
 
Unbalancing the Visual Field 
  
Balance in the film frame can be constructed through a variety of means – the 
even spacing of objects throughout the space, for example – and the harmony 
engendered by that balance can subsequently affect the viewer’s engagement with a 
particular scene. Similarly, imbalance can be generated by resisting the conventions 
of visual equilibrium. It can also, however, be stimulated by the technologies of 
cinema and simulated by manipulating the diverse metaphors that arise from 
                                                        
18 The rule of thirds is a more subtle way of creating frame balance in cinema. Instead of clustering 
significant characters around the central axis, the frame is often constructed around a grid of third 
intervals. The frame is split horizontally and vertically into three sections, with characters and objects 
of importance being situated at the intersections of each third. As such, a frame with a human body 
positioned at third intervals from left to right will appear as balanced as one with the human in the 
centre. 
Figure 2.4: The Rule of Thirds 
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physiological experience.19 Marcus Dunstan’s The Collector (2009) achieves a 
distinctive unbalancing of the visual field through its repeated invocation of the 
physiological experience. Often assigned to the ‘torture porn’ category of 
contemporary horror, the film deploys a simple plot: ex-convict Arkin must return to 
house burglary in order to raise money for his wife who owes a debt to loan sharks. 
Using his job as a way to stake out houses, Arkin identifies a large gemstone he 
wishes to steal. On returning to the house after nightfall, however, Arkin realises that 
someone else – The Collector – was also staking out the house for an entirely 
different reason. Arkin must run the gauntlet of The Collector’s torturous traps as he 
attempts to escape. 
 
Torture porn is, as Steve Jones argues, remarkably difficult to define.20 
Usually incorporating films as diverse as Hostel (2004), The Devil’s Rejects (2005), 
The Hills Have Eyes (2006), The Strangers (2008) and The Collector (2009) the 
dynamics of the interrelation between violence and pornography are not always clear. 
Jones claims that the confusion over what torture porn is originates in the wide 
interpretations of the confluence of violence and pornography such that, 
 
on the one hand, the films are said to juxtapose violence with nudity, 
or emphasize sexual violence such as acts of rape and castration. On 
the other, they allegedly present non-sexual violence in such gory, 
close-up detail that their aesthetic is akin to pornography.21 
 
The Collector is not an overtly sexual film – it contains only one scene of a sexual 
nature, which is dominated by The Collector’s voyeurism rather than his sadism – but 
instead wears its sexualised connotations in the form of The Collector’s gimp mask. A 
stylised version of the sadomasochistic costume ‘ramped up to horror movie material’ 
the mask, as noted by Gary Needham, dominates the film’s publicity material to such 
an extent that it becomes the killer’s signature look.22 In addition, the preoccupation                                                         
19 Up is good, for example, is a metaphorical association evident in language (we get a pay rise, we get 
a foot on the property ladder, things look up, and so forth) that is principally based upon the upright 
posture of the human body. 
20 Steve Jones, ‘The Lexicon of Offence: The Meanings of Torture, Porn and Torture Porn’, in 
Controversial Images: Media Representations on the Edge, ed. by Feona Attwood, Vincent Campbell, 
I.Q. Hunter and Sharon Lockyer (London: Palgrave, 2013), pp. 186-200 (p. 187).  
21 Jones, ‘The Lexicon of Offence’, p. 187. 
22 Gary Needham, ‘Bringing Out the Gimp: Fashioning the SM Imaginary’, Fashion Theory, 18 (2014), 
149-168 (p. 163). 
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with confinement – in trunks, basements or houses – and The Collector’s own 
apparent fascination with watching the suffering of his victims make a clear case for 
the categorisation of the film as a visually titillating pornography of torture. What 
seems to be missing from many considerations of so-called torture porn films, 
however, is analysis of the way in which the film is presented to and subsequently 
interacts with the viewer. Rather than pornography indicating a definitive link to the 
sexual elements within these films, I would like to suggest that the term is instead 
associated with a mode of embodied fascination that emulates the embodied 
experience of arousal, but does not automatically necessitate the sexuality of its 
namesake. This mode of embodied fascination is facilitated through the combinations 
of form and content that incorporate and indoctrinate the viewer’s body into the 
viewing experience. For The Collector, embodiment is facilitated through its 
exceptional appeals to the vestibular sense of balance and orientation. Indelibly tied to 
the impetus and experience of locomotion, the vestibular sense is adept to manifesting 
the frantic, life-preserving action represented in horror and it is this organic link that 
renders the viewing experience unstable. 
 
The opening sequence of The Collector (2009) displays a distinct focus upon 
balance through its repeated emphasis upon bilateral symmetry and visual 
equilibrium. Prior to the credit sequence there is a sweeping right-pan of a house at 
night; a lit insect trap is situated in the left foreground and provides the only light as 
disproportionally large beetles crawl over one another (Figure 2.5, below). The 
juxtaposition of insects and signifiers of American suburban ‘normality’ echoes 
David Lynch’s Blue Velvet (1986). Although lacking in the satirical tone of Lynch’s 
all-too-perfect white, middle class America, the sentiment nonetheless remains as 
human society is underpinned, or encroached upon, by an animalistic anti-civilisation. 
In The Collector it is the intrusion of the insects – the fact that they appear in the 
foreground and attempt to overrun the additional signifiers of human society, such as 
the houses – that contributes to the sense of foreboding that is built into the opening 
scenes.  
  
102 
 
 
In the scene above, the three-dormer bungalow is nestled behind the intrusive 
insect trap and gradually emerges to the right of the frame as the camera continues its 
smooth track. Despite the bungalow remaining unfocused in the background it retains 
a degree of visual importance for a number of reasons. It is initially familiar, easily 
recognisable from its bilaterally symmetrical dormer windows even though the low-
key lighting scheme ensures it is kept primarily in shadow. Although the insect trap 
dominates the left third of the frame the fact that the bungalow slowly comes to 
occupy the second two-thirds gives it a compositional weight that further increases its 
importance. In addition, the most discernable and familiar of its characteristics, the 
dormer windows, are approximately positioned at third intervals along the horizontal 
axis. By positioning the lightest and most discernable feature of the bungalow at one 
of these intersections the house regains in visual weight what is lost through the 
unfocused, poorly illuminated nature of the scene. The high key lit and overly large 
insect trap is prominent but does not entirely overwhelm the perceived magnitude of 
the house. Despite its relative unimportance to the human viewer, the size, lighting, 
prominent frame position and the fact that it is oriented to the vertical axis draw the 
eye in such a way that the right and left portions of the frame seem to be equally filled 
with similarly sized objects. As a result of the combination of this visual equivalency, 
the smooth movement of the camera and the relative quietness of the soundtrack in 
this scene, there is a sense of calmness that pervades the shot in spite of the usual 
connotations of chiaroscuro lighting, the viewers’ expectations of the genre and the 
horizontal orientation that subtly implies discomfort. Indeed, as this short sequence 
Figure 2.5: The Collector (2009) 
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progresses the initial calmness that finds its metaphor in images of balance recedes to 
tension as the eponymous collector terrorises the inhabitants of the bungalow. 
 
During the following credit sequence intermittent images of frogs, millipedes, 
dung beetles and spiders are interposed with fleeting chiaroscuro images of an upright 
human body. The contrast between insect and human orientations provides a visual 
restatement of the assumption of the uniqueness of human existence as the bipedal 
figure stands alone among the insects, a collector and master of the vermin he hoards. 
Yet the proximity and repetition of the insects draws the human toward the perceived 
lower order of the insect world. The iconography of animals set against humanness 
generates a sense of ambiguity as ‘the essential sameness/difference of the 
human/animal divide’ becomes impressed upon the salient features of the film.23 The 
human body is isolated in such a way that it stands out amongst the primal and 
primitive animals: the same and yet different in a domineering, overpowering sense. It 
is first implicitly equated with that of an animal and then a semi-sentient insect that is, 
to the human mind at least, incapable of higher order processing, emotion or 
compassion.24 Human versus insect is a well-travelled path for horror film – from 
Blue Velvet and The Fly (1986) to Tremors (1990) and The Human Centipede (2009) 
– with arthropods and annelids having long been symbolic of the intrusive anti-
human. That The Collector chooses to hoard these animals is indicative not only of 
his own difference or monstrosity but also the disavowal and dismemberment of the 
human body that is enacted by the film. The body is problematized by the presence of 
the insects as they at once connote radical inhumanness whilst retaining many of the 
experientially fundamental faculties of embodiment that question the special status of 
humans as ‘civilised’: like humans, the insects are bilaterally symmetrical, show 
cephalisation, build communities, generate communicative ‘languages’, designate 
tasks and participate in inter-community conflict.  
  
The primary adaptations of the nervous system of a bilaterally symmetrical 
animal are: centralisation, whereby nerve fibres are bundled together in specific areas 
of integration (such as the spinal cord and areas of the brain in mammals) rather than                                                         
23 Paul Wells, The Animated Bestiary (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2009), p. 28. 
24 The mechanisms and implications of aligning the human body with that of another, differentially 
orientated, animal will be considered later with reference to Tom Six’s The Human Centipede where 
the human body is aligned first with that of a dog and ultimately with the eponymous centipede. 
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being disparately spread throughout the body; and, cephalisation, which is the 
concentration of major nervous system structures at one end of the animal (the 
head/brain in mammals).25 In this juxtaposition of human and insect, the acts of 
human reasoning are reduced to the most basic presuppositions of survival and, more 
insidiously, the kind of curiosity that may motivate an avid collector of the insects. 
Significantly, both of these states, survival and morbid curiosity, are heavily mediated 
by bodily instinct and sensation. To be bilaterally symmetrical thus connotes a 
particular way of being in and experiencing the world that at once speaks directly to 
the specific experiences of being human and yet denies the uniqueness of that 
experience as it aligns embodiment with both human and insect alike. If ‘our sense of 
what is real begins with and depends crucially upon our bodies’ then the shape and 
principal structure of the body becomes an important and easily definable norm, but 
not necessarily an aspect that is universally unique to human existence.26 This partial 
reduction of the human to insectoid suggests a reoriented outlook on embodied 
experience as the ‘truth’ of perception is accessed through the limited and curtailed 
body. The faculties of human existence that are placed above those shared with other 
animals – consciousness, empathy and emotion, for example – are partially 
subordinated to the structures of understanding that arise directly from the embodied 
existence that is common between all creatures.   
Immediately following the credit sequence bilateral symmetry is constructed 
as a positive and stable attribute by associating the elements of physical and visual 
balance with ordinariness. The shot begins with a woodland panorama: the camera 
tracks smoothly and slowly through the landscape, lingering slightly on a remarkably 
detailed close-up of a spider as it descends from a tree branch (Figure 2.6, below). 
The spider’s symmetry, in both shape and markings, connects it experientially to 
notions of natural order and the philosophical outlook that what is natural is 
necessarily harmonious, even if it may not be connotatively ‘good’.  
                                                        
25 The greater levels of integration and coordination afforded by such structuring are beneficial to the 
quick processing of various stimuli and the semi-autonomic minute bodily and postural adjustments 
required for forward movement. Richard W. Hill, Gordon A. Wyse and Margaret Anderson, Animal 
Physiology, 3rd edn (Sunderland, MA: Sinauer, 2012), p. 399. 
26 George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, Philosophy in the Flesh: The Embodied Mind and its Challenge 
to Western Thought (New York: Basic, 1999), p. 17. 
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This connotation of nature is reflected in the human tendency to search out and 
identify harmonious patterns both in manmade and naturalistic endeavours. Of 
specific relevance to the metaphor of balance is the notion of the Golden Ratio. 
Originally defined in Euclidean geometry as a methodology for the bisecting of a line, 
it is claimed that the ratio (1:1.618…) is expressed in the proportions of spiral 
galaxies, nautilus shells, Leonardo da Vinci’s Vitruvian Man and Salvador Dalí’s The 
Sacrament of the Last Supper. It is proposed to demonstrate the most aesthetically 
pleasing ratio of parts to the whole and psychological investigation has centred upon 
whether human beings exhibit a preference for things constructed using those 
proportions.27 That the claim for the aesthetic pleasure and visual balance of the 
Golden Ratio persists demonstrates the impact that physiology has upon the way in 
which humans cognitively classify their world. If the sociocultural context of human 
civilisation is removed, temporarily, and the human is considered purely as a 
physiological being, the body becomes the primary frame of reference for 
experiencing and interpreting the world.28 Because the body is bipedal, because the 
human animal can physically balance and because it perceives in its own materiality a 
bilateral symmetry that mimics that act, these factors come to define the normative                                                         
27 As Mario Livio discusses in The Golden Ratio, however, many of these examples of the so-called 
‘divine proportion’ at work ‘involve numerical juggling’ and often ‘overlook inaccuracies in 
measurements’. The nineteenth-century psychological experiments conducted by Gustav Fechner 
likewise demonstrate inconclusive results as to whether subjects preferred the proportion of the Golden 
Ratio to other rectangular formations. Mario Livio, The Golden Ratio (London: Review, 2002), p. 46; 
p. 179. 
28 A purely philosophical endeavour, of course, since one cannot remove sociocultural influence from 
the behaviour of humans. Enculturation modifies physiological understanding immediately and over 
generations, but that does not negate the importance of embodied knowledge. Rather, it serves to 
recognise a synthesis between the two whereby both hold equal importance. 
Figure 2.6: Spider’s Descent, The Collector 
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structures of understanding. These qualities are categorised as desirable – for how 
could the very mode of existence be undesirable? – and objects that are seen to share 
these qualities are judged accordingly as desirable and familiar.29 Moreover, these 
qualities are then imposed upon other facets of human knowledge and understanding 
as a framework for relating the external world to the internal, or material, existence of 
the individual. This type of bodily knowledge is then absorbed into the sociocultural 
existence of the individual as the framework is adapted to suit changing experiences 
and technologies, but it nevertheless remains at the foundations of understanding.  
 
In addition to these comforting associations of nature, more threatening 
connotations of insects and spiders are also evoked by this scene as we follow the 
spider’s invasive movement through the visual field. Insects have long been a source 
of fascination for the Gothic and horror genres, in both written fiction such as Franz 
Kafka’s The Metamorphosis (1915) and films like David Cronenberg’s The Fly 
(1986) or David Marshall’s Arachnophobia (1990), for their decidedly uncanny 
nature. In such works the connotations of natural order are set against the otherness of 
the insects’ bodies to generate an object that is both familiar and threatening. Often, 
as in The Fly, the insect is used to question the sanctity of the human body. Although 
linked with scientific endeavour in Cronenberg’s film, the domination of the human 
body by the insect nevertheless elicits an embodied reaction of primal fear. In this 
scene from The Collector, the spider descends from an unseen point and its proximity 
to the camera lens gives the movement an air of invasion. The foregrounding of the 
spider seems peculiar at this point in time as there has been no exposition, no dialogue 
and no real introduction to the narrative. The spider, a creature that commonly incites 
phobia, is an uninvited visitor to the camera’s leisurely sweep that darkens the 
valorisation of nature that is implied by the opening panoramic sequence.30                                                          
29 There is no intent here to impose a sociocultural value judgment upon these qualities, but merely to 
highlight that standing upright and being balanced is generally more desirable than being imbalanced. 
This is then projected onto our understanding of other objects and events such that, for example, falling 
over is ‘clumsy’ which carries with it a slightly pejorative inflection. 
30 With its high-key lighting the opening panorama itself approaches a representation of what 
Immanuel Kant calls the ‘mathematical sublime’ in its overbearing desolation. As these scenes are so 
closely followed by images of houses, cars and people, however, the vastness of the natural world is 
subtly clipped in order to restrain the connotations and maintain focus upon the human aspects of the 
film (most notably the body). Kant’s notion of the sublime and the way in which it inherently invokes 
the human body into its understanding will be further explored later in this chapter. Immanuel Kant, 
The Critique of Judgment, trans. with analytical indexes by James Creed Meredith (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1982), p. 94. 
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The camera continues past the spider, emerges from the woodland and rests 
upon a large, Grecian style house whose imposing buttressed exterior mirrors the 
bilateral symmetry of the insects and vertical orientation of the human bodies that will 
shortly come to share the frame (Figure 2.7, below). Once again, the juxtaposition of 
scenes of undomesticated nature with symbols of human civilisation questions the 
perceived disparity between animals and humans as primary elements of conceptual 
understanding can be seen to be carried through from the insects, to the humans, and 
the human houses. Moreover, the symmetry and implied left-right balance that is 
inherent in this scene is extended further by the musical accompaniment. Patient 
113’s track Awake to You is a mid-pace ballad whose melody consists of a four-note 
refrain of third interval pairs repeated over four bars. This four bar sequence is then 
varied in rhythm and tone and provides the melodic structure of the track. Despite the 
variations, the repetition of the same sequence of notes and the preservation of the 
third interval create a harmonic tonal consonance that is smooth and even.31 The track 
harbours an almost palindrome-like quality as it progresses and repeats individual 
notes, pairs of successive harmonic notes, pauses and the full melody. The music, like 
the house and spider, exhibits a comfortable balance that creates a calm, 
contemplative atmosphere and mimics the long sweeping movement of the camera.  
                                                        
31 Tonal consonance and musical intervals provide another example of the human propensity to find 
balanced patterns in natural phenomena. Pythagoras is often said to have ‘discovered’ harmonic 
progressions in the musical scales by manipulating string-length to change the pitch of a note. While 
the C notes at either end of an octave stand in a ratio of 2:1 to each other, the harmonious fifth (notes in 
a 2:3 ratio) and fourth (notes in a 3:4 ratio) progressions stand approximately in the Golden Ratio to 
one another. It should be remembered, however, that mathematics has been imposed upon musical 
sound and is not an inherent property of the phenomena itself. Livio, p. 28. 
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Michel Chion draws a critical distinction between two functions of film music 
and the way in which each behaves within the cross-modal film.32 Chion claims that, 
 
On one hand, music can directly express its participation in the feeling 
of the scene, by taking on the scene’s rhythm, tone, and phrasing […] 
In this case we can speak of empathetic music, from the word empathy, 
the ability to feel the feelings of others. 
 
On the other hand, music can also exhibit conspicuous indifference to 
the situation, by progressing in a steady, undaunted, and ineluctable 
manner […] This juxtaposition of scene with indifferent music has the 
effect not of freezing emotion but rather of intensifying it, by 
inscribing it on a cosmic background. I call this second kind of music 
anempathetic (with the privative a-).33 
 
In contrast to the anempathetic music addressed in the previous chapter, which had an 
augmenting effect upon the visual stimuli with which it was paired, the empathetic 
nature of the musical accompaniment in The Collector incorporates Chion’s notion of 
synchresis as moments of cross-sensory simultaneity extend to produce a sustained 
replication of balance through both the visual and auditory registers. As the audio-                                                        
32 I am using cross-modal here to refer to films that not only present multiple sensory stimulations (as 
all film arguably does), but that provide moments, scenes and sequences that draw the sensory 
modalities together until they contact one other, mingle and a produce a hybrid sensorial experience 
that cannot be reduced to any one of its concomitant sensorial ‘streams’. Chion’s audio-vision is 
neither wholly audible nor wholly visible, and yet it is both. Similarly, The Collector’s imbalance is 
neither wholly vestibular nor wholly visual but a fusion of both that is corporeally appealing and 
ambiguous. 
33 Michel Chion, Audio-Vision: Sound on Screen, ed. by Claudia Gorbman (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1994), p. 8. 
Figure 2.7: Bilateral Symmetry and Vertical Bias as an Outer Representation of the Human Body, The 
Collector 
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visual becomes a combined multisensory field the effect of the invocation of balance 
upon the viewer is amplified to the point of discomfort. Contemporary horror often 
displays a preference for heavy metal music that usually contributes to the tension of 
the narrative, perhaps due to heavy metal’s capacity to represent musically ‘a dialectic 
of controlling power and transcendent freedom’ that mimics the violent struggles of 
the horror film.34  
 
The dissonant, rhythmic nature of heavy metal music finds synchresis in 
scenes of terror and violence and, in fact, the musical accompaniment to key scenes in 
many titles has become equally as iconic as the visuals. Marion Crane’s death in 
Psycho, for example, is as synonymous with Bernard Herrmann’s squealing violin 
chords as the rhythmic thrust of the knife. Similarly, John Carpenter’s tension-
building pursuit scenes in Halloween owe much to the iconic electronic score that 
explicates musically the repetition and anticipation of Myers’ stalking. In most cases, 
then, extended synchresis between the audio-visual fields implies impending, and 
often unending, danger. In The Collector, however, the calmness of the visual scene 
that is replicated in the calmness of the audio track generates an atmosphere of serene 
balance whilst subtly indicating to the seasoned horror viewer that this balance will 
shortly be obliterated. It is in this way that these scenes first create a neutral 
atmosphere from which the narrative can then deviate: musical balance, and visual 
equilibrium and consonance indicate a diminished sense of tension or a degree of 
safety. Moreover, the subsequent manipulations and positioning of elements within 
each frame continue to build positive connotations of visual and audible balance 
whilst also positing the opposing imbalance as a metaphor for negative narrative 
effects, the pain of characters and a challenge to the sanctity of the human container-
body. 
 
One such manipulation of visual balance occurs once the protagonist, Arkin, 
has entered the Grecian house intent on stealing precious stones from the safe. Upon 
his arrival he realises that he is not alone and proceeds to move around quietly in an 
effort to evade the masked Collector. The camera follows Arkin as he moves from 
room to room, closing doors behind him to conceal his whereabouts. At the same time                                                         
34 Robert Walser, Running With the Devil: Power, Gender and Madness in Heavy Metal Music 
(Hanover: University Press of New England, 1993), p. 168. 
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The Collector is also moving from room to room and as yet there has been no explicit 
or implicit violence towards human bodies. This movement again stimulates an 
expectation within the viewer as doors open and close and the protagonist and villain 
pass within mere inches of one another. As the two men move through the house the 
camera is raised, smoothly via a small crane, in order to show a cross section of two 
rooms, separated by a wall (Figure 2.8, below. NB: the image has been artificially 
brightened for better visibility). Having entered the shot from a door at the bottom-
right Arkin waits behind another door that separates the left and right halves of the 
screen. He hears The Collector approach from the top left and pause in front of a third 
door at the bottom left. The subtle disorientation caused by the camera apparently 
transitioning through the ceiling of the house is dissipated by the momentary pause in 
motion and sound: the scene is approximately balanced with a human body on either 
side of the frame. When movement is restored it flows anticlockwise as the collector 
first moves out of shot through the door at the bottom left and Arkin then follows by 
moving from right to left and out of shot. The motion of one body remains balanced 
by the equivalent movement of the other and the expectation of conflict brought about 
by the physical proximity of hunter and prey is not fulfilled: the ability to balance the 
visual field becomes a metaphor for the avoidance of conflict. It also, however, 
sustains the level of tension that has been subtly accumulating throughout the opening 
scenes and builds the viewer’s sense of expectation. 
 
The use of balance as a metaphor of safety is, however, challenged as Arkin 
becomes the victim of The Collector’s arsenal of traps. Arkin attempts to make a 
phone call and as he lifts the receiver the viewer sees that his adversary has installed a 
Figure 2.8: Visual and Directional Balance, The Collector  
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long spike in the earpiece. The length of the weapon would suggest that the target of 
its attack is not only the parts of the ear that facilitate hearing but also the vestibular 
apparatus that lies behind the cochlear organs. The loss of sensation and balance 
implied by the attack on the vestibular system is then visually embodied by a 
disorientating series of camera movements that follows the protagonist from room to 
room. The apex of this motion sees the camera apparently rotating through two axes 
of orientation simultaneously. The scene is constructed from two camera movements 
– one that sees a camera spiral to the left through the transverse plane, and another 
that shows a camera flip horizontally through the sagittal plane – which are then 
edited together to form what appears to be 
a smooth and disorientating aerial roll 
(Figure 2.9).  
 
The circularity of the camera’s 
movement is of critical significance to the 
stimulation of the vestibular system. The 
anatomy of the semi-circular canals, 
utricle and saccule of the inner ear enable 
the system to detect vertical and horizontal 
movement and rotary acceleration. ‘The 
vestibular organs are suited to detect starts 
and stops and changes in motion, not 
constant velocities’.35 As a result, the 
rotary motion of spinning is one of the 
more confusing movements for the 
vestibular system and is often the product of vestibular malfunction – as in the case of 
excessive alcohol consumption or seasickness. In order to augment the vestibular 
sensation of spinning, which is actually a quick succession of changes in motion and 
velocity, the visual system is required. During a spin, the eye performs several 
movements including spotting; remaining focused upon a single point for long as is 
feasible and returning to that same point on completion of a revolution in order to 
maintain a static point-of-reference that confirms velocity, directionality and bodily                                                         
35 Harvey Richard Schiffman, Sensation and Perception: An Integrated Approach, 5th edn (New York: 
Wiley, 2001), p. 403. 
Figure 2.9: Camera Roll Through the Transverse 
and Sagittal Planes, The Collector 
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balance. With no forewarning of the artificial spin performed cinematographically in 
The Collector, the momentary destabilisation of the visual and vestibular systems, 
despite the fact that this kind of simultaneous movement through the transverse and 
sagittal planes would be incredibly difficult to physically replicate, creates an instant 
of disorientation. As vision is used to supplement the inaccurate vestibular sensations 
this scene is able to induce a temporary feeling of dizziness or disorientation while the 
viewer’s physiology attempts to reconcile the incongruent information. 
 
This emphasis upon movement and the perplexing effects that counterintuitive 
visual motion can have upon the body enhances the tension and brings the viewing 
experience that much closer to the internal, interoceptive human senses. The 
integration of the vestibular sense anchors the viewing experience not only to the 
conceptual human body but to the specific body of each viewer so that watching 
becomes a distinctly embodied experience that is reliant upon the specificities of its 
viewers’ bodies.36 As Merleau-Ponty claims, ‘we can only think the world because 
we have already experienced it’.37 This is not to say, however, that without 
experiencing each and every facet and adaptation of metaphorical balance one cannot 
apply the schema to new situations. It merely indicates that in order to have a schema 
of balance one must have experienced some form of physical balance from which a 
schema can be elaborated. 
 
This vestibular attack provides a moment of sensory overload that signals the 
onset of bodily violence in the film. When Arkin’s vestibular apparatus was 
functional the visual, audio and emotional stimuli were balanced and stable; when it is 
no longer functional the stimuli become unbalanced with increased tension and 
human pain being the result. As Arkin moves from room to room following the                                                         
36 Horror cinema is by no means unique in its attempts at creating an embodied viewing experience. 
Arguably, the trajectory of all cinematic technology is converging towards the multisensory – take for 
example the periodic resurgence of three-dimensional film and its endeavor to ‘surround’ the viewer 
with visual action. What this thesis argues for is a predisposition of horror cinema to ‘need’ to engage 
the viewer’s body in order to remain effective in its remit. The horror genre’s primary concern with the 
human body seems in part to direct the course of the genre to either the bodies onscreen, which have, 
by now, been subjected to myriad tortures and mutations, or the bodies in the auditorium. 
Technological capability has made the latter increasingly accessible and this has generated what might 
be considered the ‘optimal conditions’ for the incorporation of the viewer’s body into visual fiction of 
this type.  
37 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, ‘The Primacy of Perception and its Philosophical Consequences’, trans. by 
James M. Edie, in The Primacy of Perception, ed. by James M. Edie (Evanston, IL: Northwestern 
University Press, 1964), pp. 12-43 (p. 17). 
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attack, for example, the camera work could pursue him in a linear and continuous 
track or through editing shot-reverse shot sequences together. Instead of these 
conventional options the scene transitions from room to room by way of the aerial 
roll.38 Not only does this technique once again display cross sections through 
structural walls but it also rotates through both the horizontal and vertical axes so that 
when the camera rests the scene presented is inverted. Such elaborate and physically 
impossible movement creates a sense of disorientation that mimics the effects of the 
loss of vestibular function. When the vestibular apparatus malfunctions the effects can 
be akin to vertigo, a visual illusion of movement produced by a disparity between two 
sensory modalities.  
 
The final scenes of the film exemplify the ambiguous connotations of 
disorientating sensory manipulation, both inter- and extra-diegetically. Arkin appears 
to outwit The Collector and rescue the young daughter of the household. Having 
ensured the girl is in the hands of the police, Arkin is loaded into an ambulance and 
taken to hospital. As the ambulance leaves the property the scene cuts to an extreme 
close up of a spider that recalls the earlier scene and the subtle implications of both 
natural order and physical otherness. Earlier, the spider suggested a creeping threat to 
suburban life and this extreme close up provides an increased iteration of this feeling 
of impending violence. The spider is fragmented by the computer-generated zoom 
that focuses upon its multiple eyes, at once highlighting its innate difference from 
human norms and its perceived prescience in the heralding of instability. As if to 
confirm the viewer’s growing sense of anticipation this shot is closely followed by 
one of the most disorienting scenes in the film. As the ambulance takes Arkin to the 
hospital it collides with something unseen and is forced off the road, rolling multiple 
times. Rather than using the motion of the camera to approximate the roll, the camera 
remains static in the centre of the screen. Adopting an objective point-of-view shot, 
                                                        
38 The combination of ears, spiral camera movements and American suburbia again recalls the imagery 
in Blue Velvet (1986). In Lynch’s film, the camera’s zoom and spiral into the insect-laden severed ear 
that Jeffrey Beaumont discovers in a field becomes a metaphor for a journey into the ‘inside’ or 
unconscious of his hometown. Underneath the surface, suburban bliss in Blue Velvet is punctuated with 
dysfunction and neuroses. Similarly, in The Collector, the villain disrupts the serenity of suburbia but 
the human body is also questioned by the consistent juxtaposition of the human and insect that 
speculates how similar they may be underneath the superficial exterior. 
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the ambulance and its contents rotate in front of the stationary camera so that the 
visual field appears to tumble around the viewer (Figure 2.10).39  
 
The sense of disorientation is generated by the sensory contrast between the viewer’s 
stasis and the implied alteration of gravitational force as the visual field rotates around 
the central axis. The vestibular apparatus of the viewer is sensing immobility as there 
is no direct stimulation of the vestibular sacs or canals but the eye is ‘seeing’ mobility 
in the violent effects of gravity as the ambulance rolls. The incongruence between the 
vestibular and visual information creates a subtle effect that is much like the sensation 
of movement that can be generated by other visual illusions, including Cine360’s 
trompe l’oeil. It is due to the principal illusion of self-vection that this phenomenon is 
generated. ‘We normally see the total scene move only when we are actually moving                                                         
39 With a relatively low budget of $3 million (compared to Saw III’s $10 million, for example), this 
effect was achieved by mounting an ambulance chassis onto large steel wheels and physically spinning 
it around an axis. Shots of the spinning chassis were then cut together with shots of the exterior of a 
miniature ambulance to create a convincing approximation of the full-sized vehicle rolling over. 
Figure 2.10: Gravitational Manipulation, The Collector 
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relative to a stationary environment’ and so significant shifts in the visual field – 
particularly in an environment that limits that visual field, like cinema or Cine360 – 
readily lend themselves to the creation of visual illusions that manipulate the viewer’s 
sense of kinesis.40 If a significant shift in the visual field occurs, the brain 
autonomously attributes movement to the individual, despite a lack of vestibular 
corroboration. Consequently, presenting the rolling motion of the ambulance in such a 
manner manipulates the viewer’s sense of gravity and orientation and contributes to a 
subtle and temporary illusion that the viewer is somehow following the rotation of the 
ambulance. Indeed, if the viewer were actually spinning the effects on the visual field 
would be remarkably similar to those represented onscreen. The disorientation created 
by the temporary spinning sensation embodied by this scene is followed in the 
narrative by the reappearance of The Collector, once again aligning imbalance with 
violence and life-threatening events. The Collector re-captures Arkin and imprisons 
him in an ornamental box as inter-diegetic vestibular motion disturbs the narrative 
balance and signals a return to distress. 
 
The embodied experience of balance, structured by a bilaterally symmetrical 
body, enables humans to form an expansive metaphorical concept of balance that can 
be extended beyond the boundaries of the physical human body. Thus from the basic 
physical experience of balance a metaphorical schema is constructed which is both 
direct and specific enough to be communicable and yet flexible enough to be 
extended and applied to instances where the physical experience of balance may not 
directly apply. Analysis of The Collector has shown that this comprehensive schema 
can be manipulated visually and audibly at both an inter- and extra-diegetic level. 
Extra-diegetically, the prevalence of the images of animals and architecture that share 
the same type of symmetry coupled with consonant and steadily rhythmic musical 
accompaniment can create a sense of ordinariness. A proliferation of this type of 
imagery, however, is also a precursor to instability and imbalance. Inter-diegetically, 
camerawork that combines computer-generated images with traditional handheld, 
Steadicam, aerial and crane-based cinematography, can manipulate the field of vision 
in order to present incongruent visual and vestibular information. Of particular                                                         
40 Schiffman, p. 404. It is pertinent to note that The Collector and Neil Marshall’s The Descent (2005) 
are among a minority of films discussed in this thesis that had larger-scale cinematic releases. The 
environment of the cinema auditorium provides the optimum conditions for visual-vestibular 
manipulation as the big screen literally takes over the visual field of its viewers. 
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interest in The Collector are the movements that can be emulated by combinations of 
these technologies. By integrating the tracking Steadicam with crane-based 
technology the sweeping movements of characters can be replicated by the omniscient 
point-of-view shot of the camera. 
 
The fact that the cinematography of The Collector has such a specific function 
adds an embodied dimension to the way in which the viewer can interact with the film 
and thus problematizes its ‘torture porn’ label. Rather than simply visualising scenes 
of gratuitous violence to the extent that ‘the spectacle of violence – the 
pornographication of torture, in other words – exceeds what is necessary to convey 
the meaning of the action in the narrative context’, the stylised camerawork assists in 
the communication of sensations that are typically difficult to express.41 Terror, pain, 
disorientation and fear are physiological states that, despite having corresponding 
signifiers in both the verbal and visual domains – the wound, for instance, 
symbolically represents pain when that sensation cannot be shared between two 
individuals – can only be adequately communicated through combinations of sensory 
stimuli that approximate the original sensation. The embodied appeal to the viewer’s 
sense of balance enhances and amplifies the affective nature of viewership by 
allowing multisensory engagement with the film. It is not the images of suffering that 
are ‘the point’ of The Collector, but the way in which those images can make contact 
with and directly affect the viewer. This is not a case of visual fascination, implied by 
the pornographic label, but of a bodily fascination that is engendered through vision. 
 
It is prudent to note, however, that direct vestibular stimulation, whether inter- 
or extra-diegetic rarely appears without also being associated with the metaphorical 
concept of balance. The camerawork of The Collector directly stimulates the viewers’ 
sense of balance but is always associated with other aspects of the metaphorical 
schema, including balance as a positive characteristic and imbalance as a negative 
one, reinforced of course through classical Hollywood’s traditional narrative sequence 
of equilibrium-disequilibrium-equilibrium. This metaphorical framework is an 
example of what Mark Johnson terms an orientation schema: one that ‘presuppose[s] 
                                                        
41 Jones, ‘The Lexicon of Offence’, p. 188. 
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a “viewpoint” from which the movement is observed’.42 The physical act of balance 
that structures our understanding of the schema is necessarily embodied and 
orientation-based but the metaphorical extensions retain a similar perspective. The 
experiences of our bodies not only organise the concept but they also influence its 
application in a metaphorical context. In this way it can be argued that balance is 
indicative of positivity as it connotes an upright posture, control over one’s body and 
the avoidance of injury. Conversely, imbalance is indicative of negativity as it 
connotes a lack of control, failure to remain in an adequate position and the potential 
for harm. Such an association can be seen in The Collector with the repeated use of 
vestibular manipulation immediately prior to the appearance of the villain or the onset 
of physical pain. The metaphorical applications of balance and positivity are more 
explicitly manifest in the film to which we shall now turn: Neil Marshall’s The 
Descent (2005). Unlike the sometimes bravura cinematography of The Collector, 
Marshall makes use of more conventional techniques to construct a subtle but 
sustained manipulation of the viewer’s metaphorical understanding of balance that 
does not rely solely upon the explicit manipulation of sensory input but 
simultaneously invokes and subverts the conceptual understanding of balance. 
 
The Appeal to Metaphorical Balance  
 
Neil Marshall’s The Descent follows protagonist, Sarah, and five friends as 
they embark on a caving expedition in the Appalachian Mountains. The trip, designed 
to help Sarah overcome the accidental deaths of her husband and daughter, is 
endangered when parts of the cave system they are exploring begin to collapse. The 
group soon realise that they are not alone in the caves and have to battle to find an 
exit as they are hunted by creatures indigenous to this subterranean setting: the 
Crawlers. Extra-diegetic manipulation of visual and auditory balance is deployed to 
contrast the world above ground with the one below by exploiting viewers’ 
associations of balance as positive and imbalance as negative. 
 
The first third of the narrative features sweeping scenes of outstanding natural 
beauty with events set first in the Scottish Highlands and then in the Appalachian                                                         
42 Johnson, The Body in the Mind, p. 36. 
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Mountains. These scenes are dominated by high key lighting and smooth camera 
pans; the purposeful and sustained movement of the camera is reflected in the choice 
of subject matter as we first follow a fast flowing river and later the trajectory of a car 
along a straight road. The use of aerial photography both reflects and enhances the 
scale of the surrounding wilderness. The indicators of civilisation, such as roads, cars 
and boats, are visually dwarfed by the expanse of mountainous woodland that seems 
to contain and overwhelm them. By reducing the signs of human habitation to 
seemingly insignificant components of a larger whole, the images evoke both a 
pleasurable awe and a lingering discomfort. The ambivalence initiated by these scenes 
mirrors that generated by the insects and spiders in The Collector as it highlights the 
concept of natural order whilst subtly repositioning human beings as small, 
insignificant creatures.  
 
This reduction of the human is a factor of what Immanuel Kant labels the 
sublime. For Kant, the sublime is an ambiguous and almost inexpressible feeling that  
 
represents all that is great in nature as in turn becoming little; or, to be 
more exact, it represents our imagination in all its boundlessness, and 
with it nature, as sinking into insignificance before the ideas of reason, 
once their adequate presentation is attempted.43 
 
Certain environments, for Kant, elicit an awe-like affective state in which the human 
being, along with their all-encompassing subjective consciousness that appears to 
structure the world in which it exists, experiences an immediate and embodied 
reduction of themselves to insignificance. Although instigated by an outside agent, the 
perception of the sublime is an internal relation in which the individual’s sense of 
reason and scale becomes skewed. The resulting sensation is both overpowering and 
embodied, uniting the organic existence of the individual with their psychology as 
both are ousted from the central position of significance in the conception of the 
phenomenal world. Objects in and of themselves are not bestowed with an inherent 
quality of the sublime but rather have the quality ‘sublime’ projected onto them by the 
viewer. It is thus within the relation between the individual viewing and the thing 
being viewed that the sublime is generated as a dialectical product of relations in 
scale, force and power. Forces, as in the conceptualisation of balance, are understood                                                         
43 Kant, p. 105. 
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by the individual first through bodily experience. In the same way that Julia 
Kristeva’s abject is enabled by the experience of the body, Kant’s sublime is built 
upon the embodied experiences of the individual. As Kant proposes, ‘for the beautiful 
in nature we must seek a ground external to ourselves, but for the sublime one merely 
in ourselves’.44 The sublime is a sensation of the complete diminution of the agency 
of the sentient individual to a composite part of an infinitely wider organic reality: the 
full and unapologetic (although temporary) reclamation of every facet of our being by 
the cellular substrate of our existence. An amplification of the moments of bodily 
sensation that allow our embodied nature to rise into consciousness during the 
viewing experience, Kant’s sublime is the extreme invocation of matter over mind.  
 
While certain environments or objects may elicit the sensation of the sublime, 
the replication of the corresponding relations in scale and power can be used to 
simulate ambiguous sensation in film. While in The Collector many of the images of 
nature were short and focused upon the small-scale (insect life) in order to generate a 
feeling of anxious anticipation, The Descent favours the grander scale of the natural 
world that evokes Kant’s sublime. The aerial camerawork and the fluid motion of the 
camera’s actions, reiterated by the purposive and relentless flow of the river that is 
integrated into the opening sequence, visually represent the scale and power of the 
setting and create an expectation that the human characters are to be similarly 
overwhelmed during the film. The viewer does not look upon the film as the sublime, 
but as a visual recreation of the dynamics of a sublime experience. The relation 
between the self and the sublime that Kant strives to communicate verbally is 
embodied – is within and because of me – and this physiological link allows the 
concept to be simulated through the body of the viewer. 
 
Another striking feature of the composition of these scenes is the continued 
utilisation of visual balance, a concept that involves the consideration of a variety of 
aspects within the field of vision including: the relative location in the plane of 
orientation, spatial depth, relative size, intrinsic interest, visual isolation and shape of 
objects, the viewer’s prior knowledge of the objects in the field of vision, and 
                                                        
44 Kant, p. 94. 
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colour.45 The two-dimensional planes of orientation referred to here are those 
primarily associated with bodily experience and object manipulation: the central 
vertical, central horizontal and intermediary diagonal planes. Thus, a large, red 
circular object on the right side of the field of vision may balance a large, red circular 
object on the left. Visual balance is created by the use of scenery that provides 
copious numbers of horizontal, vertical and diagonal lines. The opening shot details a 
silhouetted mountainside that adheres to the diagonal axis with trees projecting from 
it. As the camera follows the flow of the river it adopts an overhead angle to present 
the rapids as a rather orderly diagonal line rather than opting for a more dramatic eye-
line view. In addition to adhering to the dominant axes of orientation these scenes also 
present characters centrally along both horizontal and vertical axes (see figure 2.11, 
below). The orderly arrangement of objects along these axes of orientation creates a 
continuous sense of balance and normality such that although the orientation of the 
trees opposes that of the road, for example, the changes between horizontal, vertical 
and diagonal are smooth and visually comfortable for the viewer. It has been noted 
that human beings have a tendency towards searching for patterns and order in the 
visual field, as evidenced by the perpetual fascination with the Golden Ratio, and both 
repetition and pattern are suggestive of order, predictability and stability.  
 
 
The isolation of visual balance is, however, counteracted somewhat by the 
appeal to the sense of the sublime that is constructed through the connotations of 
balance and power that are intrinsic to the setting. The alternation that occurs between 
the comforting balance and the disquieting nature of the image is a matter of scale: 
when an isolated section of woodland is viewed, as it was at the beginning of The 
Collector, or an insect microcosm is enlarged as in Blue Velvet, the repeated visual 
balance is both stable and familiar. When presented as an aerial shot, however, the                                                         
45 Johnson, The Body in the Mind, p. 83. 
Figure 2.11: Diagonal Preference and Character Centrality, The Descent (2005) 
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scale overcomes the familiarity and brings the feeling of diminished agency that 
characterises the sublime. Despite this subtle foreshadowing of threat, the initial 
sequence of The Descent remains relatively calm, with the foreboding associations of 
the sublime building implicitly in the expectations of the viewer. The seamless track 
of the camera is mimicked by the long ascending orchestral overture that plays in a 
major-key scale. The stringed instruments used for this piece sound the evenly spaced 
tones legato as one note runs into the next with no intervening silence. The even 
spacing between each sound becomes attached to the equally even spacing between 
the axes of orientation that are subtly invoked by the imposing imagery. As a result, 
the scene gains an overtone of grandeur that at once offers comfort but physically and 
metaphorically overpowers the human figures that pass through it. This ambivalence, 
that valorises and reduces the human body in the same moment, is reminiscent of the 
effect Kant attributes to the sublime whereby, 
 
the mind feels itself set in motion in the representation of the sublime 
in nature […] This movement, especially in its inception, may be 
compared with a vibration, i.e. with a rapidly alternating repulsion and 
attraction produced by one and the same object.46 
 
As the sublime is knowable only through the subjective frame of reference of the 
individual viewing – it requires a ground ‘internal to ourselves’ – the mind enters into 
an interpretative process in which it attempts to reconcile the sublime with its 
knowledge and expectations. This is the motion that Kant speaks of which produces 
alternate feelings of repulsion – because it does not fit our frame of reference – and 
attraction – because it is internal, emanating from our conceptualisation of ourselves. 
The incorporation of metaphorical balance in this opening sequence of The Descent 
combines with the subject material in order to convey to the viewer a sense of both 
attraction and repulsion, of calmness and foreboding, that mimics both the adrenaline-
fuelled extreme sports in which the characters engage and the structure of the horror 
narrative. The viewer is thus subtly made aware that when violence or imbalance 
occurs, its nature will be akin to the sublime: attractive and repulsive, exciting and 
terrifying, and interpreted through an embodied frame of reference. 
 
                                                        
46 Kant, p. 107; emphasis added. 
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Just as the lines created by the landscape, river, trees and roads are orderly and 
adhere to the major planes of orientation, so too does the position of the characters 
onscreen denote order and balance. The centrality of human figures in the field of 
vision is perhaps intuitive: the recognition of a being of the same species gives human 
bodies a high level of intrinsic interest and their subsequent positioning at the centre 
of a scene lends them a sense of visual importance. Furthermore, the central 
positioning of human bodies mirrors the way in which individuals perceive the world 
around them. The ordinary conceptions of frame balance, however, would seem to 
imply that centrality is not the only, nor necessarily the most effective way of 
generating positive associations of characters. In principle, gathering many characters 
around the centre of the frame could lead to an excess of negative space around the 
edges that would seemingly unbalance the visual field. Similarly, because the 
characters do seem ‘grouped’ at times and, because the majority of characters are not 
positioned according to the rule of thirds, it is quite noticeable that they gather around 
the central point of some scenes. Despite their centrality, however, they continue to be 
overpowered by the scale of the scenery around them. The river rapids collide with 
and jostle the dinghy in which the women ride; the woodland that surrounds the thin, 
straight road seems to crowd around the tiny cars that contain the even-smaller human 
figures. Even as visual and auditory balance is maintained, the imposition of such 
images begins to question the intrinsic value and importance attached to the human 
bodies represented, to the extent that the events displayed retain the eerie character of 
calm waters before the tempest. 
 
This implication comes to fruition in the following scene as Sarah, along with 
her husband and daughter, is involved in a car accident. The scene leading to the 
collision is a relatively long one and consists of a series of shot-reverse shot cuts as 
Sarah speaks to her daughter who is in the back seat of the car. The continuity editing 
throughout this scene assists in creating a calm, flowing movement from start to finish 
that mirrors the continuous motion of the car and connects this scene to the previous 
shots of the Scottish Highlands. Unlike the preceding scenes, however, there is no 
extra-diegetic soundtrack – with the sounds of Sarah speaking and the quiet hum of 
the car engine dominating the soundscape. The final shot in the sequence is from the 
perspective of the daughter whilst the adult faces frame the scene (Figure 2.12, 
below). 
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The large profiled faces balance one another in the foreground through their 
equivalent size, shape, axial positioning and intrinsic interest. The viewer’s attention 
is drawn to the exchange between the two: their voices are the loudest sound at the 
time and the inherent familiarity of the car engine renders its continuous drone 
practically inaudible. Additionally, elements of tension between the two adults are 
introduced as Sarah tells her husband that he seems ‘distant’. The viewer is visually 
and audibly captivated by the exchange between the two faces and it is not until the 
shrill squealing of brakes is heard that the small, neutrally coloured car in the centre 
of the frame becomes an important object in the visual field. Due to this deflection of 
attention from the visual to the auditory, the resulting collision generates a more 
intense jolt, emphasised by the intrusion of extruded metal through the car’s 
windscreen. As the diegetic sound effects cease immediately following the loud, 
staccato collision, a non-diegetic musical note takes over the soundscape. The quiet, 
but continuously sustained F# contrasts with both the immediately preceding diegetic 
sounds, which were all lower in pitch and varied, and the previous soundtrack that 
progressed through the natural notes of the major scale. The semitone note sounded 
here, and continued in the following scene when Sarah wakes in hospital and learns 
that her family has died, generates a degree of musical dissonance as it stands out as 
an imbalanced element amongst a slew of previously evenly spaced musical 
progressions. As a result of this visual and auditory manipulation the viewer, like the 
passengers in the car, does not see the collision coming despite it occurring quite 
explicitly in the centre of the visual field. The audible speech guides the viewer’s 
Figure 2.12: Visual Balance and Audio-visual Redirection, The Descent 
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visual focus away from the oncoming hazard in the same way that Sarah and her 
husband refocus their attention away from the road ahead of them. 
 
The use of visual and auditory balance can denote stability, as in the initial 
calming scenes, and thus detract from the explicit realisation of oncoming instability. 
Simultaneously, however, this forced repetition across the senses contributes to the 
anticipation of the loss of balance that is intrinsic to the horror film. The combination 
of multimodal equilibrium and traumatic events creates an intriguing dynamic in 
which the trauma that Sarah experiences seems to be lessened. The mise-en-scène and 
frame composition invoke notions of re-stabilisation and resilience even as intense 
physical and emotional trauma impinges upon the characters onscreen. In contrast to 
this narrative optimism, the setting and the composition of many scenes change when 
the group of friends travel to and descend into the underground cave system. The 
journey through the Appalachian Mountains is in many ways an uncanny repetition of 
the Scottish Highland scenery that conveyed balance and equilibrium in its 
presentation. Unlike the Scottish Highland scenes, however, the musical overture of 
this journey incorporates lower pitched wind instruments that recall those associated 
with Native American music. The flute, in particular, bears the low harmonic sounds 
evoked by the overture used for this journey that seems to emphasise the vast and 
uninhabited nature of the mountainous terrain. It is notable, however, that although 
the wind instruments evoke connotations of Native American culture, they are a 
relatively late addition to tribal music, being incorporated in certain areas as late as 
the twentieth century.47 The incorporation of Native American music differentiates 
this setting from the Scottish Highlands historically and geographically whilst 
foreshadowing colonial struggles between two people – in this case the human 
explorers and the hominid Crawlers. The hybridised music, however, suggests not 
only difference and contention, but similarities as well. As Native American music 
integrated the instrumentation and principles of Westernised music, traces of one 
people came to be found in the artefacts of the other, thus eliding the boundary 
between the two in an uncomfortable manner. The common connection between the 
explorers and the Crawlers is, of course, the humanoid body that they share. The                                                         
47 Laurel Sercombe, ‘Power and Song in Myth Narratives’, in Music of the First Nations: Tradition and 
Innovation in Native North America, ed. by Tara Browner (Champaign: University of Illinois Press, 
2009), pp. 34-53 (p. 37). 
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difference in timbre of the notes sounded, although remaining in a major tonal scale 
alters the perception of the music from depicting grandeur to generating a sense of 
foreboding.  
 
This notion of impending hardship is subtly reinforced as the party nears the 
caving site. An overhead shot shows the road as a thin vertical stripe in the centre of 
the screen, dwarfed on both sides by the expansive forest, as the two cars travel from 
the top of the screen to the bottom. The perspective of this shot minimises the visual 
impact of the cars as they become insignificant against the larger scenery. Moreover, 
the lower pitch of the music coupled with the downward movement of the vehicle 
manipulates the viewer’s embodied conception of up, originating from the upright 
body posture, being a positive attribute and down as being negative. The music and 
visual movement both mimic the eponymous and imminent descent and imply a 
departure from the balance that has pervaded even the most tragic and disorienting 
event of the narrative thus far.  
  
Having arrived at the site of their caving expedition the group of friends 
partially scale a mountain. During the hike, medical student Sam lists a variety of 
symptoms that could be triggered by the claustrophobic surroundings of the cave 
including ‘visual and aural deterioration’. Given the principal interactions between 
these two modalities thus far, this acts as both a diegetic warning and an extra-
diegetic foreshadowing of the complex relation between the two sensory systems that 
will be exploited within the film’s subsequent scenes. Indeed, the relationship 
between the visual and auditory fields is often manipulated in these underground 
scenes in ways that mimic the sensory deterioration the characters may be feeling. In 
addition to enhancing the communication of inter-diegetic sensations, this 
manipulation impinges upon the viewer’s conceptual schema of balance by the cross-
stimulation of the two sensory organs responsible for the achievement and 
manipulation of bodily balance. The first two images of the underground cave system 
begin to challenge the primacy of the major bodily axes of orientation by adopting an 
off-centre positioning of the human figure (Figure 2.13).  
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The first sees Juno descend into the cave ahead of the group. Because of the 
setting, lighting is limited and low-key with the only source being the previously 
balanced over-ground world. Juno’s physical sensory deprivation is communicated in 
situ to the viewer through the mise-en-scène. As Juno’s body replicates the earlier 
downward trajectory of the vehicle, the negative connotations of falling are once 
again invoked and the cave becomes a geographical metaphor for the physical and 
psychological descent into trauma that will inevitably befall the explorers. 
Additionally, the human figure is once again dwarfed by the scenery and moves 
vertically downwards just slightly to the right of the central horizontal axis indicating 
through a subtle visual cue that perceptual and conceptual norms will once again be 
Figure 2.13: Off-Centre Positioning of Human Figures Underground, The Descent 
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skewed. To further enhance the destabilisation of the centrality of the human body, 
the position of the main light source on the left-hand side of the frame creates an 
illusion that the human figure is further away from the central axis than is actually the 
case. Indeed, when Juno lands in the cave, the image features a more pronounced 
imbalance as she is situated to the far left of the screen with extensive negative space 
to her right. Above ground the human figure was an agent that balanced the visual 
scene, either by being situated centrally or by being complemented by another figure 
along a major axis of balance. Below ground, however, the human figure is off-centre 
and unable to balance the visual field. 
 
The auditory field also changes between the over-ground and underground 
sections of the narrative. While the over-ground scenes are permeated by a sweeping 
string orchestral overture, with wind and brass instruments providing attenuated 
contrasts to the melodic flow of the major-key notes, underground the musical 
accompaniment reverts to a piano ensemble that features more percussive 
instrumentation. The piano and percussive notes are played staccato, a series of short, 
discrete notes with audible silence in between, and contrast with the legato of the 
over-ground strings. The musical accompaniment performs a progressive devolution 
from orchestral sublime to percussive primitivism as the explorers move closer to the 
Crawlers. The separate intonation of each note in the repeating piano melody creates 
tension by constructing a rhythmic pulse of alternative noise and silence akin to a 
heartbeat. The separation of the notes also subtly connotes the isolation of the cavers 
from the above ground world, its comforting structures of familiarity and eventually 
from one another. Underneath these more obvious connotations of the change in 
orchestral sound is the alignment, once again, with traditional Native American music 
that is heavily dominated by rhythmic percussion. Although this association does 
speak to notions of difference between two opposing peoples, or in the case of The 
Descent two different creatures, the invocation is so subtle that it manifests as more of 
a general feeling of impending threat rather than as a colonial subtext. 
 
The piano and percussion repeat a simple two-beat melody consisting of a 
three-note ascent in the higher pitched treble clef ending on a dissonant semitone that 
is then inverted in the lower pitched bass clef into a three-note descent concluding on 
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a similarly dissonant tone.48 As a result, the melody has a distinctive rise and fall 
quality with the bass clef repeat adding a more impressive sense of foreboding as the 
explorers descend further into the darkness. The continued repetition of the melody, 
coupled with its low volume in comparison to the diegetic sounds, constructs a cyclic 
and haunting quality that enhances the disruption it creates in the auditory field.   
 
The nature of the physical setting for the underground scenes renders 
disorientation easy to simulate: a realistic depiction of caves would naturally include 
low-key, potentially insufficient lighting, a limited field of vision and a predominance 
of shadows. By limiting the amount of light, the effects of visual deprivation 
experienced by the characters can be simulated for the viewer. This specific backdrop 
also creates further opportunities to manipulate the viewer’s sense of balance by 
utilising the contrasting aspects of light and dark to emphasise certain directions of 
movement. Often, moving objects hold more interest in the visual field than stationary 
ones, but there is also a mechanism in the ocular neural pathway that allows for 
preferential perception of movement in specific directions. When stimulated, the optic 
nerve transmits information to the primary visual cortex and the accessory optic 
pathway, whilst the accessory optic pathway transmits information to the lateral and 
dorsal terminal nuclei and back to the primary visual cortex.49 It is along this second 
accessory pathway that ‘neurons [are found to] respond to visual movements in 
preferred directions aligned along the planes of the semicircular canals’.50 As we have 
already seen, the canals are orientated along the horizontal, vertical and sagittal planes 
of the human body and, due to the existence of the direction-specific neurons in the 
accessory optic pathway, perceived movement along these axes carries a higher level 
of significance than movement in other directions.  
 
                                                        
48 Traditional Native American music not only does not feature the piano but also makes use of various 
scales that depart from the heptatonic major and minor scales of Western music. Bi-, tri-, tetra- and 
pentatonic scales are more common in traditional tribal music but this is not replicated here. Milagros 
Agostini Quesada, Dale A. Olsen and Amanda C. Soto, ‘Music of Latin American and the Caribbean’, 
in Multicultural Perspectives in Music Education, Volume 1, ed. by William M. Anderson and Patricia 
Shehan Campbell (Plymouth: Rowman & Littlefield, 2010), pp. 79-112 (p. 81).  
49 Carlson, p. 152. It should be noted that there are several pathways of nerve activity originating from 
the retina and projecting into several areas of the brain for processing and integration. The examples 
described above form only two of these pathways. 
50 Berthoz, p. 64. 
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Movement along certain axes can be coded as either positive or negative and 
this is evident in a scene from The Descent in which a tunnel collapses around the 
group of women (Figure 2.14). Following her friends through the claustrophobic 
tunnel, Sarah becomes trapped and begins to panic. The camera is positioned at the 
end of the tunnel looking up to where Sarah’s light can be seen. The angle of incline 
is steep enough to deviate from the sagittal axis of movement, but not enough to be 
considered vertical and the only visible aspects of the scene are Sarah’s light and the 
immediate rocks surrounding her. In addition to this visual restriction, the 
underground setting dictates that both character and viewer have no point of reference 
from which to determine the actual direction of travel: although this scene appears to 
be angled downwards, remaining congruent with the thematic of descent, 
directionality could easily be upwards or indeed sideways with no up/down bias at all. 
This creates an unbalanced image, as the visual weight of the human figure impresses 
upon the empty space below it. As Sarah panics the camera almost imperceptibly 
rotates to the right in a manoeuvre that emphasises the claustrophobic nature of the 
situation and changes the angle of incline resulting in the illusion of the visual field 
tightening around the human figure. The tunnel begins to collapse around her, the 
walls literally closing in and the sound ratio between diegetic speech and extra-
diegetic music switches; the speech lowers in both tone and volume while the music 
increases in volume. This dip in inter-diegetic volume mimics the loss of resonance 
that would be initiated by the tunnel becoming smaller and further enhances the sense 
of isolation and trauma.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.14: Tunnel Collapse with Steeply Angled Perspective, The Descent 
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Sarah finally advances down the tunnel and toward the camera, her relative position 
on the screen not altering as she remains in an off-centre and steeply diagonal 
position. The visual balance of the scene does not change until she exits the tunnel 
and is immediately situated to the bottom-left corner of the screen. While she remains 
out of balance in the following shot she is no longer in the immediate danger signified 
by the deviation from the major axes of orientation. The use of steep diagonals to 
indicate imbalance or instability is contrasted with a scene at the end of the film when 
in order to escape the caves Sarah must scale a mound of skeletal remains by 
following a perfect corner to corner diagonal (Figure 2.15).  
 
  
This trajectory conforms to one of the major planes of visual balance and also 
enables the human figure to pass through the central point of the screen. When 
considering the axes of balance of a visual field one considers the horizontal, vertical 
and diagonal lines that divide the field into even proportions and intersect through the 
centre. This central point becomes the locus of visual balance and importance: thus, 
above ground figures presented centrally were both balanced and important to the 
narrative. Below ground, however, human figures cannot reach the central point; as 
the camera rotates during the tunnel scene Sarah is unable to reach or pass through the 
Figure 2.15: Perfect Diagonal Ascent Through the Centre of the Frame, The Descent 
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centre of the screen. It is only when she escapes from the caves at the end of the 
narrative that visual balance and human primacy are restored as she travels through 
the central point and back to the world above ground.  
 
Below ground, the composition of the shots is unable to find an appropriate 
centre of balance: a sense of foreboding is created by scenes that appear to be on the 
verge of ‘falling’ because of the visual inequalities within them. Above ground, 
however, balance is easier to find in the tangible ‘real world’, even when events are 
equally as devastating as those that occur in the caves. The choice of lighting effects, 
camera angles, shot composition and soundtrack enables The Descent to embody the 
disturbance that the characters themselves experience when they are contained within 
the dark, unknown and profoundly disorienting cave system. Even though the 
camerawork retains a relatively steady and continuous position, the ways in which 
visual and aural stimuli interact enable the film to simulate a disquieting imbalance.  
 
On Balance 
 
Our bodily experiences, the physiology of the vestibular apparatus and the 
planes in which we can move and experiment, structure a range of metaphorical 
understandings. On a primitive level, our nervous system shapes our bilateral 
symmetrical bodies and embodied experience and aids in the formation of an equal 
distribution metaphor of balance that can be appealed to through camerawork and 
composition. As an extension of this model we conceptualise balance as stability, a 
positive attribute and as something that can be applied to conceptual spaces such as 
the visual and auditory fields. Of fundamental importance in the effectiveness of 
vestibular manipulation in film is the cross-modal stimulation of vision and the 
auditory sense to approximate the experience of vestibular excitation. The otoliths and 
endolymph of the semi-circular canals do not sense movement when Arkin’s 
ambulance rolls in The Collector, but the visual illusion leads to a momentary 
perception of movement nonetheless. Similarly, even though directionality is not 
explicit in The Descent, downwards motion is implied whenever danger is close. 
Indeed, a visual field that is possessed of equality in distribution or relative weight of 
objects can be balanced and this balanced visual field, like the ones presented initially 
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in both The Collector and The Descent, can connote positivity, harmony or safety. 
Conversely, an unbalanced visual field can serve to heighten tension or intensify fear 
and apprehension. More often in horror, however, the connotations of balance are 
coupled with subtly contradictory visual or auditory stimuli – the spider that invades 
the balanced scenes of domesticity in The Collector or the introduction of bass toned 
music in The Descent – to build tension in order to foreshadow an impending loss of 
balance or stability that is usually accompanied by violence. Vision is thus afforded a 
proprioceptive and vestibular inflection in these multi-sensorial viewing experiences.  
 
The presentation of events onscreen creates an instant of physical sensation 
during which the viewer’s own ‘body [appears] in the focus of attention’.51 The 
represented events temporarily recede as the viewer’s attention is directed towards the 
physical experience of watching the film. It is through these moments of physical 
sensation that balance as a metaphorical concept can be exploited in order to generate 
or dissipate tension or shock within the viewer. In The Descent, the moment of 
physical sensation that is most prominent, the road accident that begins the narrative, 
is so disorientating because the balance of the visual field was not disrupted prior to 
the physical and emotional jolt of the collision. Although less explicit than the found-
footage aesthetic at work in The Poughkeepsie Tapes and The Bay, the manipulations 
of frame balance and attention achieve a similar affective shock. Following this initial 
moment of physical sensation, tension and foreboding in the narrative are expressed 
primarily through imbalance and the descent of human bodies from over-ground to 
underground – light to dark – civilised to primitive.   
 
Without the physical experience of balance we would be unable to designate 
rules of composition, or alter the impression of a scene simply by moving elements 
within the film frame. The very fact of embodiment means that at any given point an 
individual is bombarded with sensations and perceptions. Consciously, only a small 
number of these incoming stimuli are attended to with the choice being influenced by 
biological and cultural factors. Although the nature of embodiment is not often the 
focus of consciousness, ‘meaning is happening without our knowing it’ with attention 
being directed at perceptions that are already imbued with significance based upon the                                                         
51 Shaun Gallagher, How the Body Shapes the Mind (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2005), p. 28. 
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nature of embodied life.52 Whilst the manipulations of balance discussed in this 
chapter rely heavily upon combinations of visual and audible stimuli, film has the 
ability to initiate a remarkable range of sensory experience. Such experience can 
manifest formally in the way certain images, objects or actions are depicted, or 
metaphorically through the manipulation of physiological and social structures of 
understanding. The following chapter explores the ways in which the lesser-
stimulated senses of touch, smell and taste can be powerfully evoked by the 
contemporary cinema of extreme horror. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
52 Mark Johnson, The Meaning of the Body: Aesthetics of Human Understanding (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 2007), p. 17. 
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Chapter 3 – From the Haptic to the Somatic: The Human Centipede 
(2009) and The Human Centipede 2 (2011) 
 
 I have thus far sought to demonstrate the ways in which contemporary 
extreme horror embodies Vivian Sobchack’s notion that ‘a film is an act of seeing that 
makes itself seen, an act of hearing that makes itself heard, an act of physical and 
reflective movement that makes itself reflexively felt and understood’.1 It has been 
argued that film spectatorship is never merely a case of engaging visually with a pre-
constituted narrative, but is instead a multisensory experience that, through an appeal 
to the human sensorium extending beyond the eye and brain, reincorporates the 
viewer’s body in the creation of a coherent and meaningful sensory experience. This 
sensory experience – constructed by each individual viewer in the space in which 
their subjective consciousness and the film contact one another, comingle and form a 
dynamic consortium of physiological, psychological and social interactions – forms 
the basis for what the viewer will later come to understand as their ‘interpretation’ of 
the film. In the introduction, it was stated that a ‘bi-level physical 
reductionist/reconstructionist hierarchy’ would be utilised to address the influence of 
the physiological body on the viewing process.2 In this framework, the act of viewing 
a film finds a correlate to the prevalent scientific theory of mind that states that neural 
architecture generates the basic conditions of consciousness. Similarly, the viewing 
process is comprised of distinctive layers of engagement: on a neurobiological level 
the viewer makes physical contact with the film through the sensory modalities 
considered in this thesis while on a cognitive level the viewer constructs a coherent 
interpretation in which they assign personal and sociocultural significance to the 
actions and events depicted onscreen. These levels of engagement are not independent 
but are tightly correlated with one another. Physiological interaction with the film, 
which incorporates the viewer’s current and previous embodied experience, 
influences the subsequent interpretation of the film through structures of 
understanding that encode bodily experience in cognitive concepts. We have already 
seen, for example, that our experience of balance results in extensive metaphorical 
understandings of the significance of up and upright as associated with success,                                                         
1 Vivian Sobchack, The Address of the Eye: A Phenomenology of Film Experience (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1992), p. 3. 
2 Randall C. O’Reilly and Yuka Munakata, Computational Exploration in Cognitive Neuroscience: 
Understanding the Mind by Simulating the Brain (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000), p. 6. 
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civilisation, happiness, and positivity. The interpretation of a film, therefore, is never 
merely ‘mind-work’ because we cannot think outside of our bodies, or outside of 
physiological influence. Sensory experience gives birth to cognitive engagement as 
the cinema makes use of ‘modes of embodied existence’ and ‘structures of direct 
experience’ to influence and guide the viewer.3 One such mode of cognitive 
engagement is ‘interpretation’ – a subjective process of making sense of a 
biopsychosocial experience.  
 
This thesis has so far delineated a number of senses in order to expose two 
fundamental facts of sensory experience. Firstly, no sense ever operates in isolation as 
the sensorium is fundamentally integrated on a cellular and neuronal level. The 
neurological conditions of agnosia (being unable to recognise an object in one sensory 
modality, whilst retaining its recognition in others) and synaesthesia (experiencing 
stimuli of one modality in another, as in hearing middle C and seeing the colour red) 
demonstrate the capacity for sensorial exchange and mingling across modalities. In 
terms of film, a similar cross-modal exchange has been explored in the combinations 
of vision and touch and vision and sound wherein the mingling of multiple modalities 
results in an embodied and augmented viewing experience that is phenomenologically 
more than the sum of its parts. Secondly, direct sensory experience generates 
ontological and orientational metaphors that underlie significant cognitive concepts 
such as balance, containment and even individuality (predicated, of course, on our 
physiological experience of our bodies showing us that we are discontinuous from 
other people). Having established the foundations for sensory integration in the 
contemporary horror film, the inquiry must now turn towards the intrinsic connections 
between the neurobiological sensations of film viewing and the biopsychosocial 
process of interpretation. To this end, the embodied schemata and conceptual 
metaphors that arise from physiological experience will be explored in more detail, 
with particular emphasis placed upon the ways in which physiology influences 
sociocultural significance. 
 
The following discussion will analyse the ways in which The Human 
Centipede (2009) and The Human Centipede 2 (2011) can be approached through the                                                         
3 Sobchack, p. 4; p. 5. 
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medium of the human body. It will begin by acknowledging the implications of the 
embodied viewer to a culture that is principally obsessed with the body. By presenting 
an extended case study, the ways in which embodied experience – including 
ontological metaphors (the body is a container) and body schemata (inside-outside, 
whole-part) – can be encoded in contemporary film will be explored. It will then be 
argued that, having invited viewers to engage bodily with the film, The Human 
Centipede and more explicitly The Human Centipede 2 utilises a specific combination 
of extreme subject matter, cultural metaphor and somatic image to stimulate the 
senses of touch, smell and taste. Finally, the effects of engaging the viewer in such a 
bodily fashion will be considered as the principal generator of anxiety that resituates 
body horror from the bodies onscreen to the dynamic bodies that experience, rather 
than simply view, the material before them.  
 
The All-Consuming Sensorium 
 
 As we have seen above, the physiological relation between the film and its 
viewer is one that has been explored in the phenomenological inquiries of Laura U. 
Marks. Marks’ framework for haptic visuality emphasises the contact between the 
viewing body and the object viewed as she approaches spectatorship as an interaction 
between two bodies. Marks writes that ‘in a haptic relationship our self rushes up to 
the surface to interact with another surface’ and ‘we cannot help but be changed in the 
process of interacting’.4 In the haptic mode, a viewer approaches a film in the same 
manner they approach any other object and the sensuous experience of the film – 
accessed through the eyes that are so intimately connected, proximally, chemically 
and neurologically to every sensory modality and nerve fibre of the human body – 
produces a reaction, an exploration of a phenomenon by a perceptive creature. It is a 
different mode of engaging with film that incorporates and transcends ‘viewing’, thus 
representing a sustained turn towards the visceral. This is not an attempt, however, to 
marginalise the dynamics of spectatorship that have already been explored in relation 
to cinema, merely an argument for recognising that underlying those dynamics is a set 
of primal structures of experience and comprehension. Indeed, Marks notes that ‘the 
haptic image usually occurs in a dialectical relationship with the optical’ in the same                                                         
4 Laura U. Marks, Touch: Sensuous Theory and Multisensory Media (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 2002), p. xvi. 
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way in which the two terms of a binary opposition define one another as much as 
themselves.5 Spectatorship engages us on a viewing continuum as the viewer 
transitions somatically between engaging with the narrative, or the ‘meaning’ of a 
film, and the sensory qualities of making contact with that film. Such somatic 
transitions, however, necessarily affect the viewer’s subsequent conscious 
engagement with film as the conscious and somatic realms mingle in a malleable 
spectrum of embodied experience.  
 
 The preceding chapters have contended that vision is the gateway to bodily 
sensations in contemporary film and that visual engagement cannot, therefore, be 
analysed in isolation from the wider sensorium. Indeed, no single sense modality is 
truly isolated and even sensations we perceive as being wholly within a single sensory 
remit have, in fact, multiple sensory components. Balance, for example, is comprised 
of interoceptive, proprioceptive and visual stimuli that combine in ways that can be 
perceived as comprehensible by the individual being stimulated. Similarly, the 
conditions of agnosia and synaesthesia (which are both physiological conditions) 
suggest that the senses are not as distinct or as rigid as one may like to think. 
Physiological studies have demonstrated that the neurons and cortices of the brain are, 
to a certain extent, flexible in the reception and reporting of sensory stimuli.6 Analysis 
of Gut and The Poughkeepsie Tapes explored the ways in which vision can allow 
access to the sense of touch, both formally and metaphorically. Laura U. Marks’ 
adoption and development of the notion of haptic visuality demonstrates that a 
different way of looking at an image can open that image to the realm of visceral 
experience. Similarly, the incorporation of balance as both a physical sensation and a 
metaphorical concept in The Collector and The Descent highlights the ways in which 
visual perception can be augmented by the interactions of a secondary sensory 
modality. 
                                                         
5 Marks, Touch, p. 12. 
6 Christine Métin and Douglas O. Frost (‘Visual Responses of Neurons in Somatosensory Cortex of 
Hamsters with Experimentally Induced Retinal Projections to Somatosensory Thalamus’, PNAS, 86 
(1989), 357-361) and Mriganka Sur, Preston E. Garraghty and Anna W. Roe (‘Experimentally Induced 
Visual Projections into Auditory Thalamus and Cortex’, Science, 242 (1989), 1437-1441) show that 
foetal re-routing of visual and auditory cortices leads to each developing some features of the other. 
The nerve fibres and neural tissue are effectively unspecialised until they are primed and assigned to a 
specific sensory modality shortly before birth. C.U.M. Smith, Biology of Sensory Systems (Chichester: 
Wiley, 2000), p. 29. 
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 The very concept of a ‘turn towards the visceral’ directs the viewer and the 
critic alike to the physiological dimension of the human body as it invokes the 
innards: intestines, stomach, mastication and the distinctly viscous, wet textures of the 
innermost parts of the organic body. Rarefied in horror film through the thematic of 
cannibalism – Cannibal Holocaust (1980), Blood Diner (1987), Parents (1989), The 
Silence of the Lambs (1991) and its sequels and spin-off television series, Sweeny 
Todd (2007) and The Green Inferno (2013) – and more subtly (but no less 
horrifically) in the narratives of consumption engendered by Cheol-su Park’s 301/302 
(1995) and Brett Leonard’s Feed (2005), human consumption retains an element of 
fascination. The horror genre’s commentary upon consumption, in its correct and 
incorrect forms, perhaps finds it main course in Tom Six’s The Human Centipede 
(2009). Six’s premise is startlingly simple: a generically constructed mad scientist, 
Dr. Heiter, becomes obsessed with surgically connecting human beings together, anus 
to mouth, in a grotesque centipede operation. He captures four hostages – later 
discarding a German truck driver in favour of the physically more suitable Japanese 
tourist, Katsuro – performs his operation and then attempts to successfully spend his 
life with his new ‘pet’. Deliberately conflating consumption with a species of 
cannibalism, the faecally fascinated film constructs a discourse of nausea that offers a 
metaphorical commentary upon consumption, proper, and the other kind of 
consumption invoked by the film’s satirical unveiling of the execrable aspects of 
organic human existence: capitalist consumer culture.7  
 
It is perhaps pertinent that the two bodies Heiter selects to be the recipient 
segments of the centipede are American tourists, Jenny and Lindsay. Paradigmatic 
stereotypes of American consumer culture, the immaculately groomed duo display 
what can only be described as a stunning lack of self-awareness – and horror film 
tropes – as they travel through Europe ‘consuming’ the alternative cultures. In an                                                         
7 The link between the two modes of consumption exposes the symbiotic relationship between the 
physiological world and the psychosocial one. Consumer culture is, at heart, based upon the needs of 
the human animal – the need to eat, drink, be safe from predation, reproduce and provide for the 
offspring. Although intensely augmented, even mutated, from the evolutionary imperatives for 
survival, the cyclic consumerism that dominates nevertheless incorporates the generation of a ‘need’ 
(which is no longer a ‘need’ but a desire packaged as such ‘false needs’) followed by the provision of 
goods and services to satisfy it. Cinema is undoubtedly a commodity produced to satisfy a set of 
interlinked ‘needs’ but the identification of these needs and the analysis of the ways in which they are 
satisfied by contemporary horror cinema is not within the scope of this thesis. Instead, this project 
seeks to establish that in the satisfaction of the cinematic need(s), contemporary film increasingly 
strives to incorporate the viewer’s bodily sensation to heighten the viewing experience.  
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echo of Eli Roth’s Hostel (2005), the girls reveal to their absent friend that they have 
met a ‘cute German waiter’ who invites them to a party located somewhere deep 
inside the German countryside, miles from any town. Although Jenny and Lindsay 
avoid becoming commodities in the vein of Roth’s metanarrative, they embody the 
same hedonistic, hungry consumer culture as Paxton and his associates. They devour 
the cultures of the world and, regrettably for them, quite a lot more besides.  
 
Jenny and Lindsay are products of a culture of appearances – indicated by 
their revealing attire, their hiring of an executive grade BMW with alloy wheels to 
drive through woodland and their trust of the German waiter based upon the scale of 
his ‘cuteness’ – that can be viewed as a by-product of what Guy Debord addresses as 
the society of the spectacle. The spectacle is an image, an appearance, which holds 
value in a capitalist culture because of what it represents. The image that Jenny and 
Lindsay proffer (albeit satirically) is that of the desirable feminine as constructed by 
Western culture: airheaded, naïve, beautiful and exceptionally well-presented they are 
the quintessential, unthreatening and easily controlled ‘trophy wives’. That 
stereotypical image, however, transcends the mere physical presence of either 
character onscreen; they are representations of an ideal mobilised by Tom Six in order 
to create a specific dynamic within the film. The transcendence of the representation 
over the object being represented is a key function of spectacle as ‘appearance 
becomes just as important – and practically more so – than the [represented object’s] 
being itself’.8 The stereotypical image of the American consumer has a certain 
cultural (and literal, in Hostel) capital. The spectacle, in Debord’s words, ‘is capital 
accumulated to the point where it becomes image’.9 
 
The ideology of consumption is threaded through the eye of the spectacle’s 
needle in both its relation to the practice of film viewing and the wider visual culture. 
That visual culture is an important sociocultural industry exposes the significance that 
images, and the technologies (mechanical and social) that produce them, carry. The 
rise of the spectacle has been accompanied by what Jonathan Beller terms a 
‘cinematization of the visual’ as social relations become evermore attuned to the                                                         
8 Wolfgang Fritz Haug, Critique of Commodity Aesthetics, trans. by Robert Bock (Cambridge: Polity, 
1986), p. 17. 
9 Guy Debord, The Society of the Spectacle, trans. by Donald Nicholson-Smith (New York: Zone, 
1995), p. 24. 
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value and exchange of the image in a way that mimics the mechanics of cinema.10 A 
brief scoping of contemporary society reveals unparalleled use of the image as a force 
driving the propagation of mass consumption: advertising, mass media coverage, 
healthcare, wellbeing movements, cosmetics, fashion, enhancement surgery and 
medicine all communicate with their consumers through the image. The image of the 
healthy body, attractive body, successful body, wealthy body and the anatomically 
perfect body permeates the social environment like a spectre. Its presence remains 
spectral because, ultimately, this body that envelops contemporary culture is not a 
body at all. 
 
Society surrounds its inhabitants with images of bodies and yet these images 
refer us not to the body, but to a set of cogent societal norms that are reiterated and 
upheld through the reproduction of these spectacular un-bodies. Indeed, as Marzena 
Kubisz recognises, the emphasis upon the image of the body, and the perfection of 
that image, has resulted in ‘the human body [being] fragmented and prepared for the 
exchanging of imperfect parts’.11 The result is that the body proper recedes from 
consciousness even as it remains firmly within ‘sight’. The irony in this dynamic is, 
of course, that the physical body is the lynchpin of all human experiences and it is this 
quality that allows it to be so malleable. Cross-culturally, the human body is a 
universal factor in the shaping of experience and understanding: it is ‘because every 
individual in a society has a physical body and because the education of that body can 
begin from babyhood (if not before) [that] the body (that is the socialized body) is the 
fundamental and universal guide by which human beings understand that they are 
social beings’.12 Moreover, it is because every person has a body and shares the 
experiences of that body that images of the body are open to such diverse and fluid 
significations. Only something so undeniably immediate could wield such intrinsic 
and adaptable power over so many different societies. 
 
A paradoxical situation thus arises: although socially, medically and 
technologically we ‘now have the means to exert an unprecedented degree of control                                                         
10 Jonathan Beller, The Cinematic Mode of Production: Attention Economy and the Society of the 
Spectacle (Lebanon, NH: University Press of New England, 2006), p. 2. 
11 Marzena Kubisz, Strategies of Resistance (Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 2003), p. 16. 
12 Ted Polhemus, ‘Social Bodies’, in The Body as A Medium of Expression, ed. by Jonathan Benthall 
and Ted Polhemus (New York: E.P. Dutton, 1975), pp. 13-35 (p. 31). 
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over bodies […] we are also living in an age which has thrown into radical doubt our 
knowledge of what bodies are and how we should control them’.13 The complexities 
of the paradox replicate the multifarious nature of phenomenal experience as 
physiological existence facilitates the extrapolation of the body from a physical entity 
to a psychosocial symbol. To take a social constructionist outlook, the body ‘is named 
as a theoretical space’ that is constructed socially and can thus be reconstructed as 
required.14 Images of the body are layered: on the one hand, they represent a 
reproduction of a specific body; while on the other they represent a reconstruction of 
a social imperative. The changing shape of femininity, for example, denotes the 
physiological trends in a given population along with the social trends towards 
specific features or attributes. Crucially, however, it is the reconstruction of social 
imperatives within images of the body that takes precedence as the body proper 
becomes subsumed by the potential symbolism of the spectacular image. There is, it 
seems, an emergent ambiguity within the culture of the body. For film, this manifests 
in medical horror (Joel Schumacher’s Flatliners (1990) and Jen and Sylvia Soska’s 
American Mary (2012)) and the so-called ‘torture porn’ cycle of films, which question 
the limitations of material existence. As medical and technological developments 
extend, curtail and alter the limits of the human body, the question of what it means to 
be embodied comes under scrutiny. In this respect, body horror is perhaps the most 
apt genre to engender a physiological return to bodily experience as it mobilises the 
privileged sense of consumer culture (vision) and reopens the channels of 
communication between the other senses and the conscious mind. Consumption in 
contemporary cinema is being reconnected with the physiological imperatives that 
underpin the psychosocial realm of experience. 
 
 In her considerations of the haptic mode of viewing, Laura Marks claims that 
‘the more general desire to make images that appeal explicitly to the viewer’s body as 
a whole, seem[s] to express a cultural dissatisfaction with the limits of visuality’.15 
This assessment insinuates that the turn towards the viscerally somatic image – an 
image that reunites the internal viscera with the externally facing surfaces and organs 
of the viewing body – denotes a deliberate change in the stylisation of                                                         
13 Chris Shilling, The Body and Social Theory, 2nd edn (Thousand Oaks: Sage, 2003), p. 3. 
14 Shilling, p. 9. 
15 Marks, Touch, p. 4. 
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cinematographic technique, and that this change occurs in response to a widespread 
dissatisfaction or lack. The incorporation of the human body in the viewing 
experience is undoubtedly a sustained trope within contemporary extreme cinema and 
this would indeed suggest a requirement for that change.16 It is not as simple, 
however, to link the somatic nature of contemporary film directly and only to 
dissatisfaction with vision as Marks herself notes that the visual and haptic image 
work in concert. The haptic is not a denial of the visual but a development of it, which 
does not suggest dissatisfaction so much as a desire to reach past the current mode of 
spectatorship and evolve the way in which we experience film.  
 
 The evolution of the way in which images are presented to the viewer can be 
identified in the so-called ‘MTV aesthetic’, discussed in the previous chapter, that 
promotes rapid-fire cuts and editing techniques, incongruent or counterintuitive 
sensory pairings and manipulations of sensory simultaneity in order to generate a 
coherently incoherent multisensory experience. No longer defined as simply 
‘viewing’ this experience engages the perceiving body in a dynamic and sometimes 
contradictory process of meaning finding. Moreover, the bodily sensation generated 
by these films offers something of a remedy to the predominance of the spectacle. If 
in spectacle culture ‘all that once was directly lived has become mere representation’, 
the reinstatement of a direct physiological relation between an image and its viewer 
becomes a rebuttal of its status as representation.17 The haptic image is not merely an 
image: it does not hold the vestige of embodied meaning in a diminished capacity but 
instead roils grotesquely and incessantly with phenomenological immediacy. Among 
those films experimenting with embodied images, Tom Six’s The Human Centipede 
(2009) and The Human Centipede 2 (2011) stand out as examples of the disturbing 
quality of the somatic viewing experience. As Steve Jones notes in an article for Cine-
Excess, the franchise has been vilified by some critics – spurred by the ban imposed                                                         
16 It should be stressed that, owing to the nature of embodiment and the pervasive influence of the 
material body upon human experience and cognition, such incorporation of the body into the cinematic 
experience is not limited to a single genre or subgenre. The argument being advanced in this thesis is 
that contemporary extreme horror displays a sustained and explicit trend in foregrounding the 
incorporation of the body into the viewing experience because of its extreme content and its 
socioeconomic need to attract viewers to the industry. Implicitly, all human experience involves the 
body (because without a body, nervous system and a brain you cannot experience anything) but this 
inquiry seeks to focus upon the explicit incorporation and utilisation of embodied experience in 
cinema. 
17 Debord, p. 12. 
  
143 
upon the uncut sequel – as inherently harmful, either to their viewers or to culture 
itself. These critics, Jones states, ‘present the series as illustrative of declining 
standards, both in the horror genre and in cinema more broadly’.18 The implication of 
these ‘declining standards’ is, of course, that there is a growing desire among the 
viewers to watch grand displays of increasingly extreme, socially taboo depravity. It 
is not the spectacle of decadence, however, that produces the unavoidably visceral 
reactions elicited by the film and its sequel. Indeed, the artifice of spectacle that can 
be found in Six’s use of stereotypical characterisations, that allows his characters to 
represent the archetype for which they stand (consumer, mad scientist, foreign other, 
social reject), is actually the keystone to an altogether more complex interaction 
between the ‘consumers’ onscreen, and those in the auditorium. That interaction takes 
place unavoidably and disturbingly through the manipulation of the viewer’s bodily 
experience and understanding in the form of ontological metaphor and body 
schemata. 
 
Ontological Metaphor and Body Schemata  
 
Dr. Heiter (Dieter Laser) stands before his three restrained subjects, 
illuminated by the light of a projector, framed by his own shadow and overlaid with a 
crude diagram, as he explains the details of their forthcoming medical procedure 
(Figure 3.1). His thick German accent seems to emphasise the abrupt contours of his 
markedly square jaw and his sunken cheeks as he reveals himself as a ‘master 
surgeon’ with a specialty for separating conjoined twins. To the horror of his captives 
– American friends Lindsay (Ashley C. Williams) and Jenny (Ashlynn Yennie) and                                                         
18 Steve Jones, ‘No Pain, No Gain: Strategic Repulsion and The Human Centipede’, Cine-Excess 
Special Issue: Cult Controversies (ejournal; n.d) <http://www.cine-excess.co.uk/subverting-the-
senses.html>, [accessed 3 July 2014], p. 2. Other critical responses to The Human Centipede have 
adopted a variety of frameworks to interpret the franchise in an effort to account for its seemingly 
universal ability to repulse and appal. Eugenie Brinkema, for example, delivered a paper at the Film-
Philosophy conference (2013, ‘Disgust, Shame, Love’) outlining Levinas’ dynamic of shame as 
enacted across the three captive bodies of the centipede (abstract available at http://www.film-
philosophy.com/conference/index.php/conf/2013/paper/viewPaper/460). Although sustained critical 
engagement with The Human Centipede franchise tends to be polarised, it is most often upheld as 
marking a significant development/break in contemporary horror. This is due, in no small part, to its 
use of undeniably emotive content that provokes a sustained reaction in its audience. Yet, as Mark Betz 
points out, the premise incorporates tropes discovered in earlier examples of extreme cinema – most 
notably Pier Paolo Pasolini’s Salò, or 120 Days of Sodom (1975) – in a restatement, rather than a novel 
envisioning, of the apex of body horror. My investigation hopes to establish that The Human 
Centipede’s infamy is based, in part, on its intrinsically embodied nature. Mark Betz, ‘High and Low 
and In Between’, Screen, 54 (2013), 495-513.  
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Figure 3.1: Dr. Joseph Heiter (Dieter Laser) The Human 
Centipede (2009) 
Japanese tourist Katsuro (Akihiro Kitamura) – he demonstrates with the aid of 
depersonalised diagrams that he intends to connect the three individual bodies into a 
hideous Siamese triplet; the eponymous human centipede. Through name, nationality 
and vocational specialty, Joseph Heiter is a monstrous recreation of the infamous Nazi 
surgeon, Dr. Josef Mengele.19 As Heiter stands before his victims dressed in the 
surgeon’s gown the viewer both sees the clinical significance of the outfit, reflected in 
the unnaturally bright lighting, that brings associations of assistance and salvation and 
feels the subversion of these associations through the disturbing invocation of 
Mengele’s ‘white angel’ façade. The superimposition of the deformed human form 
over Heiter’s chest subtly implies both his deviance as the centipede literally comes 
from within him and the way in which the signification of the visual image in the film 
is metaphorically imposed upon the body of the viewer. 
 
 When Lindsay, Jenny and 
Katsuro see the crude diagram of the 
proposed body modification the response, 
despite Katsuro’s evident language barrier, 
is one of terror. One could surmise that the 
terror originates in the knowledge that 
anus-mouth connections would necessarily 
involve coprophagia but the simplicity of 
the image would suggest a further source of 
discomfort. Although the digestive tract is 
drawn in red, highlighting it as a continuous feature of the hybrid creature, the 
drawing lacks other details such as fingers, toes or facial features. Its simplification of 
the human body both heightens the horror of the image and foreshadows the loss of 
dignity and corporeal integrity that the centipede segments will experience. As a 
result, the diagram invokes a disgust response in both the victims and the cinematic 
viewer in two ways: firstly, by challenging prevailing body schemata and secondly, 
by mobilising an emotive metaphor and cultural norms in support of this challenge.                                                          
19 The legacy of Mengele’s work in Nazi concentration camps centres around his inhumane 
experiments on children, including the artificial conjoining of twin siblings. This particular aspect of 
Mengele’s work is hinted at by Heiter when he first meets Jenny and Lindsay and asks, with 
considerable interest, whether they are relatives. Even Heiter’s surname appears to be a combination of 
the stereotypical Nazi salutatory phrase Heil Hitler, firmly aligning the character with the stereotypical 
image of monstrous science that was first dramatized in Dr. Frankenstein’s famous sutures. 
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Part of the horror of the centipede diagram lies in its defiance of the primary 
body orientation and schemata human beings have developed based upon their 
principal mode of embodiment. Shaun Gallagher defines a body schema as ‘a system 
of sensory-motor capacities that function without awareness or the necessity of 
perceptual monitoring’ to facilitate the comprehension and understanding of things or 
events.20 They incorporate various parts of the body and brain that are involved in 
directly sensing and reacting to phenomena, in a structure of understanding that 
provides a continuous organising function to the milieu of sensory data. From these 
body schemata we can then extrapolate metaphorical connotations. In the same way 
that we are able to transmute our physical experience of bilateral symmetry and 
upright balance into the metaphorical schema of balance we are also able to take 
sensory-motor experience and develop ‘perceptual schemata’ which are ‘the various 
possible structures that our experience must fit if it is to be coherent and 
comprehensible’.21 A body schema is therefore a set of sensory-motor potentialities 
that bodily experience must conform to in order to make sense. Examples of body 
schemata include: front-back; part-whole; balance; and, into-out of.22  These are 
structured, in part, by the experience of having a cephalised, vertical and locomotive 
body. From the opening scenes of The Human Centipede the dominance of this 
embodied knowledge is challenged by the overpowering visual presence of horizontal 
lines and movement that deemphasise the vertical axis.  
 
The opening scene of The Human Centipede depicts a busy autobahn, the 
camera tracking slowly from left to right as the frame is dominated by horizontal lines 
(Figure 3.2). Visually, the frame remains balanced in three quadrants through the 
horizontal plane (the sky, the road and the scrubland) and the vertical with the 
oversized bush on the left of the screen balancing the visually important movement of 
the vehicles to the right. Whereas frame balance in The Collector and The Descent 
accentuated vertical balance between left and right quadrants as both normative and 
positive, the overwhelming preference for visual balance in this scene remains with 
the horizontal plane, as evidenced by the preferential positioning of the rectangular                                                         
20 Shaun Gallagher, How the Body Shapes the Mind (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2005), p. 24. 
21 Mark Johnson, The Body in the Mind (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1987), p. 21. 
22 George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, Philosophy in the Flesh: The Embodied Mind and its Challenge 
to Western Thought (New York: Basic, 1999), p. 35. 
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lorry as it moves through the frame. Movement is a visual feature that necessarily and 
autonomously draws the viewers’ attention, perhaps due to the evolutionary 
significance of being able to identify both moving threats and moving prey. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The role of evolutionarily significant physiological changes in response to 
horror film is something that has received limited attention from research fields, 
although it has been presumed, particularly in psychological and cognitive approaches 
to film and media, that basic physiological mechanisms contribute to a fear response 
in most viewers. Watching horror film does cause some physiological changes: Mian 
et al. (2003) report increases in white blood cell counts, heart rate and blood pressure 
in a group of individuals viewing The Texas Chain Saw Massacre (1974), when 
compared to a control group sitting quietly in an empty room.23 Hayashi et al. (2009) 
similarly report that viewing a psychologically distressing video causes 
vasoconstriction in the forearm and finger.24 Crucially, what these types of studies do 
not attempt to do is relate these physiological changes directly to affective or 
emotional states. They do not claim, for instance, that the alterations in heart rate 
cause or conversely are a product of fear; they merely identify the similarities 
between the physiological and emotional states. On the other hand, psychological 
research tends to focus on affect above physiology with the emphasis upon subject                                                         
23 Rubina Mian, Graham Shelton-Rayner, Brendan Harkin and Paul Williams, ‘Observing a Fictitious 
Stressful Event: Haematological Changes, Including Circulating Leukocyte Activation’, Stress, 6 
(2003), 41-47. 
24 Naoyuki Hayashi, Nami Someya, Toru Maruyama, Yoshitaka Hirooka, Masako Yamaoka Endo and 
Yoshiyuki Fukuba, ‘Vascular Responses to Fear Induced Stress in Humans’, Physiology and 
Behaviour, 98 (2009), 441-6 (p. 445). 
Figure 3.2: Horizontal Bias in Opening Scenes, The Human Centipede  
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self-reporting. Whilst the current project operates from a theoretical standpoint in 
relation to physiology and cognition, it aims to consider the juncture between the 
realms of the purely physical and the cognitive, and seeks to highlight the ways in 
which the two influence and structure one another.25 
 
As we saw in chapter two, the vestibular organ of the inner ear is a primary 
site for the detection of bodily movement that contributes to both the physical 
experience of balance and the metaphorical schemata of balance. As previously 
discussed, the accessory optic pathway in the brain possesses neurons that respond 
specifically to the detection of movement along distinct orientations and this, coupled 
with the fovea’s ability to allow optical pursuit – the tracking of a moving object and 
the prediction of where that object is moving to – suggests that movement of 
ourselves and other objects is of great evolutionary significance.26 As a result, the 
preferential movement in a frame is likely to engage the viewer’s eye in a way that 
emphasises the direction of that movement. The senses are mingled once more as 
vision is influenced and directed by the senses of balance and kinesis. Dwarfed by the 
negative space of the sky above and scrubland below, the movement of the traffic in 
the opening images of The Human Centipede creates a clear horizontal preference that 
is underscored by the striped appearance of the shot.  
 
The camera then tracks in a horizontal arc and reveals Dr. Heiter’s car in a 
lay-by. Heiter is visibly emotional and smooth camera movements reveal that he is 
looking at photographs of his dogs. The reproduction of the look through both the 
camera and the actions of characters onscreen focuses the viewer’s attention upon the 
act of looking in a mechanism reminiscent of the dynamic of spectatorship in Gut. We 
are, once again, looking at looking and analysing Heiter’s optical fascination with the 
photograph. This placid introduction to the principal antagonist, enabled through a 
moment of displaced emotionality that strikes the seasoned horror viewer as 
somewhat odd, foreshadows Heiter’s discord with conventional notions of humanity 
as he leaves his emotions in his car before sedating and abducting a human hostage. It                                                         
25 Whilst neurocinematics has begun to rectify this imbalance, the stimulation of higher order processes 
and sensory areas of the brain by film has not yet received adequate attention. fMRI scans, for 
example, may be able to show how neurons react to the kind of vestibular stimulation outlined in the 
previous chapter. 
26 Alain Berthoz, The Brain’s Sense of Movement, trans. by Giselle Weiss (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2000), p. 64. 
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also, however, encourages the viewer to be critical of vision per se and particularly of 
the images that are presented to them. Just as the consistent deep focus shots used in 
Gut encouraged the viewer’s eye to explore the extraneous details of each scene, the 
reproduction of the look through Heiter, the camera and the viewer encourages that 
viewer (not to mention the film critic) to search for the contradictions within the 
images. They search for the potential source of Heiter’s fetish, for the indications of 
the horrific that are expected from the title of the film, and for the foreshadowing of 
Heiter’s failure to achieve his goal. This kind of visual scrutiny, as in Gut and The 
Poughkeepsie Tapes, offers the viewer an opportunity to engage in a somatic way 
with the images before them as bodily orientation, movement and vision are subtly 
combined to create a scene that stealthily reveals many of the building blocks of 
horror that will be used later in the film. The continuity of the camera movement from 
right-left and the maintenance of both high key lighting and the subtle horizontal bias 
allow the presentation of the photographs, which depict three Rottweiler dogs 
standing nose-to-rump, to flow neatly into the silent narrative. Mirroring the lack of 
dramatic revelation, the image of the dogs does not generate a feeling of shock or 
revulsion, does not disrupt the movement of the camera or the flow of the narrative 
and shows no obvious signs of the abhorrence that is to follow. The dog remains a 
persistent emblem throughout the narrative, despite being entirely absent onscreen. 
Throughout the film there are three cuts that show the dog’s memorial plaque bearing 
the inscription meine leibe 3-hund (my sweet three-dog). These cuts serve as a 
recurrent reminder of both Heiter’s objective – to create a replacement pet constructed 
of three human beings – and his failure to perfect a technique for achieving this that 
does not result in death. In this way, the image of the three-dog becomes both a 
memory of a failed attempt and a heralding of a future conclusion: Heiter’s aim is to 
recreate the tri-dog but his efforts are already fated to fail. 
 
 The persistence of the image of the dog generates a quadrupedal emphasis that 
develops the horizontal bias created by the movement of the traffic and the panning of 
the camera in the opening scenes. This alteration in orientation signals a subtle de-
evolutionary gesture often invoked in horror that aims to question the embodiment 
and actions of humans. In The Collector the villainous body was aligned with insects 
in a manner that questioned the perceived differences and similarities between them, 
whilst in The Human Centipede the image of the dog begins to question the hierarchy 
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often perceived between humans and animals. The symbol of the dog functions on 
two levels in Six’s film. Firstly, it destabilises the rationale of expected human norms 
and returns the viewer to the corporeal fact of the organic nature of the human body 
and, secondly, it subtly begins to redistribute sensory importance from the human 
norm of sight to wider mammalian norms. As an organic entity, the human body is 
subject to rules of existence and behaviour that originate outside of the conscious 
mind. Subjective experience dictates that humans perceive themself to be the central 
force of agency in their perceptible world – it is, after all, my life – and that they are in 
some way elevated or specialised above other humans to a certain extent, and other 
animals in more obvious ways. As a result, the human body is most often conceived 
of as a tool or container: it has a boundary, the skin, that separates it from the 
phenomenal world; it has an interior, the organs and flesh that exist within the skin; 
and it has an exterior that can only enter into the body through accepted modes of 
access.27 Permutations of the body-as-container schema include the body as a 
fortress, impenetrable and unchangeable. The subtle repetition of the quadrupedal 
orientation in The Human Centipede draws the conceptually impenetrable fortress of 
the human body towards its organic reality: it reminds the viewer that their body is 
simply one of many possibilities. It is the organic nature of the body that challenges 
the ‘fortress’ trope of human conceptualisation as organic entities can be manipulated, 
deformed and mutated. By invoking the orientation of another body and placing the 
image of the dog as the ultimate aim of Heiter’s endeavours, the human body is de-
privileged and remade not as a fortress but as a prison that is controlled by forces 
outside of the body itself – forces which the film both subtly and not so subtly aligns 
with consumer capitalism. 
 
 The narrative of consumption in The Human Centipede functions on two 
levels: the transmuted parody of consumer culture within the film, and the meta-
textual commentary upon cinematic consumption engendered by the film’s 
relationship with the viewer. The former is represented by Jenny and Lindsay, tourists 
from the largest consumer economy in the world whose desire to experience coalesces 
with their naivety to place them in a horrifically literal ‘consumer’ situation. The 
latter finds its centre within the viewer, as the film subtly undermines its own                                                         
27 Mark Johnson, The Meaning of the Body (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007), p. 141. 
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interpretation. The Nazi subtext of Six’s film has been noted in Heiter’s 
characterisation, and is reinforced by his choice of Japanese and American victims, 
but the stereotypes of all characters approach parody.  
 
The representation of Heiter gestures towards stereotyping through the 
limitation of his speech and actions to matters concerning the centipede operation. He 
is doggedly fixated and narrowly characterised as a caricature of Mengele’s absence 
of humanitarian concern in the pursuance of a distorted scientific ideal. Both Mengele 
and Heiter strive to transcend the human by overwriting the body but, absurdly, Heiter 
refuses to acknowledge that his centipede is fated to fail; its death is inevitable. Jenny 
and Lindsay are ciphers, embodiments of cultural typecasting that find antecedents in 
Hostel and Cannibal Holocaust. Katsuro too, is a stereotyped spectre of Samurai 
culture that begins his captivity proclaiming ‘the Japanese possess unbelievable 
strength when backed into a corner’ but ends by committing suicide. His attempt at 
the honourable seppuku of the Samurai is nevertheless diluted by his enactment of the 
female equivalent, jigai, intended to dispel an already-present dishonour from the 
family lineage. The characters are so stereotypical that they parody their own 
stereotypies through their facetious natures. The purposefully clumsy and facile 
characterisation becomes increasingly reflexive, as the redundancy of the characters 
(and Heiter’s obsession) becomes apparent. The purpose of the characters (to die) is 
handed to the viewer in a manner that presupposes the purpose of the viewer (to 
watch them die). Heiter’s centipede becomes an allegorical satire of Six’s viewers 
who ‘consume’ a repackaged representation of their own acts of consumption. 
 
Srdjan Spasojevic’s A Serbian Film (2010) shares this particular brand of 
reflexive black humour and can be considered alongside Six’s films as paradigmatic 
examples of extreme horror. Spasojevic’s controversial title – a veritable centipede 
constructed from the Siamese triplet of horror, pornography and postmodern black 
comedy – endlessly reproduces the mechanics of vision through its film-within-a-film 
within the context of another film structure. Aging porn star Milos is convinced to act 
in one more X-rated feature by the entrepreneurial Vukmir. Given no details about 
plot, script or events, and simply told to arrive at an address at a given time, Milos 
becomes simultaneously the actor and viewer of a private show that culminates in a 
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crescendo of sex and death.28 The satirical amplification of vision recalls the subtler 
questioning of visual legitimacy in The Poughkeepsie Tapes that engendered semantic 
slippage between the categories of news reporting, documentary and feature film. In A 
Serbian Film, the mechanics of vision are repeatedly emphasised by the presence of 
cameras and the manipulation of particular scenes and events by the inter-diegetic 
film crew that seek to capture a very specific type of film (as indeed, do the extra-
diegetic film crew). Spasojevic’s house of mirrors is almost painful in its visual 
confusion: in one scene the external viewer watches a recording of a film crew 
making a recording of Milos watching a young girl being filmed watching her mother 
perform fellatio. The persistent framing of vision emulates the disjointed texture of 
The Poughkeepsie Tapes, as each successive construction of vision is undermined by 
the breakdown of the visual premise of the medium. With A Serbian Film, as with The 
Human Centipede, we are viewing the act of viewing through the cinematic medium. 
In both films, the interior and exterior ‘consumers’ are conflated by the satire of 
vision and consumption constructed by the narratives. 
 
The culmination of A Serbian Film’s questioning of vision is a scene 
described by Adam Carey as the film’s ‘most harrowing [which] depicts a baby being 
raped just moments after it is born’.29 The magnification of vision, however, results in 
the implication, rather than the depiction of this depraved act. The section in question 
is a film-within-a-film as, following an anticipatory speech about the lack of morals 
among the purveyors of extreme pornography, Vukmir shows Milos a short clip of his 
new venture. A heavily pregnant, naked woman walks over to a bench accompanied                                                         
28 Spasojevic’s film is often approached through a political prism, with its violence being read as an 
allegory of the metaphorical birthing pains of the Serbian nation. Mark Feathersone and Beth Johnson, 
for example, employ a Freudian-Lacanian framework to argue that the film represents ‘the horror of the 
Serbian real’ in its brutality. Nevertheless, many critics agree with Mojca Kuplen’s assessment of the 
film as ‘an outstandingly and constantly disgusting movie’. It is interesting to note that critical 
engagement with the film has focused upon the political frame – marked by Spasojevic’s meta-textual 
address to the viewer that precedes the DVD version – or the repugnance of the violence, while very 
little has been made of the amplified and confusing dynamics of the look engendered by the structure 
of the film. Mark Featherstone and Beth Johnson, ‘”Ova je Srbija”: The Horror of the National Thing 
in A Serbian Film’, Journal for Cultural Research, 16 (2012), 63-79 (p. 63) (See also Featherstone’s 
article ‘Coito Ergo Sum: Serbian Sadism and Global Capitalism in A Serbian Film’, Horror Studies, 4 
(2013), 127-41); Mojca Kuplen, ‘Disgust and Ugliness: A Kantian Perspective’, Contemporary 
Aesthetics, 9 (2011), <http://hdl.handle.net/2027/spo.7523862.0009.010>, [accessed 4 July 2014] (e.n. 
44). 
29 Adam Carey, ‘Political Parable or Perversion?’, The Sunday Morning Herald (2 July 2011) 
<http://www.smh.com.au/entertainment/movies/political-parable-or-perversion-20110701-
1gv0n.html>, [accessed 3 July 2014] (para. 7 of 17). 
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by a man dressed in the attire of a sadomasochistic gimp. The image quality is poor 
and the lighting is low-key so that the colours of the walls, floor, bench and the 
woman’s skin seem to mingle. She sits upon the bench and assumes the stereotypical 
position of childbirth and the masked man stands between her legs, largely obscuring 
the camera’s view. Labour is simulated through the woman’s archetypical cries and 
crosscuts to the emerging baby. The scene cuts to Milos, watching in discomfort, and 
then to Vukmir, smiling in anticipation. At this point, it is assumed that Milos and the 
external viewer are expecting the same thing, prefaced by Vukmir’s arrogant assertion 
that his clients will watch anything and the extra-diegetic expectation of what 
Spasojevic’s widely censored film offers to its viewer through its notoriety. A 
disturbing wet sound, followed by the wailing of the baby signals the end of the 
labour as the scene cuts back to Vukmir’s clip. The masked man is in the centre of the 
frame, he is holding something at waist level but we cannot see what and the baby’s 
cries increase in pitch. Its mother smiles before the shot cuts back to Vukmir. The 
grotesque projectionist grins widely and declares ‘newborn porn’. The rape of the 
baby is implied, but not visualised, through a series of associated crosscuts and the 
viewer’s own expectations. The unseen nature of the apex of violence both harks back 
to historical horror film, where shot-reverse shot combinations associated Norman 
Bates’ arcing knife with Marion Crane’s screaming countenance, and creates 
ambiguity regarding where this act of vile repugnance originates. A web of inter- and 
extra-diegetic implication leads the viewer to a specific conclusion that, once reached, 
is confirmed by a character in the film, but it is the viewer – Milos, the extra-diegetic 
viewer – that generates the assumption that what is represented here is the rape of a 
newborn baby. The repugnance of this scene is equally divided between what it is 
implied to represent, and the thought process of the viewer that acquiesced to that 
implication. The optical fascination generated by the convoluted structure of the film 
is thus mobilised against the viewer to complicate and question the relationship 
between the mediated image and the viewing subject. The superficial characterisation 
of The Human Centipede and the incessant re-framing of vision in A Serbian Film 
result in the image losing depth as it projects itself towards the viewer as a spectral 
appearance – a imitation of a commodity that, once ‘consumed’ exposes the viewer’s 
complicity in the cycle of consumption. 
 
Whilst The Poughkeepsie Tapes and Gut reinforced this de-privileging of 
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vision through the layering of somatic sensation across the surface of the film, A 
Serbian Film and The Human Centipede engender somatic experience through the 
intricate combinations of formal elements and the contravention of body schemata – 
most notably the body as container and the into-out of schemata. These embodied 
structures of understanding precipitate from the experience of the organic body 
contained by the skin and accessible only through the ‘proper’ means. Upon this 
basis, rules for the use of the human body are tacitly established: objects defined as 
food enter and leave the body in a particular manner and other objects should never 
enter the body. The Human Centipede replaces food with waste in a manner that 
simulates sexualised oral obsession, indicated by the anal-oral connections of the 
centipede and Heiter’s joyful shout of ‘feed her’ when Katsuro eventually defecates. 
Although not overtly sexual there is nevertheless a deviant sexual desire in Heiter’s 
actions and behaviour.30 Sexuality is explicit in Spasojevic’s film as it repeatedly 
exchanges the sexual organs for weapons and wounds in its amalgamation of 
pornography and horror. 
 
Pornography and horror are both unquestionably concerned with bodily 
arousal and, more specifically, with opening the body through the wound or sexual 
organs. In that respect, the genres enact a partial inversion of the body as they bring 
the interior biological processes ‘out’ through the orifices of the skin. In its structure, 
A Serbian Film bears echoes of Michael Findlay’s Snuff (1976), a faux-snuff picture 
that sees pornography giving rise to extreme violence in the final scenes. Enacting 
what Linda Williams identifies as ‘a perverse displacement of pornographic hard-core 
sexual activities […] onto the penetrating violation of the body’s very flesh’, Snuff, A 
Serbian Film, and The Human Centipede (albeit in a more subtle fashion) succinctly 
meld the (sexual) arousal of intercourse with the (bodily) arousal of death in a relation 
that exemplifies Julia Kristeva’s abject.31 In this dynamic interaction the body 
engaged in pleasurable sexual stimulation is juxtaposed with that same body’s 
transmutation to corpse, an abjected entity that ‘shows me what I permanently thrust 
                                                        
30 This sexual desire becomes explicit in Six’s The Human Centipede 2 (2011) as Martin Lomax rapes 
his monstrous centipede. 
31 Linda Williams, Hard Core: Power, Pleasure and the ‘Frenzy of the Visible’ (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 1989), p. 192. 
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aside in order to live’.32 In The Human Centipede Heiter’s anal-oral fixation alludes 
to a species of organic pleasure garnered from the abject functions of the human body, 
whilst enacting the transformation of that body into a carcass. Both attractive and 
repulsive, the body-corpse is an affirmation of the organic nature of existence as it 
oscillates between life and death, subject and object. As Williams’ analysis suggests, 
the visuality of both pornography and horror generates an optical fascination with the 
body-corpse and specifically with its orifices (both natural and unnatural) as the site 
of penetration, sexually between bodies and metaphorically between the states of life 
and death. Yet this optical fascination is enabled bodily, through the implicit and 
inherent comprehension of the body-as-object and the structures of embodied 
understanding that permeate both A Serbian Film and The Human Centipede. 
 
A Serbian Film relies primarily upon the fusion of pornography and horror to 
open its narrative to the embodied knowledge of its viewer and engages in explicit 
somatic techniques (found-footage style segmentation of the narrative, abrupt and 
incoherent crosscuts, and the addition of anempathetic musical accompaniment) only 
in the last third as Milos recovers his memories through a drug-fuelled haze. The 
Human Centipede, on the other hand, adopts a subtler relation between pornography 
and horror that enhances the sociocultural implications of Heiter’s subversive sexual 
fascination with an intricate and nuanced array of formal techniques which de-
privilege both vision and the primacy of human beings. Vision is denied its violent 
potential as bandages and sheets cover the sites of horror. The secondary sensory 
modality of film – audio – is desaturated as a minimalist extra-diegetic soundtrack 
accompanies the film and emphasis is placed upon inter-diegetic sound effects. 
Olfaction, the primary canine sense, is incorporated into the narrative through the 
recurrent image of the dog and the faeces that result from acts of consumption. 
Finally, the axis of orientation is delicately transmuted from vertical (human) to 
horizontal (canine). The primacy of the horizontal axis established in the opening 
scenes is reinforced through the use of perspective so that even when there are human 
bodies in the frame the viewer’s eye is drawn to the opposing orientation. 
 
                                                        
32 Julia Kristeva, Powers of Horror: An Essay on Abjection (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1982), p. 3. 
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As Heiter enters the basement and wakes his captives (Figure 3.3), his bipedal 
form is dwarfed by the horizontal perspectives of the two visible walls. The line of 
hospital gurneys, the beams of the ceiling and the harsh strip lighting all encourage 
the viewing eye to move horizontally across the image. Heiter himself moves from 
right to left in accordance with the perspective in this scene and yet his gait is slow as 
he stops to revive his captives. This pace detracts from the visual primacy usually 
afforded to human figures onscreen. In addition, the colour saturation decreases 
Heiter’s visibility as his blue shirt and dark trousers mingle with the almost turquoise 
overlay generated by the green-blue hue of the walls under the fluorescent strip 
lighting and the deep shadows created by the isolated, top-down lighting arrangement. 
In this scene, the upright human body is subordinated to the horizontal flow of the 
frame and Heiter appears as a diminished figure.  
 
 
Heiter’s house, despite being shown explicitly as having two floors, also finds 
its vertical axes subordinated to its horizontal as the exterior appears as a bungalow of 
asymmetrical design (Figure 3.4). The small rising dormer to the left, its twin 
windows taking on the appearance of unblinking eyes, provides an unbalancing effect 
as the shape of the house vaguely mimics the horizontal shape of the dog. This image, 
like the autobahn from the opening sequence, appears to be horizontally striped: the 
sky and trees above, the bungalow in the centre and the shadowed lawn below.  
 
Figure 3.3: Heiter’s Basement, The Human Centipede  
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In addition to the visual presentation of lines, the angulation and movement of the 
camera also emphasises the horizontal orientation. In Hollywood filmmaking the 
angle that the camera adopts is often used to highlight certain character traits or 
narrative elements. High-angled shots, like the one used by Hitchcock in The Birds 
(1963) to show the geography of Bodega Bay as the birds descend, typically diminish 
the perceived power of the subject being looked down on. Conversely, low-angled 
shots can increase the perceived power of the subject. The basis of this power relation 
lies within the axes of orientation and the metaphorical understanding that up is 
positive. The bipedal human animal naturally associates ‘up’ with positivity, power, 
wellness and accomplishment and ‘down’ with negativity, illness and ineffectuality.  
 
The inclusion of high and low-angled shots, as well as vertical tilts and pans, 
within a film subtly reaffirms the primacy of the vertical axis that offers a sense of 
reassurance. We have seen in Gut that the lack of motion in cinematography can 
create an uneasy stasis in the look of the viewer. Similarly, a continuous absence of 
dramatic angles can augment the reception of characters and events. Given the 
extremity of the subject matter one may be excused for assuming that the camera 
would present, however subtly, a viewpoint that was imbued with an explicitly 
positive or negative association that would add to the coherence of the narrative and 
the viewing experience – particularly in light of Heiter’s association with Joseph 
Mengele. John Carpenter’s Halloween (1978), for example, uses the low-angled shot 
in the climax of the film to demonstrate the power that Michael Myers exerts over 
Laurie Strode. As Laurie flees through the house the camera looks up the staircase to 
give a medium close-up of Michael as he listens to her movements.  
 
Figure 3.4: The House, The Human Centipede  
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In The Human Centipede, neither Heiter nor his victims are displayed in this 
subjective way – the majority of shots assume a third-person perspective and are 
approximate eye-line shots – and when the camera does pan or move it is always 
through the horizontal axis such that scenes take on the appearance of a panorama. 
The single pan that moves through the vertical axis comes at the conclusion of the 
film: as Lindsay is stranded between two corpses and Heiter lays dead by his 
swimming pool, the camera first moves backwards to view Lindsay through the patio 
doors, and then upwards, showing the roof of the bungalow and finally the sky. 
Accompanied only by Lindsay’s muffled cries, the upwards trajectory that should 
finally signal an end to the negative events of the film is more successful in resigning 
the viewer to the inevitability of Lindsay’s death than in suggesting there may be an 
imminent positive resolution. The lack of point-of-view shots inhibits the 
identification processes ascribed to the camera by Carol Clover. Clover implicitly 
accepts the role of the camera in the subjective positioning of the viewer in relation to 
characters and events when she claims that horror ‘is far more victim-identified than 
the standard view would have it’.33 As subjective point-of-view shots situate the 
viewer in relation to characters, the lack of differentiation between the portrayals of 
each character entails a resistance to this kind of positioning. The viewer’s empathic 
connection to and engagement with the characters is negatively affected by the 
sustained illusion of impartial objectivity – illusory, of course, because all film is 
subjectively constructed irrespective of the attempts at objective portrayal the medium 
can make. This impression reiterates the two-dimensionality of the characters 
constructed by their stereotypical nature and facilitates the privileging of the 
horizontal axis achieved by the film through the use of lines, limited camera 
movements and the human gaze.  
                                                        
33 Carol Clover, Men, Women and Chain Saws (London: BFI, 1992), p. 8. 
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There is ‘a certain visual weight’ to the gaze 
of a character that has to be factored into the 
composition of individual shots in order to achieve a 
visually balanced image.34 Because the gaze is 
assumed to be directed at an object, even when that 
object is off screen, there has to be sufficient space 
within the frame for the gaze to rest. Moreover, the 
direction of that gaze guides the viewer’s attention 
towards the hypothetical object at which the 
character looks. The Human Centipede frequently 
uses a close-up shot that features a human face in the 
foreground with the line of their vision extending 
horizontally through the frame, either from left to 
right, or extending out of the frame towards the 
viewer (Figure 3.5). While this type of shot 
emphasises the eye and the look of the character, it also establishes a hierarchy of 
space whereby the viewer’s own eye is directed towards the point at which the 
character is looking. The effect of these directional gazes is perhaps most observable 
in the final image of Figure 3.5. Despite Lindsay and Jenny sitting upright and 
providing vertical markers that should draw attention, the proximity of Heiter’s face 
to the camera and his disinterested look to the left of the screen re-route the viewer’s 
attention to the horizontal lines of the sofa as their eye follows the trajectory of 
Heiter’s gaze. When the characters gaze towards the viewer, the horizontal axis is 
implied in the third dimension – they do not look directly up or down but maintain a 
relatively level gaze out of the frame – and reinforced by the inclusion of strong lines 
surrounding the face of the character. The centre image of Figure 3.5 shows this bias 
in an extreme form as an injured Heiter reorients his head between two metal stairs 
and stares not up, to where his centipede creation has escaped, but out of the screen 
towards the viewer. 
 
The horizontal orientation dominates the shot composition of The Human 
Centipede even when it is illogical for it to do so. The proposed transition from the                                                         
34 Blain Brown, Cinematography: Theory and Practice (London: Focal Press, 2002), p. 44. 
Figure 3.5: Directional Gazing, The 
Human Centipede 
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norm of bipedal human to the mutated quadruped challenges many primary body 
schemata. The front-back schema is rotated from ventral-dorsal (chest-back) to 
rostral-caudal (head-rump). The part-whole schema is subverted, as a whole person 
becomes a part of a larger entity. Balance is rotated from vertical to horizontal and the 
into-out of schema, like part-whole, is subverted so that what should be outside of the 
human form becomes inside. Heiter’s procedure literally alters the nature of 
embodiment for his victims in a way that mirrors, albeit horrifically, the film’s re-
embodiment of the spectator. Meta-textually, director Tom Six engages in a type of 
sensory play with the viewer as the more explicit the bodily function of the centipede, 
the more somatically engaged the viewer becomes. Rather than displaying this threat 
to the human body graphically through explicit images of wounds, surgical incisions, 
faeces and other effluvia – which would have horrified audiences in the same way 
that Hostel horrifies with its dripping, molten flesh as Kana’s eye is burnt with a 
blowtorch – the threat is instead depicted as something that has already infiltrated the 
very premise of how the film is constructed. As the victims’ lives are threatened, the 
viewer suffers a destabilisation of body schemata and knowledge through the sense 
most often considered to report ‘reality’ to the perceiving body. The viewing 
experience is uncomfortable not because of the graphic nature of the images presented 
– indeed there is a surprising lack of viscera for a film that revolves around the human 
digestive system – but due to the unfamiliar emphasis placed upon orientations and 
bodies that lie outside of the norms of ordinary human experience.  
 
The lack of graphic imagery in this film is notable because of the deeply 
disturbing emotional response it is capable of rousing in viewers. Ordinarily, extreme 
film integrates violence and realistic depictions of blood or viscera into its narratives 
as they can be easily and quickly related to the viewer’s own bodily experience of 
similar, although markedly less extreme, physical distress. Such graphic images assist 
in the generation of the emotional response and without them the truly horrific nature 
of the centipede operation must be communicated through an implicit web of 
associations and assumptions that the viewer is led towards. In doing so, much of the 
crude nature of the subject matter is bypassed so that the narrative may focus upon the 
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disturbing threat to the human body that lies beneath the cultural abhorrence of, and 
fascination with, faeces.35  
 
Emotive Metaphor and Cultural Norms 
 
In addition to the manipulation of body schemata and orientation to challenge 
the viewer’s embodied understanding of their body and the world, The Human 
Centipede also utilises an emotive metaphor based upon the into-out of schema in 
order to generate a feeling of revulsion and disgust. We have seen in the case of the 
balance schema that primary orientation metaphors are based upon bodily experience. 
Our conceptual metaphor of into-out of is based first upon bodily experience of food, 
beverages and waste products, and secondly upon the capacity to manipulate objects. 
In this view, there is a certain type of ‘felt meaning’ to specific metaphorical concepts 
so that it might be said that the individual ‘cannot have the meaning without the 
sensed feel of it’.36 The concept of ‘up’, for example, relies upon the conditions that 
the human body be bounded by skin and be superficially solid; that the head and eyes 
can travel in at least one dimension; and that proprioceptive receptors can relay 
information about the position of the body in space when the head and eyes move. In 
such a manner ‘up’ becomes that which is above my eyes and ‘down’ becomes that 
which is below my eyes. Similarly, propositional indicators such as ‘above’ and 
‘below’ presuppose an imagined or virtual body around which to orientate 
themselves: as the metaphors become more complex the relationships can be 
developed between objects but something can only ever be above something else. In 
relation to the body, because we can put food in and excrete waste out the body as a 
container metaphor is strengthened. 
 
The image of three individual people, on all fours and bandaged to the person 
in front of them, compels a certain kind of bodily understanding for the viewer. The 
posture of the crawling body rekindles the experiences of childhood, of the infancy of 
the human species, of learning to move and also manifests the feeling of                                                         
35 In The Human Centipede 2, however, the crude nature of the coprophagy trope is embraced in its 
entirety creating a contrast between the subtle terror of the first film and the crescendo of disgust found 
in the sequel. 
36 Eugene Gendlin, Experiencing and the Creation of Meaning: A Philosophical and Psychological 
Approach to the Subjective (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1997), p. 67. 
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unnaturalness that has gradually been accumulating through the combination of the 
image of the dog, the horizontal bias and the uneasy fusion of pseudo-sexual fetish 
and horror within the film. The familiarity of the posture is made uncanny by its 
enforced nature and the unseen connections to the person in front. The bandages that 
cover the anal and genital area of each centipede segment obscure the site of horror 
yet reinforce it through associations of incontinence that render coprophagia an 
inevitability. The viewer is terrorised by the many connotations of this image: 
physical incapacitation, incarceration, bodily helplessness and physical infirmity are 
all implied alongside the culturally abhorrent notion of being force-fed faeces. 
Meaning emerges from the body as well as from the conscious mind of an individual. 
Metaphorical associations based upon physical experience, like the neurophysiology 
of the human brain, ‘present us with a self-organising capacity’ that integrates 
neurophysiological experience, memory and cultural influence into a dynamic and 
emergent network of nuanced associations. Doing is embedded in thinking and 
communicating, whether metaphorical or literal and ‘is based on the same conceptual 
system that we use in thinking and acting’.37 Just as the experience of spatial 
orientation created the metaphorical balance schema, bodily manipulation and 
experience creates ontological schemata, including the into-out of schema, and 
ontological metaphors derived from them.  
 
The body as a container metaphor is structured by two biocultural concepts: 
tissues, organs and life-sustaining fluids are inside the body; and, food goes into the 
body while waste comes out of it. With the skin and mucosa acting as the boundaries 
of the container-body, the metaphor generates cultural connotations: that which is 
inside should remain so and that which is outside should only venture inside via 
culturally acceptable means. When something contravenes the in-out norms 
associated with the container-body revulsion, disgust, and at times pleasure, may be 
generated. Julia Kristeva’s notion of the abject can be utilised at this juncture to 
explore this complex corporeal-affective dynamic.  
 
In Powers of Horror, Kristeva addresses a specific embodied reaction to 
certain subject matter — she pointedly looks to nausea, excrement, death and the                                                         
37 George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, Metaphors We Live By (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1980), p. 3. 
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corpse to illustrate her theory, all of which have a clear cogency to The Human 
Centipede and its sequel — that creates a violently uncanny response in the mind of 
the viewer. Kristeva’s abject proceeds from a phenomenological basis, beginning with 
a strong physiological reaction —  
 
a massive and sudden emergence of uncanniness, which, familiar as it 
might have been in an opaque and forgotten life, now harries me as 
radically separate, loathsome. Not me. Not that. But not nothing either. 
A ‘something’ that I do not recognize as a thing. A weight of 
meaninglessness, about which there is nothing insignificant, and which 
crushes me. On the edge of nonexistence and hallucination, of a reality 
that, if I acknowledge it, annihilates me.38 
 
For Kristeva, the abject is a complex dynamic of misrecognition, a play between the 
cognitive categories of me/not me and inside/outside that acknowledges and subverts, 
rather than supports, these binaries. It draws upon the faculties of one that enables the 
other to exist — the bounded nature of inside that also constitutes the free-flowing 
outside that becomes its antithesis — such that both are invoked in a grotesque 
contradiction of their individual signification. While Kristeva relates the abject 
directly to psychoanalytic notions of desire, drive and repression to account for what 
she calls the ‘vortex of summons and repulsion’ created by the abject the fact that she 
chooses nausea, excrement, death and the corpse as exemplary examples connects her 
theory directly to the human body.39 Indeed, it was argued in the introduction to this 
thesis that the abject reaction requires a highly specified body schema to be in place 
before self-identification and the subsequent abjecting of certain bodily remnants can 
occur, and that the abject is created as a by-product of this incomplete self-
identification. 
 
In the experience of nausea, Kristeva describes one bodily action in terms of 
another when she writes that ‘I give birth to myself amid the violence of sobs, of 
vomit’.40 In nausea the involuntary overtakes conscious control of the organic body in 
a way that reaffirms the materiality of life. Nausea is an evolutionary measure that is 
difficult, if not impossible, to control. It is both a denial of (conscious) agency and a                                                         
38 Julia Kristeva, Powers of Horror: An Essay on Abjection (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1982), p. 2. 
39 Kristeva, p. 1. 
40 Kristeva, p. 3; emphasis added. 
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reaffirmation of (physiological) agency that mingles the self and body in a repugnant 
moment of now-ness as the self becomes other to its own material existence. It is this 
false Othering of the body as separate to ‘me’ that produces the oscillating notion 
suggested in the extended quotation above — ‘Not me. Not that. But not nothing 
either’ — that suggests that the abject is most intimately connected to the norms and 
experiences of the perceiving body. Kristeva goes on to explain that, 
 
I experience abjection only if an Other has settled in place and stead of 
what will be ‘me’. Not at all an Other whom I identify and incorporate, 
but an Other who precedes and possesses me, and through such 
possession causes me to be. A possession previous to my advent […] 
significance is indeed inherent in the human body.41 
 
 What Other has the ability to precede the Self that is used to define the very 
parameters of the other? If we invoke Kristeva’s psychoanalytic heritage and assume 
that ‘me’ refers to the conscious construct of myself, the preceding Other becomes my 
material self, the one who denies conscious authority and reinstates organic authority 
and inevitability. Humans do not often consider themselves as confined or limited and 
yet the human body restricts as much as it enables. We see only a small spectrum of 
light. We hear only a small range of sound. We are adapted to succeed in a highly 
specified environment, and these adaptations directly effect consciousness. Existential 
experience prefigures consciousness; physiology exists before ‘me’. My body and my 
capacity to experience shape what and how I sense, perceive and think. Kristeva 
claims that in abjection 
 
we are no longer in the sphere of the unconscious but at the limit of 
primal repression that, nevertheless, has discovered an intrinsically 
corporeal and already signifying brand, symptom, and sign: 
repugnance, disgust, abjection. There is an effervescence of object and 
sign – not of desire but of intolerable significance; they tumble over 
into non-sense or the impossible real, but they appear even so in spite 
of ‘myself’ (which is not) as abjection.42  
 
 Abjection thus lies at the very limits of comprehension, at a point of pre-meaning 
whose significance is imposing and corporeally felt. Abjection exists at a place of 
genesis where physiological experiences begin to impose upon the individual and                                                         
41 Kristeva, p. 10; emphasis added. 
42 Kristeva, p. 11; emphasis added. 
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constitute the material world. We feel the Other — who is, I propose, our material 
self, that thing that stands before all else (including the symbolic Mother) — begin to 
impose its will upon us, challenging our conscious understandings with knowledge 
that is alien yet undeniable. The disjunction between how we think and how we 
experience makes the position of abjection seem alien and Other. Genesis 
masquerades as exogenesis thus generating the corporeal and significant slippage — 
me/not me, self/other, proper/improper — that constitutes the abject. The abject 
cannot be divorced from the Self because although it appears to be exterior it is, in 
fact, interior. The Human Centipede’s surgical connections that symbolically 
materialise the innards of the organic body seek to re-interiorise the abject by raising 
awareness of the material Other as an integral part of the Self. The contravention of 
the into-out of schema implied by the consumption of faeces problematizes the 
categories of inside and outside both physiologically – human waste is expelled from 
the body; it is rightly outside and should remain that way – and socially. 
 
The social construction of waste products has seen human faeces become a 
symbol of filth, baseness and a lack of refinement. In History of Shit, Dominique 
LaPorte traces the symbolic nature of excreta to the on-going and somewhat 
meandering process of developing cleanliness in human civilisation. Taking 
sixteenth-century France as his point of departure, LaPorte documents what he terms 
the ‘privatisation’ or ‘domestication’ of waste whereby human and animal waste 
products were removed from public view and interred within the household: from 
outside to inside.43 The increasing use of latrines and cesspools in domestic settings 
removed excreta from the public sphere and in doing so helped to create a 
paradigmatic shift in the way excreta were viewed. 
 
If something like a goal can be said to be achieved [through the 
privatization of waste], it is always at the price of a certain loss of the 
object (in this case, shit), which is bypassed in favour of its symbolic 
substitute. Furthermore, it is less the object in question that counts than 
the subject’s relationship to it.44  
 
                                                        
43 Dominique LaPorte, History of Shit, trans. by Nadia Benabid and Rodolphe el-Khoury (Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press, 2000 [1978]), p. 28. 
44 LaPorte, p. 48. 
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The ‘cleaning’ of waste from public view and its continued invisibility bestows upon 
it a certain quality of un-desirableness that was perhaps not intrinsic to the substance 
itself.45 By virtue of its banishment it becomes filth because what is cast out of society 
is surely that which would inhibit or disable the ‘correct’ functioning of civilisation. 
The notion that if sanitation is attended to ‘civilization will take care of itself’ is so 
entrenched in Western culture that ‘the body [becomes] a symbol of society’ and its 
waste is the waste of society.46 Human excreta is cast out and made filthy by the 
special measures taken to remove it and, in turn, the absent waste attains a symbolic 
dimension that allows it to not only define itself as filth but also to define its antithesis 
— cleanliness, good health and civility. In doing so, however, the invisible (and by 
virtue of its invisibility, abject) object becomes its symbolic dimension, a simulacrum 
that defines its semantic opposite more than itself. In LaPorte’s terms 
 
by elevating bodies and objects […] to the status of signs, it places 
them in a translucent state: the very light that penetrates them blurs 
their contours, renders them opaque and tasteless, luminous and free of 
smell.47 
 
Through the process of removing excreta from the public sphere, waste becomes a 
symbol that opposes itself. It is no longer organic matter, natural by-product of life-
sustaining mechanisms but waste, signifier of filth and lack of social refinement. It 
becomes that which should be expunged, the dirty secret of human existence, yet it is 
oddly divorced from its human producer. In its symbolic form it has no organic reality 
— no smell, no taste, no image — to the extent that the only real significance it can 
gain is through its absence. After all, ‘good health is signalled by the overall absence 
of [waste and] smells and a quasi-palatable excremental odour sets the norm’.48 
Faeces have not always been considered as the ultimate symbol of unhealthy waste 
yet the longstanding cultural association of excrement with filth generates and 
upholds the view that ‘if I can maintain myself upright, if I can contain myself, then 
others must not remind me – must be prohibited from making me feel – that I once 
                                                        
45 Indeed, LaPorte notes many archaic practices that utilise human urine and faeces in everything from 
beauty products to medicine and, more persistently, in organic fertiliser. 
46 Reginald Reynolds, Cleanliness and Godliness (Norwich: Jarrold and Sons, 1946), p. 7; Mary 
Douglas, Purity and Danger (London: Routledge, 1966), p. 115. 
47 LaPorte, p. 80. 
48 LaPorte, p. 82. 
  
166 
walked on all fours’.49 The Human Centipede, however, contravenes this notion by 
taking the symbolic aspect of excreta (entrenched in the processes, physical and 
metaphorical, of production and consumption) and forcibly reattaching it to the 
organic human body, as Heiter proposes to attach his victims to one another. The 
absent presence of waste (which mimics the absent presence of the body within the 
wider culture) is signalled in The Human Centipede by the sterility of the wounds and 
bandages. Little is ‘in view’ in terms of the gross potential of the subject matter and 
yet its implications resonate clearly. The combination of physical understanding and 
socially constructed emotive metaphor succinctly communicate the abject without the 
need to visualise it explicitly.  
 
From the moment the deformed centipede diagram is shown onscreen the 
captives and the viewer are enticed into an atmosphere of dread by the implications of 
the operation. An insidious disgust is implanted into the film and reinforced with each 
successive oral exploration. Heiter wakes Jenny by inserting a finger into her slightly 
open mouth in what is both an invasive and erotic gesture. The IV tubes Heiter has 
installed in each captive bypass the correct functioning of the digestive system and 
imply a perverted, incorrect function that foregrounds the digestive tract. The gentle 
indentations of the pen Heiter uses to mark out the facial incisions remind the viewer 
of the impassable surface of the container body whilst indicating it as the site of 
abjection. Following the centipede operation the connective wounds are dressed and 
invisible but the cheek wounds stand as the signifier of the horror beneath the 
bandages (Figure 3.6). They arc with a hideous grace, the edges swollen where the 
flesh of one meets the flesh of another, and appear as a grotesque continuation of an 
exaggerated jester-like smile that extends and mutates the mouth of the victims. This 
image of the captive, mutilated and hybridised body implies the necessity of 
coprophagia without the need for explicitness. Indeed, there is only one instance of 
faecal consumption in The Human Centipede despite the three victims being 
conjoined for a number of days, and this takes up mere seconds of the film. What this 
demonstrates is that the social construction of faeces is more horrifying than the 
representable reality. Moreover, it shows that allowing the metaphorical meaning of a 
                                                        
49 LaPorte, p. 64. 
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trope to interact with the visceral representation of the physical act can often heighten 
both the meaning and the physical affect generated by its inclusion. 
 
The oscillation between metaphorical meaning and embodied response, 
between reacting to the physiological and social abjection implicit in the image, 
returns us to a way of seeing that alternates between Laura U. Marks’ definitions of 
the optic and the haptic.  
 
Optical visuality depends on a separation between the viewing subject 
and the object. Haptic looking tends to move over the surface of its 
object rather than plunge into illusionistic depth, not to distinguish 
form so much as to discern texture. It is more inclined to move than to 
focus, more inclined to graze than to gaze.50 
 
For Marks, optical visuality is the way of seeing most often assumed by traditional 
film theory, including Laura Mulvey’s fetishistic scopophilia and narcissistic 
identification, and critical responses to so-called ‘torture porn’ films that focus upon 
the visuality of the pornography-horror dynamic. The distance Marks notes is a 
metaphorical one whereby the viewer approaches the image, not as a phenomenon 
that has been presented to the viewing body, but as an already-perceived and 
categorised projection of a fictive reality. The viewer engages with the film’s 
representation, but not the film itself. In this mode of seeing, Lindsay’s facial wounds 
express the perverse nature of Heiter’s fantasy, symbolise the enmeshing of the 
digestive tract and the subversion of social normality through the swollen edges and 
                                                        
50 Laura U. Marks, The Skin of the Film: Intercultural Cinema, Embodiment and the Senses (Durham: 
Duke University Press, 2000), p. 162. 
Figure 3.6: Facial Wounds and Directional Gaze, The Human 
Centipede 
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the industrial staples that create the artificial, monstrous connection and imply the 
consumption of another body’s faeces without needing to explicate these facts. Yet 
this mode of seeing bypasses a crucial element of the viewing experience: the act of 
viewing itself. Before the viewer is able to access the metaphorical meanings they are 
accosted bodily by the image, by its isolation of the single wound, its muted colour 
palette, its inclusion of Lindsay’s nose that reaffirms the sensory devolution implied 
by the persistent image of the dog and by Lindsay’s direct visual address to the 
camera that communicates acknowledgement of her fate and fear at the inevitability 
of death. The involvement of bodily experience and knowledge that permeates The 
Human Centipede is invited by the image that presents a segment of a segment, a 
single wound carried by the mid-section of the centipede. There is no depth into 
which the viewer may plunge, in Marks’ terms, no intrinsic meaning to this single 
image that the viewer may latch onto and identify with. They are instead presented 
with the rawness of the wound, the staples that dehumanise and make flesh out of the 
fortress-body, spring holes in the container-body and the glossy sheen of Lindsay’s 
eyes as emotions rise and conjoin in disarray. If the camera were to pan out slightly, 
however, to reveal the rise and fall of Katsuro’s torso, the extent of the nappy-like 
bandages and the proximity of his legs to Lindsay’s naked shoulders, the possibility 
of optical visuality would be introduced. The segment of a segment would be 
recognised as a body within a body, a perverse adaptation, and the significance of the 
centipede operation would again align itself with social metaphor and the wider 
context of body horror. Such sliding between the haptic and the optic mode of seeing 
is possible because the two do not form a binary, where one negates the possibility of 
the other, but are within a spectrum. The way in which the image is presented offers 
the viewer the opportunity to consciously engage optically, haptically or with a 
combination of the two. The haptic images of The Human Centipede, and the other 
films discussed in this thesis, are not simply imposed upon the viewer but are offered 
through the fragmentation of the human body and appeals to embodied knowledge 
concerning the ‘correct’ modes of being-in-the-world.  
 
This thesis has begun to extend the boundaries of haptic towards the somatic 
as it has traced the tangible connections between sensory modalities and pertinent 
structures of understanding that arise from embodied experience. In so doing, it has 
suggested that the senses not often associated with film – touch, balance, orientation, 
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smell, and taste – can be equally and effectively incorporated into the viewing 
experience. The Human Centipede is quite subtle in its invocation of smell and taste, 
with much of its horror being generated implicitly. The Human Centipede 2 (2011), 
however, mounts an explicit sensual assault upon the viewer as it documents Martin 
Lomax’s obsession with The Human Centipede. The following discussion will 
explicate the connections between the usually implicit sensory modalities that 
demonstrate the inherent interconnections between sensations, perceptions, 
psychology and culture.  
 
Somatic Viewing 
 
 The Human Centipede 2 begins by replaying the final scenes of its predecessor 
as Jenny dies and Lindsay is stranded between two corpses. Displayed in 
monochrome, the muted colour of the original drained, the camera transitions through 
alternating haptic and optic images. A close-up of Lindsay’s face focuses upon her 
wounds, the tears streaming down her cheeks, and her muffled cries are heard before 
cutting to an image of one of her hands as she grasps Jenny’s, the fingers straining 
and intertwining in front of the confused assemblage of arms, legs, thighs and torsos. 
The shot cuts again and returns to Lindsay’s face from a different angle, the bottom 
half of her features obscured by the layers of bandages, and then finally moves to a 
mid-length shot that displays the entirety of Lindsay and the corpses that enclose her. 
The proximity of the camera to Lindsay’s body reinstates the fascinated looking 
evoked by the original film, as fine details are somehow made starker by the 
monochrome scheme. Black stains stand out against the grey carpet and bandages as 
the camera pans backwards, incrementally revealing more of the gruesome and 
inescapable scene. After a brief moment the camera tracks upwards to pass through a 
close-up of roof tiles, the uniform pattern and slight sheen infusing an altogether more 
stable texture to the shot, and finally settles upon the treetops. The only sound 
throughout this movement is the consistently audible sobs of Lindsay even as the 
camera leaves and all hope is relinquished. Isolated from its own narrative and devoid 
of colour, this scene is presented as a washed-out replica of the original. It stands 
alone as a reminder of the previous film but lacks the context that created its previous 
poignancy. Moreover, the lack of colour detracts from the visual contrasts created by 
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the red blood, white bandages, pink skin and Jenny’s cadaverous appearance that 
reminded viewers that Lindsay remains alive and stranded between two corpses. The 
limitation of the soundscape, also present in the original, adds to the sense of isolation 
to effectively maroon the viewer of The Human Centipede 2 in a place where context 
seems to be assumed but remains just beyond reach. The scene cuts to reveal that it is 
playing on a computer screen watched by Martin Lomax: what had started as part of 
the narrative abruptly becomes a postmodern decoy that prepares the viewer to move 
beyond the narrative, which has already been fragmented and layered, and engage 
bodily with the images before them. 
 
Martin, an obese, middle-aged man with learning difficulties who works as a 
car park attendant, plans to emulate and exceed Dr. Heiter by constructing a twelve-
person centipede. A narrative of excess is a critical component of the meta-textual 
reflexivity of The Human Centipede 2. Six’s original film was met with mixed 
reviews by the popular press, with Roger Ebert claiming that ‘no horror film I’ve seen 
inflicts more terrible things on its victims’.51 Six clearly interpreted the challenge with 
his sequel, which was banned by the BBFC due to ‘the spectacle of the total 
degradation, humiliation, mutilation, torture, rape and murder of [Martin’s] naked 
victims’. The BBFC rejection continues to note that ‘there is little attempt to portray 
any of the victims in the film as anything other than objects to be brutalised and 
degraded for the amusement and sexual arousal of the main character and for the 
pleasure of the viewer’.52 It seems that when Ebert asked ‘is [The Human Centipede] 
good? Is it bad? Does it matter?’ the answer was ‘yes’, because declaring Tom Six’s 
original film as a work of malicious degradation foreshadowed the mutated birth of its 
sequel – a film that is everything detractors claimed The Human Centipede to be. It is 
a dialogue with its critics, and with its fans.  
 
Martin Lomax’s first appearance is pre-empted by off screen coughing as the 
credits roll over the monochrome scene from the original film. A slightly canted 
camera angle reveals the side of his head: his cheek appears bulbous, a shape                                                         
51 Roger Ebert, ‘The Human Centipede (2009) Review’, Roger Ebert.com (2010) 
<http://www.rogerebert.com/reviews/the-human-centipede-2010> [accessed 4 July 2014] (para. 1 of 
12). 
52 BBFC, ‘The Human Centipede 2 (Full Sequence) Rejection Explanation’, BBFC.co.uk (n.d.) 
<http://www.bbfc.co.uk/releases/human-centipede-2-full-sequence>, [accessed 4 July 2014] (para. 1 of 
4). 
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emphasised by the low-key lighting and lack of distinguishing colour, his hair is 
thinning and his glasses are discernibly thick as he watches The Human Centipede, 
seemingly mesmerised. A cut takes us to a long shot that places Martin in his car park 
booth with half of his face visible through the window. This visual isolation of Martin 
sets him apart from other bodies that may appear onscreen, but the fragmenting of his 
physical form also aligns him with the haptic mode of viewing elicited by the 
preceding close-ups of Lindsay’s face and hands. His body is disjointed and the 
viewer does not yet have a full picture with which to identify. As a result, the 
contours of Martin’s form, the roundness of his cheek, the distortion of his glasses’ 
lens and his short stature move to the fore. When Martin’s entire face is shown it is 
these small details that draw the viewer’s attention (Figure 3.7). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As Martin looks directly at the camera two aspects of the image reach out to 
the viewer more insistently than others: a perceived fish-eyed effect and the sheen of 
sweat that covers his skin. His positioning at the centre of the frame in shallow focus 
gives him optical precedence and an overbearing visual weight: he is the largest and 
most imposing object in the frame and his globular form draws the viewer’s attention. 
The convex arc of his head is exaggerated by his almost comically large glasses and 
surpassed only by the deeper convex line of his shoulders. The lighting in the scene 
picks out and seems to deepen each crease and roll of Martin’s skin whilst 
highlighting with iridescence the sweat in which it is coated. His slightly parted lips, 
again swathed in deep shadow, and bulging eyes both seem to embody some kind of 
pressure that is pushing outwards from his insides, forcing sweat and effluvia to seep 
Figure 3.7: Martin Lomax, The Human Centipede 2 (2011) 
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out. Martin Lomax possesses a vaguely amphibious body that appears to leak into and 
onto the film. The ways in which he leaks are decidedly abject and demonstrate the 
refutation of the container-body manifested in The Human Centipede. If the abject is 
concerned with borders and categories whereby ‘the border has become an object […] 
something rejected from which one does not part’ we can quite fairly say that 
Martin’s border, his skin, is failing in its purpose.53 It fails to keep what properly 
belongs to the inside within his skin — as his centipede creation fails to keep what is 
properly outside from entering its mutated body — yet the continuous leaking 
reaffirms the origin of the effluvia.54 If, as LaPorte suggests, ‘human excrement, like 
the soul, carries the ‘noxious’ trace of the body it departs’, Martin’s continuous 
seeping not only creates a spectacle of the abject but strives to reconnect human waste 
to its point of origin.55 This waste no longer functions metaphorically, it is no longer a 
mere concept that defines the correct functions of civilisation, but is irreducibly and 
inescapably organic. It is, in a sense, alive. 
 
The fluids that leave Martin’s body of their own accord, ejecting themselves 
or seeping through his pores in an almost continuous stream, are waste products of 
bodily functions and it is this status that ties them to the abject. Kristeva states that 
waste and ‘these body fluids, this defilement, this shit are what life withstands, hardly 
and with difficulty’ and that contact with them brings an individual to ‘the border of 
[their] condition as a living being’.56 The fluids that Martin excretes so copiously are 
remnants that remind viewers of the organic status of not just the human body, but of 
this human body. The continued expulsion of fluid from Martin’s body gives the 
character a distinctly tactile wetness that is repulsive: repellent, disgusting, rejected. 
Martin, like the centipede, questions the distinct and bounded nature of human 
experience that in turn highlights the continuous sensual relationship each human                                                         
53 Kristeva, p. 4. 
54 A similar combination of tactile wetness and the literal stretching of the body’s boundary occurs in 
Brett Leonard’s Feed (2005), which sees protagonist Michael feed women to death and broadcast their 
demise over the internet. There are extended scenes of sitophilia involving atypical foods as erotic aids: 
greasy burgers, tins of cold baked beans and fried chips. As Michael indulges in an all-over body 
massage of his willing captive Deidre, the viscous tactility of the oily foodstuffs combines with 
Deidre’s obese form. Her flesh undulates beneath the mucosal layer of food and the protrusions of her 
body take on an odd inside-out tactility, invoked by the placing of food on her body rather than in it. As 
the food continues to slop and slide, it is as if Michael were giving an internal colonic massage instead 
of an external erotic one.  
55 LaPorte, p. 35. 
56 Kristeva, p. 3. 
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being has with their environment. Martin’s body foregrounds its functions in such a 
way that the viewer’s senses are foregrounded by association. His body recalls to the 
viewer’s mind their body; he is the ‘not me’ that defines ‘me’ in Kristeva’s abjection-
reaction, an Other to the viewer’s self-image that is simultaneously a reflection of 
their own inescapably messy materialism. 
 
This type of repulsion is then utilised as the images of Martin transition from 
the haptic ones that display only parts of his distorted body to longer, optical shots 
that display his entire body. It is in the optical shots that the metaphorical associations 
of bodily fluid and waste begin to infiltrate the presentation of his character. Kristeva 
writes that ‘abjection is coextensive with social and symbolic order, on the individual 
as well as on the collective level […] One encounters it as soon as the symbolic 
and/or social dimension of man is constituted’.57 The abject is not merely limited to 
physical experience and the abjection of certain bodily acts or fluids is not simply a 
case of physical repulsion. As the general principle that bacteria is carried in stools is 
exacerbated by a social impetus towards cleanliness that generates an intense 
repulsion towards faeces, so too are other bodily fluids subjected to social coding of 
their abject nature. Blood, for example, is often socially accompanied by panic and 
distress. The significance of blood is myriad: it denotes wounding, the pain of an 
individual, disease through its associations with HIV, gender through its associations 
with menstruation and it also signifies the disruption of social order by violent 
conflict. In this manner, Martin’s effluvia are both symbols of his physical 
malfunction – he suffers from asthma, obesity, vision problems and learning 
difficulties – but also of the malfunction of society against which his body stands as a 
non-hegemonic anti-body.  
 
Another aspect of tactile texture that infuses the film is the absent presence of 
the human bowel. The insides of the human body are implied by the slew of fluid that 
streams from Martin but each instance of secretion stands, in part, for the pinnacle of 
excretion that the viewer acknowledges and awaits throughout the film. Martin’s body 
itself appears to approximate the bulbous, twisting form of the digestive system as 
each convex line of his head and body imitates the rippling intestines. Even the way                                                         
57 Kristeva, p. 68. 
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his flesh moves as he dances amidst his centipede creation mimics the slippery 
undulations of the inner organs, coated as it is in his mucosal effluvia. In its specific 
physicality, Martin’s human centipede readily invites comparisons to the structure of 
the human intestines (Figure 3.8). Increasing in scale from Heiter’s three-person 
centipede, the ten interconnected human bodies produce a whole that undulates 
asymmetrically as they crawl around the floor, the serpentine movements mirroring 
the culturally accepted depictions of the small and large intestines as convoluted and 
misshapen. The low-key lighting and monochrome colour scheme serve to de-saturate 
the scene and prevent the viewer from discerning fine details. As a result, the overall 
shape of the centipede and the intermittent contrasts between light and dark are 
brought to the fore to invite the viewer to experience the scene not solely through its 
visual content but also through its slimy texture. The mismatch of body sizes and 
types leads to slighter bodies flailing between oversized companions, arms and legs 
fumbling against one another as the centipede shuffles and snakes its way around the 
empty warehouse accompanied by the churning sounds of stifled cries and muffled 
gags. 
 
The scene above explicitly displays the focus of horror in the film as the human body 
is effectively reduced to its digestive system and waste products but this scene does 
not end there. In addition to creating a hybrid monster and manifesting the wetness 
and revulsion of the human intestines in its physical form, Martin wishes to breach yet 
another physical and social boundary. In order to heighten the intense level of distaste 
generated by the scene, the haptic imagery of The Human Centipede 2 must go further 
and traverse the border of somatic imagery by vividly invoking the senses of smell 
and taste. 
Figure 3.8: Martin’s Centipede, The Human Centipede 
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The mechanics of Dr. Heiter’s centipede operation in The Human Centipede 
along with the continued invocation of the image of the dog subtly simulated the 
viewer’s sense of smell through the associations of the visual cues. It was not 
explicitly addressed in the film even in the single scene of coprophagia that served to 
satisfy the expectations of the viewer and it remains a testament to the emotional 
significance of the sense of smell that such an implication can be maintained without 
it featuring in the film as a referential entity in itself. Olfaction, despite being 
relatively unrefined in humans, is one of the more emotionally charged senses due to 
its neural association with the hypothalamus and the limbic system, the part of the 
human brain that regulates emotions and memories.58 As a result of this connection, 
smell is much more easily associated with emotional events and particular odours are 
more likely to create long lasting memory impressions than other sensory input.59 The 
sense of smell is interesting not only for its strong emotional connotations but also for 
its mechanics: smell is a chemical sense that requires physical contact between the 
receptors of the nose and the particles that generate the odour. Unlike hearing or 
vision, in which waves influence the sense organs into making movements or changes 
that are then translated into light or sound as we understand them, smell along with its 
partner sense, taste, requires some kind of contact between the sensing body and the 
other ‘body’ that generates the smell. In this way it ‘forces contact among bodies: 
chemical bodies, our own bodies that act in sympathy with them, and the social body 
in which we all partake’.60 Like Martin’s grotesque centipede, the sense of smell quite 
literally unites the physical experience of an individual with their emotional and 
social existence to create an intense, and in this instance uniquely unsavoury, 
experience. One must remember that the sense of smell was, and still is, used for 
survival reasons, ‘to check for the presence of rotting meat, mould, infection, sewage, 
gas leaks, and other things that pose a danger’.61 As a result, the strength of a smell is 
often positively correlated with the perceived threat to human life: strong smells, and 
a sustained effort to simulate them, would quite naturally lend themselves to the                                                         
58 Neil R. Carlson, Foundations of Behavioural Neuroscience, 8th edn (Amherst: University of 
Massachusetts, 2011), p. 206. 
59 This is true of mammals in general. The dog that acted as the conduit for smell experience in The 
Human Centipede is known to have life-long ‘smell memories’ that allow it to recognise any 
previously encountered scent regardless of the interval between encounters. 
60 Marks, Touch, p. 116. 
61 Laura U. Marks, ‘Thinking Multisensory Culture’, Paragraph, 31 (2008), 123-37 (p. 130). 
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construction of an intensely negative emotional experience. Recall too that, for 
LaPorte, the eradication of smell went hand-in-hand with a drive towards overall 
cleanliness and the removal of waste from public view. 
 
Smell is not a sense that is conventionally stimulated by film. This is perhaps 
due, in part, to the relative complexity of the nose – the eye, for example, has four 
different receptor cells (red, blue, green cones and rods) whereas the nose has 
approximately 1,000 receptors each attuned to a different chemical bond. As Joseph 
Kaye notes, ‘the complexity of this problem is such that the science of smell has not 
even been successful in creating a rigorous, systematic, and reproducible 
classification scheme for [it]’.62 As a result, attempts at integrating odours into 
theatrical or cinematic performances have been limited to the selection of existing 
scents that are the most appropriate for a given scene or event. The phenomenal 
contingency between vision and olfaction has, thus far, been an approximation that 
lacks the inherent synergy between an object and phenomenological scent. In 
addition, ‘odour perception is highly subjective, has a habit of changing and it has 
also been found to be greatly influenced by age, sex, social and cultural factors, as 
well as by emotions, memory, experience and input from other sensory modalities’.63 
It is, therefore, routinely difficult to produce a consistent reaction to a particular scent 
in any situation, which perhaps accounts for the commercial failure of ‘Aromarama’ 
and ‘Smell-O-Vision’ during the 1950s.64  
  
  The sense of smell is spectral in The Human Centipede 2: present through the 
associations of other sense modalities, but extremely affective. In the original film it 
was subtly infused through the image of the dog and the recurrent isolation of 
Lindsay’s eyes and nose framed by her facial wounds. In the sequel it is present 
through Martin’s profuse leaking. Each expulsion of waste product from his body is 
in part symbolic of the ultimate act of excretion with which the film is preoccupied. 
                                                        
62 Joseph Kaye, ‘Aromatic Output for HCI’, Interactions, n.s., 11 (2004), 48-61 (p. 50). 
63 Gheorghita Ghinea and Oluwakemu A. Ademoye, ‘Olfaction-Enchanced Multimedia: Perspectives 
and Challenges’, Multimedia Tools and Applications, 55 (2011), 601-626 (p. 605). 
64 Aromarama was an adaptation of a ventilation system that could introduce aromas into an auditorium 
on cue. It was also able to clear an aroma and replace it with another when required. Smell-O-Vision 
had a similar mechanic but instead delivered scents to individual chairs through a network of pipes. 
The film or its soundtrack cued both systems and the intensity of scents could be controlled in the 
projection room. Neither system, however, proved to be popular or cost effective.  
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With each seeping or ejection the viewer is at once reminded of the act of defecation 
and the closely associated smell. The embodiment of the human bowel found in 
Martin’s centipede reinforces this association as the creature engages in peristaltic 
movements and loses its own bodily fluid: blood, sweat, tears and eventually faeces. 
Following his triumphant dance, Martin offers his creation food, mimicking Heiter’s 
use of the dog bowl in place of a plate. The soundscape here takes the opportunity to 
reinforce both the feeling of wetness and the association with faeces as Martin 
empties a tin of stew that plops and splashes into the bowl. As Martin collects a 
funnel and length of plastic tubing with which to force feed his creation, the camera 
cuts to close-ups of the segments, focusing upon their faces with only their eyes and 
noses visible. The long, scared, gasping breaths of the segments reinvigorate the sense 
of smell before the wet sounds of the first segment choking on the tubing dominate 
the soundtrack. Finally, unsatisfied with the lack of excretion the centipede has 
engaged in so far, Martin proceeds along the construction squeezing the stomachs so 
that each segment noisily breaks wind. The sound, which is integrated very high in 
the audio mix so that it remains unnaturally loud, replicates those that preceded it – 
the slop of the stew, the mucosal choking of the first segment as it is force fed – and 
exceeds them through its close association with the act for which it stands. Despite 
this association, and the growing dis-ease in the viewer, Martin remains dissatisfied 
with the mere sound, imitating and exaggerating it out of frustration before 
proceeding to inject high doses of laxative in each of the centipede segments. The 
gradual crescendo of sound and the sustained presence of the human bowel through 
metaphors of viscera and wetness finally culminate in the spectacle of noise and 
disgust generated as Martin’s vision comes to fruition. A brief close-up of Martin’s 
face reveals his pleasurable anticipation before the centipede, the walls, Martin, and 
even the camera are lavishly covered with faeces. In this scene Martin’s centipede 
completes a literal as well as metaphorical transition from ten individual people to a 
living model of the human digestive system as Martin stands behind it: the animated 
conductor of an abject symphony of faecal flatulence. 
 
The simulation of smell stems from the associations of other sensory 
modalities, including touch and sound that are given precedence over the ordinarily 
dominant sense of sight. The individual details of the scenes, where blood transitions 
into faeces for example, fade into the background as the contours and movements 
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combine with the soundscape to create the overwhelming impression of slime and 
peristaltic movement, that invokes smell and its counterpart - taste. Smell and taste 
are closely linked proximally, as the nasal cavity connects to the rear of the mouth, 
mechanically as they are both chemical senses, and culturally. It is anecdotally 
accepted that carnivorous mammals, such as dogs and cats, respond more 
enthusiastically to food with a strong smell than to food without. This is because food 
is ‘tasted’ through a combination of odour and smell so that when smell is impaired, 
when one has a cold for example, food tastes different. As a result, a strong 
simulation of smell necessarily involves a subsequent simulation of taste. 
Additionally, the subject matter of the film, together with its distinct wetness, draws 
forth associations of nausea commonly associated with Julia Kristeva’s food loathing: 
‘perhaps the most elementary and most archaic form of abjection’ that permeates 
human behaviour to the point of apparent automation.65 Food loathing is an embodied 
reaction incorporating smell, taste and touch in the violent expulsion of an object. 
 
It may be that the inherent nature of food loathing originates in the 
physiological basis: unsavoury foodstuffs are prone to cause illness or death and 
ridding the body of them is of paramount importance. As a result, lasting associations 
are easily made between taste, its counterpart smell and the act of cleansing the body 
of foreign pathogens. Nausea is a process that Kristeva marks as particularly and 
uncannily abject as she writes, 
 
but since the food is not an ‘other’ for ‘me’ […] I expel myself. I spit 
myself out, I abject myself within the same motion through which ‘I’ 
claim to establish myself. That detail, perhaps an insignificant one, but 
one that they ferret out, emphasize, evaluate, that trifle turns me inside 
out, guts sprawling.66 
 
The nausea associated with food loathing is not a direct response to the food itself, but 
rather a pre-emptive response of the body to its own impending reaction to something. 
In evolutionary terms, nausea is a survival mechanism but it entails the body acting 
upon itself whilst seemingly responding to the food. Kristeva notes that food cannot 
be ‘other’ to ‘me’ as it cannot stand in opposition to me or the principles of my 
                                                        
65 Kristeva, p. 3. 
66 Kristeva, p. 3 (original emphasis). 
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existence. The ‘other’ is the perceived othering of my own body that would occur 
upon ingestion: the separation of my bodily response from my conscious will. Nausea 
aims to prevent this turning inside out of the body by enacting a diluted version of it 
and forcing the viscera to attention in an inauspicious gesture. The outpouring of 
flatulence followed by the frenzied excretion of faeces by the centipede combines 
visual, audible, tactile and olfactory simulation in such a manner that taste, and 
nausea, are woven into the texture of the scene through its various associations. There 
is no denying that the aim of these scenes in The Human Centipede 2 is to repeatedly 
force feed the viewer the concept of coprophagia in a more sustained and graphic 
manner than the original film accomplished and the combinations of sensory 
stimulation inherent within the film achieve this unequivocally. 
 
Final Sequence 
 
Although undeniably disturbing The Human Centipede (2009) contains few 
explicitly violent scenes. One of the more disturbing images in the film consists of a 
single frame shot: Heiter has completed the centipede operation and the camera cuts 
to show him slumped upon the dogs’ grave before cutting again to the recovery room. 
The human centipede lays upon a large hospital gurney; where before there were three 
individual people, each covered from shoulders to toes with modesty sheets, there is 
now only one distorted shape under a green blanket. Katsuro’s head is uncovered and 
attached to a ventilator with a hand protruding from the blanket half way down. 
Whilst revealing nothing of the full extent of the horror, this single image implies the 
threat that is embodied by the narrative. It is the viewer that completes the image, 
constructing it through their own body as they conjure what lies beneath the blanket. 
The very notion, without the need for demonstration, of attempting to sustain a human 
body on a substance with such low nutritional value and such an intense cultural 
negativity produces a dual disgust reflex. Firstly, reversing the normal flow of waste 
from in-out to out-in plays upon the socially unacceptable taboo of coprophagia and 
its connotations of disease, death and animality. If, as Kristeva suggests, ‘orality 
signifies a boundary of the self’s clean and proper body’ the forced coprophagia of 
The Human Centipede issues an attack on both the physical human body and the 
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social norms it often represents.67 Secondly, by forcing coprophagia on the human 
victims the body becomes trivialised as organic matter. The biological workings of 
the human body, which are socially nullified, ignored or vilified ordinarily, are 
exposed and brought to the centre of attention both within the narrative and within the 
viewing body. Foregrounding the human body’s messy materialism is, of course, not 
a new phenomenon and could be seen as a reaction to certain sociocultural conditions.  
 
It was suggested at the beginning of this chapter that the dominant culture of 
the spectacle, and the increasing propagation of images of the human body that 
signify something other than the body proper, has brought into question the nature of 
embodiment in contemporary society. The immediacy of the body has become 
ambiguously confused: on the one hand the mass media pushes the need for the 
‘correct’ maintenance of the body through healthy eating and exercise, while on the 
other scientific advances in therapeutic cloning of human embryos suggest that 
fundamental modification is not only acceptable, but sometimes desirable.68 What 
arises from this contradictory congregation of social imperatives (cherish it, keep it 
healthy, make it beautiful, enhance it, reprogram it, swap it) is a psychopathology 
relating to body images and the image of the body. The body becomes a chameleon: 
changing its colour, size, shape and contours to best suit its sociocultural 
environment. More importantly, the consumer embroiled in this culture becomes 
curiously disembodied, imprisoned in a maze of spectacular body images that 
insidiously overrule the materiality of their organic body. 
 
When considering The Human Centipede films as a cultural product, it is 
impossible to ignore the appeal to, and critique of, a contemporary consumer culture 
that indefatigably enacts the metamorphosis of the body and insists that experiences 
are bigger and better, or simply more extreme. The films themselves form part of a 
horrendous sequence of consumption, as the first gives birth to its sequel, which in 
turn, we might say, excretes the forthcoming final sequence scheduled for release in 
                                                        
67 Kristeva, p. 75. 
68 While surveys show approximately 75% of respondents were morally against reproductive cloning, 
therapeutic cloning to produce perfect-match organs for transplant and the genetic screening of 
embryos for abnormalities are only opposed by 52-63% of respondents. Matthew C. Nisbet, ‘Public 
Opinion about Stem Cell Research and Human Cloning’, Public Opinion Quarterly, 68 (2004), 131-54. 
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2015.69 Lindsay and Jenny’s downfall in the original film came from their desire to 
consume other cultures and Martin obsessively consumes the original in a pastiche of 
a stereotype of horror film spectatorship that assumes both pleasure and gratification 
in viewing. The viewer in the auditorium, however, is revealed as the ‘real’ monstrous 
consumer as their desires for extremity create The Human Centipede (or A Serbian 
Film (2010), or MurderSetPieces (2004), or The Green Inferno (2013) et al.).70 If 
Marzena Kubisz’ claim that ‘consumer culture has brought about an unlimited display 
of physicality in mass culture’ is accurate, then The Human Centipede and its sequel 
can be seen as an extended commentary on the avid consumption of bodies wherein 
the figurative becomes literal; where society spends hours consuming images of the 
elusive perfect body, The Human Centipede ratifies the falsity of that ‘perfect body’ 
by transmuting it into faeces in the ultimate display of undeniable, organic 
physicality.71 Yet, if there is an unlimited display of physicality in mass culture, 
including body horror, one would not imagine there to be a need to reinvigorate the 
body by engaging the senses to the extremes achieved in The Human Centipede. The 
desire to be stimulated in this physiological manner, or even to simply respond to it 
with any emotion whatsoever, would imply that rather than consumer culture 
embodying a surge of physicality it somehow ensures the opposite. The 
dematerialising force of capital – in Marx’s lyrical phrase, ‘all that is solid melts into 
air’ – renders the body absent as culture erases the physical in favour of the 
appearance.72 The body is no longer a necessity but a vehicle, as bodily sensation is 
subsumed by the illusion of disembodied freedom. The embodiments of contemporary 
horror offer a response to this dematerialisation of the viewer-consumer by exposing 
the threads of bodily sensation within the viewing experience.                                                         
69 In an extension of Six’s meta-textual recognition of his films’ notoriety, The Human Centipede: 
Final Sequence brings both Dieter Laser (Joseph Heiter) and Lawrence R. Harvey (Martin Lomax) 
back as different characters. Playing Bill Boss and Dwight Butler respectively, the teacher-student 
dynamic created between Heiter and Lomax in the first two films looks set to be parodied. Although 
details of the plot are unconfirmed at the time of writing, it is reputed to be set in an American 
maximum-security prison and feature the epitome of consumption: a 500-person monstrous centipede. 
70 What all these films have in common, of course, is a collection of socially taboo and abject subject 
matter: child pornography, child murder, cannibalism and the hedonistic pursuit of personal pleasure 
through the torture and dismemberment of other people. In most cases, the reputation of these films 
precedes them either through advertising (MurderSetPieces is billed as ‘the most visceral horror film 
ever made’) or association (The Green Inferno is associated with Cannibal Holocaust, for example, 
through Eli Roth’s adoption of Deodato’s original working title, its premise and focus upon 
cannibalism). 
71 Kubisz, p. 8. 
72 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, Manifesto of the Communist Party (Salt Lake City: Project 
Gutenberg, 2005), p. 11. Project Gutenberg eBook (ePub edn). 
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The manipulation of physiological experience and body schemata performed 
by these films creates a viewing experience which, like the subject matter, forcefully 
includes the totality of the human body instead of simply relying upon the 
mechanisms of vision and identification. The incorporation of the body is perhaps 
most evident in the construction of The Human Centipede 2 as it offers a graphic 
depiction of the deviance largely implied by the first film. Much of the violence of the 
sequel manifests as a type of sensory sadism whereby vision is limited by the lack of 
lighting and colour whilst sound, texture, smell and even taste are repeatedly and 
insistently appealed to metonymically. As a result, The Human Centipede 2 is 
embodied in its excess, in the loudness of the sound effects and the lack of musical 
accompaniment, in the accumulation of images of effluvia and viscera, both literal 
and figurative, in the extremity of Martin’s physique that focuses and enhances the 
gruesome nature of the depicted acts. The sensory appeals and manipulations are so 
widely distributed throughout the film and so consistently sustained that the site of 
disgust and horror is unavoidably and irresistibly relocated from the images that play 
out onscreen to the organic layers of the viewer’s body. 
 
The combination of subject matter and formal elements in Tom Six’s films 
offers the viewer the opportunity to engage both visually and somatically with the 
films. The embodied knowledge of smell, taste and nausea integrates with the socially 
abject notion of coprophagia to create a film that is rich with embodied and 
metaphorical meaning – a film that reaches out to the viewer and stimulates the bodily 
senses in ways that are relatively unusual in the existing cultural climate. Horror film 
viewers are accustomed to a certain mode of viewing that allows them a degree of 
physical and emotional distance from the events of the film (the mechanisms of which 
are perhaps foregrounded in the post-modern era) but which nevertheless remains 
constrained within the sphere of entertainment. The combination of physical and 
metaphorical stimulation evident in The Human Centipede films disallows the 
figurative distance between viewer and film and instead offers an experience which 
combines enjoyment of familiar narrative arcs with multisensory stimulation through 
a somatic mode of viewing. The adaptive and metaphorical meaning of the subject 
matter is ‘felt’ in the same way that ‘up’ or ‘above’ have a felt dimension that 
contributes to the interpretation of balance and orientation in The Collector and The 
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Descent. As a result of this inherently felt meaning the body, the one onscreen and the 
viewer’s body, is brought to embodied consciousness in a continuous and profound 
manner. The films expose our intrinsic reliance upon the health and proper 
maintenance of our bodies. Katsuro, Jenny and Lindsay are literally reduced to the 
sum of their bodily functions and forced to experience visceral operations as ‘the 
basis of the emotional qualities of experience’.73 Visceral functions define Martin’s 
physical existence as he is literally and metaphorically encased in bodily and societal 
waste. The body can no longer be taken for granted. At the same time the viewers are 
invited into a visceral encounter with their own bodily workings as the bodies 
onscreen mutate, excrete, decay and die.  
 
The discordant nature of this experience stems from the fact that, although the 
bodily sensations of disgust or nausea are unpleasant they are, to the disembodied 
consumer of contemporary culture, not unwelcome. They offer a true avenue of 
material experience in a society that often delivers only facsimiles. The horror of The 
Human Centipede and The Human Centipede 2 lies in their embodiment of the 
recurrent horror motif that we are bodies; organic matter, like dogs or insects, and that 
the nature of our physicality shapes and influences the ways in which we are able to 
exist. It defines the human body as both ‘a torturous prison of deception, temptation, 
and pain’ but also the place ‘where I retreat from my interest in observing or acting in 
the world’.74 The human body is a thing to celebrate and to abhor; it enables and gives 
rise to our specific form of consciousness and yet relegates our existence to the realm 
of animals. It is at once sanctuary and prison, enabling life whilst covertly ushering in 
inevitable death. Perversely, and not entirely unpleasantly, being reminded of this 
restarts the organic heart of the viewer in a way that is quintessentially arousing. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                         
73 Don M. Tucker, Mind from Body: Experience from Neural Structure (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2007), p. 14. 
74 Richard Shusterman, Body Consciousness: A Philosophy of Mindfulness and Somaesthetics 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), p. 51; p. 60. 
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Chapter 4 – Pain: Feeling the Extreme in Martyrs (2008) and The 
Bunny Game (2010) 
 
The infliction of pain is a thing so naturally revolting to the cultivated mind, that any description of it 
inevitably arouses strong sentiments of dislike, if not of horror (Francis Power Cobbe, ‘The Rights of 
Man and the Claims of Brutes’ [1866])1 
 
 
This thesis began by making the claim that cinema is quintessentially a 
multisensory medium, not simply because of the technologies of its production but 
because of the conditions of the viewers’ embodiment. Rather than focusing solely 
upon the interactions between visual and auditory stimuli presented to the viewer the 
locus of the argument so far has resided within the viewer themselves and with the 
fundamentally integrated nature of the human sensorium. In the initial chapter a 
theory of vision was proposed that delineated the seemingly isolated sense into a more 
physiologically accurate mode of looking that necessarily incorporated and invoked 
multiple sensory modalities. Laura U. Marks’ theory of haptic visuality provided the 
foundation for this suggestion that outlined a body-shaped void in theories of cinema 
spectatorship. The ties between vision and the lesser-considered vestibular sense were 
then demonstrated and it was contended that basic physiological experience provides 
ontological and orientation metaphors that structure much of our conceptual 
understanding regarding balance, orientation and directionality. A further level of 
complexity was discovered when body schemata and metaphors arising from those 
schemata were considered in relation to the senses of touch, taste and smell. Through 
nuanced physiological experience and metaphorical understanding, vision provides a 
gateway to the simulation of sensory modalities one may not automatically consider 
to be present in the filmic experience. In this manner, the poverty of vision when it is 
considered in total isolation from its sensory siblings has, it is hoped, become 
increasingly obvious. The human sensorium is integrated to the point of 
inextricability, from the micro- to the macro-level of experience and comprehension, 
and to address any phenomenon through a single, isolated sensory modality is to 
reduce the phenomenon to a spectre of itself, devoid of the rich sensorial 
understanding that is intrinsic to all embodied experiences. Yet the very act of                                                         
1 Francis Power Cobbe, ‘The Rights of Man and the Claims of Brutes’, in Animal Welfare and Anti-
Vivisection 1870-1910: Nineteenth Century Woman’s Mission, ed. by Susan Hamilton (New York: 
Routledge, 2004), pp. 1-50 (p. 12). 
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attempting to think through sensory experience and to share its richness replicates this 
reduction: whilst arguing for an integration of sensory experience this thesis has 
nevertheless drawn out individual or small groups of senses in order to first highlight 
them and then construct a case for their inherent integration. Arguably, the 
phenomenological method also replicates this reduction as a necessary step towards 
attempting to communicate the richness of sensory experience. 
 
Edmund Husserl’s phenomenological method, adapted and applied to film 
theory by Vivian Sobchack in The Address of the Eye, seeks to discard 
presuppositions and approach a given phenomenon as it is experienced and ‘in the 
fullness and potential of [its] possibilities for experience’.2 While the emphasis is 
upon the relationship between the observer and the phenomenon, rather than the 
phenomenon and the structures of understanding the observer applies to it, the sharing 
of what appears to the observer entails rendering in descriptive language the richness 
of the sensorial experience. It has been demonstrated that vision can act as a gateway 
to other sensory modalities due to the symbiosis of the senses and language can 
similarly act as a conduit in the communication of sensory phenomena. Our 
embodiment in the world structures existential experience, which in turn generates a 
plethora of metaphorical understandings that influence our language system. As such, 
‘the lived-body being-in-the-world establishes the concrete ground (that is, the 
premises as well as the necessity) for all language’.3 That is not to say that the body 
literally generates language but rather that the need to communicate and the 
understanding upon which concepts are based arise from the physiological experience 
of the body. The individual is unceasingly accosted by a multifaceted sensorial 
richness that is a continuous flow of integrated and developing experience. This 
phenomenological knowledge can be accessed through language and the complex 
web of connotations built between linguistic signs and experiential concepts. It is 
these accumulative associations which allow the more nuanced bodily sensations to 
be communicated, whether linguistically in text or sensationally in film. Indeed, as 
sensations become more complex the sharing of them relies increasingly upon the 
interrelations between bodily experiences, embodied knowledge and metaphorical                                                         
2 Vivian Sobchack, The Address of the Eye: A Phenomenology of Film Experience (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1992), p. 36-7 (original emphasis). 
3 Sobchack, p. 41. 
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associations rather than the unmediated replication of the exact sensation. 
Undoubtedly the most complex and controversial sensation appealed to by 
contemporary horror film is pain.  
 
Horror exhibits a predilection for the display of the human body in minute and 
often disturbing detail. Yet its fascination is not merely with the organicity of the 
human body, but also with the extremities of physiological arousal and distress. The 
body in horror film is perpetually in extremis: sexual arousal, terror, panic, escape, 
and the ultimately unavoidable state of intense pain. Beating, torture, evisceration, 
amputations, flaying, rape, dismemberment, and the slow destruction of the fibres of 
the victimised body punctuate the contemporary extreme horror film. The 
representation of the body in pain can be discovered behind all acts of violence – be it 
evisceration in Gut (2012), primitive dismemberment in The Descent (2005), slow 
torture in The Collector (2009), poisoning of the prison-body in The Human 
Centipede (2011) or the sustained beatings we shall shortly find in Martyrs (2008) 
and The Bunny Game (2010). One cannot systematically destroy the human body 
onscreen without first inflicting extreme agony upon it. Moreover, in order to 
communicate that represented pain, film must seek to inflict an analogously 
excruciating sensorial experience upon its viewer. The following discussion will 
propose that pain is a sensation that must be embodied – felt by the viewer through 
multiple sensory modalities simultaneously – in order to overcome the paradox of 
communication and be meaningful as a sensation. Moreover, it will be contended that 
the sensorial immediacy of pain in contemporary extreme horror contributes 
significantly to the intense affective response generated by such titles. It will be 
demonstrated that, where pain is concerned, psychosocial meaning evolves from 
sensorial comprehension in a way that cements the irreducible relationship between 
the body, the mind and the social sphere. 
 
Pain and the Paradox of Communication 
 
Pascal Laugier’s Martyrs (2008) tells the story of Lucie (Mylene Jampanoi), a 
girl kidnapped and tortured from a young age, and her friend Anna (Morjana Alaoui). 
Obviously traumatised by her experiences, Lucie is haunted by a terrifying, 
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apparently supernatural, apparition that continues to inflict injury upon her. As a 
young adult Lucie seeks out and murders a family she is convinced are responsible for 
her abduction. Upon joining her, Anna discovers one of the victims is still alive and 
attempts to help them. Faced with her friend’s disbelief Lucie commits suicide, 
leaving Anna alone to discover that Lucie’s actions were justified: these are the 
people who tortured her. 
 
Martyrs begins with a short scene that prefigures the content and focus of the 
film. The camera alights on a darkened corridor with bare concrete walls. A young 
Lucie stumbles into the frame. Bathed in shadow she runs from the camera as her bare 
feet slap against the floor. She stumbles as she tries to run, hyperventilating and 
letting out the occasional guttural cry. The camera bobs and shakes as it recreates her 
jaunty, sharp movements, flailing in the dark as she moves laboriously through the 
corridors. The girl’s body is the only moving object as the camera follows her 
trajectory from inside the warehouse-like building to the abandoned industrial estate 
beyond. She crosses the threshold and the scene cuts to the reverse shot as she now 
runs towards the camera, her face a patchwork of bruises and dried blood (Figure 4.1). 
The camera slowly cuts between vantage points showing her ravaged face, her blood 
stained clothes, scarred arms and wounded legs as it accretively reveals her tortured 
body in toto. As she runs through an estate of abandoned and decaying buildings the 
only sounds that can be heard are those of her cries, her ragged breathing and the 
distinctive sound of her footsteps. The blood that stains her clothes and the wounds 
that cover her flesh combine with this muted auditory and visual landscape to enhance 
the communication of her physical pain.  
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As the only body in the frame, Lucie’s visibly damaged flesh exudes pain with 
each movement. The flailing of limbs evokes panic, the sound of her feet hitting 
concrete speaks of desperation and mimics the texture of the slick blood that covers 
most of her body and, her embittered cries of pain resound through the skeletal 
buildings as she tries, but ultimately fails, to summon other bodies to enact her rescue. 
So easily identified are her cries that when the girl eventually stumbles upon freedom 
the lingering gaze of the camera that reveals her bodily wounds entails little shock; 
the visual simply restates and reinforces the auditory expression of pain. The 
unintentional and reflexive cries of pain are more likely to elicit a visceral, emotive 
response from an observer than the visual representation of the same sensation, 
according to Kenneth D. Craig et al. (2010).4 In this manner, the auditory expression 
of the girl’s pain generates an emotive response that preconditions the viewer into 
expecting a horrific visual counterpart. When the girl finally emerges into the light the 
lingering shots of her injuries do not present the viewer with new information, but 
simply compound the already-distinct impression of pain by reiterating it visually.  
 
The foregrounding of pain in this short scene suggests that the sensation 
speaks both literally and metaphorically. Under extreme pain the human body will 
pass through a number of reactive phases: avoidance, escape, retaliation and, in lieu 
of any other effective alternative, vocalisation. The first two phases can be attributed                                                         
4 Kenneth D. Craig, Judith Versloot, Liesbet Goubert, Tine Vervoort and Geert Crombez, ‘Perceiving 
Pain in Others: Automatic and Controlled Mechanisms’, The Journal of Pain, 11 (2010), 101-108 (p. 
104). 
Figure 4.1: Opening Scene of Pascal Laugier’s Martyrs (2008) 
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to a variety of reflex actions, such as the neuron arc between thermoreceptors in the 
skin and the spinal cord that causes the immediate removal of a limb from a hot 
surface; the third can be attributed, at least in part, to hormonal reactions as adrenaline 
readies the body for the fight-or-flight response. The final phase, however, remains 
somewhat of a mystery. Why do humans cry out in pain when words fail to 
encapsulate the sensation? The act of vocalising pain does nothing to alleviate the 
severity of the sensation thus implying that pain cries have a purpose that is directed 
outside of the phenomenal body. Yet despite the ostensible will to communicate, the 
sensation itself appears to lie beyond the reaches of human language manifesting not 
in words but in feral sounds.  
 
It is this apparent refutation of language that leads Elaine Scarry to designate 
pain as an ultimately indescribable and unsharable sensation. To the sufferer, pain is 
undeniable regardless of its origination yet to the pain-free observer the incoherent, 
animalistic expressions of pain are nearly incomprehensible except in their 
signification of intense bodily sensation. As such, ‘to have great pain is to have 
certainty; to hear that another person has pain is to have doubt’.5 The ambiguity of 
pain communication is perhaps eloquently surmised by the abundance of terms used 
to articulate it. The McGill Pain Questionnaire, for example, lists seventy-eight 
adjectives to describe type, intensity and effect for the diagnosis of chronic pain.6 The 
range of terms available – including ‘flickering’, ‘sharp’, ‘jumping’, ‘scalding’, ‘dull’, 
‘heavy’, ‘taut’, ‘rasping’ and ‘vicious’ to name but a few – would imply that 
whenever pain is classified by language the full breadth of the experience is never 
fully captured. Yet the classification of the McGill adjectives into meaningful groups 
that define individual aspects of the pain experience – ‘temporal’, ‘spatial’, ‘punctate 
pressure’, ‘incisive pressure’, ‘constrictive pressure’, ‘traction pressure’, ‘thermal’, 
‘brightness’, ‘dullness’, ‘tension’, ‘autonomic’, ‘sensory’, ‘fear’, ‘punishment’, 
‘evaluative’ and ‘affective-evaluative’ – would suggest that the range of descriptors is 
in fact testament to the multifaceted nature of the sensation. It is not that language is 
inadequate but that the individual facets of sensory perception are difficult to 
delineate in order to neatly label each one. Describing pain is not a case of identifying                                                         
5 Elaine Scarry, The Body In Pain: The Making and Unmaking of the World (New York and Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1985), p. 7. 
6 The full questionnaire can be found at Grid Enabled Measures Database (GEM) Website: 
https://www.gem-beta.org/public/DownloadMeasure.aspx?mid=1348 [accessed 7 May 2013]. 
  
190 
the one or two perfect descriptors, but is more akin to composing a picture, choosing 
descriptors based upon their interactions with other terms that are also selected. A 
‘burning numbness’ or a ‘shooting stabbing’ pain convey more detail about the 
sensation than single terms like ‘hot’ or ‘insistent’ are able to because meaning 
develops in the space between the terms chosen.  
 
The special status that Scarry bestows upon pain is largely based upon a 
complex slippage between physical sensation and conscious perception. Scarry claims 
that 
contemporary philosophers have habituated us to the recognition that 
our interior states of consciousness are regularly accompanied by 
objects in the external world, that we do not simply ‘have feelings’ but 
have feelings for somebody or something […] If one were to move 
through all the emotional, perceptual, and somatic states that take an 
object – hatred for, seeing of, being hungry for – the list would become 
a very long one.7 
 
Scarry suggests that we have become habituated to projecting our interior states 
outwards, towards objects in the phenomenal world, to the extent that we are unable, 
or unwilling, to divorce the interior state from the external object. The human body is, 
however, capable of generating interior states, of fear, euphoria, love or pain, without 
the presentation of concomitant objects: this is a constituent element in the definition 
of psychosis.8 What psychotic conditions reveal is that internal states are not ineffably 
tied to physical objects, that the physical body can indeed feel hate, see and be hungry 
without the pre-existence of objects onto which these states can be projected. When 
Scarry claims that pain ‘unlike any other state of consciousness – has no referential 
content’ she promotes it above the level of other bodily sensations.9 Her conception 
of those other sensations, however, is misconstrued. Pain has no absolute referential 
content, but neither does love nor hate.  
 
                                                        
7 Scarry, p. 5. 
8 The term psychosis is invoked here in its strict medical sense to indicate a psychiatric condition that 
results in a skewed or entirely absent comprehension of objective reality. As such, a psychotic is 
entirely able to perceive a highly specified emotional state or event without ever having sensed it 
physically. The perception that psychotics are accustomed to is, therefore, conscious, socially imbued 
and entirely divorced from their material existence and their environmental surroundings. 
9 Scarry, p. 5. 
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It is Scarry’s presumption that pain is an exceptional state which leads her to 
the conclusion that it constitutes an unsharable experience. In Scarry’s view, the 
internal state is isolated and eternally imprisoned within the boundaries of the 
perceiving body as it cannot be tied to an external object.10 There is some validity to 
this notion: because of the necessarily limited nature of human verbal communication 
and the fact that language is descriptive, occurring after the initial sensation, there is 
something of a space between what is felt and what is communicated. As the McGill 
pain questionnaire demonstrates, descriptions of pain are never entirely accurate as 
the sensation has so many composite facets and any account demonstrates a loss of 
sensory richness in favour of perceived accuracy of communication. Bodily pain of 
any variety is an affirmation of material existence and, regardless of its origin, is 
undeniable for the sufferer. Because the sufferer cannot communicate the true nature 
of their pain, however, the observer is perpetually in a state of wonderment, 
pondering the precise nature and extent of the apparent suffering. Yet despite this 
seeming inability to communicate the exact phenomenal experience of pain, 
representations of the sensation persist in many cultural artefacts including, as Susan 
Sontag notes, Christian iconography, wartime photography and even contemporary 
advertising.11  
 
Scarry sees in pain’s resistance to language an ability to ‘obliterate all 
psychological content’.12 It is a physical sensation that overruns and eclipses the 
‘higher order’ reasoning that constitutes conceptions of ‘social life’. Reducing 
language to guttural cries, pain isolates the individual within intense bodily affect 
that, Scarry claims, ‘actively destroys [language]’ as it ‘[nullifies] the claims of the 
world’.13 Pain isolates the individual from society, contradicts all notions of civility, 
human rights and compassion as it renounces the psychosocial world. The body in 
pain is a body reduced, denied its order in civilisation: pain ‘(even if unconsciously) 
self-consciously and explicitly announces its own nature as an undoing of civilization, 
                                                        
10 That is to not say, however, that empathy is implausible in Scarry’s model. On the contrary, the 
empathic connection between the sufferer and the observer is what overcomes the inability to 
communicate the specific, embodied and subjective experience of pain. In Scarry’s framework, the 
sensation becomes transmuted to a significant sociocultural symbol – an expression of ‘pain’ rather 
than the sensation itself – in order to be shared through the empathic understanding of that significance.  
11 Susan Sontag, Regarding the Pain of Others (London: Hamish Hamilton, 2003), p. 71. 
12 Scarry, p. 34. 
13 Scarry, p. 4; p. 33. 
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acts out the uncreating of the created contents of consciousness’.14 The body that 
opens Martyrs is a de-territorialised mosaic of sensation, isolated from ‘the human’ 
(that is, the sociocultural identity of ‘human’ that sets the species apart from the 
animals with which we share the Earth) by its inability to communicate. That Lucie 
flees through a deserted industrial estate – a symbol of First World civility and human 
advancement that invokes largely negative connotations in the post-industrial age – 
exacerbates this isolation and social abandonment.  
 
In the pointed representation of pain engendered by the injured body, the 
psychosocial world is denied by the all-encompassing nature of the sensation, and yet 
it is precisely this denial that Scarry identifies as the communicative force behind 
such depictions:  
 
this phenomenon in which the claims of pain are eclipsed by the very 
loss of world it has brought about is a crucial step in the overall 
process of perception that allows one person’s physical pain to be 
understood as another person’s power. 15 
 
What Scarry outlines is a fluid process whereby the immediacy of the material body 
in the felt experience of pain is augmented by the dynamics of observing. Pain is an 
incredibly personal and subjective experience, directly accessible only to the sufferer. 
The observer must, therefore, witness only the external manifestations of the internal 
sensation – wounds, weeping, vocalisations, panic and escape. Through the viewer, 
the representation of pain necessarily disassociates itself from the experience of the 
sufferer and concentrates upon the psychosocial significance of pain as a de-civilising 
gesture. Represented pain most often, and most obviously, seeks to represent the 
effects of the sensation rather than the (unsharable) sensation itself. The appearance of 
pain takes meaningful precedence over the material reality of sensation in a move that 
echoes the dematerialising function of the spectacle examined by Guy Debord. It is in 
this manner that, as Susan Sontag claims, pain and the process of its infliction ‘turns 
anybody subjected to it into a thing […and…] can exalt someone subjected to it into a 
martyr or a hero’.16 
                                                         
14 Scarry, p. 38. 
15 Scarry, p. 37. 
16 Sontag, p. 11. 
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 Pain is intimately connected to power. The act of inflicting pain – violence – is 
thus frequently intrinsic to sociocultural models of control. René Girard denotes 
violence as a crucial factor in religious control, both as an antithetical aim and a 
means to achieving it. ‘Religion invariably strives to subdue violence […] 
Paradoxically, the religious and moral authorities in a community attempt to instil 
nonviolence […] through the application of violence’.17 The reflexive aim of religious 
violence – including the depictions of Christ’s human suffering, for example – is to 
quell violence through threat, culminating, of course, in the wrath of God himself. 
Martyrs invites religious interpretations in both name and iconography, despite 
presenting an unorthodox account of spiritual belief. Although the protagonist-cult 
demonstrates no clear affiliation to a specific religion, later iconography aligns their 
martyred victim with the crucifixion of Christ. Alongside the use of pain in religion, 
Michel Foucault’s Discipline and Punish offers detailed analysis of the ways in which 
violence has become ‘a political tactic’, and claims that its strategic application in the 
form of torture has developed into ‘a technique […] not an extreme expression of 
lawless rage’.18 It seems accurate, therefore, to claim that ‘the image of the body in 
pain animates and makes possible a whole host of political activities’.19  
 
 Yet, if that were the extent of pain’s communicative value, if it exclusively 
represented a hierarchy of power mobilised by controlling forces – be it religion, 
politics or something else entirely – one would expect the impact of images of pain to 
be highly individuated between cultures, to be localised or targeted, and to diminish 
over time. As Sontag writes of World War II photography, ‘for a long time some 
people believed that if the horror could be made vivid enough, most people would 
finally take in the outrageousness, the insanity of war’.20 That, however, does not 
seem to be the case as images of extreme pain persist in news reporting, photography, 
performance art, syndicated reality television (including The Crime and Investigation 
Network, and Sky TVs ‘ID’ channels), advertising campaigns including the NSPCC 
adverts noted by Sontag herself, viral internet images and videos including the                                                         
17 René Girard, Violence and the Sacred, trans. by Patrick Gregory (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1977), p. 20. 
18 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, trans. by Alan Sheridan (New 
York: Vintage, 1991), p. 23; p. 33. 
19 Elizabeth Dauphinée, ‘The Politics of the Body in Pain: Reading the Ethics of Imagery’, Security 
Dialogue, 38 (2007), 139-155 (p. 139). 
20 Sontag, p. 12. 
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executions of political figures and hostages, and internet ‘shock’ sites such as 
BestGore.com. The legitimacy and apparent universality of pain as a medium of 
communication is undeniable. The persistence of images of pain in disparate 
sociocultural contexts suggests that such images have an irrecoverable immediacy – 
that they are connected to some structure of comprehension that continues to bridge 
the problematic space between the physiological sensation and its representation. 
There is something inherently meaningful about pain – something that bestows upon 
representations the ability to function as a cogent method of sociocultural control. 
This immediacy, I propose, originates from the nature of the sensation itself: pain is a 
synergy of physiological, psychological, emotional and sociocultural influences that 
has immense evolutionary significance. Moreover, it is the sense that is most 
explicitly irreducible to any one of its constituent elements.  
 
There is little doubt in the mind of the viewer that the opening scene of 
Martyrs depicts a body in pain. It echoes in her cries, in the repetition of her footfalls 
and is reflected in the blood that seeps from her wounds. Whether in language or feral 
noise, pain possesses an intrinsic social component that stems from the sensation’s 
point of origin. All sensation is comprised of physical and psychosocial elements but 
pain is the sense that most explicitly combines the two facets. Pain is neither the sum 
of neuron circuits connecting the skin and flesh with the brain nor the sum of 
emotional and psychological associations of the mind but is instead a synthesis of 
both. Its immediacy originates in its inextricability from all imaginable spheres of 
human existence, irrespective of individual differences. No single living body can 
escape, surmount or transcend the embodied experience of pain; it is encoded in our 
births and our deaths and can be experienced by every cell and fibre of the human 
body. The phenomenal immediacy of pain can be accounted for by Ronald Melzack’s 
theory of the sensation as a biopsychosocial phenomenon. 
 
Melzack’s ‘neuromatrix’ theory presents a view of pain that focuses upon 
what happens in the brain, rather than what is happening to various receptors in the 
body. The theory states that, rather than pain being conducted linearly from receptor 
cell to neuron cluster and then triggering an isolated pain response, the incoming 
information is relayed around a neuromatrix consisting of a ‘widespread network of 
neurons that consists of loops between the thalamus and cortex [of the brain] as well 
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as between the cortex and limbic system’, and is cross-checked against 
proprioceptive, interoceptive and emotional information that is simultaneously 
relayed around the same neural circuits.21 The pattern of associations made between 
simultaneously occurring stimuli – between, for example, the relatively small pain but 
intense fear of needles when having an injection – produces what Melzack terms a 
‘neurosignature’. Each neurosignature is the characteristic pattern of brain activity 
that is triggered by a specific perceptive experience: it is not, for example, simply the 
physical pain of the needle prick but all elements of the physical and emotional state 
at the time of the event. This model of pain illustrates the way in which complete 
sensations are consciously perceived and categorised but, more importantly, it reduces 
physical pain to being one component of the pain experience thus avoiding the 
reduction of perception to mere physiological sensation. As Melzack notes, ‘the 
neurosignature may be triggered or modulated by input [but] the input is only the 
“trigger” and does not produce the neurosignature itself’.22  
 
The perception of pain disassociates itself from the sensory experience to the 
extent that an individual can be terrified of the ‘pain’ of an injection and yet 
comfortably sit for several hours for a tattoo artist: it is not that one experience is any 
more or less ‘painful’ but that the neurosignature is different and, therefore, elicits a 
different affective response. In this model pain is characterised as an internally 
generated affective state that can be, but is not necessarily, modified and altered by 
external stimuli. Pain is thus situated at the very interstice between body and 
consciousness and can be stimulated both physically and psychologically. Melzack’s 
neuromatrix theory of pain perception not only provides a conceptual link between 
the apparently disparate physical and cognitive aspects of a single sensation, but also 
demonstrates the ways in which those aspects can be manipulated. 
 
Melzack’s theory argues for a specifically neural framework to the experience 
of pain that ties the surface and flesh with previous cognitive associations and 
experiences in a dynamic conjunction between the physical and the psychological. It 
also reinforces the intimate connection between the different facets of pain –                                                         
21 Ronald Melzack, ‘Pain and the Neuromatrix in the Brain’, Journal of Dental Education, 65 (2001), 
1378-1382 (p. 1379). 
22 Melzack, p. 1380. 
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physiology, psychology, emotion and sociocultural influence – and demonstrates the 
way in which a single sensation can be concocted from many different sources. The 
very nature of the construction of pain as multifaceted, in turn, positively affects its 
ability to be represented: the expression of pain is not, indeed cannot, be limited to a 
simple replication of one individual facet but rather should arise through the interplay 
between them all. This model allows for more variety in the experience and 
representation of pain that does not simply rely upon weeping wounds. Tom Six’s The 
Human Centipede (2009), for example, enacts a version of pain that relies 
predominantly upon cognitive associations of correct human gustatory function. 
There is very little blood or bodily fluid displayed onscreen and the parts of the 
human body that would generate the highest empathetic response from viewers – the 
surgical connections between the centipede segments – are consistently hidden from 
view. It is the combination of sensations that communicates pain in the opening 
sequence of Martyrs: the unsteady camera, the girl’s decentred position onscreen, the 
lack of soundtrack, the loudness of her breathing and footfalls, the low-key lighting, 
her cries of desperation and the solitude of the setting accumulate and crescendo in a 
portrayal of pain that mimics the creation of her pain. 
 
If the physical sensation of pain is comprised of a delicate dialectic between 
the physiological, emotional and sociocultural aspects of experience then the 
communication of pain through the visual medium must draw upon an equally diverse 
range of communicators in order to successfully convey the sensation. Looking is not 
enough: pain must be appealed to bodily, through structures of understanding that are 
common between viewers. Images that seek to represent the multidimensional 
experience of pain through vision alone render the sensation a spectre of itself. They 
claim to communicate ‘pain’ through the metonymic use of symbols – the weapon 
and the wound, for example – but what they actually communicate is not the 
sensation but the psychosocial significance of that instance of represented pain. 
Christian iconography, for example, uses human suffering as a means to generate awe 
and reaffirm faith: the image of Christ on the crucifix is not about his human pain so 
much as what His suffering represents to the Christian faith. In the following analysis 
it will be contended that while all representations of human pain may be viewed as 
metaphorically representing something else, there is a current of embodied 
understanding that underpins them. To be truly successful, images of pain cannot 
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merely be looked upon but must somehow be felt by the viewer in order for the pain 
itself to be communicated.  
 
Looking/Feeling Beyond The Spectacle  
 
Martyrs is a film concerned with the act of looking and with the legitimacy of 
that witnessing look. The title at once alludes to the religious violence of martyrdom 
and, through its Greek antecedent martus, to the act of bearing witness. Lucie and 
Anna are captured by what appears to be a cult, led by a matriarch called 
Mademoiselle, that is intent on producing a martyr who will be a living witness to the 
afterlife. Their methodology for achieving this involves the systematic torture of 
young women in an attempt to propel them into transcending their material existence 
in order to ‘let go’ and see ‘the other side’. Often addressed as a paradigmatic 
example of the ‘New French Extremism’, Martyrs is perhaps the most widely 
theorised of the case study films explored by this thesis. Tanya Horeck and Tina 
Kendall group Laugier’s Martyrs with fellow French horror films – Switchblade 
Romance (dir. by Alexandre Aja, 2003), Inside (dir. by Alexandre Bustillo and Julien 
Maury, 2007), Frontier(s) (dir. by Xavier Gens, 2007) and Fabrice Du Welz’ The 
Ordeal (2004) – and draw an ambiguous parallel between French extremism and the 
Hollywood ‘torture porn’ cycle.23 While I believe that the ‘torture porn’ label itself is 
ungainly, bringing connotations that do not routinely apply in equal measure to all 
films within its proposed remit, the similarities between the presentation of 
increasingly extreme violence against bodies are legitimate. Adam Lowenstein’s 
analysis of ‘spectacle horror’ is particularly pertinent to this thesis although his 
terminology is somewhat inaccurate. Lowenstein claims that extreme films present,  
 
spectacularly explicit horror for purposes of audience admiration, 
provocation, and sensory adventure as much as shock or terror […] 
Spectacle horror’s ‘loudness’ as a mode of direct, visceral engagement 
with viewers distinguishes it from ‘quieter’ forms of what we might 
call ambient horror, but this distinction should not mandate the 
negative value judgements that structure torture porn as a category.24                                                         
23 Tanya Horeck and Tina Kendall, ‘The New Extremisms: Rethinking Extreme Cinema’, Cinephile, 
2nd ser., 8 (2012), 7-9 (p. 8).  
24 Adam Lowenstein, ‘Spectacle Horror and Hostel: Why ‘Torture Porn’ Does Not Exist’, Critical 
Quarterly, n.s., 53 (2011), 42-60 (p. 42). 
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Lowenstein recognises within this genre shift the move towards ‘sensory adventure’ 
and the visceral engagement of the viewer that is being argued for in this thesis. His 
alignment of this embodied viewing experience with spectacle is, however, somewhat 
contradictory. If, following Debord’s analysis, the spectacle entails ‘all that was once 
directly lived [becoming] mere representation’ then the fact that these films engage 
their viewer in sensory adventure directly contradicts the dematerialising effect of the 
spectacle.25 Indeed, if sensory adventure inherently includes the relocating of horror 
from the bodies onscreen to the body viewing – accessed through the modes of 
embodied understanding that have been explicated throughout this thesis – then the 
experience of viewing these films is intrinsically lived. Viewing extreme horror in an 
embodied fashion repositions the phenomenal experience of the film from 
communication of a narrative to the generation of an embodied lived experience. Tim 
Palmer suggests that the New French Extremism aesthetic generates 
 
profound, often challenging sensory experiences. In the age of the 
jaded spectator, the cynical cinephile, this brutal intimacy model is a 
test case for film’s continued potential to inspire shock and 
bewilderment – raw, unmediated reaction.26 
 
The visceral images of extreme cinema – no longer limited to French horror film, but 
incorporated into European and American titles such as those discussed in this thesis 
– accost the viewer bodily and engage them in a collaborative process. Reactions are 
‘raw’ and ‘unmediated’ because of the phenomenal, physiological and psychological 
contact between the spectator and the film. Whilst this type of viewing experience 
remains indelibly tied to the ideology of consumption – becoming ‘the next step in 
[…] the progression of economic value’ – it is, nevertheless, an evolution of the 
spectacle that has dominated Western culture for decades.27 This image is not a 
spectre of itself, but a reflection of the consumer concealed within the appearance of 
                                                        
25 Guy Debord, The Society of the Spectacle, trans. by Donald Nicholson-Smith (New York: Zone, 
1995), p. 12. 
26 Tim Palmer, ‘Style and Sensation in the Contemporary French Cinema of the Body’, Journal of Film 
and Video, 58 (2006), 22-32, p. 22. 
27 B. Joseph Pine II and James H Gilmore, ‘Welcome to the Experience Economy’, Harvard Business 
Review, 76 (1998), 97-105 (p. 97) <available at ebscohost.com> [accessed 13 April 2012]. 
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the commodity: it uses the viewer’s body as its vehicle of delivery in order to render 
the commodity-experience all the more immediate and, in a way, real.28 
 
Much of the critical engagement with Martyrs has centred upon the extremity 
of its violence, and the relation of this extremity to the female form that is 
conspicuously at the epicentre of the narrative. Amy M. Green, for example, 
addresses the ‘suffering and neutering’ of the female form as a controlling image that 
encases the film. Enacting a collapse of the feminine tropes of virgin/matron/crone, 
Green argues that Laugier’s film challenges the ‘eroticisation of violence’ against 
women often perceived in contemporary culture.29 Indeed, the lack of sexual 
exploitation/sexual torture in the film creates a void: contemporary audiences are 
accustomed to a particular brand of violence against women in horror films, 
exacerbated by the exploitation and rape-revenge titles of the 1970s, including Wes 
Craven’s almost-unpalatably eroticised The Last House on the Left (1972). The 
opening scenes of Craven’s film focus upon teenager Mari approaching her 
seventeenth birthday in the era of ‘free love’. The elderly postman arrives with cards 
for Mari’s birthday, places them in the mailbox and soliloquises to himself about the 
beauty of the girl. The scene cuts to Mari in the shower, the dappled glass shower 
screen obscuring the fine detail of her naked body whilst leaving enough definition to 
her breasts and pubic area for her anatomy to be visible. Having dried and dressed, 
she goes to the living room where her parents are fussing and her father openly 
questions her about not wearing a bra, pointing out that her nipples are visible through 
her shirt. Mari herself later declares that she feels like a woman for the first time since 
her breasts filled out the previous winter. It seems that almost every character in the 
film is oddly obsessed with Mari’s body as a signifier of her ‘womanhood’ and the 
lingering shots of her in the shower, wrapped in a towel, cupping her own breasts as 
she discusses the merits of braless adventures with her father (whose incessant staring 
at his daughter’s body provokes a disconcerting atmosphere) reinforce the 
‘importance’ of her as an object of beauty for the admiration of other people.  
                                                         
28 The ‘reality’ of this type of viewing experience should not be confused with a suspension of 
disbelief. The viewing experience is in the realm of the ‘real’, whilst the viewer engages with the 
events onscreen as a mediated representation and not a reality in itself. 
29 Amy M. Green, ‘The French Horror Film Martyrs and the Destruction, Defilement, and Neutering of 
the Female Form’, Journal of Popular Film and Television, 39 (2011), 20-28 (p. 21). 
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In contrast, Martyrs, which also details the systematic defilement and 
destruction of two young women, ‘assaults its audience’ from the moment the scarred 
and bleeding body of the young girl stumbles into the frame.30 Whilst Craven’s 
exploitation film remains focused upon the sexual subjugation of Mari and her friend, 
and consistently eroticises violence by lingering upon the voyeuristic look of the 
perpetrator as opposed to the suffering of the victim, Laugier’s film instead uses the 
female body as a vehicle to access bodily sensation. While it is undeniable that 
Martyrs displays horrific violence against women it differs significantly from the 
routinely accepted spectacular-sexualised violence against the female body that many 
exploitation films employ. Not only does this reinforce Lowenstein’s claim for the 
inappropriateness of the ‘torture porn’ label in this context as Martyrs excludes sexual 
connotations but it also allows the violence itself – which is both brutal and 
unrelenting – to assume centre stage. There is no doubt that what is being questioned 
in this film is the dynamic of the sensorial body, and its relation to the psychosocial 
mind. In this manner, I wish to follow Maria Dschaak in focusing upon Martyrs as a 
film that unveils the fragility of the human body in order to ‘show different ways of 
depriving the occidental subject of its alleged sovereignty’.31 A key component of this 
unveiling of fragility is, I propose, a reiteration of encompassing bodily sensation for 
both the characters onscreen and the viewer. It is not just the sovereignty of the 
subject that is challenged by Martyrs’ ritual destruction of the female body but the 
sovereignty of the notion of ‘mind over matter’, as well.  
 
 While Martyrs openly fixates upon the act of ‘seeing’, there is a dichotomy 
within the film between two types of looking – one that is supported by physiological 
experience and one that is not. While this separation of the look seems to replicate 
Scarry’s claim that ‘to have great pain is to have certainty; to hear that another person 
has pain is to have doubt’, it also speaks directly to Marks’ spectrum of looking. In 
addition, the preference for the embodied look as the true communicator of extreme 
states of bodily sensation also reflects the nuanced and intimate connection between 
physiology and psychology that is explicated by Melzack’s neuromatrix theory. In 
order to be communicated, represented pain must replicate the neuromatrix – the web                                                         
30 Green, p. 21. 
31 Maria Dschaak, ‘Cinema du Corps’ (unpublished conference paper, Body Horror: Contagion, 
Mutation, Transformation, 2013), <http://www.inter-disciplinary.net/at-the-interface/wp-
content/uploads/2013/09/dschaakbhpaper.pdf> [accessed 8 July 2014], p. 2. 
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of connections between sensory fibres, emotion centres, memory and sociocultural 
associations. The opposition of looking, and the inadequacy of the spectacular gaze of 
the observer, are first represented within the dynamic of belief that exists between 
Lucie and Anna during the first section of the film. 
 
The opening sequence shows Lucie, obviously terrified and in pain, as she 
flees from an abandoned warehouse (Figure 4.1, above). Her pain is undeniable and is 
conveyed through a combination of sensory stimulations. The look of the viewer is 
preceded by multiple sensations that are then confirmed when the image becomes 
truly visible such that vision is effectively underpinned by the other senses that first 
suggest pain and suffering to the viewer. This multimodal communication of pain 
generates a feeling of sharing, as the viewer is directly and sensationally privy to 
Lucie’s experience. That is not to say that this scene provides a literal translation of a 
painful experience, but rather that Lucie’s experience of pain becomes a matter of fact 
for the viewer. 
 
In her subsequent relationship with Anna, Lucie does not share details of her 
ordeal but allows her physical scars to stand as symbols of her pain. In a process that 
bears the hallmarks of the spectacular image defined by Debord – wherein ‘being’ 
becomes ‘having’ and ‘having’ becomes ‘appearing’ as the spectacle privileges seeing 
over the phenomenally immediate senses of direct physiological experience (touch, 
taste, smell, balance) – the wounds are used ‘associatively to express pain’, where 
‘pain’ becomes a generalised concept that is redefined by each person that views the 
wound.32 Lucie’s wounds are the manifestation, the appearance, of a pain no longer 
physiologically felt. Her scars, like Lindsay’s facial wounds in The Human Centipede, 
however, represent simultaneously more and less than her experience of pain. 
Because they indicate the structures of power that created them and hint at the 
subjugation of her body in the pursuit of an external aim, Lucie’s wounds are more 
than physical. In attaining this symbolic dimension, however, the wounds transcend 
their physicality and lose touch with the afflicted body; they become less than wounds 
as their psychosocial signification becomes more important than their sensorial 
reality. Through the manifestation of a sensation that should indicate her phenomenal                                                         
32 Debord, pp. 16-17; Scarry, p. 16. 
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embodiment, she ceases to be Lucie and becomes ‘the wounded’. As such, the scars 
do not represent her experience of pain but stand as objects that Anna views and 
interprets by her own definition; they become symbols of pain, but not of Lucie’s 
pain. It is in this manner that wounds ‘locate perception at the pulsing boundaries of 
the body’ by drawing the observer’s attention to the surface in a way that bypasses the 
substance of the body that underlies the skin.33 Yet, for the viewer of Martyrs, as for 
the viewer of The Human Centipede, the bodily sensation incorporated into the 
representation of the wound bridges the gap between surface and flesh, appearance 
and sensation, wound and pain. Melzack’s neuromatrix theory argues for a similarly 
intimate connection between the surface, flesh, previous cognitive associations and 
experiences in a dynamic and inescapable sensation that unites body and mind. 
Indeed, the effect of viewing only the symbolic surface of Lucie’s painful experience, 
rather than having access to the sensation, is comparable to Anna’s continuous need 
to look, and to see.  
 
After Lucie finds and murders the people she holds responsible for her 
childhood torture, Anna arrives at the scene of the crime to assist her friend. When 
they meet, Lucie is clearly panicked, having been attacked by a creature while in the 
house. Despite her friend’s insistence that ‘she’s here’, Anna, in a statement that 
recalls the etymology of martyr and foreshadows her own pending martyrdom, 
declares ‘I have to look’. Upon entering the house Anna sees nothing but the remnants 
of Lucie’s murderous spree. Anna remains, at this stage, in the position of having to 
take Lucie’s word when she says that these are the people who abducted and tortured 
her. Between scenes of Lucie and Anna cleaning the house, however, the viewer is 
shown Lucie’s flashbacks, brief asides dominated by sensory stimulation that recall 
the opening scenes. In one scene the young Lucie screams and struggles against her 
shackles and the clanging of heavy steel restraints can be heard over her cries, but the 
scene remains dark with low-key lighting ensuring that visual details are more 
difficult to discern. While Anna is faced with looking only at the aftermath or the 
symbols of Lucie’s pain, the viewer is once again invited to experience it through an 
expanded sensorium.  
                                                         
33 Mitchell B. Merback, The Thief, The Cross and The Wheel: Pain and the Spectacle of Punishment in 
Medieval and Renaissance Europe (London: Reaktion, 1999), p. 113. 
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There are two modes of looking encoded here. The first, Anna’s, is what 
Marks would term optical visuality, looking for or at the metaphorical meaning of an 
image or symbol. The second, which is assumed by the viewer, is a mode of looking 
more akin to the somatic viewing engendered by The Human Centipede films that 
necessarily invokes multiple sensory dimensions simultaneously. The juxtaposition of 
the two modes of looking crescendos when Anna tries to help one of the victims 
escape after she discovers the woman is still alive. Lucie asks Anna if she ever 
believed her, or whether she thought her mad like the doctors, before hearing a noise 
behind her. The creature that attacked her earlier writhes at the top of the staircase, its 
insect-like yet humanoid body is covered in open wounds. It contorts its body as it 
moves, is possessed of excessive strength for its emaciated frame and is capable of 
making only guttural growls and snarls. It is an enhanced reincarnation of the young 
Lucie who opened the film with all aspects of its being connoting pain: its starved and 
neglected frame, tortured and wounded body and the inability to articulate itself all 
appeal to the primary shared facets of the sensation. All indicators of humanity are 
removed and all that remains is the tortuous, afflicted body that moves with 
supernatural speed and agility and attacks with brutal precision. As Lucie kneels in 
the hallway conversing with the creature, claiming ‘they’re dead, they can’t hurt you 
anymore’, Anna makes her way to the hall. A series of shots and reverse shots display 
two different viewpoints that alternate in quick succession. One displays the creature 
slicing open Lucie’s arms and wrists before smashing her head into the wall 
repeatedly. The accompanying reverse shot, from Anna’s perspective, shows no 
creature, but Lucie slicing her own arms, with her own hands on her head as she 
repeatedly harms herself (Figure 4.2, below). The creature is the manifestation of 
Lucie’s pain, an apparition or a figment of her damaged mind. The creature is also, 
however, a symbolic expression of the materiality of Lucie’s pain – its body is 
Lucie’s body – and because Lucie has not shared her individual experience of pain 
with Anna, she is unable to comprehend the totality of Lucie’s suffering. Lucie ‘sees’ 
because she feels – the viewer ‘sees’ the creature because they have, in some small 
way, been subject to sensory stimulation that manifests Lucie’s experience of pain – 
but Anna does not ‘see’ because she does not feel: Anna sees only the remnants of 
someone else’s pain without being able to access the sensation herself. 
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Yet, the way in which Lucie’s pain is presented to the viewer suggests that the 
sensation of pain can be shared through the medium of film. To return to the opening 
sequence, there is no question that the girl fleeing the warehouse is in pain: this is a 
certainty for the viewer and it is communicated through combinations of sensory 
stimuli that provide the foundations for the visual understanding of the film. Indeed, 
as the same faction that abducted Lucie takes Anna captive, the necessity of embodied 
knowledge to the communication of pain becomes more explicit. As Anna is slowly 
pushed towards witnessing, it is through a complex and sustained assault on the 
senses – hers and the viewer’s – that her final, transcendent look is achieved.  
 
When Anna is held captive her experience of pain is manifest in the auditory 
and visual dimensions as a desaturation of sensation. Anna is held underground, in a 
small room lined with metal plates containing only a single chair and a metal bucket 
in which to relieve herself. High-angled shots emphasise Anna’s helplessness and her 
Figure 4.2: The Creature Reaches for Lucie (top) While Anna Sees 
Self Harm (bottom), Martyrs 
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physical isolation as no other furniture, no windows and no doors can be seen in the 
frame. The only sounds in these scenes are the rattling of her chains and her 
intermittent screams. The lighting maintains an intense low-ratio as shadows overtake 
the scene so that parts of Anna’s body disappear into darkness with each movement 
she makes. Her initially frantic struggles as she rattles the chains and screams for help 
are frustratingly counteracted by the static nature of the camera – there is no escape. 
The camera that followed Lucie from the warehouse into civilisation bobbed and 
shook, but the camera now remains passively static as Anna fights against the 
unbreakable shackles. Scenes of such desperation fade into ones of absolute silence as 
close-up, eye line shots show Anna’s bloodied body lying peacefully while 
somewhere in the distance metal scrapes against metal. Anna moves and the 
thundering of the shackles re-enters the soundscape, louder than any other diegetic 
effect. She tries to sit against a metal wall and knocks her shackle against it, 
beginning an almost deafening echo that causes her to wince and move once more. 
Once again, the scene fades into blackness in a way that replicates the cycle of 
sensory overload followed by deprivation that Anna endures. Between each sense-
assaulting scene is a pause, a moment of blackness that represents Anna’s moments of 
unconsciousness or delirium.  
 
As the torture progresses, with the sounds of Anna being beaten appearing 
unnaturally loud, there is no dialogue and no musical overture. The only regular 
sounds are those that punctuate her existence: the metallic clatter of the ladder that 
signals an abuser’s arrival; the rumble of the trolley that brings her pureed food; and, 
the scrape of the metal spoon on the metal bowl. These sounds with their sustained 
volume and repetitive nature signal impending pain for Anna while for the viewer 
they become an aggressive intrusion on the otherwise quiet scene. The enhanced 
volume and contrast between silence and metallic sounds mimic the importance they 
have for Anna: these are the sounds that signify her existence and the viewer should 
not and cannot ignore them. In conjunction with intrusive auditory stimulation there is 
also a sense of visual deprivation created for both Anna and the viewer. Anna exists 
in two small rooms – the room with the chair and, later, a room with a mattress – that 
have no windows, no decoration and no textures. She sees nobody other than those 
who abuse and feed her. Her body has been withdrawn from the sensorial world and 
contained in a state of absolute sensory deprivation. Unable to even confirm her own 
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existence by experiencing textures, objects or the warmth of sunlight on her skin 
Anna retreats into herself, seeking solace in auditory hallucinations that enable her to 
speak with the deceased Lucie. This landscape of desolate emptiness symbolises both 
the isolation of Anna’s captivity and that of her pain. 
 
The initial stages of Anna’s torture are presented in a specifically sensorial 
manner in order to aid the communication of her suffering. It is because they are 
presented in such a way that the following scenes, in which she is repeatedly 
physically beaten and psychologically abused, do not belong to the realm of spectacle. 
Spectacle, in this sense, refers not only to the flamboyant representation of pain but 
also a state of diminished meaning or purpose. The spectacle redefines feeling as 
seeing and completes a subtle disembodiment of the representation of pain in which 
‘the perceptible world [and its phenomenal sensations] is replaced by a set of images 
that are superior to that world yet at the same time impose themselves as eminently 
perceptible’.34 The facsimile comes to hold the same value as the sensation it 
represents whilst offering only the appearance of the sensorial qualities of the 
embodied experience. A commonly exploited remedy for this unfelt pain in horror 
films is to approach the spectacle through the medium of shock, a move that initiates 
a continuous process of reaching for extremity in an effort to infuse the empty image 
with threads of the embodied sensation. As Debord suggests, ‘the spectacle is the self-
portrait of power’, an image that points to the authority it claims to hold but falls 
short of embodying.35 While reliance upon spectacle may superficially ‘free’ the 
image to engage with sociocultural paradigms of control, it also disassociates the 
image of pain from its sensorial origins. If the spectacular image of the body in pain is 
not convincingly justified it loses meaning and results in the perception of an image 
that glorifies violence for violence’s sake. 
 
The dampening effect of spectacle horror can be seen in Robert Lieberman’s 
The Tortured (2010) where an alternating focus upon bodily injury and cut sequences 
that display the emotional reactions of the perpetrators as their victim screams in 
distress, strip wounds of their signification. The narrative depicts the kidnap and 
murder of toddler Benjamin Landry. After his killer is convicted and sentenced                                                         
34 Debord, p. 26. 
35 Debord, p. 19; emphasis added. 
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leniently the parents decide to abduct and torture him to avenge their son. One scene, 
for example, depicts the parents of the murdered boy crushing their victim’s foot in a 
vice. The shot transitions through a static image of the foot waiting to be crushed, a 
close-up of the parents’ hands as they turn the crank of the vice, a close-up of the 
parents’ faces as they wince when the victim begins to scream, before finishing with a 
fleeting shot of the victim’s now-mangled foot. At no point does the camera show 
either the injury being inflicted or the victim’s reaction to the physical pain. The 
wounds inflicted upon the convicted killer are entirely secondary and represent 
neither the victim’s pain, which is never addressed as the shot cuts to the perpetrators 
each time a new wound is inflicted, nor the pain of the parents, since the wounds they 
choose to inflict cannot encapsulate or represent the pain of having a child murdered. 
As such, wounding becomes superfluous to the narrative as it neither punishes the 
criminal nor reiterates the righteousness of the aggrieved parents. It is, for all intents 
and purposes, a diversion, an expression of emotional pain that has no real physical 
concomitant for the victim – who is ignored almost entirely – or for the perpetrators. 
Pain, in The Tortured, is intangible. It is indicated and gestured towards but never 
encapsulated or communicated to the viewer. This superfluity is reinforced by the 
conclusion of the film, as it is revealed to the viewer – but crucially not to the 
perpetrators – that they have been torturing the wrong man. Torture in this context is 
truly pointless.  
 
The sensorial nature of the scenes of torture in Martyrs, by contrast, avoids 
spectacle by assaulting the viewer through the visual and auditory senses and through 
the associations of bodily experience garnered from those sensory manipulations. 
Anna’s pain is not merely seen but is reproduced by the way in which the sensory 
impressions are combined and manipulated. If the spectacle is a self-portrait of power, 
it is one that Martyrs paints black in order to deny its spectacular influence. The 
image of Anna’s mutilated body resists spectacle, thus posing, as Amy Green argues, 
an embodied challenge to the predominance of spectacle in the representation of 
violence against women. Here, gendered violence is reduced to its evolutionary 
ancestor: violence against the body – all bodies – in such a manner that the embodied 
appeal transcends the gender of the character it is inflicted upon. The denial of her 
gender – enacted by the shaving of her hair, the removal of her clothes and the 
  
208 
distortion of her facial features through physical violence – and the reinstatement of 
her organic body are finally completed by the removal of her skin. 
 
Human skin ‘is the most widely distributed and the most various of the organs 
of the body’.36 It is also the most immediate and, as Steven Connor argues, the most 
absent of the human sensory organs. Documenting historical conceptions, Connor 
delineates three phases of philosophical attitudes towards the skin. The first saw the 
skin ‘as the guarantee of the wholeness of the body’ whilst simultaneously being ‘not 
itself a part of the body’.37 Seen as an ossification, an excretion even, of the flesh that 
differentiated itself from the human body that lay beneath, shielding it from the 
outside world, skin was a protection that was not part of the body per se. In this view, 
the skin embodies Julia Kristeva’s abject – a me that is not me, a thing that is 
indistinguishable from the flesh that I know to be mine, but that is nevertheless a by-
product, an excretion of the correct and proper functioning of that flesh. Kristeva’s 
invocation of borders in the dynamics of the abject, an ambiguity in which the abject 
‘permeates me’, speaks both to the notion of skin as excretion and the second phase of 
conceptualisation that Connor draws out – the skin as a membrane.38 The notion of 
permeability brings an ambivalence to skin: that things can go through it stands in 
direct contradiction to the notion of the skin as protection. It also, however, questions 
the sovereignty of the human subject so often conceptualised as being ‘within’ the 
skin. If the skin is no longer solid, impermeable, strong then what happens to the 
human within? The Human Centipede 2 questions the unity of the human subject in 
its portrayal of Martin Lomax’s perpetually leaking epidermis – an excretion that 
secretes and ejects itself beyond the bounds of human ‘decency’. The third phase 
Connor identifies sees the ‘general functions and connections of the skin [restored]’ 
but not without the influence of the previous conceptualisations: ‘first a screen, then a 
membrane, and finally […] a milieu: the skin becomes a place of minglings, a 
mingling of places’.39 The skin remains the abjected ‘not me’, a membrane that 
contains (though never completely), but now it comes to be what it is, as well: a 
sensory organ, the point at which the subject comes into contact with everything that                                                         
36 Steven Connor, The Book of Skin (London: Reaktion, 2004), p. 27. 
37 Connor, p. 26. 
38 Julia Kristeva, Powers of Horror (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), p. 11; Connor, p. 
26. 
39 Connor, p. 26. 
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is external. Laura U. Marks’ adoption of the term haptic is intended to invite 
associations with touch, a sense enabled and encapsulated by the skin, as the principal 
and primary mode of tactile engagement with the world. My own development of the 
concept of the viscerally somatic image hopes to reunite the sense of skin evoked by 
haptic with the anatomy that lies beneath. No sense operates in isolation, no milieu 
can be contained and no part of the human body is entirely distinct. Indeed, no part of 
the phenomenal world exists in absolute isolation. That Martyrs climaxes with the 
removal of Anna’s skin, apart from her face, forcibly reveals the centrepiece of the 
viewing experience. 
 
As Anna is taken into an operating chamber to be flayed, the lighting 
progressively becomes higher key, perhaps mirroring Anna’s supposed transcendence 
of her physical self toward martyrdom (Figure 4.3). The increase in light intensity as 
Anna is manipulated into the metal frame allows the viewer to see her injuries clearly 
for the first time. The consistent use of shallow focus permits individual aspects of the 
scene to be focused upon. Most commonly it is Anna who is in focus, her wounds 
bright and wet under the intense light. The viewer’s eye is drawn to the contours of 
her injuries, the swelling of her lips, the deep crevices of the wounds on her forehead, 
the deep angry purple of the bruises on her legs and feet.  
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Like the perversely detailed images in Elias Ganster’s Gut, the viewer is invited to 
spend time focusing upon the minute details of texture, colour and contour that had 
previously been unavailable to them due to the darkened lighting. This movement 
along the surface of the image constitutes a type of somatic grazing that allows the 
viewer to engage in the ‘sensory adventure’ that Lowenstein recognises in extreme 
films.40 Although the somatic image does ‘not invite identification with a figure so 
much as [it encourages] a bodily relationship between the viewer and the image’, it 
does not follow that the somatic mode of viewing provokes a ‘shallow’ engagement 
with the multisensory aspects of the film that overlooks the often-controversial 
content.41  
 
                                                        
40 Lowenstein, p. 42. 
41 Laura U. Marks, Touch: Sensuous Theory and Multisensory Media (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 2002), p. 3. 
Figure 4.3: Progression of Lighting Changes 
in Martyrs 
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In his refusal of ‘torture porn’ as an adequate label for extreme horror films, 
Lowenstein argues for ‘shifting the [critical] conversation from identification to 
attractions’.42 Drawing upon Tom Gunning’s definition of a cinema that ‘bases itself 
on […] its ability to show something’, Lowenstein presents a case study of Eli Roth’s 
Hostel (2005) as a paradigmatic example of this kind of cinematic showmanship.43 
This is a brand of cinema that Gunning identifies as exhibitionistic; a quality that 
certainly finds expression in the bravura construction and the extreme depictions of 
violence in Hostel, undermined by a narrative weaved intricately with dark humour 
and a satirical interpretation of the value and effects of American consumer culture.  
 
There is, however, an assumption that permeates Lowenstein’s adoption and 
implementation of Gunning’s terminology that directs his analysis towards 
conventional notions of spectacle entertainment as a refusal or denial of narrative 
authority. The desire of cinema to show something seems to be implicit in 
Lowenstein’s reading, and yet I have argued in this thesis that contemporary horror 
often seeks to question the legitimacy of simply showing something to the viewer. 
Indeed, Gunning borrows his term from Sergei Eisenstein’s disputation on the 
montage of attractions pertinent to theatre, adapting Eisenstein’s argument in a 
manner that, I would suggest, elides the complexities of Eisenstein’s original 
formulation. Whilst Gunning aligns ‘attractions’ with the exhibitionism of spectacle 
entertainment, Eisenstein’s writings contain much more of an embodied inflexion, 
with the focus being placed upon the effect of attractions upon the viewer. 
 
An attraction (in our diagnosis of theatre) is any aggressive moment in 
theatre, i.e. any element of it that subjects the audience to emotional or 
psychological influence, verified by experience and mathematically 
calculated to produce specific emotional shocks in the spectator in 
their proper order within the whole.44 
 
The montage of attractions that Eisenstein later applied to film was not privileging the 
visual spectacle over the narrative, but was rather demonstrating the symbiosis of the 
embodied experience of the viewer and their engagement with, and interpretation of                                                         
42 Lowenstein, p. 44. 
43 Tom Gunning, ‘The Cinema of Attraction: Early Film, Its Spectator and the Avant-Garde’, Wide 
Angle, 3 (1986), 63-70 (p. 64). 
44 Sergei Eisenstein, ‘The Montage of Attraction’, in Sergei Eisenstein: Writings 1922-1934, ed. by 
Richard Taylor (London: I.B. Tauris, 2010), pp. 34-38 (p. 34). 
  
212 
that narrative. The aggressive moments of sensorial affect are not purposeless, as is 
implied in the case of the cinema of spectacle (whose signification overruns the thing 
signified to the point of ridicule, as in the case of The Tortured), but instead 
contribute to the effectiveness of the complete experience of biopsychosocial 
engagement. It was proposed in chapter two that the ‘pornographication of torture’ 
often identified in the contemporary extreme horror film enacts bodily fascination 
engendered through vision, rather than a simplistic voyeuristic optical obsession.45 
Whilst the image of Anna’s flayed body generates a type of visual frenzy as it 
encourages the viewer to scrutinise the image, it also unavoidably incorporates modes 
and structures of embodied understanding in the extremity of its presentation. The 
harrowing details of her injuries replicate in the visual sphere the tactile bombardment 
of Anna’s senses and this re-creation of pain opens the body onscreen and the one off 
screen to the visceral organicity that permeates and structures both. To claim that 
Martyrs, or any of the other films addressed in this thesis, are merely collections of 
attractions that detract from their narrative trajectories or the effectiveness of their 
representation is to do a disservice to the strategic incorporation of somatic sensation 
within both the narrative and the form of the films. The somatic grazing facilitated by 
these films creates a different, though no less effective, empathetic engagement with 
the image and its contents. In this dynamic the somatic image generates a 
physiological relation between the viewer and the film that enhances the psychosocial 
relationship between the viewer and the narrative. It is not that one eclipses the other 
but that the two come into contact in a transient exchange. Somatic sensation 
facilitates the comprehension of Anna’s wounds as more than mere signifiers of her 
captivity and subjugation; it allows them to replicate and communicate the embodied 
experience of pain. 
 
The removal of her skin, like the increase in light intensity during these 
scenes, naturally lends itself to notions of somatic visuality, extending the subversion 
of the body’s boundary found in The Human Centipede 2 beyond the abject and 
towards the monstrous. If watching a gloved hand caress a naked torso in Gut 
stimulates the sense of touch, as mirror neurons ensure that it does, then the very                                                         
45 Steve Jones, ‘The Lexicon of Offence: The Meanings of Torture, Porn and Torture Porn’, in 
Controversial Images: Media Representations on the Edge, ed. by Feona Attwood, Vincent Campbell, 
I. Q. Hunter and Sharon Lockyer (London: Palgrave, 2013), pp. 186-200 (p. 188). 
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concept of skin and the removal of this protective barrier lead to the overstimulation 
of the viewer’s tactile sense. Anna’s flesh, her nerve endings, muscles and tendons are 
exposed and displayed in fine detail and the associated excessive stimulation is 
conveyed through her ambiguous facial expression. If, as Connor argues, ‘all the 
senses are milieux, or midplaces where inside and outside meet and meld, then the 
skin is the global integral of these local area networks, the milieu of these milieux’.46 
The skin is the neuromatrix of the senses, the integration hub through which disparate 
information finds order and meaning through its continual relay between sensory 
organs, the brain, the mind and memory. Without her skin Anna is at once 
dehumanised and hyper-humanised: she is identified as monstrously abject by her 
exposed flesh, pulsing veins and her disturbingly affectless facial expression, and yet 
she is undeniably human and in a state of ultimate sensory experience. The 
psychosocial world in which the human subject imagines they exist is quelled by the 
immediate and extreme sensorial crescendo that results from the unprotected body in 
contact with the phenomenal world. Her matter has eclipsed her mind, symbolised by 
the removal of the surface that allows the body to mediate its contact with the outside 
world. Anna can no longer control her experiences; she is assaulted continuously by 
the smallest particle contacting her uncovered flesh to trigger her exposed nerve 
endings. She is over-stimulated, inundated by her own body – a body that is ordinarily 
more contained, constrained, controlled – as, in a manner of speaking, the viewer is 
simultaneously assaulted by their own senses in the act of bearing witness to Anna’s 
final annihilation.  
 
The somatic image is one that denies the primacy of vision in such a way that 
other sensations must be called upon to interpret the information presented. As Anna 
kneels suspended, in a position reminiscent of Christian iconography, her flayed body 
is overtaken by a final somatic image that begins and ends with an extreme close-up 
of her eye. The camera zooms in on Anna’s eye, bypassing the bright red musculature 
that surrounds her face, the only piece of coherent skin that remains as an island atop 
the pulsating flesh that has become her body. As the camera zooms the periphery 
becomes unfocused, blurring the colour and contours of her injuries and exposed flesh 
as it fixates upon an isolated, glazed eye. Individual capillaries are visible on the                                                         
46 Connor, p. 27.  
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surface as the zoom continues and the camera appears to enter the pupil. Discernible 
features fade into black, as the reflection that overlaid the iris becomes the focus of 
the darkened scene: a translucent glaze that gradually overtakes the entire frame. The 
unfocused scene is now completely swathed in a whitish-blue hue, the elements of 
light and shade drawing the eye across the screen from right to left, top to bottom. 
Still, the zoom continues, bearing down upon a single point of light within the 
stippled hue until it becomes a pinprick, a beacon in the centre of a black rectangle 
that gradually billows and grows, like a nebula in space. The soundtrack 
accompanying the flow of light from the centre outwards is industrial – heavy 
machinery moving over a concrete floor perhaps – repetitive, intrusive and almost 
painful in its insistence. Intercut with this heavy, low sound is another tone somewhat 
similar to whale song, higher and somehow cleaner, but the combination of the two 
produces a discord between the long, low baritone of the first and the staccato, 
intermittent tenor of the second. The resulting effect is one of discomfort tinged with 
expectation of a final conclusion, a close to Anna’s, and the viewer’s, suffering once 
and for all. The light finally brightens to envelope the screen, the higher tones 
overtaking the lower ones in the auditory landscape as the camera slowly zooms out 
again, allowing Anna’s eyeball to reform before the camera’s eye. Slowly but with 
rising clarity her face becomes visible and, as the camera completes its zoom out, the 
red, pulsing flesh around her face once again takes precedence. 
 
Despite her injuries Anna displays no outward signs of pain: if the darkness 
signified hopelessness and suffering, then light here comes to signify her 
transcendence of the previous situation. The extreme invasion of the eye seems to 
suggest an alteration to the way in which Anna sees. Certainly, there is no question 
that Anna’s senses are integrally comingled as her body lies in a state of consistent 
and extreme stimulation resulting from her bare nerve endings. In contrast to her 
earlier mode of looking, Anna’s sight in this scene is crucially framed by her physical 
condition – evidenced by the reiteration of her torture performed by refocusing upon 
her wounds before and after the exploration of her eye – and supported in every 
instance by physiological sensation. Because of the systematic layering of sensation 
throughout the film, and the somatic nature of this final image, the viewer has 
received a multidimensional representation of pain that allows them to intuitively 
build a sensorial model. As a result of the underlying sensation that has been 
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effectively communicated through the medium, the final fantastical image does not 
detract from the brutality of the events onscreen but rather becomes the final layer of 
sensation. The image of Anna flayed but somehow alive becomes the skin of the film 
itself: the single image to which all sensation has been gradually leading. It is the 
ambiguity of this simple image that finally attempts to encapsulate the experience of 
pain.  
 
Embodiment and Pain 
 
The experience of pain in Martyrs assists in the development of a narrative 
that questions the sanctity of the individual and restates the influence of the 
physiological upon the psychosocial. The Bunny Game, however, is a film that on the 
surface presents an exploration of pain that has neither cause nor purpose beyond that 
of mindless torture. The film depicts a nameless prostitute, billed in the credit 
sequence as Bunny (Rodleen Getsic), as she sells her body in order to fund her drug 
addiction. After a catastrophic day in which her body and mind are subject to 
inhumane abuses, a nameless delivery driver kidnaps her, billed in the credits as Hog 
(Jeff F. Renfro). Held captive in Hog’s trailer on a deserted strip of land, Bunny is 
physically and psychologically tortured for five days and forced to play the 
eponymous Bunny Game before being handed over to a man named Jonas (Gregg 
Gilmore). Upon the film’s release in 2010 the BBFC refused it a classification, stating 
that 
 
the principal focus of the work is the unremitting sexual and physical 
abuse of a helpless woman, as well as the sadistic and sexual pleasure 
the man derives from this. The emphasis on the woman's nudity tends 
to eroticise what is shown while aspects of the work such as the lack of 
explanation of the events depicted, and the stylistic treatment, may 
encourage some viewers to enjoy and share in the man’s callousness 
and the pleasure he takes in the woman’s pain and humiliation.47 
 
It has thus attained something of a cult status and while the film is often mentioned 
alongside similarly controversial extreme cinema titles – as in Steve Jones’ article 
‘Gender Monstrosity’ that simply notes the film has been banned because it                                                         
47 BBFC, ‘The Bunny Game: Rejection Explanation’, BBFC.co.uk (n.d.) 
<http://www.bbfc.co.uk/releases/bunny-game-1970> [accessed 11 July 2014] (para. 3 of 5). 
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‘graphically depicts sexual abuse’ – it has received surprisingly little critical 
commentary.48 Jenny Barrett addresses some of the controversies of the film, 
including director Adam Rehmeier’s claim that the torture was improvised but un-
simulated and his assertion that the film could be read as a feminist text. Drawing 
similarities between the performance art aspects of the film (actress Rodleen Getsic is 
a performance body artist who claims The Bunny Game to be, more than anything, an 
art film) and Antonin Artaud’s theatre of cruelty, Barrett argues that The Bunny Game 
is ‘characterised by sensation in its presentation of violence’ in a manner that attracts 
both the ‘torture porn’ horror fan and the sadomasochistic pornography viewer.49  
  
Whilst I agree that The Bunny Game is undeniably characterised by sensation, 
I would counter Barrett’s claim for the appeal of the film. The consistent 
foregrounding of the tortured body through somatic images, I will argue, dilutes the 
pleasurable attributes of watching through the propagation of an uncomfortable 
viewing experience for specific (although numerable) cohorts of spectators. 
Furthermore, the perspective of The Bunny Game is predominantly focused upon the 
victim, precluding the portrayal of the perpetrator’s ‘enjoyment’ of his actions. 
Indeed, it will be suggested that the actions of Hog are not in focus at all and it is the 
direct biopsychosocial effects of his actions upon his victim that the film focuses 
upon. In this manner, while the ‘director and cast meticulously explore the minutiae 
of the physical and psychological abuse of a helpless woman’, the events of the film 
are not comfortably classified as sadistic, as Barrett claims them to be, as they lack a 
convenient identification-point in and through the narrative.50 The Bunny Game is not 
a traditionally pseudo-pornographic exploitation horror film despite the enmeshing of 
sexual activity and violence it performs. Instead, it will be proposed that the film 
enacts an embodied representation of unrelenting violence that questions the unity and 
perseverance of the human body by refusing to allow the viewer to ‘imagine’ the 
significance of the acts depicted in the narrative. Everything in The Bunny Game is 
given, and it is done so violently. 
                                                         
48 Steve Jones, ‘Gender Monstrosity’, Feminist Media Studies, 13 (2013), 525-539 (p. 526). 
49 Jenny Barrett, ‘More Than Just a Game: Breaking the Rules in The Bunny Game’, Cine-Excess 
Special Issue: Subverting Senses (ejournal, n.d.) < http://www.cine-excess.co.uk/subverting-the-
senses.html>, [accessed 3 July 2014], (para. 2 of 25). 
50 Barrett (para. 4 of 25). 
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The film, shot entirely in monochrome, begins with a shot of a human head 
(Figure 4.4, below), covered in what appears to be a plastic bag. A masculine arm 
bearing a significant scar can be seen behind the head as it thrashes from side to side. 
The muffled cries of the victim, along with the disturbing stretching sound of the 
plastic, are heard as they attempt to breathe. Shadows swing to and fro across the 
frame, alternately obscuring and revealing details such as the folds in the material and 
the hair on the captor’s chest, to emulate the swinging of a single light source 
overhead. With its amateur-style cinematography, The Bunny Game shares 
similarities with the haptic imagery of The Poughkeepsie Tapes. The swinging light 
moves the visual emphasis of the scene continuously, ensuring that the viewer must 
take in only fragments of details on each sweep that the light completes. The primacy 
of vision as the principal mode of cinematic communication is questioned as the 
disturbing sounds take over the soundscape and the movement of the shadows across 
the contours of the face alternately reveal and obscure the visual scene. 
 
As the victim inhales, the plastic crudely reveals the features of the face that 
lies beneath in a harrowing realisation of suffering. The choice of this shot to open the 
narrative is significant in two ways. Firstly, it is an image of pain that is 
communicated through combinations of sensorial stimulations that appeal to the 
embodied viewer. The tone of the victim’s cries as the plastic pulls into their mouth 
when they inhale communicates audibly the shortness of breath and accompanying 
panic they are perceived to be feeling. The fact that it is displayed in the centre of the 
frame marks the victim as the focal point of this scene, and the ensuing narrative. It 
also, however, problematizes the notion of ‘seeing’ as it is both physically difficult for 
Figure 4.4: Adam Rehmeier’s The Bunny Game (2010) 
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the viewer to discern what is happening and the face itself is covered in a plastic veil. 
The covering of the face creates a second skin, an alien layer that prohibits the body 
from its ordinary function: it obscures features, but retains recognisable landmarks; 
prevents vision, but encourages the haptic senses in its alternate blotting and revealing 
of the humanness beneath it as the victim exhales and inhales. The veiling of the face 
resists the conventional notion of ‘torture porn’ that is predicated on a pathological 
desire to see every single detail of the dismemberment and murder of the human 
body, refusing the viewer ocular access to the victim at what would be the pinnacle of 
bodily arousal.51 Instead, the viewer is given some visual detail, some haptic detail 
and more auditory detail in a decontextualised image that is neither realised nor 
expanded upon in the film that follows.  
 
In an inversion of Anna’s flaying in Martyrs, the skin, which ‘is the ground 
against which the other senses figure’, has its function curtailed by the plastic 
covering.52 It no longer protects or mediates contact: it merely creates pain. If ‘the 
skin is, so to speak, the body’s face’ then the covering of the face can be read as a 
symbolic removal of the skin with the ultimate aim of dehumanising the victim.53 
While Anna’s face remained, thus ensuring her body entered into the abject (me-not 
me), this body resists explicit identification as ‘the same as me’. It oscillates on the 
border between the human and the abject, the body and the spectacle, whilst adhering 
comfortably to no single category. The human face is, according to Mary Ann Doane, 
‘the most articulate sector of the body’ and is able to communicate the highest degree 
of subjective experience.54 In addition, the face contains many of the specialised                                                         
51 Whilst this scene metonymically invokes the notion of erotic asphyxiation, generating an 
undercurrent of sexual desire that was not present in Martyrs, the presentation of the scene goes some 
way to deny the pornographication of the violence. Firstly, the monochrome colour scheme, low-key 
lighting and perpetually moving light source counteract the visual fascination engendered by notions of 
pornography. In pornographic material, as Linda Williams states, one expects to see ‘naked bodies 
engaging in sexual numbers’. In this scene, however, the viewer sees a covered body – that is 
disassociated from the human form through the veiling of the face – which is clearly not in a state of 
sexual arousal. Secondly, and perhaps more pertinently, the viewer does not witness the perpetrator’s 
‘pleasure’ in performing the asphyxiation, which may cue the pornography viewer into accepting the 
erotic dimensions of inflicting pain. All markers of eroticism, pornography and pleasure are removed 
from this scene, and the film, as the violence of these acts overcomes other potential significations. 
Linda Williams, Hard Core: Power, Pleasure and the ‘Frenzy of the Visible’ (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1989), p. 128. 
52 Connor, p. 27. 
53 Connor, p. 29. 
54 Mary Ann Doane, Femmes Fatales: Feminism, Film Theory, Psychoanalysis (New York: Routledge, 
1991), p. 47. 
  
219 
sensory organs – the eyes, nose, mouth and ears – and is often located, particularly in 
horror film, as the seat of the individual’s experience. All pain, all fear, in visual 
representation is communicated through the face and its outpouring of sensorial 
humanity. The opening scene of Martyrs used the face of Lucie – its scarred skin, 
wide terrified eyes and the cries that issue from it – to confirm her pain as she 
stumbled into the light from the abandoned warehouse. The face in the corresponding 
curtain-raiser from The Bunny Game, however, is concealed with an opaque film that 
obscures the features associated with human subjectivity even as it tightly hugs their 
contours with each breath. This denial of the victim’s face objectifies them but it also 
refuses the actuality of the representation itself. If the human face is the body part 
most ostensibly ‘for the other’, as Doane claims, the part most concerned with sharing 
experiences and knowledge, then refusing the viewer access to that face at the 
moment when communication of their physiological and psychological experience 
would seem paramount denies the notion that this image is for the other at all.55 This 
face is unable to communicate the suffering it feels. It is unable to manifest fear in its 
widened, bloodshot eyes or to display the pain of asphyxia in its pallid coloration or 
darkened lips. The covered face cannot communicate its own sensory experience and 
leaves the viewer with only their own sensations as the light swings and the sound of 
stretching plastic fills their auditory field. If this image is not for the other, if it does 
not communicate for the other, then it must be for me. To the viewer this means that 
the image must have direct applicability to them and their own sensory experience. 
Like the pain the as-yet anonymous body onscreen feels, this image must be felt by 
the viewer and not simply seen. 
 
 The definition of the body and the recognition of the mediated body as a 
human being are thus problematized from the outset. The prominence of the victim’s 
physicality in the frame, however, ensures that the body does not fade from view. The 
human body is, after all, a powerful conduit of understanding as George Lakoff and 
Mark Johnson state in Philosophy in the Flesh: 
 
                                                        
55 Doane, p. 47. 
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our sense of what is real begins with and depends crucially upon our 
bodies, especially our sensorimotor apparatus, which enables us to 
perceive, move, and manipulate, and the detailed structures of our 
brains, which have been shaped by both evolution and experience.56 
 
Lakoff and Johnson suggest that the very nature of human existence and experience is 
defined by the qualities of a highly specific and specialised body. This body in turn 
allows the individual to sense and interact with the external environment in ways that 
are ultimately enabled and limited by the nature of that body’s corporeality. The 
repeated representation of the body being engaged physiologically, whether through 
torture or sex, along with the refusal of dialogue or narrative at this point, creates a 
clear emphasis on bodily sensation. In a brutal fashion, The Bunny Game is not 
concerned with subjective experiences, only physiological ones. Indeed, Rodleen 
Getsic proclaims The Bunny Game to be an ‘experiential gift’ that is inescapably 
‘about torture’.57  
 
While the unrelenting focus upon violence as the crux of the narrative may 
seem to align the film with conventional notions of ‘torture porn’, there are a number 
of key stylistic and thematic differences. As Steve Jones discusses, the torture porn 
label signifies much more than the combination of sex and violence ‘because of the 
cultural power imbued in the word ‘porn’’.58 The pejorative label connotes not only 
the pornographication of violence, which implies a valorisation of suffering in the 
name of entertainment, but also constructs a specific dynamic between the viewer and 
the image. On the one hand, the inclusion of porn assumes ‘that audiences are 
sexually stimulated by the gore and suffering’ whilst, on the other hand it works ‘to 
illegitimate Torture Porn and demand that body horror retreats to its more ‘fitting’ 
position on the outskirts of the cultural radar’.59 The reactionary term thus promotes a 
confusing confluence of associations between extreme violence, spectacle 
entertainment, sexual arousal, a lack of empathy, and the critical decline of 
sociocultural cohesion and humanitarian concern. In essence, torture porn is                                                         
56 George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, Philosophy in the Flesh: The Embodied Mind and its Challenge 
to Western Thought (New York: Basic, 1999), p. 17. 
57 Rodleen Getsic, ‘My MonsterPiece: An Artfilm‘, Cine-Excess Special Issue: Subverting Senses 
(ejournal, n.d.) <http://www.cine-excess.co.uk/subverting-the-senses.html> [accessed 3 July 2014], 
para. 4; para. 7 of 65). 
58 Jones, ‘The Lexicon of Offence’, p. 190. 
59 Jones, ‘The Lexicon of Offence’, p. 188; p. 191. 
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constructed as symptomatic of a self-destructive society that enjoys the grand 
spectacle of violence displayed in these films. It is in the relationship between the 
viewer and the image that The Bunny Game, and all the films explored in this thesis, 
most strenuously denies the torture porn categorisation. The Bunny Game is 
unremittingly attentive to the suffering of Bunny’s body, but it is the way in which the 
images of the film make contact with the viewer that is ‘the point’ of the film. Torture 
is not merely a visual spectacle but is instead communicated through the viewer’s 
sensorium in order to stimulate a bodily fascination with, and to provoke the 
questioning of, the contemporary experience of spectatorship.  
 
Just as Martyrs manipulated sensory and associational cues through 
cinematography in order to convey pain, so too does The Bunny Game. The choice of 
a monochrome scheme for the film at first signifies Bunny’s disassociation from 
physical reality but later becomes indicative of a more extreme enactment of the 
visual desaturation in Martyrs that allowed the tortured body to stand alone in the 
cinematic frame. In The Bunny Game, the monochrome scheme enacts the physical 
response to pain that focuses attention only on essential qualities of the environment: 
colour would not be a significant quality to a body in extreme pain. Both applications 
indicate that the body takes precedence over the external world in cases of extremity 
such that, as Scarry states, ‘the body utterly [nullifies] the claims of the world’.60 On a 
practical level, a monochrome scheme allows for higher degrees of contrast both 
between and within shots. When Hog rapidly flashes a bright light in Bunny’s eyes 
the high contrast between absolute blackness and incandescent whiteness is more 
intense than the coloured grey to yellow alternative (Figure 4.5). This becomes 
significant when considering the nature of bodily pain and the fact that the 
overstimulation of any sense will generate a pain reaction. As the conditions of the 
film mimic those of Bunny’s plight, both Bunny and the viewer have a superficially 
comparable reaction to this overstimulation.  
 
 
 
                                                         
60 Scarry, p. 33. 
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This kind of sensory contrast is also deployed in the auditory field as incredibly loud 
or distorted sound is set against absolute silence. The use of metal music as an 
overture at the beginning and end of the film reflects the genre’s tendency towards 
dissonance and distortion and lends an affinity to those emotions that distort physical 
reality. The violence of sound is perhaps most evidently manifested in a montage 
segment detailing aspects of Bunny’s torture (Figure 4.6, below). The rapidly 
changing scenes are punctuated by a heartbeat rhythm sounded by Hog driving a knife 
into the thick wooden floor of the trailer. The resulting staccato crash is high in the 
sound mix and can be heard above the overture music and Bunny’s screaming. 
Startling in its volume, repetition, tone and auditory brutality, the sound becomes a 
measure of Bunny’s pain and fear.  
 
Figure 4.5: Visual Contrast and Overstimulation Mirrors Bunny’s Painful Experience, The 
Bunny Game 
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Figure 4.6: Bunny’s Torture Montage, The 
Bunny Game 
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 The elements of colour, contrast, sound and the evocative content of the 
narrative are further displaced and manipulated through the consistent use of montage 
editing and temporal disruption. The overt and effective use of montage recalls Sergei 
Eisenstein’s montage of attractions, while the use of visual and haptic imagery 
encourages the viewer to move over the surface of the film frame. Together with the 
auditory accompaniment that alternately punctuates and heightens the atmosphere of 
helplessness, the somatic mode of viewing is evoked as the montage not only links 
images but ‘different spheres of feeling’ as well.61 The rhythmic nature of the editing 
and the somatic nature of the images ensure that the viewer must assemble them 
manually into some form of coherence. These are not moments of formal 
showmanship that are ‘complete within [themselves]’ but rather moments to be 
constructed that ‘depend upon something relative, the reactions of the audience’ for 
the realisation of their potential to develop the narrative.62 In other words, this is not 
exhibitionist cinema, as Adam Lowenstein may term it, as it lacks the quality of 
engaging in bravura cinematic techniques for their own purpose. It is not exaggeration 
or pomposity of showmanship as the adoption of such techniques enhances and 
furthers the experience of viewing past the superficial enjoyment of spectatorship. 
This proves to be a fruitful technique for approximating Bunny’s experience of pain 
as each individual shot functions in a similar way to the McGill Pain Questionnaire 
adjectives. Each disjointed frame points to a single facet of pain, the total of which 
provides a matrix of associations that approximates Bunny’s painful experience. Hog 
flashing bright lights into Bunny’s eyes represents an affective-sensorial quality of 
pain that can be described as blinding while his screaming in her face represents an 
affective-evaluative quality of pain connected to fear. Thus the facets of physical 
sensation, affective evaluation, autonomic sensation (sickening pain, for example), 
brightness, constriction and temperature are addressed momentarily through a 
combination of seemingly disarrayed and disconnected scenes.63  
 
The scenes of Bunny’s torture occupy two thirds of the 1 hour 16 minute run 
time and are consistently harrowing. Bunny, like Anna in Martyrs, is chained and left 
in the darkness of a trailer for long periods. She is screamed at and slapped,                                                         
61 Sergei Eisenstein, The Film Sense (London: Faber and Faber, 1981), p. 63. 
62 Sergei Eisenstein, ‘The Montage of Attractions’, p. 34. 
63 The consistent focus upon the victim during these montages resists the notion of voyeuristic or 
sadistic enjoyment as the viewer is almost as blind to what is happening, and why, as Bunny. 
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bombarded with light, darkness and noise. Her head is shaved and she is forced to 
watch video footage of other women being tortured by Hog. Her mouth is clamped 
open with what appears to be a surgical instrument and litres of alcohol are poured 
down her throat. On occasion she is taken out of the trailer and forced to crawl naked 
through scrubland on a leash. She is made to play the Bunny Game whereby she, 
wearing a bunny mask and straight jacket, must run from her captor who is wearing a 
pig mask and brandishing a whip (Figure 4.7). Represented by a frantic montage 
sequence set to imposing metal music, this surreal game concludes with Bunny crying 
in Hog’s arms. She is repeatedly suffocated with plastic bags before, in one final act 
of torture, she is made to believe she is free only to be captured and subjected to a 
mock crucifixion.  
 
The iconography of Bunny’s crucifixion implies a religious aspect to her 
torture that recalls the final transcendent scene of Martyrs. René Girard has noted that 
religious violence is often paradoxically used to breed placidity in its subjects – 
indicated by Anna’s strange serenity and nimbus at the conclusion of Martyrs and 
Bunny’s disempowered state as she cries in Hog’s arms following her crucifixion in 
The Bunny Game – and the inclusion of religious symbolism brings into question the 
Figure 4.7: The Eponymous Bunny Game 
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purpose of Bunny’s torture. In this particular recreation, Hog acts as a symbol of the 
religious power structure – holy man, church, god – that seeks to control all aspects of 
Bunny’s life and body. Death is not the aim, as it is in many of the ‘torture porn’ 
films: it is the systematic de-construction and control of the captive that is the aim. 
Just as religion might wish to train but ultimately retain its disciples, so too does Hog 
wish to ‘keep’ Bunny. In a complete denial of the sovereignty of the subject, Bunny 
must subordinate every aspect of her existence to her captor and it is this process that 
is the focus of the film. Bunny’s almost-continual position in the centre of the frame, 
even during moments of extreme violence and depravity, forcibly foregrounds the 
notion that violence is not merely ‘happening’ but it is happening to her.  
 
For Bunny, as for Anna, this subordination to another includes a partial 
refutation of her womanhood in the exchange of psychosocial notions of ‘gender’ for 
a more primal notion of organicity.64 Whilst Anna’s de-gendering was prefigured by 
the lack of sexual violence, and epitomised by the removal of her skin, Bunny’s 
forced subjugation is enacted through the gender identity that is created in the first 
section of the film: her bodily sensation is accessed through the prism of her 
womanhood. Bunny’s gender is emphasised by her choice of profession. As a 
prostitute she works within an ambiguous hierarchy of power in which she may be 
seen as simultaneously empowered (making her own choices) and oppressed (a slave 
to her clients, her addictions and a capitalist economy that makes a commodity of the 
body).65 It is also a profession that engages the body in the satisfaction of 
physiological desires, ‘moves’ the body as Linda Williams argues, and subsequently 
                                                        
64 I wish to reiterate a crucial distinction here between the facts of physiology and the social 
construction of gender roles. ‘Woman’ is a category that is constituted by the social order of the society 
in which it is used. As such, what it means to be a woman in one society can be radically different to 
what the same category means in another society. This social category is superficially attached to 
female physiology in a way that has seen the concepts of biological sex and sociological gender 
become interchangeable. The developing transgender and gender non-conformance social movements 
are, however, increasingly calling into question the legitimacy of this equivalence between physicality 
and sociocultural gender roles (see Martine Rothblatt, Apartheid of Sex (London: Rivers Oram, 1995)). 
When I claim that Bunny and Anna are de-gendered, it is the sociocultural aspects of their gender roles 
that I refer to, not their biological sex. 
65 Kate Hakala of #notyourrescueproject has collated social media comments from sex workers 
regarding the continued campaigns to ‘liberate’ them from their chosen industry. The comments reflect 
both the assumptions that sex workers are oppressed by their profession and that they desire/need 
rescuing from themselves, and their clients, and the sex workers’ rebuttal of such stereotypes. ‘Sex 
Workers Declare They’re #notyourrescueproject With New Twitter Campaign’, Nerve (3 January 
2014) <http://www.nerve.com/entertainment/web/sex-workers-declare-theyre-notyourrescueproject-
with-new-twitter-campaign>, [accessed 7 January 2014]. 
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aims to ‘move’ the body of the observer/viewer too.66 As her profession moves the 
bodies of her clients and the viewer, however, it subjects Bunny’s body to a 
dematerialising force as she becomes a tool, a cipher for the fulfilment of others’ 
pleasure at the expense of her own. She enters into the ‘history of power’ encased in 
the connotations of pornography as she moves from one client to the next in the first 
section of the film.67 Her engagement is not merely enacted through connotation, but 
is also reinforced through sensory stimulations. 
 
Following the scene of the obscured, suffocating human head, the viewer is 
presented with a short ‘montage of attractions’ that details Bunny’s daily life. 
Accompanied by a grating industrial metal track that assaults the viewer’s ears and 
mirrors the visual discontinuity of the montage technique, the scenes transition 
bluntly from one client to the next. Interspersed are scenes of Bunny in hotel 
bathrooms, inhaling cocaine, contorting her face as she looks at her reflection and 
breaking down in tears. The monochromatic colour scheme achieves a measure of 
visual desaturation that is heightened by the short scenes which are spliced together. 
There is very little dialogue and the viewer still does not know who, or what, they are 
watching. At the crescendo of the montage is a scene in which Bunny passes out after 
servicing a client. Having already paid for his gratification, the client nevertheless 
seizes the opportunity before him and rapes Bunny while she remains unconscious. 
The sense of disempowerment that is first implied by prostitution is amplified by the 
overwhelming sensory contrasts, generating an impression of helplessness that is 
epitomised by the violation of her unconscious body. At all points, the events of the 
film are underpinned by the sensory stimulations offered to the viewer such that the 
effective use of prostitution as a symbol for the subjugation and control of Bunny’s 
body is built upon the foundations of bodily sensation. Whilst this amplifies the 
effectiveness of the narrative, the continued emphasis upon her body, and not the 
bodies of her clients (the viewer is predominantly shown Bunny’s head/face as she 
performs her duties), resists the temptation for the narrative to overrun the affective 
elements of the film, or to lose sight of its embodied origins and descend into 
exploitation.                                                         
66 Linda Williams, Hard Core: Power, Pleasure and the ‘Frenzy of the Visible’ (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 1989), p. xv. 
67 Williams, p. 14. 
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Uniting psychosexual depictions of male virility with the persecution of the 
(usually) female victim, exploitation films – including The Last House on the Left 
(dir. by Wes Craven, 1972) and Meir Zarchi’s I Spit On Your Grave (1978) along 
with their respective remakes in 2009 and 2010 – typically exploit the character 
archetypes they utilise to deliver their tenuous plot. The films usually depict a 
troubled relationship between the sexual exploitation of the female victim and the 
phallic violence later inflicted upon the perpetrator. The cover art for Zarchi’s I Spit 
On Your Grave, which was replicated almost perfectly for Steven R. Monroe’s 2010 
remake, presents a typically conflicted image: the half naked body of a female stands 
in the middle of the image, she is smeared with blood and her clothes are torn 
exposing both her torso and her buttocks (Figure 4.8). Her exposed body is 
provocative as what remains of her clothes cling to her in a way that emphasises her 
sexual attractiveness. In her hand she holds a bloodstained knife that questions the 
origins of the blood that also covers her body yet originates from no obvious wound: 
is it hers, or her victims’? It seems the sexual appeal 
of the victim is being invoked even before the film 
has begun which poses a troubling relationship 
between this image and the subsequent representation 
of rape.  
 
In Zarchi’s original, Jennifer’s body is 
implicated to have aroused her attackers into 
committing their crime and the continued emphasis 
upon the roundness of her buttocks, the slimness of 
her figure and her conventional beauty seems to 
accentuate this claim. She is raped because she is an 
attractive female. While The Bunny Game contains explicit scenes of sex, violence 
and the persecution, degradation and exploitation of its victim that are comparable to 
Zarchi’s film, it differs from such exploitation titles in two significant ways. Firstly, it 
provides a viewing experience that is weaved from a tapestry of sensory stimulations 
of the ilk found within its montage segments. Secondly, it maintains a distinctive 
proximity to the victim’s body throughout the entirety of her suffering. 
 
Figure 4.8: Meir Zarchi’s I Spit On 
Your Grave (1978) 
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Zarchi’s I Spit On Your Grave, in its uncut format depicts the pursuit and 
repeated rape of a young woman, Jennifer, by four men who seem to regard her as 
sport. Each scene of sexual violence alternates between shots that display the victim, 
restrained by the men or attempting to flee through woodland, and close-up shots of 
the perpetrators’ faces as they tether and rape her. The facial expressions of the 
perpetrators unambiguously portray a distinct pleasure gained from their actions as 
their victim screams. Perversely, the original cut-version passed by the BBFC all but 
eradicated the presence of Jennifer’s body during scenes of her rape – replacing 
footage of her naked body, deemed to ‘eroticise or endorse sexual assault’, with 
repeated shots of the perpetrators’ enrapt looks at their victim and each other.68 What 
results is an uncomfortable emphasis upon the emotional state of the perpetrators as 
they perform, or voyeuristically watch, acts of violence against a victim that is 
ambiguously absent. Figure 4.9, below, shows a comparison in shot composition and 
editing sequences between Zarchi’s original film (the BBFC-censored version), 
Steven R. Munroe’s remake and Rehmeier’s The Bunny Game during comparable 
rape scenes. 
                                                        
68 BBFC, ‘I Spit On Your Grave’, BBFC.co.uk, (n.d.) <available at: http://www.bbfc.co.uk/case-
studies/i-spit-your-grave> [accessed 11 July 2014] (para. 3 of 8). 
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 Zarchi and Monroe’s rape scenes contain significantly more close-up shots of 
the perpetrators’ faces, usually shown centrally or positioned in the optical field in a 
way that results in visual balance throughout the shot. In addition, the repeated focus 
upon the eyes of the rapist during the act indicates a bias towards their emotional or 
physical activity. Carol Clover argues that horror is preoccupied with eyes, and more 
specifically with ‘eyes watching horror’.69 As the camera probes the countenances of 
the rapists in both versions of I Spit on Your Grave, it fixates upon their look as they 
watch the horror that they perform. The isolation of the eyes of the perpetrators – 
amplified in Zarchi’s film by Matthew’s magnifying lenses and in Monroe’s by 
Stanley’s obsessive recording of the crime – foreground the voyeuristic-sadistic 
elements of violence in a way that constructs Jennifer’s rape as violence performed by 
her attackers. Arguably, the repeated display of the assailants could be seen as 
conforming to the victim-identified camera work Clover finds in the 1980s slasher 
film, demonstrating the disempowerment of the victim by showing the attack from her 
perspective. The specific angles of both Zarchi and Monroe’s camera position, 
however, deny the complete and convincing assimilation of camera and victim. The 
shot focuses upon Matthew as he rapes Jennifer (still 3 in Zarchi’s sequence, still 4 in                                                         
69 Carol Clover, Men, Women and Chain Saws (London: BFI, 1992), p. 167. 
Figure 4.9: Zarchi’s I Spit On Your Grave (L), Monroe’s I Spit On Your Grave (C), Rehmeier’s The Bunny 
Game (R) 
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Monroe’s) but in both instances the character does not look directly at camera as, for 
example, Michael Myers does when John Carpenter’s camera assumes Laurie 
Strode’s victim-position. Instead, Matthew’s gaze is directed slightly to the left of 
where the victim is presumed to be. Situated part way between third-party 
omniscience and first-party identification, the camera behaves as the attackers are 
shown to: it assumes a proximal position from which to voyeuristically watch the 
attackers as they in turn watch each other. Jennifer is occluded from her own rape. 
 
In The Bunny Game, however, the victim remains in a relatively stable and 
central position during her rape. Despite being unconscious, and thus unable to resist 
or cry out as Jennifer does, Bunny nevertheless remains the principal focus of the 
scene as it unfolds. The third-party camera position remains consistent, and close-up 
shots show parts of Bunny’s body and face as her rapist remains at the periphery. As a 
result this scene explicitly documents the rape of Bunny, rather than the sexual 
gratification of her rapist. This victim-centred approach is further reinforced by the 
lack of subsequent scenes featuring the nameless assailant as the aftermath of 
Bunny’s rape remains focused upon her.  
 
The Bunny Game disallows the wilful ignorance of the victimised body that I 
Spit On Your Grave propagates. Bunny is nearly always in the frame, in the 
foreground, at the centre. After she is kidnapped the viewer does not watch the 
actions of Hog, as Zarchi’s viewer watches the actions of the rapists (and only later 
those of the victim-turned-murderess), the viewer watches the effects of Hog’s actions 
on Bunny. Here is a body that forges a living from its sexuality, its sensuality, and 
here is its progressive annihilation. None of which can, should, or will be hidden from 
the viewer. Everything is in view, every inch of Bunny’s body, every moment of her 
suffering, but it is not merely visible. This is not an ocular foray into the degradation 
of the female form; this is eminently and immediately perceptible, felt by the viewer 
in a way that re-enacts Bunny’s undeniable suffering. Consequently, labelling The 
Bunny Game as an exploitation or torture porn film is a reactionary tactic that seeks to 
disavow the extremity of the violence and the embodied nature of the viewing 
experience. It does foreground sex and violence but I would argue that Hog’s violence 
is not necessarily sexual per se. He certainly does not appear to receive the type of 
voyeuristic-sadistic pleasure from his actions that Jennifer’s rapists get from theirs. 
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Furthermore, the composition of shots and camera positions do not encourage the 
voyeuristic fascination that is typically associated with exploitation cinema. Where I 
Spit On Your Grave mimetically encourages the extra-diegetic viewer to emulate the 
masterful voyeurism of the inter-diegetic viewer, The Bunny Game presents a 
sequence of events with comparable objectivity. Hog’s aim is not to gain gratification 
but to enact his victim’s complete destruction and it is this that The Bunny Game 
documents. The Bunny Game uses the combination of sex and violence because the 
two embodied activities share affective features of the arousal of the human body. 
Bunny’s body is taken through a spectrum of stimulation that explicates the innate 
contradictions that can be discovered in psychosocial concepts including femininity, 
prostitution, rape and violence.  
 
In contrast to I Spit on Your Grave and The Last House on the Left, The Bunny 
Game redefines rape as a ‘violent assault with intent to injure, humiliate and degrade 
the victim’, rather than as a mode of ‘sexual release’ for the perpetrator.70 It is not a 
film about sexual violence as such, but about violence in its ossified, invulnerable 
form. Rape is a violent act that contravenes many of the conceptual understandings of 
the body: it is an invasion of the fortress-body, a denial of the protective-body, an 
attack on the psychological-subject that denies their ability to choose and to be left in 
peace. Rape is an effective form of torture because it mobilises the victim against 
themself; it uses their body and mind to produce the intolerable pain associated not 
just with the physical act of rape but with the psychological one too. The genders of 
the bodies involved enact that violence, reproduce it within their social definitions 
(female/male, victim/perpetrator, submissive/dominant) but they do not encompass it. 
The gender dynamic between the male perpetrator and the female victim is mobilised 
through the somatic image in a way that draws upon a particular neuromatrix of 
associations – bodily sensation, psychosocial knowledge, cultural referencing, genre 
expectations, gender dynamics, power hierarchies, moral judgments – to produce a 
multidimensional communication of pain that is indelibly located not just within the 
victim’s body but within the viewer’s body as well. The experience is not directly 
comparable to that shown onscreen but the viewing experience is, nevertheless, 
distinctly disquieting and uncomfortable.                                                          
70 Myra MacDonald, Representing Women: Myths of Femininity in the Popular Media (London: 
Edward Arnold, 1995), p. 187; emphasis added. 
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It is perhaps telling that the BBFC deemed I Spit On Your Grave passable 
after nearly 8 minutes of cuts but failed to extend the opportunity to resubmit The 
Bunny Game for classification. I would suggest that part of this reasoning lies not 
within the content of the film but within the way it interacts with its viewer. When 
pain is embodied it noticeably augments the effect and affect of the narrative it 
performs. Somatic images infused with pain no longer allow the viewer to rationalise 
the filmic experience or the narrative as a fictive experience, a representation of an 
unreality. The film becomes semipermeable as violence seeps through the surface of 
the image and onto (into) the viewer through their indelible experience. The Bunny 
Game is a film about torture and, to a certain extent, it extends a torturous experience 
to its viewer as it denies them solace from the violence inflicted upon Bunny. It 
overlooks the traditional cinematic trope of searching for the response or gratification 
of the perpetrator and simultaneously denies any reasoning for the events of the 
narrative, irrespective of how thinly veiled it may be. All that remains are the 
remnants of Bunny – organic, annihilated and undeniable – wrapped in the trappings 
of film and presented to the viewer as Rodleen Getsic’s enigmatic ‘experiential gift’. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
234 
Conclusion – Once More, With Feeling 
 
The previous four chapters have been devoted to answering the following 
question: what happens when we watch a horror film? This seemingly simple enquiry 
shrouds the complexities of an intricate biopsychosocial process that unfolds 
phenomenally and subjectively within the individual viewer. A number of answers 
can be offered with superficial legitimacy. We enter a distinctly psychological space 
and interact with a socially defined cultural artefact alongside others of our social 
group. We engage as a consumer within the wider capitalist economy. We participate 
in sociological power hierarchies that are reinforced through the narratives we watch 
and the very mechanics of the industry that produce them. We sit alone in front of our 
televisions or computer screens and engage in escapism, indulging in a fictional 
narrative to pass the time. Each response begins with the same subject – ‘we’, the 
viewer – yet each ends with a different intellectual concept – ‘socially defined cultural 
artefact’, ‘sociological power hierarchies’ or ‘creative escapism’ that seems to bypass 
the common denominator. There is a conspicuous body-shaped hole in the world of 
film theory: a hole that this thesis has striven to fill. The discussion has sought to 
refocus critical attention upon the viewer’s corporeal form, their material presence 
and its formative influence upon ‘the film experience’. The following concluding 
chapter will seek to finalise the conceptual framework of the thesis in order to lay 
bare the sensorial tapestry of the corporeal viewer. In doing so, it will endeavour to 
underscore the ways in which physiology underpins and guides the complex and 
nuanced psychological processes usually ascribed to the viewing experience. It will 
also explore the implications of this somatic framework for film theory more broadly 
and the other avenues of exploration that this project might open. 
 
Somatic Viewing 
 
It was suggested in the introduction that one of the dominant critical 
paradigms for addressing horror film – psychoanalysis – can be viewed as an 
exploration of the mind ‘from “within”, from the first person perspective of what it 
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feels like to be a mind, a living experiencing subject’.1 Situated within the subjective 
consciousness of the viewer, the psychoanalytic paradigm looks out towards the film 
within the context of the sociocultural and psychological environment. As the viewer 
watches and makes sense of the film, the psychoanalytic reading analyses that sense-
made in terms of the constitution of the individual psyche and seeks to answer the 
question of what is important to this viewer in this culture within this sociocultural 
role. The critic, like the individual that they hope to theorise, is ‘directed towards an 
“outer world”, and […they…] reflect psychologically on [the] Ego and its 
experience’.2 While the viewer is directed towards the ‘outer world’ of the film, 
however, they are also subjected to the sensorial world of the film, a world that 
reaches out and phenomenally stimulates the viewing party. Traditionally, the critic is 
situated within the cognitive mind of the viewer – a prime position to consider what 
the viewer may think or how they may interpret a film. This consideration is 
necessarily focused upon the psychosocial influences that impact upon the ways in 
which an individual conceptualises and organises the plethora of information in any 
given phenomenon. What it seems to overlook, however, are the ways in which the 
viewer’s sensorial body – both now and in their formative developmental stages – 
also shapes and guides how they think and how they can interpret a film. That body is 
both stimulated directly by the phenomenal qualities of spectatorship and intrinsically 
incorporated in the structures and modes of comprehension that arise from 
physiological experience. Situating the critic within the conscious (or the concomitant 
unconscious) mind of the viewer neglects to adequately consider the physiological 
body that allows, facilitates and shapes the human being and every mental faculty 
which they are capable of developing. A consideration of the Ego as a derivative of 
the mind must necessarily entail a re-consideration of the mind as an emergent 
property of neurophysiology and anatomy. 
 
This critical position is, perhaps, problematic to a Western philosophical 
tradition that has since Descartes regarded the primitive physiological functions of the 
human body as secondary to the seemingly more complicated and nuanced abilities of                                                         
1 Joseph Dodds, ‘The Monstrous Brain: A Neuropsychoanalytic Aesthetics of Horror’, PsyArt 
(December 15 2009) <http://www.psyartjournal.com/article/show/dodds-
the_monstrous_brain_a_neuropsychoanalyti> [accessed 29 May 2014] (part 1, para 5 of 8). 
2 Edmund Husserl, Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology, trans. by W. R. Boyce Gibson 
(London: George Allen and Unwin, 1952), pp. 114-15. 
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the human mind. Phenomenology, for example, claims to be a philosophy of human 
experience yet it maintains a troubled relationship with the physiological world. In 
Phenomenology of Perception, Maurice Merleau-Ponty claims the body to be ‘the 
visible expression of a concrete ego’ in a sentiment that places conscious experience, 
considered if not in isolation from then certainly in preference to physiological 
experience, at the forefront of his inquiry.3 Merleau-Ponty cautions his reader from 
following scientific investigation into the realm of objectivity, warning that with such 
endeavour   
 
the impelling intentions of the living creature were converted into 
objective movements: to the will only an instantaneous fiat was 
allowed, the execution of the act being entirely given over to a nervous 
mechanism. Sense experience, thus detached from the affective and 
motor functions, became the mere reception of a quality, and 
physiologists thought they could follow, from the point of reception to 
the nervous centres, the projection of the external world in the living 
body.4 
 
While it is certainly true that focusing solely upon biological mechanisms in the 
consideration of sensation does neglect to consider both the totality of human 
existence and the fact that sensing and perceiving are two separate conditions, science 
no longer seeks or provides such simplistic investigations. The model of physiological 
consideration I have constructed here argues precisely the opposite: that sensory 
experience is coexistent with psychosocial experience and, as such, must be 
considered when attempting to determine how a phenomenon may be interpreted. The 
body and its experiences simply cannot be ignored because they provide the very 
basic materials and infrastructure of comprehension. It is not the external world that 
projects into the living body but the body that projects itself and its understanding 
onto and into the world around it. Human experience is – in a simplified but 
fundamentally unquestionable manner – hierarchical. The organism pre-exists its 
ability to be conscious of its existence: I do not experience society or culture without 
first experiencing the conditions of my material embodiment. As a result, the 
existential experience of being structures both the sociocultural configurations we are 
capable of generating and the ways in which we are able to conceptualise all facets of                                                         
3 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The Phenomenology of Perception, trans. by Colin Smith (London: 
Routledge, 1962), p. 55. 
4 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p. 55. 
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our embodied existence.5 When Descartes proclaimed cogito ergo sum – I think, 
therefore I am – he stated both a truism and an amorphism. A statement both 
undeniable (I am, after all) yet lacking in perceptual acuity (what am I?) could 
reasonably be met with the reply – what is thinking and where does it come from? It is 
thought that allows us to move from A to B without tripping or becoming diverted. It 
is thought that guides our interactions with people and things around us. It is thought 
– conscious and unconscious – that generates the interpretation of a film with which 
critics engage.6  
 
Psychology and neurology have engaged with this problematic question on 
parallel and increasingly converging lines. Psychology takes as its starting point the 
formation of the Ego, the individual’s subjective consciousness and the social 
environment into which they are introduced. Neurology takes as its starting point the 
human brain and body and the effect that it has upon what we do. Behavioural 
neuroscience marks the interstice between the disciplines – a space that is becoming 
increasingly less demarcated – as it considers the end result and the raw input as part 
of a single continuum produced by an organism engaging with its environment. 
Correlations and coincidences between brain function and ‘mind’ processes are 
myriad as it becomes increasingly obvious that ‘there are no brain parts for 
disembodied cognition’.7 Thought does not arise from an incorporeal firmament and 
coincidentally manifest in the minds of the thinkers. Rather, it is generated by a 
confluence of complex biopsychosocial interactions throughout both the body and 
consciousness of an individual. Behavioural neuroscience has demonstrated that 
altering or damaging the brain alters or damages the mind. If the mind is a function of 
the brain then what we describe as ‘thoughts are just modes of interaction and action. 
They are in and of the world (rather than just being about the world) because they are 
                                                        
5 Of course, the sociocultural structures that humans generate create a feedback loop between 
experience and concepts related to that experience. While this influence may appear to be formative, 
however, it is more accurately described as adaptive. That is, sociocultural experience adapts the 
embodied schemata that underpin the human ability to conceptualise and rationalise but it does not 
fundamentally change them. 
6 In the neurological, rather than psychoanalytical sense, conscious thoughts are those we are aware of 
whilst unconscious thoughts are those that operate below the level of awareness but whose effects are 
nevertheless significant. 
7 Don M. Tucker, Mind From Body: Experience From Neural Structure (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2007), p. 59. 
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processes of experience’.8 The augmentation of existential philosophy that recognises 
both ‘I am’ and that my (physical) being is an important influence upon ‘how and 
what I am’ is the experientialist philosophy of George Lakoff and Mark Johnson. 
Taking the phenomenal reduction one step further, experientialism disregards 
consciousness as the seat of our logical presuppositions, thus returning us to the 
phenomenal sensorial body as the foundations of our embodied existence. 
 
When a viewer watches a film, the process does not occur in the mental ether 
disconnected from their brain, their nervous system, their body or their organic tissue. 
It occurs in them, in all of these locations. Chapter one, ‘Re-vision’, demonstrated that 
the eyes of the viewer are not isolated during spectatorship. The metaphorical 
qualities of Laura U. Marks’ haptic image gain a truly embodied facet with the 
consideration of sensorimotor mirror neurons that fire under circumstances of 
stimulation (actually performing an action) and simulation (watching that action 
performed) as ‘our self’ literally does ‘[rush] up to the surface to interact with another 
surface’.9 Our neurological bodies simulate the actions, reactions and sensations that 
we watch, hear, or read about as the brain acts as the body’s integrating hub. As the 
ungloved finger strokes a trail down the captive torso in Gut (2012), the viewer 
watches but the act of touching is also simulated, the texture of skin is evoked by the 
deep focus, temperature is implied by the blue-tint and the pooling sweat. All of these 
sensations combine with the semantic connotations of the image to produce the 
embodied reaction of each individual viewer. This is not merely a theoretically haptic, 
almost anti-visual image, but an acutely sensorial experience; a somatic image offered 
not only to the viewer’s mind but also to their body. This somatic response is often 
accompanied by a decrease in visual perspicacity, as in the found footage subgenre, 
that appeals to other somatic process within and through the eyes. Unnerving displays 
of imbalance have a restrictive effect upon the viewer, discouraging them from 
becoming comfortable with the narrative rhythm. The structure of The Poughkeepsie 
Tapes (2007) provides an extreme and effective example of the use of momentary 
disorientation in presenting an ambiguous and ultimately unfulfilling narrative. The 
alternation of the streams of footage, along with the degradation that continually                                                         
8 Mark Johnson, The Meaning of the Body: Aesthetics of Human Understanding (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 2007), p. 117. 
9 Laura U. Marks, Touch: Sensuous Theory and Multisensory Media (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 2002), p. xvi. 
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questions the robustness and authority of the image itself, offers a type of sensory 
manipulation in place of a classical narrative structure.  
 
It is not, however, mere sensory play that structures the somatic image, as it is 
not simply the brain that structures and designates the mind. In Chapter two, 
‘Vestibular Manipulation’, it was proposed that embodied experiences, including 
sensations, provide structures of understanding, ‘perceptual schemata […] that our 
experience must fit if it is to be coherent and comprehensible’.10 One such intricate 
schemata is that of ‘balance’. Guided by our experience of the human body as 
bipedal, vertical and bilaterally symmetrical and complemented by our manipulation 
of objects and forces throughout our lives, we are able to comprehend a schemata that 
is both ineffably specific yet, it seems, almost limitlessly flexible. We speak of the 
balance of an argument or the balance of the visual field with such an inherent 
understanding that delineating what we mean can sometimes be problematic. The 
equal distribution of forces around a point or axis model is so entrenched in bodily 
experience that to find its point of origin in abstract thought seems ludicrous. Yet the 
concept itself is extended immeasurably from the physiological experience that gave 
rise to it. We are able to envisage and comprehend acts of metaphorical and physical 
balance that we are incapable of – such as circular balance or proportional balance 
between constituents of a visual field. Physiological experience underwrites the 
cognitive concept but does not limit it. There has been a concerted effort throughout 
the discussion to demonstrate the ways in which detailed consideration of human 
anatomy and neurophysiology can complement, rather than undermine, the intricate 
and insightful theory already generated by other methodological frameworks. In an 
incredibly simplified form, the arguments herein rest upon the philosophical assertion 
that an individual exists prior to a specific sociocultural context. Moreover, this pre-
conscious existence provides the concrete basis of the resulting psychosocial life. 
Sum, ergo cogito sum – I am, therefore I think I am. This material existence is not 
viewed as a limiting factor but as an enabling one. It provides the foundations upon 
which the individual – consciousness, Ego, self, I – is carefully and methodically 
constructed through the dynamic and multifarious interactions of body, mind, 
environment, and culture. Organic experience is modified, augmented and in some                                                         
10 Mark Johnson, The Body in the Mind (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), p. 21. 
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cases mutated by the extraneous influences imbued by its environment (both physical 
and psychosocial) but this modification can only occur within a spectrum of 
possibility. This spectrum is unavoidably defined by physiology. 
 
‘The neural structures of the mind, the networks of the brain, exist to construct 
information’ both interoceptively from the body and exteroceptively from the 
environment.11 What occurs in the brain, and thus generates the conditions for 
consciousness, is the large-scale integration of biologically and socio-culturally 
relevant information. The confluence of this information and the fluid experience of 
action-response-reaction as the individual navigates the biopsychosocial landscape 
generate schemata, concepts that associate physiological experience with external 
events. These concepts are associative – applied to previous experience – and 
predictive, allowing the individual to envision consequences of certain actions they 
may take. The fact that these schemata conjoin historic experience with potential 
events suggests that there is a conceptual ‘mental space in which we perform image-
schematic operations’ that allow the human brain-mind to transition from what has 
happened to what may happen in a largely unique manner.12 These embodied 
schemata, systems of sensorimotor capacities that our experiences must adhere to in 
order to make sense, are the product of the amalgamated body-mind of the individual. 
Both physiological and psychological, based in reality and abstract logic and 
conceivable as both an axiom and a flexible metaphorical concept, they give meaning 
to us ‘in patterns, images, qualities, feelings’ and only eventually ‘concepts and 
propositions’.13 When Marcus Dunstan’s camera rotates through two axes 
simultaneously in The Collector (2009) the effect of the motion is both seen by the 
discord between the viewer’s eyes and vestibular system and felt by the viewer’s 
understanding of the implications of imbalance and narrative disequilibrium. 
Manipulations of balance mean on two levels – the physiological and the 
psychosocial – and this reciprocal relationship allows films such as Neil Marshall’s 
                                                        
11 Tucker, p. 16. 
12 Johnson, The Body in the Mind, p. 25. The ability to conceptualise, hypothesise scenarios and to 
problem solve is certainly not unique to human beings. Many mammals and birds have been shown to 
demonstrate conceptual and/or abstract thought in their ability to construct multiple-step processes 
without a long period of trial-and-error. Human consciousness is generally considered to be distinct 
from these other types of comprehension due to the extent to which humans can manipulate this type of 
thought process, and the survival benefits that have resulted from this ability. 
13 Johnson, The Meaning of the Body, p. 9. 
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The Descent (2005) to generate a sustained atmosphere of unease by teetering on the 
brink between the physiological experience and conceptual application of the 
embodied schema. 
 
I have thus far implicitly proposed a conceptual distinction between two facets 
of what we think of as ‘the body’. On one hand, we have the physiological organism 
that senses its environment and organises those sensations into schemata. On the other 
hand, we have the lived-body that Merleau-Ponty saw as the visible manifestation of 
the ego, the body driven by the intentional relationships of the subjective 
consciousness, or the ‘mind’, of the individual. In this preliminary model – the 
perfunctory nature of which will shortly become evident – form and content are 
distinguished by the application of the individual (differentially referred to as 
‘consciousness’, ‘subjectivity’, ‘the Ego’ or ‘me’) to the latter formulation. Somehow 
distinct from material existence, the individual is imbued with ambivalence towards 
the physical body. It is both ‘me’ and ‘mine’; crucial to life yet overlooked in the act 
of living. Seen as a tool or a vehicle more than as a mode of being, the body is often 
elided in favour of the rich dynamism of the lived-body. It is in this vein, for example, 
that Vivian Sobchack mobilises ‘a philosophy of conscious experience’ grounded in 
‘the phenomenon of signification’ that implicitly steps over the organicity of the 
viewer even as it attempts to acknowledge the corporeal nature of the viewer-film 
interaction.14 It seems that the film experience is embodied whilst the viewer remains 
principally ‘an enworlded subject of vision’.15 What contemporary applications of 
phenomenology fail to fully articulate is the intrinsic and inescapable relationship – in 
some ways causal, in other ways dialectical – between the condition of being ‘an 
enworlded subject of vision’ and the conditions of being. Merleau-Ponty himself 
recognised, albeit with ambivalence, that ‘one does not account for the facts by 
superimposing a pure, contemplative consciousness on a thinglike body’.16 The 
human body is not an organic exoskeleton into which the subjective consciousness of 
the individual is placed. The human mind, as Sigmund Freud noted nearly a century 
                                                        
14 Vivian Sobchack, The Address of the Eye: A Phenomenology of Film Experience (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1992), p. 27. 
15 Sobchack, The Address of the Eye, p. 27. 
16 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, ‘An Unpublished Text by Maurice Merleau-Ponty: A Prospectus of his 
Work’, trans. by Arleen B. Dallery, in The Primacy of Perception, ed. by James M. Edie (Evanston, IL: 
Northwestern University Press, 1964), pp. 3-11 (p. 4). 
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ago, is not an incorporeal mental concept but is in fact a product of the convergence 
of all planes of human existence and experience. 
 
I have sought to highlight the ways in which the phenomenal lived-body 
experience of an individual is indelibly permeated by the sensations of the 
physiological organism. On a simplistic level our senses are stimulated by phenomena 
and the congruence of the sensations contributes to the way in which we combine 
them into coherent perceptions. On a more sophisticated level, I have contended that 
pre-psychosocial physiological experience provides adaptive structures of 
comprehension that form the foundations of the perceptions that we are able to 
formulate. Thus, the separation of body and mind, form and content, which was 
enacted in the first two chapters was performed not in order to reaffirm or eschew a 
hierarchy between the two, but to explicate – conscientiously and purposefully – the 
absolutely fundamental connection between physiological and psychosocial life. 
 
In so doing, an analogous comparison has become increasingly evident: as a 
viewer is a compound of their form and content (body-mind), so too is a film. As an 
active combination of technology and psychosocial signification a film, like a body, is 
capable of offering sensations and suggesting perceptions to its viewer. Also like a 
body, these sensations and perceptions are interwoven as the former generates and 
augments the latter. I do not wish, however, to pursue the body-film analogy to the 
extent of Vivian Sobchack when she writes that ‘insofar as the consciousness of 
another as well as of oneself is known in its manifest form as embodied intentionality, 
then a human and a film can both be said to articulate consciousness, or, in this 
instance, ‘mind’’.17 As I have explained, consciousness is not merely the 
manifestation of an individual existing in the world but is instead a highly specific 
and manifold property of a particular neurophysiology as it exists and operates. We 
intend towards the world because we are incarnated within it. While a film offers 
sensations and perceptions it cannot sense or perceive its own phenomenal 
environment. If consciousness is an emergent property of the large-scale integration 
of biologically and socio-culturally significant information in an on-going dynamic 
process of existential experience then a film is incapable of exhibiting consciousness.                                                         
17 Sobchack, The Address of the Eye, p. 13. 
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I feel that stretching the body-film analogy encourages an unproductive move away 
from the physiological in favour of the psychosocial. Instead, we can propose that 
tracing the junctures between the viewer’s physiological and psychosocial experience 
of cinema exposes the metaphorical nervous system of film. This exposition, rather 
than revealing the embodied nature of cinema, is in fact a reflection of the body of the 
viewer. Contemporary horror increasingly seeks to mimic the interrelated structures 
of bodily sensation and psychosocial perception evident in its viewer in a bid to 
galvanise the multimodal somatic film experience. 
 
Contemporary horror film has been chosen as the illustrative example of this 
reintegration of the physiological and psychosocial viewer-consumer for two distinct 
but reciprocally related reasons. Firstly, in both form and content, the threads of 
sensation that permeate these films are closer to the skin, or the surface of the film. 
The filmic skin, like our own, presents to the world the mingled unity of ‘sensation 
and perception’ as an irreducible phenomenological entity.18 As such, a holistic 
consideration of horror film must mirror our consideration of ‘the body’ and 
necessarily include analysis of both its form (sensation) and content (perception). 
Secondly, the foregrounding of the intrinsic nature of sensation marks a significant 
evolution of the viewing experience that reunites the viewer’s physiological and 
psychosocial existence. As the horror genre develops, the postmodern cycle of self-
referential horror, which foregrounds its own fictive nature in order to facilitate 
engagement with the image of bodily dismemberment (as spectacle or psychosocial 
symbol) is being overtaken by a subspecies that seeks to rejuvenate and reincorporate 
the existential organicity of the viewer. The body of the contemporary somatic horror 
film comes into being through the etching of sensation upon the multifarious skin of 
the viewer. Like a brand, it is a melding between two modes of being – 
sensation/perception, physiological/psychosocial, and form/content – a third ‘thing’ 
that rises from one to meet the other. The image of the body in extremis is forcibly 
                                                        
18 Laura U. Marks, The Skin of the Film: Intercultural Cinema, Embodiment and the Senses (Durham: 
Duke University Press, 2000), p. 147. 
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reattached to the organic body of the viewer to form a familiar, yet ineffably 
disturbing chimera.19  
 
A film is a symbiosis of form and content, sensation and perception that 
mimics the dynamic complexities of the viewer. I have focused upon the manipulation 
of perception by embodied sensation and enacted a partial relocation of the horror 
film from screen to skin. But skin is not merely a biological entity; it is also a site of 
psychosocial signification. Oscillating between the concepts of a formal boundary and 
‘guarantee of the wholeness of the body’, a membrane that facilitates body-world 
contact and a canvas of self-expression, the skin has been exposed as ‘a place of 
minglings, a mingling of places’.20 Humans, as social creatures, come to view the skin 
as the outer boundary of ‘me’: the visible barrier between the interior and exterior. 
Our skin enables us to enact expressions of ourselves: tattoos, piercings, body 
modifications, cosmetics. As the site of both body-world contact and self-world 
expression, the skin exemplifies the biopsychosocial dialectic of human existence. 
Resituating horror from screen to skin recognises the importance of material existence 
but also reiterates the formative influence of psychosocial experience. 
 
The viewer does not exist in a sociocultural vacuum and the more nuanced and 
culturally informed discussion presented in Chapter three, ‘From the Haptic to the 
Somatic’, sought to integrate the sensory aspects of The Human Centipede films with 
the psychosocially influenced perceptions constructed by them. In Tom Six’s 
franchise the marriage of body and culture is monstrously explicit. The Human 
Centipede (2009) and its sequel are effective not only because they appeal to senses 
that require closeness – touch, taste and smell – but also because they surgically 
attach those undeniable sensations to the culture that surrounds both the film and the 
viewer. The effigy of consumption embodied by Joseph Heiter and Martin Lomax’s 
centipede monsters stands on the threshold between the physical and the 
psychosocial. On one side, the waste product of an organic body that unites the 
viscera in an act of sensational mutiny; on the other, the waste of consumer society                                                         
19 A chimera is an organism that has two sets of genetically distinct cells – two organisms that retain 
their individuality even as they are formed into a ‘new’ whole. In the context of somatic viewing, the 
image of the body and the organic body retain their individual significations but, upon coming 
together, form a third ‘thing’ both familiar yet uncanny. 
20 Steven Connor, The Book of Skin (London: Reaktion, 2004), p. 27; p. 26.  
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that strives evermore to recreate the good-consumer, ever eager to participate in the 
propagation of the commodity. The physical and metaphorical are fused through the 
human digestive tract, through its fleshy undulations and its psychosocial 
connotations of animality, filth and disease. These images are no longer to be viewed 
per se, but are instead to be experienced. The Human Centipede is not, when 
compared to other films categorised as extreme horror, an explicitly violent or gore-
filled film, yet it is the title that has perhaps amassed the most cultural infamy. The 
Human Centipede 2 (2011), of course, is a metatextual satire of its predecessor. 
Donning the auspicious robes of vulgarity accredited to Heiter, Martin Lomax 
becomes the centipede. The linchpin in a dyspeptic conga of consumption, Lomax 
embodies the subtexts of Six’s original film: unnatural, dysfunctional, disease-ridden, 
and physically and socially abject. A plethora of connotations gathers – retching, 
roiling, skin crawling, sour tastes, cloying smells – that as a milieu return the viewer 
to their body as they ‘give birth to’ themselves in the abjection of Lomax as Other.21 
Through its somatic nature, the desecration of the human body onscreen sanctifies the 
embodiment of its viewer, unavoidably imprisoning them within its sandwich of 
effluvia and disgust.  
 
The journey through the senses began with the eyes as portals through which 
to access the organic viewer. It passed through the occularcentricity of conventional 
film criticism to access vision’s most powerful augmenter: the vestibular sense. 
Passing through the inner ear (perhaps with allusive echoes of the Proteus submarine 
in Richard Fleischer’s Fantastic Voyage (1966)), the discussion then moved to the 
viscera as a sensorial reflection of the body-world contact and self-world expression 
of the skin. The epithelial yet palpably fleshy mucosa of the centipede figuratively 
turns the viewer inside out and nausea prevails. The final panel of our sensorial 
tapestry must return to the mucosa’s metonymic cousin – the skin – and to the sense 
that most virulently and violently elides its organic integrity: pain. The interplay 
between physiological and psychosocial associations, memory, sociocultural 
knowledge and imagination can, in many cases, bridge the technological limitations 
of a medium and facilitate the sensorial reception of the film. The rebirth of the 
organicity of the individual can be incited through careful manipulation of                                                         
21 Julia Kristeva, Powers of Horror: An Essay on Abjection (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1982), p. 3. 
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psychosocial metaphors that draw upon the embodied schemata that structure them. 
The rejuvenation of the material viewer in representations of pain, however, must 
arise principally from the somatic nature of the representation itself, if only because 
this sensation can never be divorced from the body that feels it. 
 
Elaine Scarry’s claim that pain is unsharable has conceptual cogency and 
political value: it is not possible to transfer from one individual to the next an 
identical experience of pain. Due to the subjective nature of our existence, the fact 
that no two people can have precisely the same sensorial experience and that no two 
brains are identical in terms of localised function, the distinct perceptual experience of 
pain – this pain, my pain – cannot be communicated in its entirety. Pain is a sensation 
that draws together the internal and external environment, enmeshes the two in a 
continuum that renders it impossible to separate the body from experience. Pain is a 
neurologically global sensation. Ronald Melzack’s neuromatrix theory of pain 
perception suggests that pain sensations are communicated around a global network 
of brain areas involving everything from the motor cortex to the limbic system. Pain 
literally engulfs the body and mind of the sufferer in an everything-now process that 
occludes all other knowledge and psychological function. How can it be possible to 
communicate a sensation that annihilates the sanctity of the subject and lays bare their 
internal fibrous being with a mere visual representation? If the sensation of pain is to 
be communicated in any form its presentation to the viewer must recreate its own 
marauding appearance in the sensorium. Represented pain simply must be embodied. 
Films such as The Tortured (2010) frequently fail to express the phenomenological 
immediacy of the experience of pain in their inelegantly enthusiastic attempts at 
ratifying the use of extreme violence. As a result, however, the extremity of the 
violence in The Tortured is fundamentally omitted: this is not a film about the 
tortured, but about the torturers, and their motivation for inflicting this pain. Again, 
however, there is no cohesion between their motivation (the murder of their son) and 
their quest for Old Testament justice against their victim (the murderer), no 
equivalency between the two modes of violence as the psychodynamics of the 
narrative unfold within the psyches of the torturers. The viewer is sequentially left 
‘out of the loop’, as it were.  
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When pain is embodied its physical and metaphorical reach is amplified. The 
embodiment of pain described in this thesis entails the sequential and simultaneous 
combination of sensory stimulations. These stimulations are contained within both the 
form and content of the film and are projected towards the viewer in ways that at first 
seem abstract. Violent juxtapositions of light, darkness and sounds combine to create 
a textural coating of sensation that seeps into the narrative of the film, infusing it with 
somatic valence. It is no surprise that of the case studies selected, the films of pain – 
Martyrs (2008) and The Bunny Game (2010) – find a common focus upon the display 
and removal of the skin. The point of contact between self and world is often attacked 
in horror film, but in the somatic film it is almost ritually desecrated as the symbol 
and site of the unity of the human individual. The removal of Anna’s skin in Martyrs 
opens her body in a way that does not seek to expose the inside but instead fuses it 
with the outside in excruciating fashion. The very boundary of Anna’s existence is 
eradicated, as she becomes everything-now. This phenomenal immediacy is 
approximated in the film’s body by the sensorial dervish that marks the dissolution of 
the subject symbolised by the removal of her skin.  
 
The effects of such embodiment upon the signification of pain in 
contemporary horror film are disturbing. The sensation comes to have meaning in and 
of itself. It stands at centre-stage, the point around which the elements of the film are 
situated as it reaches out to the viewer. What is the purpose of pain in horror film? 
Pain is its own purpose: as Anna kneels, skinless, in a stupor, and the camera closes in 
upon her eye the narrative questions come into focus and then break apart. The 
camera zooms past them, through them, into them and alights upon the organic heart 
of the film. As the plumes of light illuminate and overtake the black screen the 
sensations that brought the viewer to this point are replayed. We are too close to Anna 
to see what she sees; we are inside looking interoceptively inwards to her 
overwhelming sensation. What Anna sees is irrelevant; the fact that she sees, and how 
she has come to see, is all that matters. The self-fulfilling prophecy of pain is that its 
communication need only be for itself, for the generation of an aesthetic that pushes 
through the viewer and dissolves their sense of being separate from the film. These 
films recruit the viewer, their biological functions and the very foundations of 
understanding as an essential cog in the generation of the filmic experience. The 
violence within the film is no longer distinct and bounded, no longer exists merely on 
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the screen, but finds expression within the body of the viewer. The film becomes 
internalised not through singular moments of sensorial disturbance but through a 
sustained phenomenal dynamism that threads the film through the viewer’s 
sensorium.  
 
The recorporealised body of the viewer is not, however, a golem (a mere 
material form without psychological influence). If Martyrs enacted the destruction of 
the subject through physiological means, The Bunny Game achieves the same through 
a combination of the physical and psychological. Employing similar sensorial 
communication techniques to embed the viewer in the unfolding of the film, The 
Bunny Game accesses both body and mind to question the sovereignty of the subject. 
The everything-now that becomes Bunny’s life is reflected in the everything-now of 
the film that leaves nothing to association, guesswork or chance. Distinguished from 
exploitation horror such as Meir Zarchi’s I Spit on Your Grave (1978) and its remake 
(dir. by Steven R. Monroe, 2010) by its unrelenting focus upon the victim, The Bunny 
Game demonstrates that sexual violence is, at heart, more violent than sexual. The 
image of the tortured and malnourished body reorganises the psychosocial perception 
of sexual violence. What is a crime of ‘sexual release’ in both iterations of I Spit on 
Your Grave becomes a ‘violent assault with the intent to injure, humiliate and degrade 
the victim’.22 The emphasis here is on the embodied experience of pain. Bunny’s 
body, like the viewer’s, becomes a vector, a tangible influence upon how she is and 
how she thinks during her captivity until she becomes a ghost of herself. What is the 
purpose? Her dissolution. A curious, disquieting equivalency emerges between the 
two bodies – the image onscreen and the viewer off screen – as they become the dual 
hosts of the film. Yet it is not a true duality; they are not two separate things 
(image/object) so much as twin poles of a spectrum. The image, a psychosocial 
construct of meaning, stands with the object that has its own organic modes of 
comprehension. They reach towards one another, towards the aspects which their 
opposite harbours and that they themselves lack. The collision that occurs between 
these two bodies rises like the scarred brand on Bunny’s back: a ridge of tissue that is 
the same but different, fundamentally altered by the interaction. It is through this 
impact that the viewer is returned, uncomfortably and uncannily, to their senses. They                                                         
22 Myra MacDonald, Representing Women: Myths of Femininity in the Popular Media (London: 
Edward Arnold, 1995), p. 187. 
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are reincarnated through the extremity of the film and the immediacy of their own 
sensations as they are reintroduced to their organicity through Bunny’s undeniable 
physical suffering. This body is neither a golem nor an immaterial vehicle for the 
mind and has much to tell about how the viewer senses and transmutes those 
sensations to perceptions. Anatomy shapes concepts, metaphors and structures of 
understanding that in turn influence the interpretation of a film. What the somatic 
horror film achieves is an explicit re-incorporation of the viewer’s body as a 
constituent element of the film experience. It combines narrative content that 
foregrounds bodily sensation onscreen with a cinematic form that promotes bodily 
sensation off screen.  
 
The Infrastructure of Psychosocial Inquiry 
 
Viewing a film is a complex and multi-layered process that recreates the 
conditions of embodied existence in so far as it provides the viewer with an 
opportunity to make contact and interact with the phenomenal world of the cinema. In 
its corporeal connection between viewer and phenomenon (film), cinema dramatizes, 
mimics, and expands upon the basic dynamics of embodied interaction between any 
sentient organism and a given environment. This interaction is comprised of a 
fundamentally hierarchical, but nevertheless multidirectional, set of stimulations, 
actions and reactions that range from the physiological recognition of light, colours, 
shapes and lines to the categorisation of those basic stimuli into cognitive concepts 
such as people, objects, places and scenarios. The hierarchy originates in the very 
basic conditions of film viewing: I am not referring here to the geography of the 
auditorium, the social conditions of spectatorship, or the psychological conditions of 
viewing but to the primitive relationship between a conscious organic entity and the 
phenomenon that it senses. The multidirectional aspect arises from the fact that 
human existence is never merely a matter of an organic entity interacting with one or 
multiple stimuli. Instead, the individual exists in a dialectical relationship with the 
physical, social and psychological world it is immersed in and to which it is 
continuously adapting. As a result, the viewing experience is comprised of two 
interrelated and interacting fields of influence – the physiological and psychosocial 
(Figure 5.1). 
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I have proposed that the body provides an architectural blueprint for the 
psychological sphere. This blueprint is then modified by the sociocultural 
environment, producing a hybrid unity enabled by physiology and made dynamic by 
psychosocial experience. As Jaak Panksepp writes, the human neocortex is ‘for all 
intents and purposes […] a tabula rasa’ at birth.23 The neocortex, which houses the 
circuits strongly implicated to be involved in higher-order human thought processes, 
has a degree of plasticity inherent within it that accounts for the individuality present 
within the human species. We are not, nor can we be outside the iconography of 
science fiction horror, brains in jars. The experiences that effectively program the 
neocortex, which generate the conditions for the creation of consciousness, are 
incredibly multifarious. The brain itself is fed by an anatomically global web of 
sensorimotor neurons, which are in turn fed by the tissues and fibres of the human 
body. The position of the body in space, its orientation, balance, movement, sensory 
stimuli in the environment and the manipulation of objects provide the individual with 
crucial embodied experiences that structure the development of neural circuits and the 
intricate neurosignatures of experience and memory they create. 
 
Physiological influence is implicit in the function of the human individual, 
embedded in the genesis of each and every conceptual manifestation of me. How can 
one present a theory of the inner workings of the human mind without first                                                         
23 Jaak Panksepp, ‘The Basic Emotional Circuits of Mammalian Brains: Do Animals have Affective 
Lives?’, Neuroscience and Biobehavioural Reviews, 35 (2011), 1791-1804 (p. 1795). 
Figure 5.1: Composition of the Viewing Experience 
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acknowledging and demonstrating an understanding of the inner workings of the 
human brain from which the mind emerges? Sigmund Freud grasped the connection 
between the brain (and its sensorial sources of stimulation) and the mind in his 
unfinished thesis Project for a Scientific Psychology but scientific tools were not 
sufficiently advanced at that stage to allow the coherences between the two to be 
mapped. As this thesis has demonstrated, neuroscience is now in a better position to 
be able to explicate the links between brain states and psychological states. fMRI 
scanners can show the areas of the brain that are engaged during a specific task and 
experimentation has allowed several areas to be identified as being involved in very 
specific activities. Although this is not ‘proof’ that brain states create psychological 
states, and indeed there are no claims from neuroscience or psychology that this does 
constitute ‘proof’, it is a sustained and reproducible coincidence which suggests that 
‘there is a correspondence between tokens of mental states and tokens of brain 
states’.24 The neurocinematic approach of Uri Hasson et al. demonstrates clearly that 
watching visual fiction produces brain activity. Moreover, the areas of the brain 
involved depend upon the genre of the fiction and ‘the activity […] increased and 
decreased following a similar time course in all viewers’.25 This indicates that far 
from being a wholly individualised process a viewer’s engagement can be guided by 
the form and content of the particular film that they watch. It seems that films truly do 
strive to ‘control’ their viewer. The ways in which they do so, however, remain 
largely unexplored from a neurocinematic angle.26 When we think or feel something 
in our minds, something also happens in our brains and these coincidences are 
relatively – in terms of sensory areas, brain formations and lobes – stable across 
individuals. As science moves forward, and offers increasingly voluminous evidence 
for the contingency between body, brain and mind, it would be remiss for theories of 
how human beings interact with objects in their environment to ignore the delicacies 
and the implications of this knowledge. Before one can interpret a film, one first must 
experience the film and this experience is guided by sociocultural, psychological and                                                         
24 Naomi Goldblum, The Brain-Shaped Mind (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), p. 14. 
25 Uri Hasson, Ohad Landesman, Barbara Knappmeyer, Ignacio Vallines, Nava Rubin and David J. 
Heeger, ‘Neurocinematics: The Neuroscience of Film’, Projections, n.s.,. 2 (2008), 1-26 (p. 4). 
26 It should be stressed that this observation, replicable across participants and genres, does not argue 
for a ‘passive’ viewer wholly influenced by screen media. Rather, it suggests that firstly there is an 
effect that is generally uniform across a wide range of audience members and that secondly, this effect 
could be involved in influencing the cognitive perception of film. This area, however, needs more 
exploration and experimentation before anything other than tentative coincidences can be successfully 
drawn. 
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physiological factors. Films are what they are because the human animal is what it is; 
they are products of our culture but that culture is underpinned, and to a considerable 
extent defined by, the material existence of the animal. Theoretical frameworks can 
benefit greatly, and gain a higher degree of critical integrity, from the assimilation of 
the knowledge of the human sciences. The already explored facets of horror film – 
spectatorship mechanics, pleasure in viewing, and gender hierarchies, to name only a 
few – can achieve a greater degree of precision from the scientific discipline whilst 
guiding it to those areas that are perhaps most closely linked to the inherent biological 
drives and imperatives of the organic viewer. It is in this way that the frameworks 
may operate symbiotically to generate a hybrid method of engagement and 
interpretation that considers and appreciates both whilst privileging neither. The 
arguments contained within this thesis have traced the threads of bodily sensation 
within the contemporary extreme horror film and established the foundations of the 
incorporation of the sensorium into the somatic viewing experience. As cinema 
continues to resituate the viewing experience from the screen to the skin, theory must 
replicate this fleshy transition, must recast its body in order to question the precise 
nature and sociocultural significance of somatic viewing. 
 
The Somatization of Cinema 
 
 The tentative steps taken above towards a somatic framework for film studies 
approach the viewing experience through the body of the corporeal viewer. This 
critical journey has recognised that the viewer is embodied and in their embodied 
state they interact with the rich psychosocial environment that contributes to the 
creation of the viewing experience. It is focused upon exposing the threads of bodily 
sensation that reside within contemporary somatic horror film with the intention of 
establishing a concrete grounding for the consideration of the effect of physiology 
upon psychosocial processes. In doing so, however, it has been necessary to exclude 
detailed consideration of the ‘complex spatial and social architectures within which 
any act of film consumption occurs’.27 The changing geography of film consumption 
and the medium’s continued migration from the cinema auditorium to the living 
room, Internet and mobile device have been implicitly recognised by the selection of                                                         
27 Andrew Dix, Beginning Film Studies (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2008), p. 300. 
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films analysed in this thesis. Of the major case studies, only The Collector (2009), 
The Descent (2005) and Martyrs (2008) received large-scale theatrical releases with 
many of the remaining titles being available only on DVD or through online 
streaming. Whilst the different spaces of consumption necessarily present different 
mixtures of technological capability, narrative immersion and psychosocial 
expectation it has been argued that there is a more immediate organic geography to 
the film viewing experience. Irrespective of how or where a film is viewed, it remains 
a sensory phenomenon that is accessed through the eyes, ears and soma of the 
embodied viewer and this thesis has sought to highlight the ways in which bodily 
sensation is incorporated, not only into the technology of cinema but into the sensorial 
construction of the ‘visual’ image. As such, a consideration of the geography of film 
consumption would benefit from the incorporation of the somatic principles 
established by this thesis: the film experience is not only mediated by the technology 
of the medium, the content of the film and the physical space of consumption, but also 
by the physiological experience enabled by the confluence of film, viewer and social 
context. 
 
Due in part to the scope of the broad topic of audience-response theory and in 
part to the complexities of navigating the interdisciplinary and potentially contentious 
convergence of philosophy, psychology, cultural analysis and the human sciences 
presented within the thesis, the project leaves a key question pertaining to the ‘social 
architectures’ of spectatorship largely unaddressed. The notion of consumption has 
been a spectre at the borders of the discussion in several chapters and it similarly 
permeates many of the films analysed. It has been suggested that there is a tangible 
element of consumer desire embedded in the turn towards somatic viewing that I have 
argued for; that it is an economic development of an industry concerned principally 
with propagating itself. It is not merely the image of the body that is now being 
mobilised as consumer capital but the basic bodily functions of the viewer. It has been 
contended that this direct physiological link between the viewer and the film 
recorporealises the viewer in a society that systematically actions a dematerialising 
effect upon consumer bodies. It is, in part, a remedy as it enables a return to organic 
experience, to a lived experience in an environment that offers so many feeble 
facsimiles.  
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Somatic viewing encourages a switch from ‘deep’ interpretative viewing to 
‘broad’ sensorial viewing, from engagement with the image as representation to 
engagement with the image as sensorial object. In so doing, I have suggested that the 
delivery of the narrative is enhanced, as both a symbol and an experience, by the 
somatic nature of the film. What is actually occurring in the augmentation of the 
viewing experience, however, is not specifically a rebuttal or refusal of the 
mechanisms of contemporary consumer society but a re-integration of the consumer 
into a modified process of consumption. The commodity is increasingly making use 
of the corporeal nature of the consumer such that they effectively consume 
themselves. It is not the film per se that is the product of the cinematic industry but 
the experience that unfolds between the viewer and the film. The mechanism of 
consumption is augmented but certainly not denied. In this respect, a consideration of 
the implications of the somatic viewing experience for the continued development of 
film as a commodity, and cinema as an industry, would begin to bridge the conceptual 
space between the corporeal viewer and their scripted socioeconomic subjectivity. 
 
 As part of this process of consideration it will be essential to retain an 
understanding and appreciation of the visceral organicity of the viewer-consumer. 
Regardless of how abstracted the socioeconomic environment may be, the individual 
that works for and within it remains at all times an organic human being. To this end, 
there is much value to be found in using the basis of bodily sensation mapped in this 
thesis to underscore further study into the distribution and control of attention in film 
viewership. Such an inquiry would seek to augment Jonathan Crary’s Suspensions of 
Perception (1999) with a distinctly embodied element. Crary develops Guy Debord’s 
analysis of the spectacle as ‘a social relationship between people that is mediated by 
images’ in his address of the sociocultural effects of the phenomenon.28 Casting the 
manipulation of attention through perception as largely driven by sociocultural 
influence, he argues that it is concerned with ‘the construction of conditions that 
individuate, immobilise, and separate subjects’.29 Both Crary and Debord choose to 
focus their critical accounts upon the sociocultural influence and effects of this 
particular mode of spectatorship; a mode that Jonathan Beller aligns with film in his                                                         
28 Guy Debord, The Society of the Spectacle, trans. by Donald Nicholson-Smith (New York: Zone, 
1995), p. 12. 
29 Jonathan Crary, Suspensions of Perception: Attention, Spectacle and Modern Culture (Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press, 1999), p. 74. 
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claim for the metastasizing ‘cinematicization of the visual’.30 Yet spectatorship and 
attention are not merely psychosocial phenomena but physiological ones as well. I 
have argued in this thesis for the re-incorporation of the viewer’s body into the 
viewing processes, which subsequently implies the intervention of physiological 
influence in the ‘social relationship’ constructed between people and images that 
Crary and Debord explore. If the visual aspects of cinema have contributed to a 
burgeoning ‘cinematicization’ of visual culture more broadly, then the somatization of 
cinema proposed by this thesis, in turn, augments the dynamics of the visual 
spectacle. The current inquiry provides the physiological architecture that is inherent 
within the sociocultural construction of spectatorship. It has been necessary to focus 
upon the excavation of bodily sensation in contemporary horror cinema in order to 
generate a robust and comprehensive account of the ways in which physiology 
fortifies psychology. The subsequent phase of investigation lies in the reconciliation 
of this biopsychological architecture with the complex sociocultural institutions – 
including consumer culture, the spectacle and the attention economy – upon which it 
rests. Consumerism has thus haunted the arguments contained within this thesis as a 
psychosocial phenomenon but the discussion has endeavoured to indicate the ways in 
which the consumptive process is unavoidably permeated by the manner in which 
physiology in turn guides and structures psychological life. 
 
In order to explore the multifarious biopsychosocial industry of consumption, 
it would prove insightful to combine scientific and cultural investigative techniques to 
cross-reference neurocinematic data from fMRI and PET scan studies with the self-
evaluative reports of individual viewers. K. J. Donnelly asserts that music ‘is a 
controlling device’, and I would argue that all sensory stimulations and simulations 
are similarly ‘controlling’ in that they instigate a response from the viewer.31 Perhaps 
neurological scanning techniques can help to illuminate the precise mechanisms by 
which these cinematic devices affect and ‘control’ their audiences.32 Indeed, an                                                         
30 Jonathan Beller, The Cinematic Mode of Production: Attention Economy and the Society of the 
Spectacle (Lebanon, NH: University Press of New England, 2006), p. 2. 
31 K. J. Donnelly, The Spectre of Sound: Music in Film and Television (London: BFI, 2005), p. 10. 
32 I am referring here not to the prescriptive meaning of the term ‘control’ but to the regulative 
meaning. Sensorimotor stimulations ‘control’ sensorimotor brain function in that stimulation enacts a 
neurological response. Hasson et al. have demonstrated that film clips ‘control’ brain function in that 
they produce a comparable response in the same brain areas of each participant over time. Thus, 
control here is invoked in its mechanical sense and not to indicate that the film independently 
constructs a prescriptive perception or affect that is merely communicated to the passive viewer. 
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enquiry to locate the neurophysiological effects of film upon the viewer would seek to 
complement work in neuroscience (that explores empathy and empathetic circuitry in 
the brain) and psychoanalytic film criticism (that focuses upon empathetic 
identification with characters as a key element of narrative engagement). Instead of 
arguing conceptually for the generation of pleasure in viewing, for example, it may be 
that the limbic system’s pleasurable circuits are indeed at work in some experiences 
of viewership.  
 
Cinematically, horror film grabs the viewer’s attention both physically (shock 
cut-stinger combinations, vestibular manipulation, nausea, the simulation of pain) and 
psychologically (the faecal fascination of The Human Centipede is primarily 
psychosocially implied), usually in concert. Its affect is culturally pervasive and often 
controversial. Increasingly, as horror film looks towards extremity to engage and 
titillate its viewers it comes to rely upon somatic viewing that, like the phenomenal 
immediacy of the film itself, unites the viewer’s flesh and mind in an all-
encompassing experience. I have tried to demonstrate the equivalence of the 
physiological and psychosocial in this thesis by explicating the ways in which one 
underpins and contributes to the structures of the other. Far from constructing a 
mindless biological entity this project has instead exposed the mutually embodied 
forms of viewer and film and has revealed both to be intricate mosaics of 
biopsychosocial experience. 
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Filmography 
 
A Clockwork Orange, dir. by Stanley Kubrick (Warner Bros., 1971 [2005]) [on DVD] 
 
A Serbian Film, dir. by Srdjan Spasojevic (Revolver, 2010) [on DVD] 
 
The Bay, dir. by Barry Levinson (Automatik, 2012) [on DVD] 
 
The Blair Witch Project, dir. by Daniel Myrick and Eduardo Sánchez (Haxan, 1999) 
[on DVD] 
 
Blue Velvet, dir. by David Lynch (De Laurentis Entertainment, 1986)  
 
The Bunny Game, dir. by Adam Rehmeier (Njuta Films, 2010) [on DVD] 
 
Cannibal Holocaust, dir. by Ruggero Deodato (VIPCO, 1980 [2001]) [on DVD] 
 
The Collector, dir. by Marcus Dunstan (LD Entertainment, 2009) [on DVD] 
 
The Descent, dir. by Neil Marshall (Celador, 2005) [on DVD] 
 
Feed, dir. by Brett Leonard (Showbox, 2005) [on DVD] 
 
The Fly, dir. by David Cronenberg (Twentieth Century Fox, 1986 [2005]) [on DVD] 
 
Gut, dir. by Elias Ganster (Vanguard Cinema, 2012) [mp4 online] 
 
Halloween, dir. by Rob Zombie (Dimension, 2007) [on DVD] 
 
Halloween, dir. by John Carpenter (Starz, 1978 [2007]) [on Blu-Ray] 
 
Hostel, dir. by Eli Roth (Lionsgate, 2005) [on DVD] 
 
House of 1000 Corpses, dir. by Rob Zombie (Lionsgate, 2003) [on DVD] 
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The Human Centipede, dir. by Tom Six (Monster Pictures, 2009) [on DVD] 
 
The Human Centipede 2, dir. by Tom Six (Monster Pictures, 2011) [on DVD] 
 
The Last House on the Left, dir. by Wes Craven (Umbrella Entertainment, 1972 
[2004]) [on DVD] 
 
I Spit On Your Grave, dir. by Meir Zarchi (Screen Entertainment, 1978 [2002]) [on 
DVD] 
 
I Spit On Your Grave, dir. by Steven R. Monroe (Anchor Bay, 2010) [on DVD] 
 
Martyrs, dir. by Pascal Laugier (Kojo Pictures, 2008) [on DVD] 
 
The Poughkeepsie Tapes, dir. by John Dowdle (MGM, 2007) [mp4 online]  
 
Psycho, dir. by Alfred Hitchcock (Universal, 1960 [2005]) [on DVD] 
 
Salò, or 120 Days of Sodom, dir. by Pier Paolo Passolini (BFI, 1975 [2001]) [on 
DVD] 
 
Sinister, dir. by Scot Derrickson (Alliance, 2012) [on DVD] 
 
The Tortured, dir. by Robert Lieberman (Entertainment One, 2010) [on DVD] 
 
Vertigo, dir. by Alfred Hitchcock (Universal, 1958 [2005]) [on DVD] 
 
Videodrome, dir. by David Cronenberg (Universal, 1983) [on DVD] 
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